A PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY ON SCHILLER'S 'LETTERS ON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN'

Patrick Timothy Murray

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

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A PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY ON SCHILLER'S "LETTERS ON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN"

PATRICK TIMOTHY MURRAY

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF M.PHIL. IN ART HISTORY

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ABSTRACT

This work provides a detailed philosophical exposition of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, (1795). In the introduction, the author's aims and methodology are briefly stated. There then follows a survey of those books in English with chapters on the treatise. The introduction concludes with an outline of Kant's critical system, and a summary of his theories of aesthetic judgement, art and beauty.

The main body of the work consists of an exegesis of Schiller's text. Its 27 Letters are divided, for convenience, into three parts. In part one (Letters 1 - 9), we follow Schiller as he describes the afflictions of civilization and their cure. From a critique of contemporary society, he argues for a political revolution resting upon the psycho-ethical reform of the individual. Such reform involves feeling becoming harmonized with reason, through the educative power of beauty and art. In part two (Letters 10 - 17), we follow Schiller as he considers the essential nature of man and beauty. He constructs an a priori model of our fundamental human nature, and asserts the need for a corresponding model of ideal beauty, if man's dual nature is to be fully realized in a harmoniously integrated manner. In part three (Letters 18 - 27), we follow Schiller as he describes the psychological development of the individual and species from a sensuous to a rational condition, through the mediation of the aesthetic. The exposition is accompanied by assessment and criticism; attention is given to Schiller's changing methodology; and Schiller's ideas and theoretical perspectives are related, where derivative, to those of Kant and Fichte.

The conclusion commences with a recapitulation of the main arguments in each Letter. This is followed by an evaluation of the Aesthetic Letters, identifying those specific theories of contemporary relevance, and with the potential for further theoretical development.

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I, Patrick Timothy Murray, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 85,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

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I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of M.Phil. (Mode A) in the University of St. Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

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INTRODUCTION

The aim of the present work is to provide an extensive and detailed exposition of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795). Although occasional references will be made to Kant and Fichte, to other works of Schiller, and (in the notes) to other commentators, the main purpose of this work is to expound and elucidate the arguments of the Aesthetic Letters.[1] Although it contains a certain amount of criticism and assessment, this is subordinate to the primary aim of elucidation. It attempts to consider the Aesthetic Letters as a systematic whole (which Schiller himself certainly supposed them to be[2]), to make some of their obscurities less obscure, and to help the reader find his way through the complexities and difficulties of Schiller's thought. These difficulties are very real, for unlike e.g. Kant or Hegel, Schiller supplies no surrounding philosophical system which would provide reference points to guide interpretation. Added to this, is his considerable usage of metaphorical language and imagery, which when 'translated' into literal language, often reveals Kantian or Fichtean concepts which themselves require elucidation. We have also to contend with never being quite sure of the extent that, at a given point in his argument, Schiller is being dependent on Kant or not, nor of the degree to which he is adopting or adapting Kant's ideas. Although I have criticized other commentators in the survey of critical literature below, this is more for their omissions than for their misinterpretations. The difficulties and ambiguities of Schiller's thought are such, that differences of interpretation are not only to be expected, but are even desirable - in so far as they stimulate further debate amongst scholars of Schiller's ideas. In the main body of this work, I have refrained from the practice of quoting and refuting secondary sources, in favour of devoting more space to quotations from Schiller's work. The student coming to the text for the first time, will want particular paragraphs explained, for their language will seem alien to him. Staying very close to the text is also a useful discipline for the expositor, helping to focus his mind on the problems that need to be addressed, and curbing potential flights of fancy in the course of interpretation. It is difficult to disagree with the view expressed by Wilkinson and Willoughby that

> 'A good deal of . . . philosophical debate has been carried on . . . in considerable remoteness from the language of Schiller's text; so that it is rarely possible to see on what actual readings conclusions have been based.'[3]

It is my belief that a detailed exposition, Letter by Letter, and almost paragraph by paragraph, is the prerequisite for a proper understanding of Schiller's thought in this particular treatise. It is not only the general tenor of Schiller's thesis, but also the details of his argument and the peculiarities of his method, which need to be exposed to the critical debate of scholars in many fields.

1. A Survey of the Critical Literature

Although almost two hundred years have elapsed since Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man were first published in The Horen during 1795[4], there is, as yet, no book in English dedicated entirely to providing a detailed philosophical exposition of the treatise. Just as remarkable, there are only two books devoted to the study of Schiller's aesthetics in general[5] (those by S. S. Kerry[6] and R. D. Miller[7]), and these provide only one chapter or less summarizing the Aesthetic Letters. The rest of the critical literature on the Aesthetic Letters (where books in English are concerned), takes the form of one or (rarely) two chapters, in books which are devoted to wider concerns, or that consider the ideas of other thinkers.

Prima facie, Wilkinson and Willoughby provide, in their book containing a translation of the treatise, an exception to the above general characterization of the critical literature, for their editorial material is extensive. However, they do not claim to provide a strictly philosophical exposition of the details of Schiller's arguments. Thus they tell us that

> '. . . we finally decided for a close analysis of the form of the treatise, and against a summary of Schiller's argument.'
> '. . . ours makes no pretence of being a "critical" edition in the strict sense of the term. It is in all respects a translator's edition - in its commentary, and large tracts of the introduction . . .' (Preface, p. vii)

Much of their introduction examines the form[8] of the treatise, particularly Schiller's employment of such rhetorical configurations as the 'chiasmus'.[9] Much space is also given over to discussing the reception and repercussions of the treatise in the history of ideas.[10] The 'commentary' section is principally concerned with translation issues (possible alternative renderings, errors committed by other translators, the historical origins of words, ideas and symbols). Where the authors do discuss Schiller's theories, they do so with insight and accuracy, particularly in their discussion of what they term Schiller's 'doctrine of indirection'[11] (the indirect relation of the aesthetic condition of the psyche to ordinary acts of knowing and willing). They carefully relate Schiller's ideas to those of Kant and Fichte, and give due emphasis to the political dimension of the treatise. They recognize that Schiller conceives of the 'aesthetic' and 'aesthetic education' in far wider terms than art and art education. Finally, they recognize the importance of Schiller's theory of 'aesthetic semblance'; the importance Schiller places upon moral education beginning in man's physical life; and the crucial role of the understanding in semi-controlling the 'aesthetic play' of the imagination in Letter 27.[12]

S. S. Kerry[13] writes in a difficult style, and operates a duality which he constantly imposes upon the treatise in his interpretation of it. He believes we must understand the Aesthetic Letters as involving a constant transition between philosophical and poetical discourse. Kerry sees this as stemming from an unresolved psychological conflict within Schiller, between the philosopher and the poet.[14] Kerry's book, as a whole, falls into the genetic fallacy of interpreting Schiller's later works through his earlier ones.[15] His account of the Aesthetic Letters is very summarized, with an average of only 2 pages per Letter, much of which is occupied by lengthy quotations from the text in German. Some important Letters receive little treatment, most notably Letters 23 and 27. As a result, we never learn how man aesthetically develops a moral character, and the political dimension of the work is omitted.

R. D. Miller's account of the Aesthetic Letters[16] is written in a clear style, but he deals with the Letters in a highly summarized manner (in some 17 pages), with many receiving only a paragraph of consideration, and with quotations from the text being mostly in German. There are some serious omissions of important theories and

whole Letters. There is little substantive discussion of Letter 10, viz. of the historical critique of beauty's effects, and the need for a transcendental treatment of beauty. There is no discussion of Letter 11 and its distinction of the 'person' and 'condition'. The drives are misleadingly termed 'impulses' in his consideration of Letters 13 to 15; and he misinterprets 'energizing' beauty in Letters 16 and 17, as a 'disguised form of the sublime' (p. 115). Miller omits discussion of Letters 18 to 20, and thus does not recognize the influence of Fichte. Little discussion is provided of Letters 23 and 24; no discussion is found of Schiller's theory of 'aesthetic semblance' in Letter 26; and the long and complex Letter 27, is merely summarized in two sentences and a short quotation in German.[17]

Deric Regin's book on Schiller[18] summarizes the Aesthetic Letters in one chapter of only 28 pages. It suffers from some peculiar renderings of key concepts, e.g. the person and condition becomes the person and 'situation', and the drives become 'urges'. On a number of occasions, we are told Schiller's moral aim in the treatise is the cultivation of 'sublime' character, whereas Schiller argues in Letter 23 for the development of a 'noble' moral disposition. Only one page is given over to expounding the complex arguments of Letters 19 to 23, which Regin rather dismissively calls a 'grey patch' (p. 127). He erroneously states that the 'chronological order of man's development is physical, moral, aesthetic' (p. 129), thus reversing the order of the last two, and passing over the mediating role of the aesthetic. Schiller's long Letter 26 is discussed in only one paragraph. Regin does devote much space to an attempt to understand the Aesthetic State in Letter 27. However, he makes the Aesthetic State a political State, and finding little evidence for this in the text, criticizes Schiller for not providing a blueprint of its constitution (p. 140). In an attempt to link the aesthetic and political in a direct manner (alien to Schiller), we are told taste 'controls legislation as well as popular movements' (p. 143).

Vicky Rippere, in her book on Schiller[19], concentrates on the social critique in Letters 5 and 6, ignoring the other 25 Letters of the treatise. The form and content of Schiller's social critique is compared to similar writings of his times, and to material written during what Rippere calls the '1960s alienation debate'. Her basic aim is to show that the latter writers have no business to claim Schiller as an intellectual forbear. Rippere examines Schiller's characteristic

manner of handling his received materials, emphasizing his forms of expression, and frequently referring to him as 'the rhetor'. She assesses the extent to which Schiller's rhetorical configurations conform to the conventions governing the use of received ideas and imagery which operated in 18th century discourse of the social critique type. Rippere's book is thus essentially a work of historical literary criticism, rather than a philosophical exposition of the arguments and concepts in the Aesthetic Letters.

Anthony Savile devotes the last two chapters of his book[20] to expounding the Aesthetic Letters. A serious defect of his exposition is that some important Letters receive little or no attention. Thus in Letter 6, only one paragraph is mentioned out of 16; only one paragraph of Letter 19 is discussed; only two paragraphs and a footnote of Letter 20; only two paragraphs of Letter 25; only one out of 14 paragraphs in Letter 26; while Letters 12 and 21 are omitted. The exposition is unsystematic, and frequently fails to follow the line of argument of the treatise. Few quotations are provided to support interpretations, and the reader is referred to Letter and paragraph numbers in a rather haphazard manner. The political dimension of the treatise is ignored, and it is essentially treated as a work of art theory with dubious moral connotations. Savile's exposition contains a multitude of errors, the more significant of which will be mentioned in the notes to the present work.

Michael Podro's treatment of the Aesthetic Letters[21] is necessarily limited in scope by being confined to 13 pages. Consequently, many important topics in the treatise are not discussed. In particular, there is no discussion of how moral character is formed; no consideration of Schiller's theory of 'aesthetic semblance'; and no attention given to the political dimension of the treatise. However, Podro recognizes the usefulness of Schiller's Matthisson article[22] for illuminating how Schiller sees the play-drive operating in Letter 14. Podro provides a short, thought provoking account of the play-drive, speculating how it might work in practice, by his own theory of aesthetic contemplation involving the spontaneous drawing of analogies between constituent elements of the organized material offered to us by an art object, (pp. 49-57).

Philip Kain considers the Aesthetic Letters and some of Schiller's other philosophical writings in the first chapter of his book.[23] Kain's discussion of Schiller is somewhat distorted by being focused[24]

on those aspects of Schiller's theories which enable him to relate Schiller to Hegel and Marx in the rest of the book. As a result, there is an over-emphasis upon Letters 5 and 6: upon ancient Greece as providing an ideal of personal wholeness and social harmony, and upon the fragmentation or alienation of modern man. Kain makes no mention in the book of Fichte's influence on Schiller (or upon Hegel). In his discussion of the Aesthetic Letters, while reference is made to the 'material and formal impulses' (p. 16), no mention is made of the play-drive. In an attempt to relate Schiller to Marx, Kain incorrectly claims that

> 'Schiller's goal is to transform labour and make it more like play.' (P. 19)

He then criticizes Schiller for not explaining how this could be done. In discussing Letter 27, Kain goes awry in seeking to interpret the Aesthetic State as a political State 'beyond' the Moral State (p. 27), rather than as the latter's psycho-ethical support. Like Eva Schaper[25], he erroneously interprets the Aesthetic State to be some kind of synthesis of the Natural State and the Moral State.

Dewhurst and Reeves' book on Schiller[26] provides texts and commentaries concerned with Schiller's early medical and psychological writings. It ends with a brief consideration of how Schiller's later writings on aesthetics were significantly influenced by these earlier writings. The authors argue, plausibly, that the Aesthetic Letters are at least as much influenced by Schiller's early psychological studies at the Military Academy[27] as by his later reading of Kant's philosophy, (p. 356). They tell us of

> 'Schiller's . . . endevour to present an essentially psychological analysis of mind in Kantian a priori terms, and to fuse Kantian transcendental freedom with his own earlier concept of psycho-physical and psychic balance.' (P. 358)

This emphasis on the psychological dimension of Schiller's mode of argumentation, is a useful corrective to the one-sided concentration of philosophically orientated commentators on the logical and transcendental character of his philosophical enterprise.

I have only discussed here (for reasons of space), those books in

English which have chapters that deal with the Aesthetic Letters. But amongst the 20 or so articles in English which deal with aspects of Schiller's aesthetics, mention should be made of those by Grossman[28], Willoughby[29], Schaper[30], Reiss[31], and Wilkinson and Willoughby.[32] These contain material relevant to the Aesthetic Letters, and are of scholarly merit. Reference to these and other articles, as well as to the books surveyed above, will be found in the notes during the course of our examination of the Aesthetic Letters.

2. The Kantian Background

Schiller's Aesthetic Letters rest upon a considerable Kantian philosophical background, for their general conceptual framework, and their specific theories of aesthetic contemplation, art, and beauty. Rather than provide a full and systematic account of Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement[33], I propose in this section of the introduction, to outline the basic framework of Kant's critical philosophy, and to then briefly discuss Kant's theories of aesthetic judgement, art, and beauty. More detailed discussions of these and other aspects of Kant's aesthetic theory, focusing upon how they relate to Schiller's aesthetical ideas, will be found at numerous points in our detailed examination of the Aesthetic Letters.

Following Hume's[34] sceptical philosophy, the main question in philosophy became how knowledge is possible. Questions also arose concerning the fundamental nature of the human subject and, in particular, whether the subject is more than a mere bundle of sensations. Kant's philosophy can be seen as an attempt to overcome some of Hume's sceptical conclusions. Kant was also particularly concerned about the human subject being merely a part of nature, caught up in its causal nexus, seeing this as destroying freedom and thus the possibility of morality.

Kant's first Critique, the Critique of Pure Reason (1781)[35], was concerned with the question of how certain knowledge is possible. Kant argued that the forms of intuition, i.e. space and time, are imposed by us upon all we experience. The pure categories of the understanding (the faculty of concepts), namely quantity, quality, relation and modality, are applied by us to the world a priori. Thus the world, as we experience it, is construed by the subject. Kant also distinguished two dimensions of being: the noumenal or supersensible world/, and the

phenomenal or sensible domain of experience. We can only theoretically postulate the noumenal dimension of being; we cannot experience or cognize it, as we can with phenomenal existence. The human subject inhabits both the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. The important point for Kant, and the raison d'être of this distinction, is that the noumenal aspect of the self is outside the world of the natural order. Thus we can postulate that man has free will whilst living in a world of natural causal necessity. Underlying the critical philosophy of Kant, is a strong concern to provide a possible basis for man's moral freedom. In his second Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason (1788)[36], Kant made it clear that the morally good is the absolute, and the moral will is the ultimate end of man as a rational being.

The moral dimension implicitly underlies[37] Kant's third Critique, the Critique of Judgement (1790). In the first two Critiques, nature was conceived of as little more than a negative foil to moral activity, being viewed as basically antagonistic to morality. In the Critique of Practical Reason, this took the specific form of an opposition between natural inclination/and rational moral duty. In the Critique of Judgement, however, Kant attempts to 'bridge' the supersensible and sensible worlds, by bringing together morality and nature. The bridging point is judgement itself. For Kant, judgement is the psychological power by which we unify a manifold of sense-intuitions. Most judgements are what he calls 'determinant', and involve the straightforward subsumption of a particular representation of the imagination under a ready-made concept of the understanding. But in the case of 'reflective' judgements, a concept must be formed, under the guidance of an a priori principle of teleology (which pertains to the faculty of judgement).[38] What Kant has in mind is, that as we encounter a new phenomenon, we implicitly apply an a priori notion of purpose to it, which assists us to form an empirical concept of it, by reference to its perceived function. The same a priori teleological principle of reflective judgement, also enables us to unify particular laws of nature by reference to their function in relation to specific ends, and to view such specific ends in relation to a presumed general end of nature. In this process, we tend to assume nature has a purposive structure, treating it as if it were a product of artifice, with each part serving some higher principle, and species being contained in genera.[39] In the second part of the third Critique, the Critique of Teleological Judgement, Kant argues that at the apex of this

teleological hierarchical structure,is man, as a moral being. The purpose of nature is ultimately to facilitate human morality.[40] In the first part of the third Critique, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, Kant argues that the way aesthetic judgements work, provides a pleasure which, by its disinterest in the sensuous, its universality, necessity, and a priori origin, is akin to morality. Thus in the Critique of Judgement, Kant no longer sees the rational subject as in opposition to nature, but at its apex[41]; and nature is not viewed as necessarily antagonistic to morality and freedom, for the aesthetic experience of natural beauty promotes moral feeling.[42]

Kant discusses two types of reflective judgement: 'teleological' judgements, and 'aesthetic' judgements.[43] Teleological judgements involve cognizing an object by reference to an explicit concept of its purpose, viewing it as an instance of a kind. Aesthetic judgements of 'taste' (concerned with beauty), have five main characteristics: 1) they are disinterested in the sensuous existence of their object; 2) they are inter-subjectively universal, as they rest on a universal structure and functioning of the human mind (which all communication between human beings presupposes); 3) they are concerned only with the purposive form of their object (its phenomenal configuration, without any particular concept of its purpose coming to mind and featuring in such a judgement); 4) such judgements are necessary and, given the universality of the mind's structure, may be imputed to others; 5) aesthetic judgements are subjectively grounded, being connected with a certain type of subjective feeling, rather than reporting upon any characteristics of the object experienced.[44]

Now what happens in an aesthetic judgement of taste is that, implicitly guided by the a priori teleological principle, we apprehend an object as having a purposive form or structure (but without any concept of the particular purpose it serves being in our mind)[45], and such form stimulates the understanding and imagination into an unusually lively combination. This is a harmonious interrelation of two general capacities, rather than between a particular representation of the imagination and a particular concept of the understanding (as occurs in ordinary cognition). Uninhibited by such particular images and concepts, the two faculties engage in a pleasurable 'free play', which is conducive to cognition in general, for it promotes the harmonious co-operation of these faculties, which all cognition

presupposes.[46]

In his theory of art, Kant tells us it is important that fine art should have the appearance of nature[47], i.e. it should hide the fact that it is contrived or designed, and appear as an unforced and spontaneous creation (although, of course, we are aware of it as an art work, and do not mistake it for a work of nature). It must be so made, that we are principally aware of the art object's formal qualities, and are not involved in thinking about the concept it was created to express (for such a concept would hinder the 'free play' of the faculties, which is the ground of the aesthetic judgement of taste). Such considerations as the artist's 'intentions', are thus inhibitory to having a 'pure' aesthetic experience. Fine art is not the result of following any 'rules' of artistic production, but is rather the personal creation of 'genius'[48]: an innate mental aptitude, characterized by the capacity to produce works manifesting spontaneity and originality. (However, originality per se, does not guarantee artistic genius; we must look to exemplary models of great art to provide the standards of taste,though not 'rules' of artistic production, which help determine true works of genius.)

It is central to Kant's theory of the judgement of taste that the beauty of a form should not involve us in referring it to a definite concept. Now since art is designed and contrived with some idea in mind by the artist,Kant had to find a way of making the conceptual character of art become hidden or implicit. He did so by his notion of the 'aesthetic idea'.[49] The artist creates a richly significant image, suggesting a multiplicity of ideas which are not reducible by our understanding to any one definite concept. Kant also distinguishes 'free' and 'dependent' beauty.[50] In apprehending some objects, it is more natural and amenable to judge them in relation to a definite concept of what they are, and ought to be, (we judge their degree of 'perfection': the extent to which they are a perfect instance of the kind of object they are). With dependent beauty, the judgement of taste is psychologically conjoined with, and immediately follows, a judgement of perfection, with the imagination's freedom inhibited by the latter judgement's conceptual character. With free beauty, no such definite concept comes to mind to hinder the 'free play' of our faculties. In general, Kant sees art objects in terms of dependent beauty, and natural beauty as free beauty, leading him to place natural beauty above the beauty of art.[51]

PART ONE

The Afflictions of Civilization and their Cure

(Letters 1 to 9)

LETTER 1

Positive and Negative Aspects of Enlightenment Philosophy[1]

Schiller commences the treatise, by informing us that he intends to present the results of an

> '. . . inquiry concerning Art and Beauty in the form of a series of letters.' (L 1:1)

By presenting his ideas in the form of letters, Schiller sees himself as free from the limitations of philosophical form, (which latter, he believes, only satisfies the intellect, whilst leaving our sensuous being unmoved by its dry abstractions).[2] Schiller is quite clear that the main subject of his Letters will be beauty and art, viz. aesthetics.

He admits that much of what he will say is based on Kantian principles:

> '. . . it is for the most part Kantian principles on which the following theses will be based.' (L1:3)

The Kantian character of the treatise varies, functioning as a backcloth providing an implicit framework of fundamental concepts (such as the distinction of natural and moral necessity), in the earlier part of the treatise, but comes more to the fore and explicit as the work proceeds,so that by its end, Schiller's own aesthetic position is closely identified with that of Kant. In letters to Körner, his friend, written in the months after the treatise, Schiller himself remarks on his increasing reliance on Kant's philosophy as the treatise proceeds.[3] (We will have cause to return to this issue in later Letters.)

Here in Letter 1, Schiller particularly pays tribute to Kant's second Critique, the Critique of Practical Reason, and states that it embodies the natural moral instincts of all mankind, but expressed in philosophical technical terms:

> 'Concerning those ideas which prevail in the Practical part of the Kantian system . . . mankind, I believe . . . have always been agreed. Once divested of their technical form, they stand

> revealed as the immemorial pronouncements of Common Reason, and as data of that moral instinct which Nature in her wisdom appointed Man's guardian until, through the enlightenment of his understanding, he should have arrived at years of discretion.' (L1:4)

The reference here to 'that moral instinct which Nature in her wisdom appointed Man's guardian', seems to hint at an idea of a natural law basis for morality[4], which has guided man until the Enlightenment made its principles explicit to the understanding. This implies a positive view of the Enlightenment.

However, Schiller has an ambivalent attitude towards philosophy, in particular contemporary Enlightenment philosophies, which for him seem to be divorced from life and feeling. Philosophy does find and present truth, and so is of value; but it only reveals its truth to one side of man, his intellect, leaving his sentient being uneducated. Thus he writes:

> '. . . it is precisely this technical form, whereby truth is made manifest to the intellect, which veils it again from our feeling.' 'Is it any wonder that natural feeling cannot find itself again in such an image . . .' (L1:4)

Perhaps Schiller hopes that his own form of presentation in the Letters, of what some scholars have called 'poetical-philosophy',[5] will appeal to and educate both sides of man.[6] The division in man of intellect/and sense, which plays such an important part in this treatise, is here already emerging, but in the shape of a discussion about the form of philosophy.

LETTER 2

Contrast Between the Ideal/and Reality of Art. The Political Function of the Aesthetic

Schiller's ambivalent attitude towards contemporary philosophy, extends to the view that he takes of his own times in a more general way. After telling us that he would not wish to live in any other

century than his own, he informs us that

> '. . . the verdict of this epoch does not, by any means, seem to be going in favour of art . . .' 'The course of events has given the spirit of the age a direction which threatens to remove it ever further from the art of the Ideal.'[1] (L2:3)

In this passage, Schiller postulates a causal link of the following kind: a) the course of events, effects b), the spirit of the age, which c) devalues art. The course of events is thus the ultimate determinant of what happens to art. (Marx would agree with this.) There is not much here about the power of art to change events or the spirit of the age, in the way that Schiller's general theory of aesthetic education aims to.

Schiller continues, in the same paragraph,

> '. . . art must abandon actuality, and soar with becoming boldness above our wants and needs;' (L2:3)

Art, it seems, must be an escapist form, detached from our real wants and needs.[2] Only in the last Letter, Schiller criticized philosophy for its detachment from our sensuous being and from life. Now he says that art, as true or Ideal, should be detached from our sensuous needs and actuality. This demonstrates the use by Schiller of two quite contrary standards, one for art, and another for philosophy. Moreover, this view of art, as detached from man's sensuous being, does not bode well for the success of his arguments in later Letters, concerning art's ability to harmonise both sides of man, including his sensuous side.

In a difficult sentence, Schiller immediately moves on to tell us that

> '. . . Art is a daughter of Freedom, and takes her orders from the necessity inherent in minds, not from the exigencies of matter.' (L2:3)

Underlying this statement is Kant's distinction between rational necessity and natural causal necessity. Schiller is simply saying that art takes its shape from mind's free self-expression, not from

the limitations which nature attempts to impose upon us.[3]

Schiller proceeds to criticize the commercial spirit of the times (in a manner then commonplace, and found in the writings of e.g., Rousseau, Ferguson, and Burke).[4] He refers to the market-place ethic of utility, which devalues everything which has no direct value in relation to satisfying material needs:

> 'But at the present time material needs reign supreme and bend a degraded humanity beneath their tyrannical yoke. Utility is the great idol of our age, to which all powers are in thrall and to which all talent must pay homage.' '. . . Art . . . shuns the noisy market-place of our century.' (L2:3)

Despite the violence of the French Revolution and the Terror which followed, Schiller remains optimistic that the form of political life is now to be decided by rational debate and not by mere force. Thus he writes

> '. . . the political scene . . . is being debated.' '. . . its method of procedure [is] of quite special interest . . .' 'For a question which has hitherto always been decided by the blind right of might, is now, so it seems, being brought before the tribunal of Pure Reason . . .' (L2:4)

Here Schiller demonstrates a typical Enlightenment optimism and faith in Reason.

Schiller admits that his concern with beauty may look irrelevant to prevailing political concerns, but he asserts that politics and art are intimately connected.

> 'I . . . put Beauty before Freedom.' '. . . if man is ever to solve the problem of politics in practice he will have to approach it through the problem of the aesthetic, because it is only through Beauty that man makes his way to Freedom.' (L2:5)

Politics then, he asserts, must be mediated by aesthetic experience, for the experience of beauty is a prerequisite of man achieving freedom. A problem arises here in Schiller's account, for beauty appears to be made useful to freedom. Schiller too, it seems, judges

the value of art in terms of utility, albeit political utility, and not simply usefulness for satisfying material needs. (Like many philosophers, Schiller seems unwilling to allow aesthetic value to stand on its own, and feels the need to support it with also having cognitive, moral, political, and psychotherapeutical values.)

LETTER 3

The Transformation of the Natural State into the Rational (Moral) State

Schiller puts forward the view that individually, and socially (in terms of the form of the State), man has a moral duty to transform that which nature provides him with (through its alien necessity), into a higher form of life and social organisation, based upon reason and morality.

> '. . . Man . . . does not stop short at what Nature herself made of him, but has the power of . . . transforming the work of blind compulsion into a work of free choice, and of elevating physical necessity into moral necessity.' (L3:1)

This transformation involves the sublation of that which is natural, for Schiller generally emphasises the need to incorporate man's natural being into 'higher' (viz. more rational), psychological, moral, and political forms. Our natural being too has its rights, which any realistic programme for individual or social reform must give adequate recognition to, if it is to be securely based.

Now the State as we know it, has not, in Schiller's view, evolved through our free choice. It fulfils our natural needs and is fashioned in accordance with the laws of nature, not those of reason, the supersensible and morality. (Schiller is here following Kant's distinction between nature/and reason; the sensible/and supersensible domains.) Thus we are told,

> '. . . [Man] finds himself – in the State. The force of his needs threw him into this situation before he was as yet capable of exercising his freedom to choose it; compulsion organized it

> according to purely natural laws before he could do so according to the laws of Reason. But with this State of compulsion[1] . . . he neither could nor can rest content as a Moral Being.' (L3:2)

Schiller tells us that some theorists have rationalized the origins of the State, by constructing models of a past 'state of nature', which men left as they chose to live in the State.

> '. . . in his maturity, [Man seeks to] retrieve by means of a fiction the childhood of the race : he conceives, as idea, a state of nature, . . . attributes to himself in this idealized natural state a purpose of which in his actual natural state he was entirely ignorant, and a power of free choice of which he was at that time wholly incapable; and . . . proceeds . . . as if he were starting from scratch, . . . from sheer insight and free resolve, exchanging a state of complete independence for a state of social contracts.'[2] (L3:2)

Schiller sees accounts of a 'state of nature' as different from his concept of the Natural State. The Natural State is the current form of the State, the modern State, founded on force and natural compulsion.[3] Men did not enter the Natural State on a voluntary basis, but were forced into it, in order to satisfy their natural basic needs, and by external circumstances.[4] The modern State remains grounded in nature's blind external necessity, not in free human reason; in natural needs, not in the moral law. Schiller views theories that postulate a 'state of nature' as retrospective rationalizations for our current political predicament. They are fictions, rational constructs, endowing man in his natural condition with awareness and choice he could only have later in a developed social and political context. Schiller's main point, however, is that no matter what the basis of our current Natural State is, we have the moral right and duty to reform it rationally and morally, and need not feel constrained from doing so, by hypothetical 'social contracts', and the like. Schiller criticizes such theories for giving the 'appearance of venerability' to the irrational:

> 'However skilfully, and however firmly, blind caprice may have laid the foundations of her work, however arrogantly she may

> maintain it, and with whatever appearance of venerability she may surround it - Man is fully entitled in the course of these operations to treat it all as though it had never happened. For the work of blind forces possesses no authority . . .' 'This is . . . the justification of any attempt on the part of a people grown to maturity to transform its Natural State into a Moral one.' (L3:2)

Man is, then, entitled to ignore such rationalizations. The work of blind forces, of natural necessity, need not deter us from the moral imperative of transforming the Natural State into a Moral or Rational State.[5]

However, while the Natural State is in opposition to man qua moral, it does satisfy his natural or physical being:

> 'This Natural State . . . is . . . at variance with man as moral being . . .' 'But it will just suffice for man as physical being;' (L3:3)

A practical problem thus arises in the transition from the Natural to the Moral State, for in seeking to do away with the former, we risk man's physical life for a moral utopian ideal; that which definitely exists in him and the State, for what may hypothetically come to exist in him and the State, viz. the development of his moral being in a Moral State.

> 'But physical man does in fact exist, whereas the existence of moral man is as yet problematic. If then, Reason does away with the Natural State . . . she jeopardizes the physical man who actually exists for the sake of a moral man who is as yet problematic, risks the very existence of society for a merely hypothetical (even though morally necessary) ideal of society.' '. . . [Reason] would, for the sake of a humanity which he still lacks - and can without prejudice to his mere existence go on lacking - have deprived him of the means of that animal existence which is the very condition of his being human at all.' (3:3)

It is notable here that Schiller breaks from Kant's negative view of

man's natural being. Instead of it being merely an impediment to the moral will, it is the essential substructure of his being human at all. Schiller's modification of the demand to abolish the Natural State and establish a Moral State, also represents a break from Kant's view of the absolute character of moral obligation. Practical, pragmatic considerations can temper the necessity of obedience to a moral imperative.

In order to overcome the (rather contrived) practical difficulty in transformation from one form of State to another, Schiller proposes a 'support' which will guarantee the continuance of society, ensure its natural being is given its due, while yet educating it to independence of the Natural State, which is to be abolished.

> '. . . physical society[6] in time must never for a moment cease to exist while moral society as idea is in the process of being formed;'[7] 'For this reason a support must be looked for which will ensure the continuance of society, and make it independent of the Natural State which is to be abolished.' (L3:4)

Schiller's talk here of abolishing the Natural State seems a little naive. It is impossible to 'abolish' the State, for as a subjective ideational object, it cannot be 'got at' to abolish. (Thus the anarchist is forced to settle for lampost bending.)

The 'support' for the interim period, between the abolition of the Natural State and the creation of the Moral State, cannot in Schiller's view, rest upon man's natural character per se (which is evil and negative on its own); nor can it rest on his moral character which is implicit, dormant, and yet to be developed. The 'support' must be a 'third character' of man, capable of educating the natural and moral aspects of man to full development, but also out of opposition into a harmonious relationship, reducing their extreme characters, and developing each to take on something of the other : morality to become more natural; our natural being to become more rational and moral. Thus Schiller tells us:

> 'This support is not to be found in the natural character of man which, selfish and violent as it is, aims at the destruction of society rather than at its preservation. Neither is it to be found in his moral character which has, ex hypothesi, first to

> be fashioned. . .' 'It would, therefore, be a question of . . . removing the former somewhat further from matter, and bringing the latter somewhat closer to it : and all this with the aim of bringing into being a third character . . .' (L3:5)

There is a sense in which the remainder of the treatise can be seen in terms of an exploration of what is involved in establishing this 'third character' of man.

LETTER 4

The Need for Wholeness of Character and an Organic Society

Schiller begins Letter 4 by discussing the subjective moral prerequisites for establishing an objective Moral State. He tells us that

> 'The setting up of a Moral State involves being able to count on the moral law as an effective force . . .' (L4:1)

The Moral State can only be set up and sustained if moral behaviour becomes our new 'second nature', as it were, by which we naturally are moral, so that our impulses and inclinations actually lead us to do our moral duty.

> '. . . to be able to count on man's moral behaviour . . . it will itself have to be nature, and he will have to be led by his very impulses to the kind of conduct which is bound to proceed from a moral character.' '. . . this can only be brought about through both these motive forces, inclination and duty, producing completely identical results in the world of phenomena; . . . through impulse being sufficiently in harmony with reason to qualify as universal legislator.'[1] (L4:1)

Here, Kant's view of an eternal opposition between rational moral duty/and natural inclination, is rejected by Schiller as an absolute opposition. He sees the possibility, indeed the political, moral and psychological necessity, of overcoming this moral dualism : if man is

to be politically free (living in the Moral State), realistically moral (following a morality in accord with his nature), and psychologically whole (integrating his rational and sensuous natures).

In a difficult passage, Schiller tells us that:

> 'Every individual human being . . . carries within him potentially . . . an ideal man, the archetype of a human being . . .' 'This archetype . . . is represented by the State . . .' (L4:2)

Schiller seems to be using the term 'ideal' here in its Platonic sense, as an ideal archetype. However, that all men have within them immanently this archetype, as a potential to be developed and realized, seems a more Aristotelian view of the ideal. (Generally, Schiller oscillates between these two views of the ideal in his discourse, with a greater tendency to the Platonic conception.)[2]

In an even more difficult passage in the same paragraph, Schiller writes:

> '[There are] two different ways in which man existing in time can coincide with man as Idea, and,in consequence, just as many ways in which the State can assert itself in individuals : either by the ideal man suppressing empirical man, and the State annulling individuals; or else by the individual himself becoming the State, and man in time being ennobled to the stature of man as Idea.' (L4:2)

There is a notable absence of explicit teleological language here. Thus we have talk of for example, man being 'ennobled to the stature of man as Idea', rather than talk of man realizing his potential to actuality. Platonic rather than Aristotelian Ideas seem to be Schiller's model. Moreover, the distinction that Schiller draws between 'man existing in time' and 'man as Idea', indicates the atemporal transcendent status of the latter. But in that case, is it an ideal immanent within men as stated earlier? The possibility of the coincidence of the two conceptions ('man existing in time can coincide with man as Idea'), implies not a transcendent, but an immanent ideal, which is atemporal in the sense of being perennial, true in all times, rather than outside time, or confined to one time

like each man. Underneath all this talk however, one suspects the Ideal in question is nothing but Kant's moral will, which has a transcendent supersensible origin, but is meant to be realized in the sensible, and whose law all men carry within them by means of their faculty of practical reason. It has the same transcendent and immanent status in man as Schiller's talk of the Ideal man here.

Returning to the passage in question, it helps to understand it if it is re-arranged, for Schiller deliberately alternates the discussion of two different topics in a rather confusing way. It makes easier reading re-constructed thus:

> There are two different ways in which man existing in time can coincide with man as Idea : either by the ideal man suppressing empirical man; or else by man in time being ennobled to the stature of man as Idea.

This means that the ideal of the moral will may suppress empirical man in all his sensuousness; or sensuous man may have his natural being ennobled to conform to the demands of the moral law.[3] The other discussion mixed into the passage, concerning the State can be re-constructed thus:

> There are two different ways in which the State can assert itself in individuals : either by the State annulling individuals; or else by the individual himself becoming the State.

The State can assert itself in individuals by either suppressing their individuality; or by individuals becoming more universal, realizing and representing themselves as whole beings in the Moral State.

Why does Schiller juxtapose these two discussions, one about the relation of the moral law to the individual; the other about the relation of the State to the individual? The answer would seem to be that both discussions are concerned with the relationship between universality and individuality. He is in the process of constructing an argument which will advocate that universality as moral (the moral law), or as positive (the State), should not suppress the individual, but rather the individual should be raised to universality (through,

as we shall see in later Letters, aesthetic education).

Schiller is concerned that man's natural being should be given its rightful recognition as part of his whole being. Morality is deficient and one-sided if it involves sacrificing our natural being. Politics and the State are defective if social harmony is only achieved by suppression of individual variety, by social control enforcing social conformity. Thus he tells us

> '. . . it will always argue a still defective education if the moral character is able to assert itself only by sacrificing the natural.[4] And a political constitution will still be very imperfect if it is able to achieve unity only by suppressing variety.' (L4:3)

The continuous placing together in this letter of these two lines of argument implies a connection in Schiller's view, between personal moral repression, and a society characterized by social and political repression. (Schiller may have anticipated Wilhelm Reich in this connection.)[5] Further evidence for this linkage is provided a couple of paragraphs later, where he writes

> '[The State] will have to observe toward those citizens the same relationship as each has to himself . . .' (L4:5)

The Moral State, in Schiller's view, rests upon its citizens having a whole view of society itself. They must be socially conscious, have a broader view than their own narrow individuality. The Moral State represents man as ideal (as universal or moral) and objective, not as merely natural and narrowly subjective. The whole man, in harmony with himself, can find in the Moral State (resting on a society of whole and objectively orientated individuals), the explicit positive expression of the moral law, which agrees with his own natural law based sense of right. In this way, ethical objectivity coincides with moral subjectivity. As Schiller puts it,

> '. . . the State . . . can only become a reality inasmuch as its parts have been tuned up to the idea of the whole.' '. . . the State serves to represent that ideal and objective humanity which exists in the heart of each of its citizens . . .' 'Once man is

> inwardly at one with himself . . . the State will be merely the interpreter of his own finest instinct, a clearer formulation of his own sense of what is right.' (L4:5)

(Schiller may also have in mind here, Kant's idea of the 'public sense', acting as an a priori universal check, on merely particular judgements.)[6] It is interesting that Schiller seems to imply an identification of natural law, moral law and positive law in the Moral State : hence the coincidence of man's 'finest [moral] instinct' with the 'clearer formulation' to be found in positive law. In the Moral State, there is to be both a coincidence of individual and universal judgements (via the public sense), and between natural law based moral instincts, and positive laws which embody the moral law. (In some of his other philosophical works too, for example On Naive and Sentimental Poetry[7], Schiller sees the moral law as the self-conscious realization of the implicit principles of natural law.[8] Here in the Aesthetic Letters, he goes further, and sees the possibility of identifying moral law with positive law in a hypothetical Moral State.)[9]

Schiller warns that should a people be wrapped-up in their own subjectivity, opposing objective norms and values, the Moral State will have the right to repress this individualism. Individualism per se is negative and destructive to the State, to man's objective (social) life, and to the realization of his own ideal (moral) harmony.

> 'If, on the other hand, in the character of a whole people, subjective man sets his face against objective man with such vehemence of contradiction that the victory of the latter can only be ensured by the suppression of the former, then the State too will have to adopt towards its citizens the solemn rigour of the law[10], and ruthlessly trample underfoot such powerfully seditious individualism in order not to fall a victim to it.' (L4:5)

Individual variety, as furnished by nature, has its place, but within the constraints of an objective social framework, not as a one-sided and selfish individualism.

Schiller proceeds to make what is an important distinction in terms of the general theory of the treatise:

> '. . . man can be at odds with himself in two ways : either as savage, when feeling predominates over principle; or as barbarian, when principle destroys feeling.'[11] (L4:6)

Here, following Kant, Schiller distinguishes two sides of man : reason/and feeling. But it is Schiller's own view that man can be internally dirempted by reason dominating feeling (in the 'barbarian'), or feeling dominating reason (in the 'savage'). Each is an equal denial of a vital part of our complete humanity, the ideal wholeness of man.

Schiller also accepts Kant's view of the universal validity of the moral law, and sees it functioning as a unifying force in a would-be moral society. However, this unifying force must allow for individual natural differences of character and temperament (so long as the moral law is not thereby negated). The opposition of moral unity/and natural diversity, is a tension which in Schiller's view, only beauty as both sensuous and formal can overcome. (For, as he will argue in later Letters, beautiful forms may educate both sides of man into a harmonious unity.)[12]

> '. . . whenever Reason starts to introduce the unity of the moral law into any actually existing society, she must beware of damaging the variety of Nature. And whenever Nature endeavours to maintain her variety within the moral framework of society, moral unity must not suffer any infringement thereby. Removed alike from uniformity and from confusion, there abides the triumph of form.'[13] (L4:7)

In Schiller's view, the prerequisite for the achievement of political freedom is wholeness of personality. The move from the Natural to the Moral State is only possible as a political exercise, on the basis of a real psychological change in the individuals who comprise the State.

> 'Wholeness of character must . . . be present in any people capable . . . of exchanging a State of compulsion for a State of freedom.' (L4:7)

This emphasis on the character of the individual by Schiller, implies the view that ultimately the political form of the State rests upon

the foundation of the mass psychology of its citizens.[14]

LETTER 5

Social Critique of the Evils of Contemporary 'Civilization'

Schiller commences Letter 5 on an optimistic note, saying that we have seen men in the course of the French and American Revolutions attempt to recover their rights (by force). The Natural State is being challenged by the demands of reason:

> '. . . over there, and over here, [man] is rising up to seize by force what, in his opinion, has been wrongfully denied him. The fabric of the Natural State is tottering, its rotting foundations giving way, and there seems to be a physical possibility of setting law upon the throne . . .' (L5:2)

However, realistically, the subjective conditions for such a revolution are not present. The opportunities afforded by objective conditions and circumstances are negated by what is possible in terms of man's subjectivity : in particular, by the limited moral development of his character. A being yet to be fashioned as moral, cannot replace the Natural State with the Moral State. Thus he tells us,

> 'Vain hope! The moral possibility is lacking, and a moment so prodigal of opportunity finds a generation unprepared to receive it.' (L5:2)

(Schiller's answer to the problem is moral education and development of a rounded kind of both sides of man, as the prerequisite for political revolution. In short, we must change the individual first.)

The moral undevelopment and unpreparedness of contemporary man means that the achievement of political freedom is impossible as yet. The upper classes are sunk in depraved passive lethargy; the lower classes are not lethargic, but rather highly active in pursuing animal satisfactions, and are steeped in savagery.

> 'Man portrays . . . On the one hand, a return to the savage

state; on the other, to complete lethargy . . .' (L5:3)

'Among the lower and more numerous classes we are confronted with crude, lawless instincts, unleashed with the loosening of the bonds of civil order[1], and hastening with ungovernable fury to their animal satisfactions.' (L5:4)

Such a social situation, in Schiller's view, even provides a justification for the Natural State, to act as an external force in relation to its citizens, so as to counter the dissolving tendency of society. The Natural State has a record of repression, but it has had to sacrifice human rights for the basic end of simply maintaining the existence of society, as the 'bonds of civil order' disintegrate:

'Can the State be blamed for having disregarded the dignity of human beings as long as it was still a question of ensuring their very existence?' '[Society's] very dissolution provides the justification of [the Natural State's] existence. For society, released from its controls, is falling back into . . . elements . . .'[2] (L5:4)

The main body of Schiller's social critique is concentrated into one long paragraph at the end of Letter 5. The critique takes the form of a large number of brief points made in rapid succession, but whose meaning is fairly self-evident and requires little explanation here. It is convenient to divide it into a few separate passages, after each of which, I will merely briefly summarize the general meaning of his main points.

'The cultivated classes . . . offer the even more repugnant spectacle of lethargy, and of a depravation of character which offends the more because culture itself is its source.' '. . . Enlightenment of the mind . . . has had on the whole so little of an ennobling influence on feeling and character that it has tended rather to bolster up depravity by providing it with the support of precepts.' (L5:5)

The so-called cultured classes have been made depraved and lethargic by their culture and civilization (in its removal from true nature). Only their excuses for depravity benefit from Enlightenment, as they

find 'rational' theoretical justifications for irrationality.

> 'We disown Nature in her rightful sphere only to submit to her tyranny in the moral, and while resisting the impact she makes upon our senses are content to take over her principles. The sham propriety of our manners refuses her the first say . . . only to concede to her in our materialistic ethics the final and decisive one.' (L5:5)

Nature is ignored qua natural law and beauty, but accepted for her contingency and irrationality, as we allow our natural being alone to govern our volition. Politeness hides obvious personal uncouthness, whilst we allow our lives to be governed by the pursuit of purely material ends.

> 'In the very bosom of the most exquisitely developed social life egotism has founded its system . . . we suffer all the contagions and afflictions of society. We subject our free judgements to its despotic opinion . . .' '. . . ridicule . . . is equally unsparing in its desecration of the noblest feeling. Civilization, far from setting us free, in fact creates some new need with every new power it develops in us. The fetters of the physical tighten ever more alarmingly . . .fear of losing what we have stifles even the most burning impulse towards improvement, and the maxim of passive obedience passes for the supreme wisdom of life.' (L5:5)

The whole social system is grounded in individual egotism. The impact of society on the individual is only negative, as social control through public opinion and the ridicule of everything of true value. New artificial 'needs' are generated as fast as old ones are satisfied.[3] The development of the individual and society is frozen for fear of losing our material possessions and by the ethic of passive obedience.

Schiller began the Letter on an optimistic note; he finishes it with a deeply pessimistic summary:

> 'Thus do we see the spirit of the age wavering between perversity and brutality, between unnaturalness and mere

> nature, between superstition and moral unbelief; and it is only through an equilibrium of evils that it is still sometimes kept within bounds.' (L5:5)

Perversity, brutality, unnaturalness, superstition and moral unbelief, all vie with one another, and only by a mutual check of evil on evil is the whole social degeneration and disintegration slowed down and limited in scope, on occasions.

It is clear that Schiller believed modern society was breaking-up and dissolving; becoming more atomistic and increasingly disorganized. Schiller's pessimism concerning civilization was probably drawn from disillusion with the outcome of the French Revolution, and from reading Rousseau's critiques of modern civilization.[4] Certainly Schiller seems to have had in mind Rousseau's view of over-culturalization : a culture which in its artificial refinement has lost touch with true nature, and thus fails to develop our natural moral instincts; or develops them in a way which makes them hostile to the promptings of natural law.[5] The Enlightenment was viewed by Schiller as having trained the intellect, but left untouched and untamed our natural being : it was a purely intellectual Enlightenment. What is needed, in Schiller's view, is a whole or total Enlightenment of both sides of man (through aesthetic experience.)

LETTER 6

Psycho-Social Diremption : the Negative Effects of Specialization

In Letter 6, Schiller continues his critique of contemporary civilization, but now focuses on one particular negative feature of it, the specialization of human faculties and functions, exploring both its causes and effects. He begins by telling us that the process of civilization takes us away from nature, a removal intensified by the one-sided development of certain of our cognitive powers. However, it is to these same cognitive powers that we must now look in order to find our way back to nature, through a higher level unity[1] which will incorporate the intellectual gains made since the time of ancient Greece.

> '. . . any people caught up in the process of civilization . . . must fall away from Nature by the abuse of Reason before they can return to her by the use of Reason.' (L6:1)

Schiller proceeds to draw a number of comparisons between ancient Greek and modern civilization, in which the latter is made to appear in an unfavourable light.[2] Whereas for the Greeks, art and philosophy each had their own place in an integrated lifestyle, we allow one small sphere of either sensuous or rational activity to entrap us into its narrow frame:

> '[The Greeks] were wedded to all the [sensuous] delights of art and all the [rational] dignity of [philosophical] wisdom, without however, like us, falling a prey to their seduction.' (L6:2)

In the Greeks, sense/and intellect worked together in harmony. Even the most abstract philosophical reasoning and speculation still considered the material dimension. Any distinctions which were made, were clearly within a general context, a whole view, which avoided disintegrating this overall unity by analysis:

> '. . . sense and intellect did not as yet rule over strictly separate domains;' 'However high the mind might soar, it always drew matter lovingly along with it[3]; and however fine and sharp the distinctions it might make, it never proceeded to mutilate.' (L6:3)

The gods of an age or people, in Schiller's view, are the projection of a peoples' own self-image qua species.[4] (In this, Schiller anticipates Feuerbach and Marx.)[5] Thus the Greek gods were integrally human, whilst our heavenly figures are each a fragment of humanity:

> '. . . in no single one of their deities was humanity in its entirety ever lacking. How different with us Moderns! With us too the image of the human species is projected in magnified form into separate individuals - but as fragments . . .' (L6:3)

Turning to focus specifically on modern psychological diremption and social fragmentation, Schiller tells us that

> 'With us . . . the various faculties appear as separate in practice as they are distinguished by the psychologist in theory, and we see not merely individuals, but whole classes of men, developing but one part of their potentialities . . .' (L6:3)

Schiller identifies two primary causes of the diremption of human nature in modern man. a) The development of analytical thought in the sciences leading to specialization of the mind. b) The State, which has developed into a complex machine, disorganizing[6] society into classes and occupational groups. Thus Schiller says,

> 'Once the increase of empirical knowledge, and more exact modes of thought, made sharper divisions between the sciences inevitable, and once the increasingly complex machinery of State necessitated a more rigorous separation of ranks and occupations, then the inner unity of human nature was severed too, and a disastrous conflict set its harmonious powers at variance.' (L6:6)

Schiller here identifies an internal and external cause of diremption. Chronologically, he sees the internal cause (the analytical development and opposition of different faculties), as prior to the external cause (the development of the modern State machine.) Thus he tells us:

> 'This disorganization, which was first started within man by civilization and learning, was made complete and universal by the new spirit of government.' (L6:7)

In this Letter, Schiller is particularly fond of employing the contrasting metaphors of mechanism/and organism, when comparing modern with Greek society. Thus for example, he tells us that modern society is

> '. . . an ingenious clock-work, in which, out of the piecing together of innumerable but lifeless parts, a mechanical kind of collective life ensued.' (L6:7)

Society is no longer an organism,[7] it is merely a mechanically (or externally) related system of separate parts.

Turning now to look at the effects on the individual of the modern development of the division of labour, Schiller tells us that

> '. . . man himself develops into nothing but a fragment . . . he never develops the harmony of his being . . . he becomes nothing more than the imprint of his occupation or of his specialized knowledge.' (L6:7)
>
> 'When the community . . . insists on special skills being developed with a degree of intensity which is only commensurate with its readiness to absolve the individual citizen from developing himself in extensity - can we wonder that the remaining aptitudes of the psyche are neglected . . . to give undivided attention to the one which will bring honour and profit?' (L6:8)

Man today then, is a mere fragment of full human being. He never develops both sides of his being to harmonious unity. He represents not humanity, but some particular occupation or field of expert knowledge. Modern society insists that the individual develops specialist skills. At the same time, he is not encouraged to broaden himself through the development of his other potentialities. Society rewards with status and salary the development of one aptitude alone.[8]

Having looked at the effects of specialization on the individual, Schiller turns to the State. As we have seen, he identifies the modern State as a cause of the problem. Schiller now makes it clear that it is reciprocally effected by the process of social atomization:

> '[The State is] forced to resort to classification in order to cope with the variety of its citizens, and never to get an impression of humanity except through representation at second hand, the governing section ends up by losing sight of them altogether, confusing their concrete reality with a mere construct of the intellect . . .' 'Weary at last of sustaining bonds which the State does so little to facilitate . . . society begins . . . to disintegrate into a state of primitive morality[9], in which public authority has become but one party more, to be hated and circumvented by those who make authority

necessary . . .' (L6:9)

The modern State does not relate to its citizens as human beings, but through the mediation of various rational constructs. The State becomes an external machine in relation to its citizens, incapable of bonding them together organically. Society begins to disintegrate into a narrow individualistic 'morality'; the State becomes viewed as just another public body to be hated, and the duties it imposes upon us evaded.

In the remainder of this Letter, Schiller is going to slowly swing-around into taking a more positive view of the development he has so far described in wholly negative terms. He will not repudiate what he has already stated, but will argue that at least where the development of our mental powers and general stock of knowledge is concerned, modern man has had to follow the course of development he has done, as an unfortunate necessity. As Schiller commences this change of perspective, he 'eases' us into it, by maintaining a negative view of the process of mental specialization, whilst introducing the idea of its necessity.

> 'In its striving after inalienable possessions in the realm of ideas, the spirit of speculation could do no other than become a stranger to the world of sense, and lose sight of matter for the sake of form.' 'But the damaging effects of the turn which mind thus took were not confined to knowledge and production; it affected feeling and action no less. We know that the sensibility of the psyche depends . . . upon the . . . imagination. The preponderance of the analytical faculty must, however, of necessity, deprive the imagination of its energy and warmth . . .' (L6:10)

Not only have knowledge and production become abstract, but the development of our analytical powers has led to loss of feeling and imagination.[10] (We have here, Schiller's first reference in the treatise to the 'imagination', a faculty which will be central to the thesis of the Aesthetic Letters as a whole. Note how already, he is subtly identifying a cognitive faculty with our sensuous being, by linking the imagination with the 'sensibility' of the psyche.)

Schiller now proceeds to his more positive view of man's

development. He admits that post-Greek psycho-social fragmentation was both inevitable, and for the species as a whole, desirable, for it enabled our knowledge across a wide front to advance.[11] If man's potentialities were ever to be developed, only the narrow specialization and mutual opposition of the faculties could facilitate this development.[12]

> 'I readily concede that, little as individuals might benefit from this fragmentation of their being, there was no other way in which the species as a whole could have progressed.' (L6:11)
>
> 'If the manifold potentialities in man were ever to be developed, there was no other way but to pit them one against the other. This antagonism of faculties and functions is the great instrument of civilization . . .' (L6:12)

Thus what in the individual is a tragic suppression and denial of full humanity, is nevertheless a gain for mankind as a whole. The specialization of some individuals' cognition or volition is the only means whereby an 'unnatural' development of powers could take place:

> 'One-sidedness in the exercise of his powers must, it is true, inevitably lead the individual into error; but the species as a whole to truth. Only by . . . contracting our whole being into a single power, do we, as it were, lend wings to this individual power and lead it, by artificial means, far beyond the limits which Nature seems to have assigned to it.' (L6:13)

But whilst mankind benefits from this specialization, the individuals involved should be seen as suffering martyrs of the Truth. Only if all of the mind's powers are developed equally, can individuals be happy and complete:

> '. . . truth will be bound to have its martyrs.' (L6:13)
>
> 'Thus, however much the world as a whole may benefit through this fragmentary specialization of human powers, it cannot be denied that the individuals affected by it suffer under the curse of this cosmic purpose.' '. . . the keying up of individual functions of the mind can indeed produce

> extraordinary human beings : but only the equal tempering of them all, happy and complete human beings.' (L6:14)

Despite mankind's general benefit from mental specialization, is it not wrong Schiller asks, that some individuals must pay for this with the loss of their very humanity in its fullness?

> 'But can Man really be destined to miss himself for the sake of any purpose whatsoever? Should Nature, for the sake of her own purposes, be able to rob us of a completeness which Reason . . . enjoins upon us?' (L6:15)

Schiller immediately answers his own question:

> 'It must, therefore, be wrong if the cultivation of individual powers involves the sacrifice of wholeness.' '. . . it must be open to us to restore by means of a higher Art the totality of our nature . . .' (L6:15)

In the end then, we must say it is wrong for individuals not to be fully human, even for a grand purpose, like man's cognitive development. Only through art he asserts, will we find the new key to fullness of humanity.

Letter 6 is long, but presents no problems of interpretation. The meaning of what Schiller largely asserts, is relatively clear. Schiller's high view of ancient Greek society was almost certainly derived from reading Winckelmann.[13] But the contrast of Greek wholeness and modern fragmentation was common in intellectual circles in Germany from the 1760s onwards. The ideal of the 'whole man' is found in Herder and Hölderlin as well as Schiller. It is an ideal which will continue to pervade this treatise.

LETTER 7

Political Reform Presupposes the Psycho-Ethical Reform of the Individual

Letter 7 does not advance the general argument of the treatise. Its function is to briefly draw relevant conclusions from the content of

the preceding six Letters. Schiller begins by telling us that the individual and social fragmentation he has described cannot be overcome by means of the State, viz. it has no political solution. This is because, as he reminds us, the current form of the State, the Natural State, is one of the major causes of such fragmentation; whilst the Moral State, is to be constructed by moral man and presupposes moral man. The Moral State is, then, an end for Schiller, an embodiment of freedom achieved, not a means for securing it. As Schiller puts it,

> '. . . the State as at present constituted has been the cause of the evil, while the State as Reason conceives it, far from being able to lay the foundations of this better humanity, would itself have to be founded upon it.' (L7:1)

The moral reform of the State presupposes men who have become more rational and moral. However, Schiller sees the mass of modern men as 'savages', sunk in nature, and pursuing the satisfaction of merely natural and material needs. Thus Schiller considers that current attempts at political reform are fruitless endeavours:

> 'The present age, far from exhibiting that form of humanity which we have recognized as the necessary condition of any moral reform of the State, shows us rather the exact opposite.'
> '. . . we must continue to regard every attempt at political reform as untimely, and every hope based upon it as chimerical . . .' (L7:1)

Political reform presupposes men who are whole, viz. who are psychologically integrated as between their sensuous/and rational natures, and thus men who are capable of naturally being moral. In short, political reform presupposes the psycho-ethical reform of the individual.[1]

> '. . . political reform [is] untimely . . . as long as the split within man is not healed, and his nature so restored to wholeness that it can itself become the artificer of the State . . .' (L7:1)

Schiller tells us that in so far as man is moral today, he is so only as a dirempted being involved in inner self-conflict with his impulses, (in the manner of the 'dependent will' in the Kantian moral philosophy).[2]

> '. . . the strife of elements in moral man, the conflict of blind impulse, has first to be appeased, and crude antagonisms first have ceased within him, before we can take the risk of promoting diversity.' (L7:2)

The need for man to achieve wholeness, the psycho-physiological[3] integration of his rational and sensuous natures, itself implies the need for a different kind of moral education, one in which reason and sense are developed into a harmonious relationship of co-operation, instead of an eternal warfare based on mutual opposition.

Returning to the political theme, Schiller (probably thinking of the French Revolution and its aftermath), warns against premature attempts to achieve political freedom before man is ready for it in psychological and moral terms:

> 'As long as natural man still makes a lawless misuse of his licence, one can scarcely run the risk of letting him glimpse his liberty;' 'The gift of liberal principles becomes a betrayal of society as a whole when it allies itself with forces still in ferment, and reinforces an already too powerful Nature.' (L7:2)

Schiller's pessimistic view of the mass of men, led him to think that until they have been fully (and broadly) educated to morality, they are not fit for political freedom. The premature granting of political freedom merely feeds naturalistic man's tendency to primitiveness and licence.

Political freedom then, in Schiller's view, presupposes a different kind of man, one emancipated from natural forces. Until man himself is changed, political reform will at best be only partially successful; but mostly not so, with there remaining a 'gap' between ideal theory/and real practice. As Schiller puts it,

> 'The character of the age must therefore first lift itself out

> of its deep degradation . . . emancipate itself from the blind forces of Nature . . .' '. . . isolated attempts [at political reform] may succeed. But no improvement in the body politic as a whole will thereby ensue, and discrepancies in practice will continue to belie unanimity of precepts.' (L7:3)

We need to be educated not only to deserve, but also to desire freedom, for paradoxically we have a fear of freedom, which leads us to flee from it into various types of servitude, including the slavery to our sensuous nature involved in licence.

> 'Fearful of freedom . . . we shall either cast ourselves into the arms of an easy servitude or . . . escape into the wild libertinism of the natural state.' (L7:3)

Schiller does not specify what types of 'servitude' he has in mind here, but we may assume it takes as many different forms as men can find or manufacture for themselves, (e.g. political, religious, ideological and mythological forms).[4]

The real point of Letter 7, is that it enables Schiller to dispose of any further consideration of the problems afflicting civilization and their cure, in political terms. The Letter is actually a 'justification' for Schiller moving from the political into the aesthetic domain. From now on, the political plays a minor role in the treatise, to be replaced by the psychological, the moral, and the aesthetic. Although the political returns again at the end of the treatise (in Letter 27), overall the political dimension of the Aesthetic Letters is not very great.[5] Nevertheless, it is significant; but its significance is far more in terms of the diagnosis of what is wrong and its causes, than in terms of Schiller's prescription for putting things to right. Politics and the State, as this Letter has emphasized, are involved in the cause of, rather than the solution to, modern man's predicament.

LETTER 8

Psycho-Ethical Reform Involves the Development of Feeling in Harmony with Reason

Having ruled out the State itself as an instrument for achieving political freedom, Schiller turns to ponder the possible roles of reason and philosophy in men's transformation from a natural to a moral life (and the subsequent creation of the Moral State). He begins by asking,

> 'Is Philosophy then to retire, dejected and despairing, from this field? While the dominion of forms [rational organization] is being extended in every other direction, is this, the most important good of all [political freedom], to remain the prey of formless chance? Is the conflict of blind forces to endure for ever in the political world, and the law of sociality never to triumph over hostile self-interest?' (L8:1)

It is notable that Schiller here makes political freedom 'the most important good of all', not the moral will (as Kant did)[1], nor even art and beauty, which are rather means to this highest end's realization.

Schiller proceeds to answer his question, but in a way which gives less of a role to philosophy, than to man's faculty of practical (or moral) reason:

> 'By no means! Reason herself, it is true, will not join battle directly with this savage force which resists her weapons.' (L8:2)
>
> 'Reason has accomplished all that she can accomplish by discovering the [moral] law and establishing it [theoretically]. Its execution demands a resolute will and ardour of feeling.". . . Truth . . . must herself become a force and appoint some drive to be her champion in the realm of phenomena;' (L8:3)

What Schiller is saying here, is that reason per se is powerless; it must work in combination with the sensuous if it is to have force. Reason per se, can do not more than discover the precepts of the moral

law.(Here Schiller follows Kant, who denied constitutive cognitive knowledge to theoretical reason, and confined it to a regulative role in relation to the operation of our lower faculties, urging them to complete and systematic knowledge. Practical reason however, can discover the precepts of the moral law, and thus has a kind of constitutive knowledge, but lacks a regulative ability over our lower sensuous nature to guarantee the implementation and realization of the moral law.) Reason qua practical, can discover the precepts of the moral law, but cannot overcome our sensuous natural being to realize this law with certainty, and on a general social scale. To overcome this, Schiller advocates that reason must work on sense indirectly, using sense and feeling itself. Only the development of a rational drive and of 'rational' sensuous impulses, can hope to counter the force of the irrational drive and purely sensuous impulses which stand in the way of our moral life and its objective realization in a reformed Moral State. (This employment of an intermediary agent by reason in relation to the impulses, is similar to Kant's notion of 'moral feeling' [2] acting for the moral will as a 'check' upon our sensuous impulses.) Schiller's reference in the above passage, to Truth appointing 'some drive to be her champion', is the first reference in the Aesthetic Letters to the 'form-drive'[3] (albeit an implicit reference), and already we have an indication of the importance which Schiller attaches to its development. (This importance becomes explicit in Letters 24 forward, in his presentation of a psychological history of the individual and species.)

Schiller continues:

> 'Our Age is Enlightened . . .' 'How is it, then, that we still remain barbarians?' (L8:4)
>
> 'There must . . . be something in the disposition of men which stands in the way of the acceptance of truth, however brightly it may shine, and of the adoption of truth, however forcibly it may convince.' (L8:5)

It is clear from what Schiller said earlier, that reason as philosophy, has already done all it can do for the ethical improvement of modern man, by discovering and making explicit the foundations of the moral law, (an implicit reference to Kant's second Critique). However, despite the development of our faculties, our knowledge, and

production, by the Enlightenment, men still refuse to accept or adopt the moral law. They live lives which are one-sidedly intellectual at one level; and one-sidedly sensuous at another. They do not allow feeling its rightful place determined by morality, but are 'barbarians'.

Given Schiller's view that most men are 'savages', we may wonder why he is now concentrating so much attention upon the barbarian. The next passage makes the reason for this clear. He is concerned that the ruling classes and the intelligentsia, because of their one-sidedly intellectual 'enlightenment', are unable to assist the moral development of the great mass of men who are sunk in subservience to their sensuous nature and the satisfaction of its needs:

> 'The majority of men are far too wearied and exhausted by the struggle for existence to gird themselves for a new and harder struggle against error. Happy to escape the hard labour of thinking for themselves, they are only too glad to resign to others the guardianship of their thoughts. And if it should happen that higher promptings stir within them, they embrace with avid faith the formulas which State and Priesthood hold in readiness for such an event. If these unhappy men deserve our compassion, we are rightly contemptuous of those others . . .' 'Such [others] prefer the twilight of obscure ideas, where feeling is given full rein, and fancy can fashion at will convenient images . . .' (L8:6)

There are thus two obstacles in the way of any advance by the mass of humanity towards morality and political freedom. a) The labour process entails that most men are too exhausted by the struggle for existence to have the time, energy and inclination to be able to think rationally for themselves. They leave this to others who b), do not take their duty in this respect seriously, but provide people with the delusions they want to have. Mythology replaces truth. (This passage is far more important than is often realized by Schiller scholars, for in <u>On Naive and Sentimental Poetry</u>, written shortly after the <u>Aesthetic Letters</u>, Schiller virtually abandons the theory of aesthetic education as impracticable, because of most men being unable to actively react to aesthetic experience, due to their exhaustion by the labour

process, and the cultural assumption that the free time to which such experience is confined, should be 'leisure time', viz. essentially passive.)[4]

Thus Schiller concludes that we cannot morally reform the individual through his reason or intellect alone. This is either inactive or exhausted (in the 'savage' masses), or irrationally active in producing and reproducing mythologies (in the 'barbarian' intelligentsia, and the ruling classes of State and church). Men of both kinds require a powerful moral education. To be powerful, it must be based on feeling (and not abstract precepts). The capacity to feel itself must be developed, for only in this way will men translate thought into action and life, and feel the need to develop their rational thought itself. As Schiller puts it:

> '. . . the way to the head must be opened through the heart. The development of man's capacity for feeling is, therefore, the more urgent need of our age, not merely because it can be a means of making better insights [into the moral law] effective for living, but precisely because it provides the impulse for bettering our insights [into truth generally].' (L8:7)

Schiller is now ready to move onto the next stage in the general argument of the treatise : that it is the aesthetic education of feeling that (indirectly) promotes both moral volition and the cognition of truth, in the way seen as so necessary here.

LETTER 9

The Basis of the Educative Power of Beauty and Art

Schiller commences Letter 9 by restating his fundamental thesis that political reform must proceed from reform of individual character. He takes the view that the political system in its present form is bound to have a negative effect upon character. Consequently, we must identify some means of morally reforming the individual that is independent of the State, and capable of communicating its influence powerfully (so as to be able to counter the negative

influence of the State). This instrument of reform, he asserts, is fine art.

> 'All improvement in the political sphere is to proceed from the ennobling of character - but how under the influence of a barbarous constitution is character ever to become ennobled? To this end we should, presumably, have to seek out some instrument not provided by the State . . .' (L9:1)
> 'This instrument is Fine Art;' (L9:2)

(Schiller did not foresee the extent to which the modern State would financially provide for, and thus indirectly control, even fine art.)

Schiller admits that the temporal nature of artists and scientists, will often lead them to degrade art and science to conform to the prevailing spirit of the times:

> 'True, nothing is more common than for both, science as well as art, to pay homage to the spirit of the age, or for creative minds to accept the critical standards of prevailing taste. In epochs where character . . . becomes enervated and flabby, science will strive to please, and art to gratify.' (L9:3)

However, this temporal limitation and social conformity, need not be true in principle, logically, even if it is often the case as a matter of fact, empirically or historically. Schiller proceeds to rescue art (and science) from temporal limitations and deficiencies, by the theoretical device of postulating atemporal Ideas of Art and Science. Beauty and Truth are asserted by Schiller to be transcendent pure rational Ideas, which are unassailable by temporal 'realizations' which fall short of them.

> 'Art, like Science, is absolved from all positive [legal[1]] constraint and from all conventions introduced by man; both rejoice in absolute immunity from human arbitrariness. The political legislator . . . can proscribe the lover of truth; Truth itself will prevail. He can humiliate the artist; but [the transcendent Idea of] Art he cannot falsify.' 'For whole centuries thinkers and artists will do their best to submerge Truth and Beauty in the depths of a degraded humanity; it is

> they themselves who are drowned there, while Truth and Beauty with their own indestructible vitality, struggle triumphantly to the surface.' (L9:3)

Schiller, then, attempts to make art an instrument of reform which is independent of the State, by the rather extreme device of making it apolitical through being atemporal and thus transcendent in status. So far, he has not provided a philosophical justification for his assertion of there being such transcendent Ideas. He also seems unaware of the problem of providing any criteria for assessing the degree of correspondence between actual works of art (or empirical 'realizations' of Art), and/the Idea of Art itself.

It seems most plausible to view Schiller's concept of the transcendent, as that which is atemporal in the sense of being perennial, which either exists (as the Idea of Art does in 'good' times), or merely subsists (as it does in times when humanity is degraded), in all times, rather than is transcendent in the 'hard' classical sense of being outside time altogether. Schiller, in other words, is operating a more 'soft' or limited concept of the transcendent and atemporal, as that whose being is not confined to any particular time, age, or peoples' artistic production. There is no need to interpret him as an orthodox Platonist[2], or as a poet[3], or as personifying concepts (as various scholars have done)[4], when he talks of realities which exist over the ages, but vary in their qualitative character from one epoch to another.

Schiller proceeds to argue that the true artist can overcome the limitations of his own time. The beautiful form he creates is, in some sense, atemporal, in the way Beauty itself is; the formal aspect of his work can transcend confinement to the taste of his age:

> 'The artist is indeed the child of his age; but woe to him if he is at the same time its ward or, worse still, its minion!' 'The theme of his work may be degraded by vagaries of the public mood . . . but its form, inviolate, will remain immune from such vicissitudes.' (L9:4)

There is a suggestion here, in what Schiller says, of a neo-Platonic connection between form (in the art object) and the Idea of Beauty, viz. that the former partakes of the latter[5], and hence is removed

from temporal and empirical limitations. These empirical limitations are here called the 'theme' in the art work, viz. that which in L22:5 is mere 'subject-matter' or content, and seen there as of low aesthetic and psychotherapeutic value (limiting the psyche). Moreover, in L22:5, there is the same emphasis on form as the essence of the art object. (Unfortunately, as ever in the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller does not provide us with enough to more than speculate about, when it comes to assessing the Platonic or neo-Platonic status of his Ideas. No firm conclusion can be drawn as to their status, and often one suspects Schiller himself was uncertain on this point.)[6]

Another way in which art can transcend the limitations of time, is that, according to Schiller, when humanity is in a degraded condition, art with its ability to preserve past truth, can rescue current humanity by confronting it with immortal exemplars:

> 'Humanity has lost its dignity; but Art has rescued it and preserved it in significant stone. Truth lives on in the illusion of Art, and it is from this copy, or after-image, that the original image will once again be restored.' (L9:4)

There is again a Platonic suggestion here, that an existential work of art is the illusory appearance of the Idea of Art, a poor 'copy' or 'after-image' of an 'original image' (the primordial Idea of Art). However, to complicate matters, Schiller also intends to suggest more mundanely, that the work of art is an 'after-image' of a past insight into truth, capable of restoring the original truth to present day awareness. Underlying Schiller's talk here of humanity's dignity living on 'in significant stone', one suspects there is the rather idealized view of ancient Greek art, and particularly its sculpture, which he inherited from Winckelmann. In the above passage, we have the first reference in the treatise to art as 'illusion'. Later (in Letter 26), this becomes developed into Schiller's theory of aesthetic 'semblance'.

Schiller now moves on from discussing the transcendent Idea of Art, the atemporal aspect of existential art (i.e. form), and art's ability to 'freeze' past truth for future use, to discuss the need for the true artist to be in some measure detached from his own time. It is important, if art is to rescue humanity from its current moral degradation and modes of psycho-social diremption, that artists remain

a kind of pure uncorrupted priesthood, disdaining the opinion of their age, focusing on the moral law, not fortune and material need:

> 'But how is the artist to protect himself against the corruption of the age which besets him on all sides? By disdaining its opinion. Let him direct his gaze upwards, to the dignity of his calling and the universal Law, not downwards towards Fortune and the needs of daily life.' (L9:5)

The artist may leave to the man of intellect the depiction and analysis of the empirical world. The artist's 'object' is the Ideal[7], viz. the supersensible domain : the Idea of Beauty and the moral law, which are to be made manifest by him in particular sensuous-forms:

> '. . . let him leave the sphere of the actual to the intellect, which is at home there, whilst he strives to produce the Ideal out of the union of what is [sensuously] possible with what is [rationally] necessary.' (L9:5)

The Ideal should be fully expressed, not merely in art, but in the conduct of the artist:[8]

> 'Let him express this Ideal both in semblance and in truth, set the stamp of it upon the play of his imagination as upon the seriousness of his conduct . . .' (L9:5)

This passage makes it clear that Schiller conceives of 'the Ideal' as including both the Idea of Beauty (to be manifest in 'semblance'), and the moral law (to be expressed in conduct). (It is noteworthy, that in the above passage, Schiller links the creation by the artist of aesthetic 'semblance' with the 'play' of the 'imagination'. The relationship of these three key terms for Schiller, will be explored by him in Letters 26 and 27.)

The aesthetic education of man, to morally reform him and the State, is conceived of by Schiller as a protracted and indirect process. The artist seeks to express and realize the Ideal in a tranquil contemplative manner, unobtrusively. But for many men, the impulse to form takes a more immediate and impatient shape, as a desire to change the world:

> '. . . the divine impulse to form often hurls itself directly upon present-day reality and upon the life of action, and undertakes to fashion anew the formless material presented by the moral world. The misfortunes of the human race speak urgently to the man of feeling; its degradation more urgently still; enthusiasm is kindled, and in vigorous souls ardent longing drives impatiently on towards action.' (L9:6)

(Schiller's use above of the expression 'impulse to form', is another implicit reference to the concept of the 'form-drive', which he will explicitly develop in Letter 12:4 onwards. He will return to the subject of the 'enthusiast' in Letter 27:11.)

So far in this Letter, Schiller has attempted to justify his view that art is a suitable instrument for moral reform, on the grounds that it has a transcendent dimension, and it is produced by men who are themselves sufficiently detached from the sensible world as not to be corrupted by its deficient taste, and so as to be able to better gain access to both transcendent Beauty and transcendent Truth (the moral law). He now takes up the argument of the treatise where he left it at the end of the last Letter : the need for a means of powerful moral education which will develop man's capacity for feeling, and reform his sensuous life, rather than directly assail his intellect with moral precepts. Schiller proceeds to discuss how art may directly address itself to the sensuous aspect of man, bypassing his intellect. This discussion takes the form of a mythical address to a young artist.

Schiller addresses the young artist, advising him to raise his audiences' perspective to the rationally necessary, that which is of eternal value (the supersensible), making it an object men feel the desire for in their hearts, and not merely know with their practical reason or believe with their intellect. Only by education of the heart and feelings will error and caprice be removed from man's inner being:

> 'Impart to the world you would influence a Direction towards the Good . . .' 'You will have given it this direction if, by your teaching, you have elevated its thoughts to the Necessary and the Eternal, if, by your actions and your creations, you have transformed the Necessary and the Eternal into an object of the hearts desire.' '. . . error and caprice will fall . . .' 'But it is in man's inner being that it must give way . . .' (L9:7)

(Schiller's talk here of the aesthetic effecting a 'Direction towards the Good', is in line with e.g. L23:3, and his view later that the aesthetic condition of the psyche promotes and is conducive to moral volition, but does not per se determine the content of morality.) Schiller's references in the above passage to the 'Good', the 'Necessary' and the 'Eternal', appear to be to the moral law. There is much talk throughout this Letter of a transcendent 'Truth' as well as Beauty. Following Kant, the only supersensible truth we have cognitive access to is the moral law (via practical reason). In the last Letter, Schiller told us that philosophy has established it theoretically (via Kant). Now he tells us that artists, detached from their times, can also establish it aesthetically, turning moral truth 'into an object of the hearts desire'. In short, beauty can become a symbol of morality. But how? Do we, as in Kant's discussion of this topic, draw analogies between what was in any case natural beauty for Kant, and moral goodness?[9] Schiller neither here, nor elsewhere in the treatise, gives us any concrete examples of how he envisages this.[10] Matters are not helped by the fact that most references to 'true' art in the treatise, are to art which is beautiful (has aesthetic value) and psychotherapeutic (has psychological value), rather than to art which manifests moral truth in some way. The connection between morality and beauty is made through the rationalizing effects of aesthetic experience upon our sensuous being, rather than (as is suggested in the above passage), through our apprehension of the moral law via aesthetic objects.[11]

One way in which it is possible to make sense of the above passage, is to see the 'Eternal' and 'Necessary' as not the moral law, but the Idea of Art or Idea of Beauty. Apart from the question of the relationship between these two Ideas (which Schiller never discusses), we can see how if they are made into 'an object of the heart's desire', men will learn to love what is of supersensible origin, and raise their minds' orientation from the sensible and their sensuous needs. They are thus given a 'Direction towards the Good'. If this interpretation is correct, we can see another reason why (apart from political independence), Schiller postulates Beauty and Art as transcendent Ideas : so that they can inhabit the same supersensible world as the moral law, and re-orientate men to their cohabitant. (This saves him the trouble Kant went to of using an a priori principle of reflective judgement to link our experience of beauty with the

supersensible domain, and thus again enable beauty to orientate us towards morality. Schiller's transcendent Ideas of Beauty and Art function as a more unsophisticated means for achieving a similar theoretical underpinning to link beauty and morality, through both being grounded in the supersensible.)

Continuing his advice to the young artist, Schiller says

> 'It is in the modest sanctuary of your heart that you must rear victorious truth, and project it out of yourself in the form of beauty, so that not only thought can pay it homage, but sense, too, lay loving hold on its appearance.' (L9:7)

The artist must nurture moral truth in his own heart, and then externally manifest it in the form of beauty : in a form available to thought/and sense, reason/and feeling; to both sides of man. This passage lends support to the interpretation that Schiller sees 'truth' as the moral law, and is advocating that beauty should serve to symbolize morality in an external sensuous form. This is a more direct linkage between beauty and morality than the second interpretation I gave above. But the two interpretations are compatible. The supersensible linkage of the two (as a transcendent Idea/and the moral law)[12] is a philosophical connection. The concept of beauty as a symbol of morality, is a sensible linkage of the two (in a sensuous-form), and works as a psychological connection of beauty and morality (in the course of aesthetic experience).[13] Kant, in the Critique of Judgement, provided a similar double linkage of beauty and morality, in logical and psychological terms, though different in content from that of Schiller here.

The last four sentences of this Letter, are rather concentrated with points of significance. It is convenient to first deal with it as a whole in order to establish the general line of argument, and then to examine aspects of it separately. Schiller, still talking to the young artist, says,

> 'The seriousness of your principles will frighten them away, but in the play of your semblance they will be prepared to tolerate them; for their taste is purer than their heart, and it is here that you must lay hold of the timorous fugitive. In vain will you assail their precepts, in vain condemn their

> practice; but on their leisure hours you can try your shaping hand. Banish from their pleasures caprice, frivolity, and coarseness, and imperceptibly you will banish these from their actions and, eventually, from their inclinations too.' '. . . encompass them about with the symbols of [moral] perfection, until Semblance conquer Reality, and Art triumph over Nature.' (L9:7)

What Schiller is saying in this passage, I think, is based upon the following reasoning. The non-cognitive character of judgements of taste (which Kant demonstrated in the Critique of Judgement), means that taste is uncorrupted by the intellect. We may find a clear avenue (unobstructed by determinate or definite concepts), to men's feelings via beauty. Thus, though we cannot undo their precepts or their practices, we can through addressing their leisurely interest in beauty, get to their feelings in order to effect a powerful re-education of the whole man. If truth, beauty and seriousness, enter into their leisure and pleasure, it will eventually permeate all men's inclinations and actions. Art provides a vehicle of education and individual reform with direct access to feeling, the fundamental motivator of all men's activity.

Schiller's reference in the above passage to 'the play of your semblance', and 'Semblance conquer Reality', is another early usage of the term 'semblance' in the treatise, and already it is explicitly connected with 'play' and also put in contrast to 'reality'. (This will be fully developed by him in Letter 26.) It is interesting to see how Schiller frequently puts down early 'markers' for concepts he only develops fully much later on in the treatise, and which are very important to his thesis. It is as though, skilful dramatist that he was, he 'eases-in' his most important concepts unobtrusively, so that we get used to them, subtly enhancing their acceptability and plausibility, before they are given an explicit philosophical development.

The reference in the passage above, to the possibility that 'on their leisure hours you can try your shaping hand', is interesting. In On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, Schiller doubts that the leisurely attitude is productive of aesthetic experience of any value in educative terms.[14] The reference at the end of the quotation to 'symbols of perfection', puts one in mind again of the section in Kant's third Critique entitled 'Beauty as a symbol of morality'.[15]

Unfortunately, Schiller neither explains what he means here, nor does he use the expression again in the rest of the treatise. But there is no doubt that the idea is prominent in Schiller's mind throughout this particular Letter.

The main point Schiller is making in the above passage, is that art and beauty can bypass the corruptions and prejudices of man's intellect, to gain direct access to his sentient being, and so effect a powerful reformation of his character by working from his physical substructure. But what Schiller argues here, implicitly rests upon the assumption that Kant is correct in his analysis of the nature of aesthetic experience : that it is immediate, non-cognitive, and based on feeling. If Kant's view could be shown to be wrong, then Schiller would be in some difficulty. (In the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller merely takes-over many positions established by Kant, without bothering to justify them himself, before he puts them to his own different theoretical purposes.)

Another problem, is that Schiller merely assumes that the re-education of feeling will lead to the re-education of thoughts, precepts and actions. But, why may not the educative process simply 'get stuck' at the level of educating only a transient feeling, felt in the course of aesthetic experience, and then 'lost' at the termination of that experience? Why should there be any lasting effect on our general sensibility, let alone on our higher faculties? This brings me on to a final problem here in what Schiller says : what is the connection between feeling and the other ('higher') elements of our subjectivity, which he hopes to educate? At least as yet, no logical or psychological links have been demonstrated. We are being asked by Schiller to simply accept assertions.

PART TWO

The Essential Nature of Man and Beauty

(Letters 10 to 17)

LETTER 10

The Negative Effects of the Experience of Beauty in History. The Need for an A Priori Concept of Beauty

Man, in Schiller's view, can live either dominated by his natural or his rational being (as a 'savage' or 'barbarian', respectively), and in so doing, suppresses one half of his full humanity. Schiller reiterates that only education through beauty[1], can counter either form of one-sidedness, and reconcile what appear to be contradictory opposites.

> '. . . man can deviate from his destiny in two quite different ways; that our own age is, in fact, moving along both these false roads, and has fallen a prey, on the one hand, to coarseness, on the other, to enervation and perversity. From this twofold straying it is to be brought back by means of beauty.' '. . . education through beauty [can] counter both these opposite failings at one and the same time, and unite within itself two quite incompatible qualities.' (L10:1)

Schiller does not expect us to find such a view automatically plausible. Indeed, he tells us that many wise men, and experience itself, seem to point to beauty having only a negative influence on humanity. We certainly cannot simply assume a connection between taste and morality. Plato, for one, saw beauty and art as dangerous to the social and political order:

> '. . . we are always being told . . . that a developed feeling for beauty refines morals . . .' 'Nevertheless, it sometimes occurs to thinking minds either to deny this fact or at least to doubt the legitimacy of the conclusions drawn from it. They do not think quite so ill of that savagery with which primitive peoples are usually reproached, nor quite so well of that refinement for which the cultivated are commended.[2] Even in antiquity there were men who were by no means so convinced that aesthetic culture is a boon[3] . . .' (L10:2)

In the debate over the value of aesthetic experience, Schiller

tells us that we can certainly discount criticisms of beauty's value from those whose commercial spirit leads them to register 'value' only in terms of money and profit:

> 'Those who know no other criterion of value than the effort of earning or the tangible profit, how should they be capable of appreciating the unobtrusive effect of taste on the outward appearance and on the mind and character of men?' (L10:3)

However, there are important arguments others make, drawn from experience. Beauty per se is morally neutral : it can be used for good or ill, and there is no guarantee that it will not be used for ill.

> 'But there are voices worthy of respect raised against the effects of beauty, and armed against it with formidable arguments drawn from experience.' '. . . it is by no means contrary to its nature for it to have, in the wrong hands . . . its soul-seducing power [put] at the service of error and injustice.' (L10:4)

A serious criticism of beauty, and of concern with the aesthetic in general, is that it fosters an escapist mentality, through its emphasis on form and appearance, at the expense of content and what is real. The value of everything ends up being determined by its external appearance:[4]

> '. . . because taste is always concerned with form, and never with content, it finally induces in the mind a dangerous tendency to neglect reality altogether . . .' '. . . appearance alone determines . . . worth.' (L10:4)

Schiller's statement in the passage above, that 'taste is always concerned with form, and never with content', is a preview of his discussion of the art object in L22:5. It is clear that Schiller did not change his mind between the early and late Letters of the treatise : from seeing the art object as a balance of form/and content (in Letter 15), to the form dominated art object described in Letters 22 and 26. Here is early talk of the latter position. (The two different

views which he does express, can be explained as a discussion of the concept of Ideal Beauty on the one hand, and on the other hand, a discussion of the reality of art required for the practical purpose of aesthetic education.)

Art can, in Schiller's view, be used as an instrument of social control. It can instil social and political quietism, through the presentation of ideal semblances which divert men's minds from real social contradictions and injustices. It can show us a 'nice' world, in place of harsh reality, destroying the urge to social conflict and political revolution.[5]

> 'How many . . . are not in conflict with the social order just because the fancy of poets was pleased to present a world in which everything proceeds quite differently, in which no conventions fetter opinion, and no artifice suppresses nature?' (L10:4)

Another argument against over-concern with the aesthetic, is that it hinders clear judgements of moral value. Obsession with outer impression ignores merit, and forgets that most vices are compatible with a pleasing appearance:[6]

> 'What has society profited from letting . . . outward impression determine the respect which should attach to merit alone?' '. . . every vice in vogue . . . is compatible with a fair exterior.' (L10:4)

The main case against art and beauty however, is provided by the evidence of history. History shows art flourishing in societies when political freedom, morality, and truth, are in decline:

> '. . . in almost every historical epoch in which the arts flourish, and taste prevails, we find humanity at a low ebb, and cannot point to a single instance of a high degree and wide diffusion of aesthetic culture going hand in hand with political freedom and . . . good morals . . . truth of conduct.' (L10:4)

In what he asserts here, Schiller may be confusing cause and effect.

Art may not be the cause of e.g. political servitude, but an idealized escapist response to it : a psychological compensation exercise. In order to support his view of art as the cause here, Schiller proceeds to discuss its negative effects as a contributing factor in historical development. He conceives of art and beauty as sapping strength and vitality, as producing an effete aestheticism. He tells us, for example, that we find art flourishing in ancient Greece and Rome, only when they had lost their strength and freedom:

> 'When, under Pericles and Alexander, the Golden Age of the arts arrived, and the rule of taste extended its sway, the strength and freedom of Greece are no longer to be found.' 'The Romans . . . enervated by oriental luxury . . . bow beneath the yoke of a successful ruler, before Greek art can be seen triumphing . . .' (L10:5)

Schiller seems, in all this talk of the virtue of 'strength', to be following Ferguson in seeing some value in war.[7] He continues, by telling us that arab culture only flowered when their war-like spirit was extinguished (L10:5). Schiller concludes his historical negative critique of art's value, by stating that

> 'Wherever we turn our eyes in past history we find taste and freedom shunning each other, and beauty founding her sway solely upon the decline and fall of heroic virtues.' (L10:5)
> '. . . energy of character, at whose expense aesthetic culture is commonly purchased[8] . . . is the mainspring of all that is great and excellent in man . . .' 'If, then, we only heed what past experience has to teach us about the influence of beauty, there is certainly no encouragement to develop feelings which are so much of a threat to the true civilization of man;' (L10:6)

A major change in Schiller's mode of argument now takes place, which lays down the ground for the way he will conduct his enquiry over the next seven Letters. He is about to justify a movement from what has, until now, been a descriptively empirical and historical discussion, to a transcendental philosophical mode of enquiry, which will focus on establishing an a priori essential model of the mind. This will involve analysing those basic and universal structures and

functions of the mind which we bring with us to all our experience.

Schiller begins, by reconsidering the nature of the terrain we have just traversed. He says that all the arguments against the idea of there being positive effects from the aesthetic education of man, rest upon either empirical experience or historical interpretation. Schiller believes that the evaluation of beauty should not be approached through historical interpretation of its supposed 'causes' and 'effects', but in terms of its logical being in thought as a transcendent concept. Actually, he is not introducing anything new here, for the concept in question is the Idea of Beauty with which we are already familiar. But instead of relating this Idea to existential art (via the latter's formal aspect, and its creation by 'detached' artists), and relating the Idea to its fellow inhabitant of the supersensible dimension,the moral law, he now proceeds to relate the Idea of Beauty to an a priori model of mind, which he calls the Idea of Human Being. He now tells us that the Idea of Beauty regulates our judgement of taste, and additionally, is the necessary pre-condition of our being fully human, viz. realizing the Idea of Human Being. The Idea of Beauty is now therefore invested with an epistemological role (in regulating judgements of taste), and an ontological status (in the achievement of full humanity). The epistemological and ontological functions of the Idea of Beauty cannot be comprehended, in Schiller's view, through a historico-empirical approach to understanding the effects of beauty.

> 'But . . . Experience is not the judgement-seat before which such an issue as this can be decided.' '. . . a concept of beauty derived from a source other than experience . . . by means of it we are to decide whether that which in experience we call beautiful is justly entitled to the name.' (L10:6)
> 'This pure rational concept[9] of Beauty . . . itself corrects and regulates our judgement of every actual case . . . [has] to be discovered by a process of abstraction, and deduced from the sheer potentialities of our sensuo-rational nature.' '. . . Beauty would have to be shown to be a necessary condition of Human Being.' (L10:7)

Schiller's reference in the above passage to the Idea of Beauty regulating our judgement of taste, confirms the interpretation that

it is not a radically transcendent concept. It has, in view of its supersensible status (in common with the moral law), a transcendent aspect. But its realization more-or-less, over time in particular art works, and now, its role in regulating judgements of taste, gives it also an immanent status.[10] Its position in this respect parallels that of the moral law, which is supersensible in origin, and yet accessible by men via their faculty of practical reason, in order to regulate their volition (should they allow it to). The Idea of Beauty is said to regulate our judgement of taste, which would seem to imply it is an Idea of theoretical reason. But on Kantian grounds, any attempt to cognize such an Idea of theoretical reason is impossible.[11] Clearly, Schiller breaks with Kant in his attempt to deduce an a priori Idea of theoretical reason, by means of a transcendental investigation.[12]

However, it must be said that Schiller's statement that the Idea of Beauty regulates our judgements of taste is peculiar, and is at variance with his brief consideration later in the treatise, as to how we assess the degree of beauty in an art object. In Letter 22, it is clear that we assess the 'excellence' of a work of art by reference to its psychological effect on us:

> 'The more general the mood and less limited the bias produced in us by any particular art, or by any particular product of the same, then the nobler that art and the more excellent that product will be.' (L22:4)

Thus, although here in Letter 10, Schiller tells us that the concept of Beauty is philosophically found by abstraction from experience, and is a priori in status, it is clear from the passage quoted above from Letter 22, that the judgement of taste operates in an a posteriori way, being involved in a meta-judgement of our own psychological state in the course of aesthetic experience. Consistency between the earlier and later Letters here, is hard to find. As ever, the main problem, is that Schiller does not say enough on the subject. Apart from not elaborating on precisely how the Idea of Beauty regulates the judgement of taste, he never again uses the expression 'regulates our judgement'. Like his reference in the last Letter to 'symbols of perfection', it is an isolated, unexplained, if not inexplicable, occurrence.

Schiller makes it clear that we can only discover and evaluate the concept of Beauty via a transcendental investigation. We must examine the universal essence of human nature, and then see what is a logical condition of it achieving its fullness of development qua human.[13] It is not, as in Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, a matter of working back from our experience of beauty to its a priori epistemological conditions, i.e. an examination of what are the necessary grounds of the possibility of our making a judgement of taste. Schiller's 'deduction', involves establishing what is basic to being a human being, and then working forward to what can fulfil his a priori essential model of mind : to what is a condition of the a priori model being realized fully in a posteriori psychological terms.[14] Schiller's answer, of course, is that given a certain basic model of the essence of the human mind, its fulfilment and realization requires the experience of certain existential forms of beauty. He will work from a), an a priori psychological model of the mind's essential structure; to b), a corresponding a priori model of Beauty as Ideal; and from this, to c), an a posteriori model of the essential structure of existential beauty. Stage a) is located in Letters 11 to 14, in which Schiller describes the essence of human nature in terms of a distinction of 'Person'/and 'Condition', and then develops the idea of the mind having various basic drives; with further development of the a priori model in Letters 19 to 21. Stage b) is located in Letter 15, in his concept of Ideal Beauty as 'living form', the correlative of his model of the a priori mind. Stage c) is located in Letters 16, 22, and 26, in discussions of two existential types of beauty, the art object, and the nature of aesthetic semblance, respectively. As can be seen from the Letter numbers underlined above, the 'deduction' takes place, in essence, through all its stages in Letters 11 to 16. Other later Letters, develop the complexity and sophistication of the three models involved and their relationships. Schiller's process of 'deduction' involves imposing the (a priori) psychological model onto both the (a priori and a posteriori) aesthetic models, so that the latter are derivatively structured; beauty is anthropomorphically modelled to suit human psychological structures, functions, and requirements. Overall, there is a good deal of conflation of types of argument in the process described here, with the logical and the aesthetic both running into the psychological, in a way which leaves the former two not only indistinct at times from

the last, but actually psychologically structured.

It must be said that as a philosophical methodology, the process of 'transcendental deduction' is somewhat dubious. As in most transcendental deductions, Schiller 'rigs' the structure of the a priori model he supposedly 'starts from', so as to achieve a predetermined a posteriori model of experience of a certain kind. The experiential side is itself hidden from the reader at the start, but it has been carefully selected. The real starting point is hidden : being from a selected view of the type of beauty or aesthetic experience Schiller wishes to 'arrive' at. Such transcendental deductions begin 'behind the back' of the reader, with a hidden induction from a carefully selected view of experience, to construct an a priori model from which, one can then, in the reader's presence, return to the originally selected experience again. The procedure is circular. It involves tailoring a priori models to allow movement from them to carefully predetermined a posteriori conclusions. (This criticism of the transcendental method, applies less to Kant in his Critiques, as he is not so interested as Schiller is in moving from the a priori to the a posteriori.[15] It does not apply at all to Fichte in The Science of Knowledge, who in taking the process of transcendental deduction seriously, was unable to arrive at any plausible a posteriori model of experience from his genuinely a priori starting point.)

Schiller's ostensible starting point will be an a priori essential model of the human mind. This will occupy him for the next four Letters. The process of constructing such a conceptual model is described by him, as he concludes this Letter.

> 'We must lift our thoughts to the pure concept of Human Nature; and since experience never shows us Human Nature as such, but only individual human beings in individual situations, we must endeavour to discover . . . that which is absolute and unchanging, and . . . apprehend the necessary conditions of their existence.'[16] (L10:7)

Let me now briefly summarize the position we have arrived at, in a way which is more sympathetic to Schiller's proposed methodology. In order, partly, to get round empirical doubts about beauty's positive educative effects, Schiller proposes to deal with beauty

transcendentally. He will embark on a transcendental psychological deduction[17], rather than a logical deduction as such. But like Kant, the logical and psychological are for Schiller intimately related, and so a purely logical transcendental deduction would not seem appropriate to him. Schiller seeks not only (despite what he says), the pure rational concept of Beauty, but also those empirical species of existential beauty, which can resolve conflicts and imbalances between man's rational and sensuous natures.[18] Criticism of his method, as involving the conflation of types of argument, may be inappropriate to such a venture : his broad approach may be necessary, in order to be able to overcome the rational/sensuous divide in man.

LETTER 11

The 'Person'/'Condition' Distinction

In this Letter, Schiller attempts to establish what is absolutely basic to human being : that which all our manifold activities logically presuppose. He distinguishes, and tersely defines, two fundamental aspects of our being,which he calls the

> 'Person and Condition - the self and its determining attributes - which . . . are . . . eternally two.' (L11:2)

Schiller rarely provides adequate definitions for his major concepts, and appears to expect us to acquire their meanings from the way he employs them. The 'person' is used by him to mean the self or 'I' (terms which he interchanges as the Letter proceeds). The 'condition' includes both bodily life, and its relation to the external sensuous world. The influence of Fichte's seminal work, The Science of Knowledge[1], is evident behind this distinction, which comes down in the end, to Fichte's distinction of the ego/and the non-ego, (with the latter including the non-ego aspect of the self, i.e. our own phenomenal aspect of being, the body). In addition, the relationship of the two terms distinguished, person and condition, has similarity to Fichte's view of the relationship of the ego and non-ego. Generally then, I think it aids clarity, to use the terms ego and non-ego to convey the meaning of Schiller's person/condition

distinction. We are entering a section of the treatise where the influence of Kant declines somewhat. The influence of Fichte is important in this Letter, and even more so later, in Letter 19. (Fichte's influential work, The Science of Knowledge, was published at Easter 1794, a few months before Schiller began to substantially revise his original letters to the Duke of Augustenburg, in order to prepare them for publication in The Horen.)

Schiller proceeds to distinguish the two sides of man's being as atemporal/and temporal : as the person which endures,/and the condition which changes. Each is conceived of as being logically independent of the other, so that the person persists in the course of changes in the condition; the condition changes despite the persistence of the person. The person or ego, then, is now attributed with an atemporal, transcendent being, in contrast to the phenomenal condition. (As ever though, for Schiller, this atemporality involves perennial being, and a transcendence which does not exclude immanence.)[2]

> '. . . in man [there is] something that endures and something that constantly changes. That which endures . . . [is] his Person, that which changes, [is] his Condition.' (L11:1)
> 'Amid all persistence of the Person, the Condition changes; amid all the changes of Condition, the Person persists.[3]' (L11:2)

Against the view Schiller puts forward here, one might want to argue that the person does change, but in a way much slower relative to the change of the condition. The mental development, decline and death of personality, are not simply to be identified as changes of condition. Mortality, in particular, would seem to show that the person is in a reciprocal relation to the condition, not abstractly separate as asserted here. Nevertheless, providing Schiller is only making a logical distinction here, such psychological and empirical considerations do not invalidate it.

Schiller proceeds to again take what appears to be an unnecessarily extreme view of the separation of person and condition, when he says

> '. . . the Condition can neither be grounded upon the Person, nor the Person upon the Condition.' '. . . were the former the case, the Condition would have to persist;' (L11:3)

One may perhaps wonder why Schiller does not allow the relationship of person and condition to be one of substance and accident, respectively.[4] This would allow the condition to be grounded in the person, and at the same time would not require the condition to persist : accidents come-to-be and cease-to-be in the course of the ongoing being of substance. However, to have the non-ego posited[5] by the (finite) ego in this way, may have seemed to Schiller to be verging on solipsism. Schiller actually follows Fichte, and accounts for the non-ego, as having been posited by an absolute ego, or as Schiller puts it,

> 'In the Absolute Subject alone do all its determining Attributes persist with the Personality, since all of them proceed from the Personality.' (L11:2)
> 'The material of activity . . . or the reality which the Supreme Intelligence creates out of itself, man has first to receive;' (L11:6)

What is a little surprising here, is that the idea of the absolute ego as being God, is only implicit in The Science of Knowledge.[6] It only becomes explicit in Fichte's later works such as The Way Towards the Blessed Life, or Doctrine of Religion, (1806). Schiller thus seems to have anticipated the later development of Fichte's philosophy in this respect.

In a statement that reads like a passage from The Science of Knowledge, Schiller writes

> '. . . we feel, think and will, because outside of ourselves something other than ourselves exists too.' (L11:3)

The activities of the person or ego, are all possible because of the existence of the non-ego or condition. Yet, Schiller proceeds to describe personality as self-grounded being, and as therefore self-determinate and essentially free:

> 'The Person . . . must be its own ground; for what persists cannot proceed from what changes. And so we . . . have the idea of [unconditioned] absolute being grounded upon itself, that is to say, freedom [self-determination].' (L11:4)

Now there are two problems here, concerning how the person can be self-grounded and unconditioned, in view of a), its ability to feel, think, and will, depending on something other than the self; and b), the question of the relation of the finite ego to the absolute ego, or the person to the Godhead, a relationship that needs careful exploration if it is to leave the person free. There is talk at various points in this Letter about a 'Godhead' (L11:2,7,9), the 'Absolute Subject' (L11:2), the 'Absolute Being' (L11:2). In order to avoid the problem for human freedom this raises, Wilkinson and Willoughby wrongly assume that in the passage quoted above, Schiller must be still talking about the Personality of God. They thus translate

> '. . . die Idee des absoluten, in sich selbst gegründeten Seins . . .' (L11:4)

in a way which puts the words 'absolute' and 'being' together from their separation in German, and capitalize them, so as to make 'Absolute Being', implying of course, God. In the context here, this results in God not the finite person (as Schiller intends), being possessed of freedom via having a self-grounded being. It is the latter position which corresponds with his earlier stated view of the person being atemporal and transcendent (L11:2), or as Kant would put it, having a supersensible aspect which makes man essentially unconditioned whilst living in a conditioned world. In terms of what Schiller has said so far, problems a) and b) above remain unsolved however. (He will address problem a) in Letter 19; problem b) is not resolved or even explored.)

Schiller tells us that whereas personality is self-grounded, the condition is externally grounded; not however in personality as one might expect, but obscurely, in 'Time', (with the creation of material reality by the 'Absolute Subject' or God, now suddenly forgotten by Schiller).

> 'The Condition . . . must have a ground other than itself; it must, since it does not owe its existence to the Person . . .' 'And so we would . . . have the condition of all contingent being or becoming, that is to say, Time.[7]' (L11:4)

In investing time with this objective logical status, grounding the material and phenomenal dimension independently of the person, Schiller breaks from Kant, who saw time as a subjective form of our intuition. For Schiller, time has an objective ontological status, whilst for Kant, it has a subjective epistemological status. Both, in their different ways, conceive of time as conditioning the way the phenomenal world appears for us, for the person's or ego's experience; but for Kant, there are other equally important conditions of the phenomenal, such as the form of space and the twelve a priori categories, not just the one condition, 'Time', as Schiller reductively asserts.

As the Letter continues, Schiller makes it more clear that the person is identified with the ego:

> 'The Person, which manifests itself in the eternally persisting 'I' . . .' (L11:5)

What Schiller says about the person, seems derivative in part from Kant's theory of the ego as the transcendental unity of apperception, in the Critique of Pure Reason.[8] This, put simply, is the idea that the self or I, is the permanent ongoing unity, at the centre of all our diverse experiences. All particular experiences are the experiences of the self which transcends any one of its experiences; which in relation to their finiteness, particularity, and limited transient nature/, is infinite, universal and permanent. Fichte takes this idea over, but develops it so as to make experience ultimately grounded in the ego itself, as the non-ego 'opposited' to itself by the absolute ego[9], in order to have an object to know, and an arena for moral activity.

Having logically distinguished the concepts of person and condition, Schiller now proceeds to logically relate them. He tells us that personality per se, as the ego, is an indeterminate pure form, it is potential being only, devoid of reality. Its real existence and determinate being is only as a phenomenal being, in a particular condition in time:

> '. . . man is not just Person pure and simple, but Person situated in a particular Condition. Every Condition, however, every determinate existence, has its origins in time; and so man,

> as a phenomenal being, must also have a beginning, although the pure Intelligence within him is eternal.[10]' '. . . without becoming, he would never be a determinate being; his Personality would indeed exist potentially, but not in fact.' (L11:5)

The ego receives external material reality into itself through the process of perception. In the course of receiving all this transitory material, the ego remains constant, and has as its activity, the organization of all this material into some unity, as theoretical reason demands.[11] The subject forms this material, raising it from the particularity of sense data, to the universality and significance of thought.

> 'The material of activity [reality] . . . man has first to receive . . . by way of perception, as something existing outside of him in space . . .' 'This changing material within him is accompanied by his never-changing 'I' - and to remain perpetually himself throughout all change, to convert all that he apprehends into experience, i.e. to organize it into a unity which has significance . . . this is the injunction laid upon him by his rational nature.' (L11:6)

In L9:6, Schiller used the expression 'the divine impulse to form'. We hear an echo of it now as he writes,

> '. . . we must surely call divine any tendency which has as its unending task the realization of . . . [and] manifestation of potential . . .' (L11:7)

The ego also has a formative tendency which is directed outwards at reality, to reform externality, and in so doing, to realize, determine and manifest its self as a potential inner being, striving to become actual outer being. (The idea of the ego's relationship to the non-ego involving an 'unending' activity of striving, again reflects the strong influence of Fichte's The Science of Knowledge here.)[12]

In the two above quotations (from L11:6 and 7), Schiller is saying it is fundamental to human being to relate to the world in two ways : one which is passive/, the other active; one which is recipient of the

external/, the other reformative of the external; one subjectifying objectivity/, the other objectifying subjectivity. What he is doing here, is laying down the groundwork for the development in the next Letter of two fundamental drives, corresponding in their aims, to these two basic ways of relating to the world. In Letter 13, he will go on to argue that the two drives work optimally when they interfunction. He now proceeds to lay down the groundwork for this later position too.

In Schiller's view, both aspects of man, his personality and his conditioned being, must be given realization, and their actuality requires their combination, for each has something the other both lacks and needs. Personality per se, or the ego, in abstraction from sensuous material in the form of perceptions and sensations, is an empty form, devoid of real content, and remains an unrealized potential being. Our sensuous nature per se, or our conditioned phenomenal being, in abstraction from the ego's formative activity, is mere matter without form:

> 'His Personality, considered for itself alone, and independently of all sense-material, is merely the predisposition to a possible expression of his infinite Nature; and as long as he has neither perceptions nor sensations, he is nothing but form and empty potential. His Sensuous Nature, considered for itself alone, and apart from any spontaneous activity of the mind, can do no more than reduce him . . . into matter . . .' (L11:8)

Feeling, desiring and willing of a purely natural kind, do not give realization to the self. Whilst man's sensuous nature is the ego's means of realizing its potential, this sensuous being itself requires the ego, in order to make any realization, any volition, the individual's own, viz. a realization which pertains to his personality:

> 'As long as he merely feels, merely desires and acts upon mere desire, he is as yet nothing but world . . .' 'True, it is his Sensuous Nature alone which can turn this potential into actual power; but it is only his Personality which makes all his actual activity into something which is inalienably his own.' (L11:8)

(It is noteworthy that Schiller now clearly identifies the 'Condition' with our 'Sensuous Nature'. This makes it all the more surprising that in Letter 27, Schiller attempts to aesthetically reconcile our sensuous/and rational natures, by reducing the former nature to a faculty of the latter, the imagination. Here in Letter 11, Schiller still gives our sensuous being its full physiological meaning, as the body.)[13]

Schiller now summarizes the position we have arrived at : the mutual necessity of both aspects of our fundamental human being, if we are to achieve the full realization of our potentiality.

> 'In order, therefore, not to be mere world, he must [internally] impart form to matter; in order not to be mere form, he must give [external] reality to the predisposition he carries within him.' (L11:8)

Man (as ego), must internally form all that is outside him, and not simply passively receive it; and he must externalize the universal form within him, objectively reforming the world about him, with the body as the necessary instrument of self-realization in this process. The two processes, (which amount to cognition and volition, respectively), are intimately related as two aspects of the one ego's 'predisposition' to formative activity. Schiller concludes the Letter, telling us that

> '[There are] two fundamental laws of his sensuo-rational nature. The first insists upon absolute reality : he is to turn everything which is mere form into world, and make all his potentialities fully manifest. The second insists upon absolute formality : he is to destroy everything in himself which is mere world, and bring harmony into all his changes. In other words, he is to externalize all that is within him, and [internally] give form to all that is outside him.' (L11:9)

Schiller, then, calls the two formative processes the fundamental laws of our sensuo-rational nature. However, on closer inspection, they both have far more to do with the rational side of man alone : with the need of the ego to internally and externally form objectivity. The sensuous nature of man has only a secondary role in these activities,

as a mere means : supplying the data for sense-perception in the former activity; supplying the bodily power needed for the latter activity.

Schiller's methodology in this Letter is open to some doubt. Neither logical reasoning nor empirical evidence are very evident. Schiller,in analysing man into two fundamental natures, (each with its own needs, but with ultimately reconcilable functions), seems to be appealing to our intuitive sense that this is the way men are essentially. The origin of what he says, appears to be based on his own introspective intuition about our fundamental psychological structure and functioning. In a letter written while revising the Aesthetic Letters, he confessed to Goethe that the psychological material in the treatise was drawn from his own self-observation.[14] The a priori model of man, is really just a picture of the essence of human nature; it is not produced by a 'transcendental deduction', but cast within the terms of an introspectively based speculative psychology.[15] Much of the argument of the rest of the treatise will rest upon this model of our essential nature; yet there seems no compelling reason to accept it,in philosophical terms. Nevertheless, it may still provide significant insights into our nature, as well as into art and its possible relation to morality and politics, despite this, or as Schiller might say, even because of this.

LETTER 12

The 'Sense-drive'/, the 'Form-drive'

In the last Letter, Schiller developed the notion of our having two fundamental natures, a rational nature based on the ego or person; and a sensuous nature, i.e. the body, linked to the external sensuous world. The descriptive elaboration of these two natures, gave the first a supersensible transcendent being, as atemporal and self-grounded; and attributed the latter nature with a sensible phenomenal being, as temporal and conditioned. Although some movement was made by Schiller to draw them towards a unity by highlighting their mutual necessity in the process of complete self-realization, he now once more falls back to emphasizing their distinctness, and indeed their opposition, (before in the next Letter, again

highlighting their compatibility).

Schiller now tells us, that we are impelled by two opposite 'drives', each of which, seeks the complete realization of one of our fundamental natures. Our sensuous nature strives for complete realization, and the total domination of our being, through the sense-drive. Our rational nature strives for complete realization, and the total domination of our being[1], through the form-drive.

> '. . . we are impelled by two opposing forces which, since they drive us to the realization of their object, may aptly be termed drives. The first of these . . . the sensuous drive, proceeds from the physical existence of man, or his sensuous nature.' (L12:1)
>
> 'The second of the two drives, which we may call the formal drive, proceeds from the absolute [unconditioned] existence of man, or from his rational nature . . .' (L12:4)

Now we may wonder what is the precise relationship here, between a 'nature' and a 'drive'. One clue which we have, is that in the passage above, Schiller tells us that each drive 'proceeds from' its corresponding nature. This makes the two concepts logically distinct, and implies that a nature, in some way, grounds or gives rise to its drive. The drives are also described as 'forces', which drive us to the 'realization of their object'. The concept of 'force' implies physical power, which suggests that the drives function at least in part, physiologically, as strong feelings. These strong feelings must be of a relatively permanent kind, for the concept of 'drive' implies temporal durability, as opposed to the temporary character of an urge or impulse.[2] These strong feelings would be either of a purely sensuous, or of a rationally and morally orientated kind, as they act as agents to prosecute the aims of the respective natures they each serve. However, there is a problem here, for whereas one can envisage how our sensuous nature might generate a strong feeling of a permanent kind, it is not at all clear how our rational nature could do so. This is a problem Schiller shares with Kant, for the latter does not clearly explain how moral reason is able to generate moral feeling.[3] There is, in other words, a 'gap' that needs bridging between rationality and the domain of feeling. Neither Schiller nor Kant, seems aware of the impossibility of constructing such a bridge from a radically dualistic

premise, (such as that which Schiller's distinction of person/and condition lays down). There are two further points to notice about Schiller's theory of drives. Firstly, it is not until L19:10, that Schiller even makes it clear upon what it is that the two drives are seeking to urge a totally rational or completely sensuous course of realization, namely the will, which we are then told, rather mysteriously, stands 'between' them. Secondly, the precise status of the drives always remains problematic, because at certain points in the treatise, Schiller also equates them with various faculties[4], as well as with each of our two natures themselves.[5]

Turning to deal first with the general aim of the sense-drive, Schiller tells us that it seeks to reduce man to a purely phenomenal being, confined to a continuous flux of sensations in time. His life, under the sway of this drive is dominated by material reality, as an endless series of sense-impressions, lacking any unity of the self.

> 'Its business is to set him within the limits of time, and to turn him into matter . . .' 'By matter in this context we understand . . . change, or reality which occupies time.' 'This state . . . is called sensation . . .' (L12:1)

By connecting the sense-drive with sensation in this way, Schiller relates it to the senses and thus to our physiological being, i.e. to our sensuous nature in its fullest sense.

In a way which is reminiscent of the first chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit[6], Schiller tells us that the life of bare sensation only has reality in the present moment, giving rise to no lasting determination, (being a passive, not a creative or formative state). The whole infinite potential of personality is unrealized (except in one limited aspect, in one temporal moment), for personality itself is absent as a unity, in this material flux of sensations over time:

> '. . . when man is sensible of the present, the whole infinitude of his possible determinations is confined to this single mode of his being. Wherever . . . this drive functions exclusively, we inevitably find the highest degree of limitation.' '. . . his Personality is suspended as long as he is ruled by sensation, and swept along by the flux of time.' (L12:2)

However, the drive to a life of pure sensuousness is essential to the whole phenomenal side of man's life, his very natural existence. Moreover, it is only through this 'drive-to-reality', as one might call it, that his rational being and formal aspect is able to achieve realization. But the sensuous also limits this realization from achieving completeness, limiting reason to always achieving at least a partially sensuous realization:

> '. . . it is . . . to this sensuous drive that the whole of man's phenomenal existence is ultimately tied.' '. . . although it is this drive alone which . . . develops the potentialities of man, it is also this drive alone which makes their complete fulfilment impossible.' '. . . it binds . . . spirit to the world of sense . . .' (L12:3)

The sense-drive presses for reality of existence; for sensuous content; for real purposes, and a content to will. It could be called the 'reality-drive'.

> 'Thought may indeed escape it for the moment . . . but suppressed nature soon . . . presses for reality of existence, for some content to our knowing and some purpose for our doing.' (L12:3)

Turning to the form-drive, Schiller tells us that it proceeds from man's rational nature, his ego or personality. It seeks to introduce harmony and form into his sensuous realizations; and within himself, to provide an ongoing unity in change, unifying the flux of temporal sensations.

> '. . . the formal drive, proceeds from . . . his rational nature[7], and is intent on . . . bring[ing] harmony into the diversity of his manifestations, and to affirm his Person among all his changes of Condition.' (L12:4)

In this passage, Schiller seems to simply identify the form-drive with the activities of the ego, so that his description of the form-drive repeats the account of the operations of the ego already provided in the last Letter.[8] (In the rest of the treatise, there are a number of places in which Schiller uses the terms 'nature' or

'drive' as though they were synonymous, in a rather loose way.)

In what sounds like a passage from Hegel's Philosophy of Right[9] (written 25 years later), Schiller says

> '[The form-drive] wants the real to be necessary and eternal, and the eternal and the necessary to be real. In other words, it insists on truth and on the right.' (L12:4)

What he is saying here, is that the form-drive seeks to make the phenomenal become rational; and to make the supersensible become manifest in the phenomenal. Put more simply, in knowing its aim is rational truth; in willing, its aim is to realize the moral law.

Continuing to discuss the aim of the form-drive in terms of rational cognition and moral volition, Schiller contrasts it, in this respect, with the sense-drive:

> 'If the first drive only furnishes cases, this second one gives laws - laws for every judgement, where it is a question of knowledge, laws for every will, where it is a question of action.' (L12:5)

In other words, whereas the sense-drive only provides endless particular sensuous items of experience, the form-drive provides the universal principles whereby our judgement is enabled to subsume a particular sensuous representation under an appropriate concept; the form-drive also provides the universal precepts which enable the will to determine itself morally. Now there is a notable identification here, of each drive with the nature it is supposed to 'proceed' from. Schiller is conflating the distinction of nature/and drive, to the extent of endowing the latter with the ability to perform the functions of the former (furnishing 'cases' and giving 'laws'). Schiller's position here, also represents a remarkable break from the Kantian critical philosophy of mind. Schiller has the sense-drive, rather than the faculties of sense (intuition and imagination), furnish particular 'cases' of sensuous experience; he has the form-drive, rather than the faculty of understanding, provide laws and concepts for our judgement; finally, he has the form-drive, not the faculty of practical reason, provide the universal precepts for the moral will. This represents a considerable simplification of the complex Kantian schema of faculties,

reducing it essentially to two fundamental drives.[10]

Schiller continues to discuss the beneficial effects of the form-drive, but now in terms of how (through promoting both rational cognition and moral volition), it also develops our sensuous nature:

> '. . . in both cases, we wrest this our condition from the jurisdiction of time, and endow it with . . . universality and necessity.' (L12:5)

The form-drive rescues our phenomenal being from the limits of a purely temporal and material existence, by involving it in the process of the ego's rational cognition and moral volition. Particular sensuous experiences become endowed with universality in cognition; and particular sensuous impulses become determined by universal precepts in volition. The whole man is able to know and will rationally whilst having being-in-the-world. The form-drive allows an essentially supersensible being to remain free, whilst yet acting to realize itself in the sensible world. Schiller ends this discussion, with a statement that echoes Kant's view of the universal consequences of willing in conformity with the categorical imperative:[11]

> '. . . once you . . . practise justice because it is justice, then you have made an individual case into a law for all cases, and treated one moment of your life as if it were eternity.' (L12:5)

The particular and phenomenal are thus endowed with universality, and raised to a supersensible significance, transcending the limits of time.

Schiller concludes the Letter, with a statement which leaves no doubt as to where his sympathy lies as between the two drives:

> 'Where . . . the formal drive holds sway . . . we experience the greatest enlargement of being : all limitations disappear, and from the mere unit of quantity to which the poverty of his senses reduced him, man has raised himself to a unity of ideas embracing the whole realm of phenomena.' 'We are no longer individuals; we are species.' (L12:6)

The form-drive enlarges our being beyond confinement to the particular and sensible, towards what is universal and supersensible. From merely passively experiencing each particular sensuous datum, we instead determine all particular sensuous data via a unified system of laws, comprehending the phenomenal world, and freeing us from its conditioning, as we manifest our rational self-determination over sensuous determination by the phenomenal.

At the end of the last Letter, we saw how Schiller's statements affirming the mutual necessity of both aspects of our being for the achievement of our full realization, on closer inspection, assigned to our sensuous nature a very secondary role. In this Letter, we have seen the form-drive discussed in a way which makes it man's means of attaining truth in cognition and morality in volition, whilst the sense-drive is seen by Schiller as confining man to 'time' and 'matter', at best an unfortunate necessity for man's rational realization. (This is a view similar to Kant's idea of man's sensuous nature, as being a mere 'hindrance' to moral volition, making the moral will a 'dependent will'.)[12] As the Aesthetic Letters proceed, Schiller increasingly moves away from the ideal expressed in the earlier Letters, of harmonizing man's sensuous and rational natures. Despite recurrent claims throughout the treatise, that he is seeking a means to establish their equilibrious[13] harmony, he actually moves towards a rationally or form-drive dominated, asymmetrical relationship of the two sides of man.

Schiller's theory of two fundamental drives, has some similarities to Fichte's theory of two primordial drives in The Science of Knowledge.[14] For Fichte, the two drives are the theoretical drive, which involves the inwardly directed self-reflective activity of the ego; and the practical drive, which is outwardly directed in moral activity to realize the ego in the non-ego. Fichte conceives of the two drives as thus striving in opposite directions. The two opposed drives 'meet' on the battleground of the imagination, where they 'oscillate' in an 'interplay'. In all activity, a temporary equilibrium is possible through another drive to harmony (or 'indetermination').[15] Schiller too, sees the drives as similarly essentially receptive/and active, as inner/and outer directed; and also seeks to harmonize them through a third drive which establishes a temporary equilibrium of the two primary drives, through achieving a condition of indetermination (in Letters 19 to 21). This condition

has its reality in the aesthetic 'play' of the imagination (in Letter 27).

Despite the number of similarities here, those very few scholars who have at all bothered about the relationship between the philosophies of Schiller and Fichte, have mostly denied a connection between their theories of drives, on the ground that Fichte really only has one fundamental drive[16], not two, viz. the drive of the ego for realization in the non-ego. It is claimed that there is no equivalent of the sense-drive. It is certainly possible to dispute this interpretation of Fichte. But, even assuming it is correct, we have seen that Schiller too gives emphasis to man's formal realization, the realization of the ego and man's rational being in knowing and willing. The sense-drive is in a secondary position to the form-drive, right from the time of its emergence in this Letter. In the next Letter, and at various points in the treatise, Schiller will talk of establishing an equilibrious harmony between the drives, but in reality, this is not to be seen as a harmony of equality : in general, the form-drive increasingly dominates and subordinates the sense-drive as the Letters proceed. As much as for Fichte then, it is possible to argue that Schiller has,in effect, one primary drive, and that other drives are secondary.

In the last Letter, we saw how Schiller's initially separate descriptions of our two fundamental natures, as involving on the one hand, passive receptivity to sense-impressions/, and on the other hand, an active reformative activity, were developed into a relationship, involving the ego's rational organization of sensuous knowledge/, and its rational realization in the sensible world, respectively. This enables us to see these activities as involving a theoretical drive/and a practical drive, respectively, underlying both of which is the ego's fundamental drive to self-realization in the non-ego. It is thus possible to argue (on a number of levels), that not only does Schiller take on Fichte's distinction of the ego/and non-ego (in that of the person/and condition), but that he also takes on something of Fichte's theory of drives; and, as we shall see later (in Letter 19), Schiller also makes use of the framework of Fichtean epistemology.

LETTER 13

The Mutual Limitation of the Two Primary Drives

Schiller's purpose in this Letter, is to argue for the essential compatibility of the sense-drive and the form-drive, for their necessary interfunctioning, if either is to carry out its own function fully. He begins by telling us that although the two drives have opposing tendencies, as a drive to reality/and a drive to form, nevertheless each seeks only the realization of that side of man's being from which it derives. Thus the sense-drive does not threaten the ego's essential unity and permanence, whilst the form-drive does not seek to do away with diversity and change in sense-experience. The two drives do not naturally encroach upon each other, but are complementary. However, civilization, in its departure from nature, has led our drives to develop beyond their respective bases in our two fundamental natures.

> 'The sensuous drive does indeed demand change; but it does not demand the extension of this to the Person and its domain . . .' 'The formal drive insists on unity and persistence - but it does not require the Condition to be stabilized as well as the Person, does not require identity of sensation. The two are, therefore, not by nature opposed; and if they nevertheless seem to be so, it is because they have become opposed through a wanton transgression of Nature . . . confusing their spheres of operation.' (L13:2)

In a footnote, Schiller tells us that one drive should not be subordinated to the other. In particular, the sensuous drive should not be subordinated to our rational being, (an allusion to Kant's moral philosophy):

> '. . . by unconditionally subordinating the sensuous drive to the rational.' '. . . only uniformity can result, never harmony, and man goes on for ever being divided. Subordination . . . must be reciprocal.' (L13:2, fn. 1)

The ideal relation of the drives, then, is for them to be

reciprocally related, in a relationship of mutual subordination and limitation, so as to enable a co-ordinated full realization of the whole man. Here, Schiller appeals to Fichte for philosophical support:[1]

> 'Both principles are, therefore, at once subordinated to each other and co-ordinated with each other, that is to say, they stand in reciprocal relation to one another : without form no matter, and without matter no form. (This concept of reciprocal action, and its fundamental importance, is admirably set forth in Fichte's The Science of Knowledge, Leipzig, 1794.)' (L13:2, fn. 1)

Each drive has its own proper sphere, which is excluded from the dominion of the other. Both drives suffer a lack of complete realization if one dominates the other. They are both mutually essential to the full realization of the self, and the complete human being of their 'owner'.

> 'Necessary as it may be, therefore, that feeling should have no say in the realm of reason, it is no less necessary that reason should not presume to have a say in the realm of feeling. Just by assigning to each of them its own sphere, we are by that very fact excluding the other from it, and setting bounds to each, bounds which can only be transgressed at the risk of detriment to both.' (L13:2, fn. 1)

It would seem so far, that in Schiller's ideal model of the relationship of the two drives, they conjoin, but do not fully combine in the sense of interpenetrate. They maintain an external relationship with each other, rather than unite in a synthesis in which they lose their separate identities.

In a second footnote, Schiller implicitly criticizes Kant's opposition of natural inclination to rational duty in his moral philosophy. In such a view, our sensuous nature becomes a mere 'hindrance' to our rational being, making the moral will become 'dependent', and 'clogged' by sensuous impediments to its rational self-determination.

> 'In the transcendental method of philosophizing . . . one easily falls into thinking of material things as nothing but an obstacle, and of imagining that our sensuous nature, just because it happens to be a hindrance in this operation, must of necessity be in conflict with reason.' (L13:2, fn. 2)

In Schiller's view, it is education which has the important role of developing both drives, within their proper spheres. Our sensuous being needs to be developed, and protected from domination by the form-drive. Our rational being needs to be developed, and protected from domination by the sense-drive. Schiller sees the development of a drive as being itself the provision of protection for it vis-à-vis the other drive. Thus the educative process involves fully developing our capacities to feel and to reason.

> 'To . . . secure for each of these two drives its proper frontiers is the task of culture [education] which is . . . duty bound to do justice to both drives equally : not simply to maintain the rational against the sensuous, but the sensuous against the rational too.' '. . . by developing our capacity for feeling . . . [and] developing our capacity for reason.' (L13:2)

Schiller proceeds to elaborate how he conceives of this dual educative process, in a long but important paragraph, concentrated with significant points. It is convenient to first deal with it as a whole, and to then pick out specific points to notice. The general meaning of what he has to say can be summarized in the following way. Our sensuous nature needs to be developed extensively, in order to be made receptive to apprehending the maximum breadth and variety of sensuous experience. In contrast, our rational nature needs to be intensively developed, to comprehend and unify in a self-determining way, the material apprehended by our sensuous nature. The two modes of development are clearly complementary, for the reception of a wide variety of stimulating sensory experiences, will furnish the ego with novel material to conceptually organize and unify.

> '. . . the perfection of that faculty which connects man with the world will have to consist in maximum . . . extensity.'

'. . . the perfection of that faculty which is to oppose change will have to be maximum autonomy and maximum intensity. The more facets his Receptivity develops . . . so much more world does man apprehend.' '. . . the more freedom reason attains, so much more world does man comprehend . . .' '. . . education will therefore consist, firstly, in procuring for the receptive faculty the most manifold contacts with the world . . .; secondly, in securing for the determining faculty the highest degree of independence from the receptive . . .' 'Where both these aptitudes are conjoined, man will . . . draw . . . into himself . . . [the] infinitude of phenomena, and subject it to the unity of his reason.' (L13:3)

Now it is notable that here in L13:3, the drives of L13:2 suddenly become referred to as 'faculties', but without mention of any particular faculty by name (in the manner of Kant). It is as if the form and sense drives also function as faculties[2], a view which corresponds with L12:5, where Schiller talked of the form-drive providing concepts for cognition, and universal precepts for moral volition, viz. fulfilling what for Kant are the roles of two different faculties, those of understanding and practical reason respectively. Schiller appears to do away with Kant's complex schema of faculties and replace them with a simpler model based on two fundamental drives. However, in Letter 26 onwards, the Kantian faculties explicitly emerge, as the understanding and the imagination, which provides some evidence for a 'break' between the philosophy of mind underlying the earlier and later Letters of the treatise.[3]

Another point to notice in the above passage, is that Schiller identifies our sensuous being with receptivity/, our person or ego with rational comprehension of what the former being provides. Thus we see our sensuous being become reduced to the cognitive process of apprehension; whilst our rational being is identified with comprehension. Now if Schiller is following Kant's model of the 'transcendental synthesis of imagination', in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason[4], then it is not surprising that by L27:4, Schiller is able to reduce our sensuous being and its drive to the faculty of imagination/, and our rational being and its drive to the understanding, for in Kant's aforementioned model, the process of apprehension is executed by the imagination/, and that of comprehension

by the understanding (in harmony with the imagination). Thus we see here in L13:3, the first indications of a process of reduction made in Letter 27, whereby the whole of our sensuous being is reduced to the faculty of imagination, and the whole of our rational being is reduced to the understanding. In this way, the fundamental division within man, becomes resolvable, as a mere conflict between the faculties of apprehension and comprehension. (Schiller probably derived Kant's distinction of apprehension/and comprehension, from the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, in its treatment of the 'Mathematical Sublime'[5], rather than from the Critique of Pure Reason first edition, as he would have read the second edition of the latter work. However, this does not affect the argument I put forward here.)[6]

Schiller now moves from the plane of the ideal model of the drives' relationship, to look at the reality of their relationship in contemporary man. He also moves from looking at the ideal of education to its contemporary real deficiencies. He begins by telling us that although nature intended the two sides of man, with their respective drives, to work in harmony, in practice, we see one drive dominate the other, and either reason supplant the function of sense, or vice versa:

> 'But man can turn these relations upside down . . .' '. . . [and] let his sensuous drive encroach upon the formal, and make the receptive faculty do the work of the determining one. Or . . . let the formal drive encroach upon the sensuous, and substitute the determining faculty for the receptive one.' (L13:4)

Schiller sees in modern 'civilized' man (the product of Enlightenment rationalism and an over-refined culture), a tendency for reason to enervate sensibility and feeling. We all agree, he says, that it is a negation of true humanity to allow reason to surrender to sense, but equal damage is done to our full humanity when reason encroaches on feeling and sense. In scientific endeavour, we impose our rational constructs upon nature and fail to see it as it is, in all its sensuousness. In morality, we become obsessed with the form of our willing, the universality of our precepts, and lose the ability to empathize with others.

> 'The pernicious effect, upon both thought and action, of an undue surrender to our sensual nature will be evident to

all.' '. . . no less important, is the nefarious influence exerted . . . by a preponderance of rationality.' '. . . [and] the damage caused when the functions of thought and will encroach upon those of intuition and feeling.' (L13:4, fn. 1)

'However strong . . . the impact made upon our organs [of sense] by nature, all her manifold variety is then entirely lost upon us, because we are seeking nothing in her but what we have put into her . . . thrusting ourselves out upon her with all the impatient anticipations of our reason.' (L13:4, fn. 2)

'How can we, however laudable our precepts . . . be just, kindly, and human towards others, if we lack the power . . . of feeling our way into the situation of others, of making other people's feelings our own?' (L13:4, fn. 3)

Schiller criticizes the conventional view of a 'character forming' education, as involving the blunting of sensibility through the one-sided instillation of rational principles. To lose one's capacity for natural feeling, makes one deaf not only to the needs of the rest of humanity, but also deaf to the needs of our own humanity:

'But in the education we receive . . . this power [of feeling] gets repressed in exactly the measure that we seek to break the force of passions, and strengthen character by means of principles.' '. . . we . . . try to make character secure by blunting feeling . . .' 'And this, for the most part, is the operation that is meant when people speak of forming character . . .'[7] 'A man so formed will . . . be armoured by principle against all natural feeling, and be equally inaccessible to the claims of humanity from without as he is to those of humanity from within.' (L13:4, fn. 3)

Feeling, then, is an important part of what it is to be fully human : its loss or suppression, is a loss or suppression of our humanity itself. We become enervated beings living a half-life. Schiller takes the view that the man who is a tyrant with himself, suppressing some aspect of his own nature, will be a tyrant with others, suppressing them:

'. . . the man who is lenient to others will also be lenient

> to himself; and he who is severe with himself will be the same with others.' (L13:4, fn. 4)

There is an implication here, that internal personal suppression leads to external social suppression. The cultural and educational suppression of the individual is perhaps connected with the political suppression of society. (This would correspond to the view that Schiller put forward in L4:3 and 5.)

Although Schiller has said much in this Letter concerning the educative need for both drives to be developed and so confined to their proper spheres, he has yet to describe precisely the means for effecting this. In Letter 16, he will talk of two existential types of beauty which will provide this means, namely 'melting' beauty and 'energizing' beauty. Yet, here in Letter 13, he proceeds to talk as if our sole need is for the relaxing of our drives (and that by implication, we need only melting beauty). Schiller thus seems to anticipate the fact that after Letter 16, he will omit energizing beauty from any further discussion, so that melting or relaxing beauty becomes synonymous with beauty, as if there is really only one type.

> 'Both drives, therefore, need to have limits set to them and . . . need to be relaxed; the sense-drive so that it does not encroach upon the domain of law, the formal drive so that it does not encroach on that of feeling.' '. . . Personality must keep the sensuous drive within its proper bounds, and receptivity, or Nature, must do the same with the formal drive.' (L13:6)

Both drives then, must be limited in scope, and this involves relaxing them down from being drives to what we might call 'tendencies'. The sense-drive must not take over the function of thought; the form-drive must not take over the function of feeling. From Schiller's account, it is clear that the controlling limit on each drive's activity, is the opposite nature of our being. Thus our person or rational nature must limit the sense-drive, whilst our sensuous nature must limit the scope of the form-drive.

However, there are difficulties in this view. It would seem that each of these natural controls must be already developed aspects of our being in order to do the necessary controlling. The drive control function of each of our natures would seem to presuppose that each is well

developed, and so capable of acting as a powerful check on its opposite nature and its drive. In other words, the harmonious reciprocal relationship of the drives Schiller seeks, presupposes a harmony between the two aspects of our human nature. But, we may wonder, how do we get to this position in the first place?

Having said in the early Letters of the treatise, that modern man is either a savage or a barbarian, viz. is one-sidedly developed in his human nature, we may wonder how this can be corrected by the scheme here, which presupposes both aspects of man are developed and powerful enough to counter the drive of the opposite side of our nature. In more concrete terms, how for example, does the undeveloped and suppressed sensuous nature of the barbarian, re-assert itself to check the over-mighty 'out of bounds' form-drive of his developed and suppressing rational side? What Schiller describes above will not do, except for an ideal humanity, yet to be achieved. What he has described above, will maintain an existing equilibrium, but not create harmony where it does not yet exist.

However, to be fair to Schiller, we must remember that despite occasional forays in footnotes into the empirical realm, he is in this Letter, for the most part, describing the fundamental features of the Idea of Human Being. In other words, although he has lapsed into brief discussions about what is wrong with contemporary man and his education, he is still, in the main, supposedly 'deducing' an a priori psychological model of the essence of human being, by assigning to it various drives and describing their relationship. The discussion of how beauty may function as a corrective to the forms of one-sidedness men actually exhibit in their character, will come later, in Letters 16 and 17.

LETTER 14

The 'Play-drive'

The ideal relationship between the sense and form drives is, as we have seen, conceived by Schiller to be one of reciprocity. In this, each drive activates the other, but also sets a limit to the scope of the other's domain of influence, confining it to its own proper sphere (the aspect of our being from which it derives). Each drive only

achieves its full development and realization through the complementary activity of the other.

> 'We have now been led to the notion of a reciprocal action between the two drives, . . . [so] that the activity of the one both gives rise to, and sets limits to, the activity of the other, and in which each in itself achieves its highest manifestation precisely by reason of the other being active.' (L14:1)

Schiller now tells us that the achievement of such a reciprocal relationship of the two drives, is a condition demanded of us by reason.

> 'Such a reciprocal relation between the two drives is, admittedly, but a task enjoined upon us by Reason . . .' (L14:2)

Now this is a rather curious position for Schiller to take up. One's first thought is that he is attempting here to employ Kant's notion of theoretical reason regulating our faculties. However, such a notion is inappropriate for Schiller, as reason is a 'party to the dispute', as it were, in Schiller's rather different philosophy of mind. Our rational being and its drive (the form-drive), is part of what needs regulating into a reciprocal relation with our sensuous being. The issue is made more complex, because Schiller adds that the reciprocal relation of the two drives is the ideal state of man's nature, an ideal which he ought-to-be, but can never actually achieve:

> 'It is, in the most precise sense of the word, the Idea of his Human Nature, hence something Infinite, to which in the course of time he can approximate ever more closely, but without ever being able to reach it.' (L14:2)

Now this idea of a rational demand to achieve the unachievable, makes the task, in Kantian terms, seem to be one enjoined upon us by practical reason : that we should achieve moral perfection, viz. become a moral will. Kant too, saw this as a matter of approximation for 'dependent' wills like ours.[1] But how can we equate a demand that men should realize

the moral law, with Schiller's idea of a psychologically optimal ordering of the relation of our drives? What has the latter got to do with practical reason? The answer is provided by Schiller at the end of this Letter, where he discloses that the optimal relation of the drives is conducive to the realizability of morality. What he does then, is move the focus of practical reason's imperative from moral willing itself (as in Kant), to a demand that man should achieve that psychological condition which is conducive to moral volition. This is one stage 'back', as it were, from moral volition itself. Schiller then, not for the first or last time in this treatise, borrows a concept from Kant and puts it to his own different use.

It is also rather strange that Schiller should now say that the Idea of Human Being, which in Letter 10 was described as the a priori essence of man, is unachievable. Realizations of any kind, would be from this essence, as their basis. Moreover, whereas up until now, whenever he refers to an 'Idea', for example the Idea of Beauty, he means something which has both a transcendent and an immanent being[2], here he seems to make the Idea of Human Being more radically transcendent. It becomes an ideal model, a Platonic Idea or primordial archetype, which we can only reflect, but never actually realize. However, under analysis, Schiller's Idea of Human Being, is neither simply equatable with a Platonic Idea, nor as we have seen, with Kant's concept of moral perfection, the moral will. It is an ideal psychological condition, an optimal ordering of the fundamental structure of the human mind. It has more in common with Kant's technical concept of the 'common sense' in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement[3], with its idea of an optimum proportionate relationship between the faculties. But Kant certainly did not attach an imperative to such an optimal mental functioning; it is cognitively desirable, rather than morally necessary.

Schiller takes the view, that as long as only one of our two primary drives is developed and realized at the expense of the other, or if they are realized separately in an alternate manner, then man falls short of achieving full humanity; he does not conform to what he ought to be, to his ideal human nature.

> 'That he does actually conform to this Idea, that he is consequently, in the fullest sense of the word, a human being, is never brought home to him as long as he satisfies only one

> of these two drives to the exclusion of the other, or only satisfies them one after the other.' (L14:2)

There may be some criticism here of Fichte's position in The Science of Knowledge, that the drives must be satisfied by turn, and then never completely. The expression 'never brought home to him' in this passage, implies that awareness of the full self, i.e. full self-consciousness, is a product of man achieving the optimal relation of drives which Schiller equates with full humanity. The imperative to achieve this optimal condition, is thus also a requirement to achieve full self-consciousness. The importance of the achievement of full self-consciousness, and its linkage with fundamental human being, is again stressed in Letter 19, where Schiller writes:

> 'Only of him who is conscious of himself can we demand Reason . . . universality of consciousness; prior to that he is not a human being at all, and no act of humanity can be expected of him.' (L19:11)

That no act of humanity can be expected of him, implies that in Schiller's view, there is a threefold connection between 1) the achievement of the optimal relation of drives, 2) the achievement of full self-consciousness, and 3) the possibility of morality. Thus Schiller instead of merely applying the moral imperative to our willing as such (as Kant did), also applies it to the conditions of such moral volition being possible at all, viz. self-consciousness and harmony between the primary drives.[4] And, not only to subjective conditions of moral willing, but also its objective conditions, for as we saw in Letter 3, Schiller talks of the moral necessity to abolish the Natural State and establish a Moral State, (cf. L3:3). Schiller's position is more complex and realistic than that of Kant, in this wider view of the necessary conditions of moral willing, and wider view of the applicability of the moral imperative to such conditions.

Having established a moral requirement to achieve self-consciousness, and harmony between the drives, Schiller now proceeds to the means whereby this condition may be achieved. He tells us that when man exercises both drives simultaneously, he is aware of his ego's self-determination, viz. his freedom as a person to realize and determine himself; at the same time, he is also aware of his sensible

material existence. This involves a self-conscious awareness (of both a rational and intuitive kind), of one's complete human nature. Now Schiller implies such a wholistic[5] or total self-consciousness, is externally generated by a symbolic object, an object which by its own harmonious combination of form/and sensuousness, in turn harmoniously activates both these sides of ourselves in its recognition. In its harmony of form/and sense, such an object sets before us a symbol of what we ourselves ought to be, our ideal being.

> 'Should there, however, be cases in which he were to have this twofold experience simultaneously, in which he were to be at once conscious of his freedom and sensible of his existence, were, at one and the same time, to feel himself matter and come to know himself as mind, then he would in such cases, and in such cases only, have a complete intuition of his human nature, and the object which afforded him this vision would become for him a symbol of his accomplished destiny . . .' (L14:2)

Now when, in this way, through such an external symbolic object, the two primary drives co-operate in concerted activity, they give rise to a secondary drive, the combined psychological product of their activity : the play-drive. The play-drive is not seen by Schiller as merely a passive product of the other two drives combination; once activated, it reacts on each of them, determining them to a new modified form, ensuring and developing their co-operation in harmony. In other words, the play-drive, once activated, is a power in its own right. Referring to the effect of experiencing appropriate symbolic objects, Schiller says

> '. . . cases of this sort . . . would awaken in him a new drive which, precisely because the other two drives co-operate within it, would be opposed to each of them considered separately . . .' 'The sense-drive demands that there shall be change . . . the form-drive demands . . . there shall be no change. That drive . . . in which both the others work in concert . . . the play-drive . . . would be directed towards . . . reconciling . . . change with identity.' (L14:3)

The sense-drive demands change and sensuous content. The form-drive

demands identity and rational form. The play-drive, as the product of their combination, provides rational identity in sensuous change in the subject; and a formed sensuous content in the (beautiful) object. What Schiller is doing here, is laying down the groundwork for later Letters, in which he will discuss beauty's ability to reconcile the rational/and sensuous in man, harmonizing his atemporal transcendent aspect/and his temporal phenomenal aspect; thus achieving a psychological ground for moral volition which is evoked through the apprehension of objects which themselves embody a formal and sensuous harmony. In other words, he will interrelate our optimal psychological condition, with the perception of beauty, and the possibility of morality.

In what is both a difficult and important passage, Schiller tells us that,

> 'The sense-drive wants to be determined, wants to receive its object; the form-drive wants itself to determine, wants to bring forth its object. The play-drive, therefore, will endeavour so to receive as if it had itself brought forth, and so to bring forth as the intuitive sense aspires to receive.' (L14:4)

The sense-drive wants to be externally determined by a sensuous object, receiving it into itself. The form-drive wants to externally determine the self qua ego, realizing it in objectivity, by reforming the latter to self-conformity. The play-drive is receptive of an object which is not merely an object as such, but a reflection of the self brought forth from subjectivity and realized in and as an object. It is determined by something which has been already re-formed by itself, to reflect itself qua the harmony of form and sense. The past tense of 'to receive as if it had itself brought forth', is thus central to interpreting the meaning of the passage and for understanding its significance for the play-drive. The object which determines the subject, and which it receives, is a subjectified object, which has already been re-formed by its self-determining volitional activity. Such a subjectified, essentially formal object, is an art object. The play-drive 'receives' in aesthetic contemplation, and 'brings forth' in artistic production.

The meaning of the above passage can be further clarified, in terms of the process of artistic production and aesthetic contemplation, by

reference to a passage in Schiller's article reviewing Matthisson's nature or landscape poetry.[6] There is a passage in this article, where Schiller writes

> '. . . there are always two demands which no poet worthy of the name can avoid : First he must leave the imagination free play and self-determination, and secondly he must stimulate a specific sensation and be certain of his effect.' 'How does the poet overcome this contradiction? By this : that he prescribes for our full imagination no other path than that which it would have to take in its freedom and following its own laws . . .'[7]

What Schiller is saying here, is that the poet must form his material so as to leave our imagination scope for free play, yet suggest definite meanings and achieve specific emotions in the reader. He does this by providing a form the imagination of the reader would have produced for itself in its freedom.[8] (This idea puts one in mind of Hegel's view of the State providing laws which the individual would have willed for himself, so that he remains free in obeying such laws.)[9] An important aspect of the poet's technique is also to leave the determination of ideas and feelings incomplete, leaving free the imagination of the reader to complete them for himself. This is obviously a freedom within pre-ordered limits, carefully designed by the poetic genius to give the illusion of full freedom to the reader.

Now if we return to the passage again (L14:4), the crucial sentence of it concerning the play-drive, can now be read in the light of the above discussion of poetry's creation/and appreciation. (I will use Podro's translation here.)

> 'The play-drive is stirred to receive [in aesthetic contemplation] as it would itself have [freely] produced, and so [aesthetically] produce in the way sense aspires to receive [viz. to produce sensuously embodied forms].'[10]

The meaning of the passage can now be stated in the following way. The play-drive is the psychological basis of aesthetic contemplation and artistic production. In its receptive aspect (aesthetic contemplation), it seeks to receive forms in a way which although

semi-determined by the artist already, still leaves the contemplator free and self-determining, as the artist has produced a form in the manner the recipient would have done had his own imagination and understanding been given full true freedom. In its active aspect (in artistic production), the play-drive seeks to produce sensuous forms (phenomenal configurations), the kind of forms the senses strive to receive (and thus not, for example, abstract geometrical forms such as triangles, etc). This short and difficult passage is important, in that it is the only time in the treatise, Schiller makes it at all clear (!) that the play-drive is the basis of both artistic production and aesthetic contemplation; and not merely one or the other, or some much wider concept which has no special relation to aesthetic perception or to art.

The concept of the play-drive receives a more full development, and one made more epistemologically complex through the mediation of Fichtean terminology, in Letters 19 to 21. The crucial idea developed in these later Letters, is that it is a condition of psychic 'indetermination'.[11] Although there is no direct reference here in Letter 14 to this more complex concept of the play-drive, one can nevertheless foresee its development in the passage quoted from L14:4, if one views it as the posing of a philosophical antinomy (in the manner of Kant in his Critiques). When Schiller, here in Letter 14 says

> 'The sense-drive wants to be determined . . . the form-drive wants itself to determine . . .' (L14:4)

one can see, perhaps, how this might be 'resolved', if the play-drive is a state of indetermination between being determined/and determining.[12]

In another difficult passage, Schiller tells us that the effect of the unfettered sense-drive on its own, is to succumb the whole psyche to the necessity of nature. The effect of the unfettered form-drive on its own, is to impose on the psyche the rational necessity of moral precepts. The primary drives thus separately exercise two types of constraint upon the whole of our being : subjecting it either to natural or moral necessity. Now the play-drive, as their combination, exerts a double, but at the same time, mutually modifying constraint:

> 'Both drives . . . exert constraint upon the psyche; the

> [sense-drive] through the laws of nature, the [form-drive] through the laws of reason. The play-drive, in consequence, as the one in which both the others act in concert, will exert upon the psyche at once a moral and a physical constraint; it will . . . annul all constraint too, and set man free both physically and morally.' (L14:5)

The idea of the play-drive both exerting and annulling constraint, at first seems contradictory. The play-drive will exercise upon the whole psyche, both a moral and physical constraint, but will also set man free physically and morally, by removing the compulsion from each. What Schiller is getting at here, is that the combination of drives in the play-drive strengthens each side of our nature so as to be capable of withstanding the drive of the opposite side. They mutually mitigate each other's power qua drives, reducing their oppositional compulsions to complementary tendencies. What we might call the 'de-driving' of our sensuous nature, enables our feelings to be compatible with rational ideas and moral precepts. The 'de-driving' of our rational nature, removes the harsh compulsion of reason and morality in relation to sense, reconciling reason and morality/with the life of the senses.

> '[The play-drive] to the extent that it deprives feelings and passions of their dynamic power . . . will bring them into harmony with the Ideas of reason; and to the extent that it deprives the laws of reason of their moral compulsion, it will reconcile them with the interests of the senses.' (L14:6)

Despite appearances, what Schiller has in mind here, is not some mutual 'neutering' of feeling/and reason, to force a harmony between the two sides of our being by creating a diluted and rather empty third neutral state of being (in which we would be both enervated/and amoral). What he has in mind is a harmonious conjunction, in which each primary drive retains power within its own appropriate sphere, but where each is able, by its own developed power, to restrain that of the other. It is a matter of what we could call a 'balance of powers' arrangement.[13] Each power is strong, but this enables it to curb its opposite from being encroachingly too powerful. The two primary drives thus not only complement each other in function, but

through the play-drive regulate each other's growth and development. The reciprocity Schiller envisages between the drives, is dynamic, with each drive functioning at a high level. The result of their interaction, is a creative-receptivity[14] which promotes aesthetic response/creativity, and a harmony of reason and sense which is conducive to moral volition.

It is notable that in L14:5, Schiller introduces the term 'psyche' (Gemüt) into the treatise, as that which all three drives, and both types of necessity, act upon. Wilkinson and Willoughby suggest that we should understand the psyche to be the whole mind.[15] However, this creates the problem of how drives which operate within the mind, and are thus part of the mind, can yet act upon the whole mind. What the drives are acting upon, must be logically distinct from, and more specific than, the whole mind. The concept of the psyche is therefore, I suggest, better understood in narrower terms as the ego.

It may be objected, that the ego is the ground of the form-drive, and too closely linked to that drive to be acted upon by it. However, we have already seen in Letter 12, how the activity of the ego ultimately grounds both primary drives (and not merely the form-drive); and here in Letter 14, Schiller has made it clear that the ego or psyche is reciprocally affected by what it grounds, experiencing necessity and constraint when affected by one of its drives, and freedom when affected by both in the play-drive (cf. Letter 14:5). In Letter 21, Schiller tells us that

> '. . . The psyche may be said to be . . . determined inasmuch as it limits itself, by virtue of its own absolute power.'[16] (L21:3)

Schiller here identifies the psyche with that aspect of man's being which is unconditioned (or absolute). He also implies that the drives which either rationally or sensuously determine it, are grounded in itself, as modes of its own either active or receptive activity, so that it ultimately determines or limits itself.

The earlier concept of the 'person' (in Letters 11 to 13), referred to the one-sidedly rational ego, which was closely associated with the form-drive. Through the full awareness of its whole humanity, achieved by the interaction of reason and sense in the play-drive, the ego becomes fully self-conscious. The psyche then, denotes the fully self-conscious personality, the person who has integrated his sensuous

being and its drive into his concept of the self. It is for this reason that, having now developed the concept of the play-drive, we hear little more about the abstractly rational 'person' in the treatise. From now on, Schiller favours the term 'psyche', to denote the more complete and self-conscious being at the centre of all our activities.

By introducing the concept of the psyche, Schiller is more explicitly psychologizing the sense-drive, diminishing its physiological aspect. The fundamental division within our whole being, between our rational/and sensuous natures, which was highlighted in the early Letters of the treatise, now becomes a microcosmic division within the mind, involving the ego or psyche being beset by two opposing psychological drives. The focus of the division has thus narrowed, a process of reduction which will be completed in Letter 27, when it becomes a mere conflict between two cognitive faculties.

In terms of Schiller's 'transcendental' philosophical enterprise, as outlined in Letter 10, Schiller has now established what is man's fundamental human nature. The next step, is to establish what is logically necessary as a condition of its realization, viz. the play-drive activated by Beauty. Now there is a problem in this enterprise concerning the logical status of the play-drive. For Schiller makes it clear that it is not a fundamental drive, but a derivative secondary one. Is it, then, part of the a priori model of our human being? Initially one may think that there is no reason why it should not be seen as derivative and secondary in the sense of being logically deduced within the context of an a priori model, and so still be itself a priori in status. Now there are two problems here : 1) The play-drive is not logically deduced but rather psychologically asserted. 2) The play-drive is externally generated or evoked by a beautiful existential object[17], so that its being derives from a posteriori experience. Its logical status, as a priori or a posteriori, is then, at best ambiguous, but the evidence points to its having an a posteriori standing which is incongruous in a transcendental deduction.

LETTER 15

Beauty as 'Living Form' : The Objective Correlative of the Play-Drive

In this Letter, Schiller is concerned with the transcendental deduction of the Idea of Beauty from the Idea of Human Being, viz. from the a priori model of our fundamental human nature which he believes he has established in Letters 11 to 14. He will also briefly discuss how the Idea of Beauty relates to existential beauty, and how the concept of the play-drive relates to the reality of the play-drive.

He begins by telling us that the object of the sense-drive is 'life', which he describes as sensuous material being in general. The object of the form-drive is said to be 'form', viz. the formal characteristics of being in general. The object of the play-drive, combining these two primary drives, is 'living form', which at this stage, he defines simply as the aesthetic qualities of being in general.

> 'The object of the sense-drive . . . we call life . . . designating all material being and all that is immediately present to the senses. The object of the form-drive . . . we call form . . . which includes all the formal qualities of things and all the relations of these to our thinking faculties. The object of the play-drive . . . may therefore be called living form : a concept serving to designate all the aesthetic qualities of phenomena and, in a word, what . . . we call Beauty.' (L15:2)

In the description of our two primary drives in the above passage, there is an interesting movement from subject/to object/back to subject. Thus we have the sense-drive/whose object is matter/perceived by our 'senses'. The form-drive has/form as its object/and this is referred back to the 'thinking faculties'. The question of interest here, concerns how Schiller conceives of the relationship between the two subjective elements he connects with each type of object. Are the subjective terms synonymous? In earlier Letters, we have seen Schiller apparently identify a drive with a nature or a faculty, and here would seem to be another instance of this. Again it is possible to see in this, the gradual identification of our sensuous/and rational natures, with the sense/and form drives, and from this, their identification with the faculties of sense/and thought. But can we equate our sensuous nature, including

the body, with the faculty of sense in this way? Schiller's reductive process is being continued, and subtly reinforced by the repetition of related terms to function synonymously,while he is seemingly dealing with some other issue (here, the deduction of the Idea of Beauty).

Schiller does not intend us to understand the concept of living form in a literal way, by interpreting it simply as the organically structured. Quite lifeless stones, he tells us, can become the living form of sculpture. Quite live things, having an organic form, e.g. the human being, may yet lack beauty and that dynamic relation of form and material content that we recognize as beautiful only when we experience it.

> 'A block of marble, though it is and remains lifeless, can nevertheless, thanks to . . . the sculptor, become living form; and a human being, though he may live and have form, is far from being on that account a living form.'[1] (L15:3)

What Schiller is getting at here, is that the mere conjunction of form/and material content will not itself produce beauty. We know that form and content are necessary, but they are not sufficient, conditions of beauty:

> '. . . because we know how to specify the elements which when combined produce beauty, this does not mean that its genesis has as yet in any way been explained; for that would require us to understand the actual manner of their combining, and this . . . remains for ever inaccessible to our probing.' (L15:4)

Because, then, we know the two factors which combine to produce beauty, viz. form and sensuous content (or 'life'), only means that we know its necessary ingredients. But we do not know how or why sometimes their relation does, or does not, produce beauty. They are necessary, not sufficient conditions of beauty. The process whereby they become sufficient in their mutual relation, is unknowable. We can only recognize beauty when we see or hear it in experience, a posteriori; we cannot formulate it in advance, a priori.[2] But this may raise doubts about the viability of Schiller's attempt, in this Letter, to transcendentally deduce an a priori Idea of Beauty.[3]

In L15:3, there is an interesting sentence, where in relation to our judgement of human beauty, Schiller tells us that

> 'Only when his form lives in our feeling and his life takes on form in our understanding, does he become living form; and . . . we adjudge him beautiful.' (L15:3)

What is interesting here, is how Schiller deliberately mismatches the aspect of the object/and the aspect of the subject who perceives it. Thus form is related not to the understanding as one might expect, but to feeling; and life (sensuous matter), is related not to our sentient being, but to the understanding. This device serves to emphasize the interaction and reciprocity of drives and natures at work in the perception of beauty. However, it seems to be at some variance with L13:4, in which Schiller condemned the determining faculty doing the work of the receptive one, and vice versa. Moreover, the play-drive was supposed to keep each drive confined to its own sphere, and not to involve an exchange of functions in this manner.

The above passage is also notable for its early reference in the treatise, to the faculty of the understanding (one of the faculties in Kant's critical philosophy of mind). Beauty itself is described in Kantian terms here, as involving a subjective judgement of taste, based upon the relationship of the faculties of sense and understanding. Following the discussion in L15:2, concerning the objective referents of the drives (i.e. 'life' and 'form'), we have here a discussion of their subjective 'inner' references. We see the beginning of a tendency by Schiller, to incorporate the two sides of our being and their respective drives, into a more Kantian view of aesthetic experience, couched in terms of an interrelation of faculties (a view fully developed in Letter 27).

Schiller tells us that, in philosophical terms, the rational necessity of the concept of the play-drive lies in it being a logical condition of the completion and coherency of the concept of Human Being. Reason (in the manner of Kant), demands completeness in our knowledge. The exclusive operation of one drive leads to imperfection, limitation, and incompleteness in the concept of Human Being. The play-drive is thus a rational necessity for the perfection and completeness of the a priori model of our fundamental human nature.

> 'Reason, on transcendental grounds, makes the following demand : Let there be a bond of union between the form-drive and the material drive; that is to say, let there be a play-drive, since only the union of reality with form . . . makes the concept of human nature complete. Reason must make this demand because it is reason - because it is its nature to insist on perfection and on the abolition of all limitation, and because any exclusive activity on the part of either the one drive or the other leaves human nature incomplete and gives rise to some limitation within it.' (L15:4)

In this passage, Schiller appears to conflate what is a logical necessity in terms of achieving coherency for the concept or Idea of Human Being/, and what is a psychological necessity in order to make existential human nature complete. He talks of both necessities here, without clearly distinguishing them.[4]

Schiller's talk, in the above passage, of 'Reason' making a 'demand', in the sense of a metaphysical imperative, is inappropriate. He is again borrowing from Kant's critical philosophy, where reason urges us to absoluteness of cognition and volition, viz. to completeness of knowledge and to moral willing. Now Schiller has not philosophically established reason as anything more than our rational nature. Moreover, for Kant, reason demands moral perfection, not psychological completeness and harmony. Indeed, Kant's view of moral perfection involves - in Schiller's terms - psychological disharmony, through its dominance of reason over sense. In addition, the demand of reason for us to overcome limitation in our being, for Schiller, involves the achievement of self-determination resting on the basis of limitation and determination by nature (as we shall see in Letter 19); a concept of self-determination quite foreign to Kant, and much closer to that of Fichte. Thus Schiller here, is hiding behind Kant's philosophy, in order to secure support for his own different philosophical purposes.

Schiller next discusses his usage of the expression 'play-drive':

> 'But you may long have been tempted to object, is beauty not degraded by being made to consist of mere play and reduced to the level of those frivolous things which have always borne this name?' (L15:6)

Schiller justifies the term 'play' in play-drive, on the grounds that it indicates the connection between beauty and freedom, viz. living form's ability to free us from the antagonistic opposition of the sense and form drives, and from the natural/and rational necessity they respectively seek to impose upon the psyche. 'Play' indicates beauty's liberating effect on the psyche, and the harmonious co-operation it establishes between the two sides of our being:

> 'This term is fully justified by linguistic usage, which is wont to designate as "play" everything which . . . imposes no kind of constraint either from within or from without. Since in contemplation of the beautiful, the psyche finds itself in a happy medium between the realm of law and the sphere of physical exigency, it is . . . divided between the two, [and] removed from the constraint of the one as of the other.' (L15:5)

In employing the terms 'contemplation', 'happy medium', and 'removed' here, Schiller appears to modify his concept of the play-drive, so as to make it become a third neutral state of quiet contemplation, lying carefully between the realm of rational laws/and natural constraints. This view of it, as involving a blissful repose in a happy medium, is somewhat escapist and passive, lacking the dynamic reciprocity of the earlier play-drive concept (cf. L14:1), which involved an interaction of the two primary drives, where each expanded - yet contained - the other to achieve its 'highest manifestation' (L14:1).

However, paradoxically, Schiller now attempts to combine the above view of the play-drive, with the idea of it being dynamic as well. He proceeds to tell us that aesthetic play between our two natures and their drives, makes us whole, while expanding the two aspects of our whole being:

> '. . . it is precisely play and play alone, which of all man's states and conditions is the one which makes him whole and unfolds both sides of his nature at once. What you . . . call limitation, I . . . call expansion.' (L15:7)

However, while this restores some dynamism to the play-drive, it does not restore its full reciprocity, which the image of it as providing a 'removed' 'happy medium' for the psyche, to some extent undermines.

In an important passage, Schiller directly employs Kant's division

of three types of pleasure, in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement.[5] This enables him to distinguish what we might call an 'aesthetic attitude' to objects, from a non-aesthetic attitude towards them. He identifies an attitude of 'earnestness', in which we relate to objects in terms of their being either sensuously 'agreeable',/or else as rationally 'good', or 'perfect' instances of a kind. This contrasts with the aesthetic attitude of 'play', which later, in Letter 26, is revealed to be associated with the contemplation of aesthetic semblance. In the attitude of earnestness, we are concerned with the material existence of an object, whilst in play, the mere appearance (or semblance) of beauty is enough.[6]

> '. . . the agreeable, the good, the perfect, with these man is merely in earnest; but with beauty he plays.' (L15:7)

(The concept of 'play' here, is, of course, inseparable from the play-drive. It is an elucidation of that 'happy medium' between rational/and natural constraints, which the psyche enjoys through the play-drive's balancing of the two primary drives influence on the psyche, freeing it from either a preponderantly rational or sensuous engagement with objects.)[7]

According to Schiller,our experience of play and beauty will usually be defective. Indeed, he goes further, and states that we can never experience the full reality of the Idea of Beauty; nor can we ever experience the fullness of the play-drive (which alone can create or appreciate such ideal Beauty). Our experience always falls short of the Idea or pure rational concept of each.

> '. . . in actual life we should . . . seek in vain for the kind of Beauty with which we are here concerned. The beauty we find in actual existence is precisely what the play-drive we find in actual existence deserves; but with the ideal of Beauty that is set up by Reason, an ideal of the play-drive, too, is enjoined[8] upon man . . .' (L15:7)

Schiller next proceeds to reiterate his basic definition of Beauty, in the following terms:

> 'The beautiful is to be neither mere life, nor mere form, but

> living form, i.e. Beauty . . . absolute formality and absolute reality.' (L15:8)

Now there is a major problem with Schiller's definition of Beauty as 'living form', for it is simply not sufficient to enable us to logically or empirically distinguish beautiful objects from any other kind of phenomena, for all existential objects are varying combinations of form and sensuous content (there being no phenomenal object which is either purely matterless form, or purely formless matter). It is difficult to see how, then, Schiller can hope to delineate a distinct species of beautiful objects from this concept of Beauty. Hence his necessary recourse to a distinct psychological state in aesthetic experience, to connect such inadequately delimited objects to. By means of the concept of the play-drive, he attempts to psychologically distinguish the effect on our primary drives of the experience of beautiful objects/, from the effect on them of experiencing objects which are not beautiful. However, if Schiller is unable either to logically or empirically distinguish the objective causes of these two types of experience, can he coherently distinguish their psychological effects? It seems unlikely that having failed to logically or empirically distinguish the objective cause of aesthetic experience, Schiller can then hope to base a psychologically distinct effect upon it.

Perhaps, however, Schiller's distinction of 'earnestness'/and 'play', can provide him with a subjectively grounded, purely psychological basis, for distinguishing an aesthetic mode of experience from other modes of experience, a distinction based on an 'aesthetic attitude' (of play) we bring to certain objects as opposed to others. Such 'bringing to', cannot surely be arbitrary though, and must be related to certain (aesthetic) qualities in certain types of object. In any case, Schiller usually talks of aesthetic play as being activated or evoked by beautiful objects, viz. that play is not so much brought to objects, but is again an effect of experiencing certain types of object. Thus the need for Schiller to adequately conceptually delimit beautiful objects remains.

Schiller conceives of a very close connection between aesthetic play and the achievement of full humanity. Indeed, each is asserted to be a condition of the other : man cannot be fully human if he does not aesthetically play; and man cannot aesthetically play unless, or until,

he is fully human.

> '. . . man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays.' (L15:9)
>
> 'With beauty man shall only play, and it is with beauty only that he shall play.' (L15:8)

Now given Schiller's views in Letters 5 and 6, that modern man is a mere 'fragment' of a human being, these statements would seem to imply that contemporary man can neither play nor experience beauty. This raises the problem of how modern man can ever experience beauty, ever come to play aesthetically, and so become fully human. There must be some suspicion that Schiller's statements here, may close the door to human progress.

The important question must now arise, that if man only aesthetically plays when he is fully human, then in what manner does he experience beauty when less than fully human? Schiller's answer, I think, lies back in L15:7 (and later, in L27:4)[9], viz. that in relation to objects of beauty, partial man is in 'earnest' in various ways, only relating to beauty in terms of the 'agreeable', the 'good', or the 'perfect'. But this raises the further question, as to how the experience of beauty can raise fragmentary men to full humanity, and change their aesthetic attitude from earnestness to one of play? The solution to this implied end/means problem here, would be for Schiller to make ideal Beauty and the ideal play-drive (of L15:7) the end, and existential beauty and the reality of the play-drive be the means to their achievement. In other words, we get to the ideal by imperfect means.

However, whilst Schiller does talk of a less than ideal existential beauty (in L15:5 and 7, as well as in L22:4), we are given no concept of a serviceable less than ideal play-drive, to either create or contemplate such inferior beauty. Inferior beauty would involve an over-preponderance of sensuous content/or of rational form in the object, compelling us to judge it in terms of the 'agreeable'/, 'good' or'perfect'. But what could an inferior play-drive be? It could only be play mixed with earnestness, a hybrid play in relation to a hybrid beauty. However, such 'earnest-play' would be indistinct from ordinary play of a non-aesthetic variety, since for Schiller, it is its total

lack of earnestness which distinguishes aesthetic play from other kinds.[10] In other words, if Schiller accepts the concept of a less than ideal play-drive, he makes beauty no more educative or important for human development, than for example, card games. It would seem therefore that Schiller must not dilute the concept of the ideal play-drive, or else aesthetic experience in its subjective aspect, is not psychologically distinguishable from other types of experience which involve an element of play. This is important, for as we have seen, his concept of Beauty as 'living form' is insufficient to enable aesthetic experience in its objective aspect (as the contemplation of beautiful objects), to be logically or empirically distinguishable from our experience of any other kind of object. By his talk in L15:7, of the play-drive being in practice always less than ideal, Schiller is in danger of failing to either subjectively (psychologically), or objectively (logically and empirically), delimit a specifically 'aesthetic' domain.

If the concepts of 'Beauty' and the 'play-drive' are to be philosophically useful to Schiller, they must have meanings which are reasonably definite. Schiller attempts to give beauty a definite meaning by grounding it in the play-drive, as its objective correlative. But this makes it all the more important, that the concept of the play-drive itself, should be logically distinct in its meaning. This, for the reasons discussed above, entails that it must only function in an ideal way : it cannot create or experience beauty which is less than ideal. This results in the ideal play-drive being narrowly identified with the creation and contemplation of fine art, a view which corresponds with Schiller's description of its functioning in L14:4.[11]

However, Schiller wants to operate both definite and relatively indefinite, 'closed' and 'open', meanings of both beauty and the play-drive. He wants to be able to talk about either concept in a narrowly defined way (in their 'ideal' modes), but also to be able to branch out from this, and investigate the aesthetic aspects of a variety of phenomena, and of diverse domains of human experience, which entails a much wider concept of the aesthetic and aesthetic experience. Thus the reason why Schiller employs the ('open') concept of a less than ideal play-drive (as expressed in L15:7), is that he does not, in fact, want to delimit a specifically aesthetic domain, or at least not one which narrowly relates the 'aesthetic' to fine art. Thus while fine art is ideal beauty, and is related to the fullness of the ideal

play-drive, Schiller intends the 'aesthetic' to be understood in much wider terms. There can be an aesthetic aspect to many kinds of object (their formal aspect), and an element of aesthetic play involved in other types of play, or mixed with serious activities. Schiller then, does not want to delimit a specifically aesthetic domain : in a post-modernist way, he wishes to point to the aesthetic qualities in all dimensions of phenomenal being.[12] There is actually nothing new in this position from Schiller's view, as right from the point where he introduced the term to the treatise, he defined living form in very broad terms, as

> '. . . a concept serving to designate all the aesthetic qualities of phenomena . . .' (L15:2)

Just how very widely Schiller conceives of the aesthetic qualities of being, only becomes fully apparent in Letters 23, 25, 26 and 27, where it includes such things as the ordering of our physical life, ornamentation, love between the sexes, and ultimately, the Aesthetic State.

There is some evidence of an 'aesthetic break' between the earlier and later Letters of the treatise. Up to Letter 19, Schiller talks of beauty as the means for the aesthetic education of man, and relates it to a narrow concept of aesthetic experience in terms of the play-drive. In Letters 22 to 27, we see the aesthetic defined more widely in terms of form in general, whilst the play-drive is developed to become 'the aesthetic condition of the psyche' in Letters 20 and 21. Form replaces beauty; and a psychic state of 'indifference'[13] replaces the dynamic reciprocity of basic drives in the play-drive. It is as though Schiller, recognizing his inability to delimit beauty as 'living form', and as a result of his unwillingness to limit aesthetic experience to the 'play-drive', decides instead to adopt a much wider conception of the aesthetic, and one which simultaneously saves aesthetic education from being dependent upon, in beauty, a means of being effective, which already presupposes a high level of aesthetic education itself.

Schiller concludes the Letter, by looking back to a time when men did play adequately and were fully human. Play and humanity were both evident in the art and life of the ancient Greeks. But they transposed and projected onto their gods, the aesthetic attitude of play. Thus the gods are depicted in Greek art, as neither subject to natural nor

moral laws, but experience their sublation in the concept of Necessity or Fate. Their calm composure and contemplative attitude (visible in Greek statuary), is an image of that 'happy medium' (between the sense and form drives), that the play-drive bestows upon the psyche.

> '[The play-drive] was long ago alive and operative in the art and in the feeling of the Greeks . . . only they transferred to Olympus what was meant to be realized on earth.' 'Both the material constraint of natural laws and the spiritual constraint of moral laws were resolved in their higher concept of Necessity . . .' (L15:9)

Schiller ends the Letter with a psychological description of the experience of aesthetic play. We are at once attracted to the object of beauty, and in our lack of earnestness, kept detached from it. We are at once in a state of rest/and of excitement. The overall effect is a complex stirring of our feelings which is not expressible in a definite concept.

> 'Irresistably moved and drawn . . . kept at a distance . . . we find ourselves at one and the same time in a state of utter repose and supreme agitation, and there results that wondrous stirring of the heart for which mind has no concept nor speech any name.' (L15:9)

Schiller's debt to Kant's description of the 'free play' of the faculties in the judgement of taste, in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, is visible here. Kant described it as involving a 'quickening' of our faculties of feeling and imagination, accompanied by a multitude of indeterminate concepts in the understanding.[14] In contrast to Schiller's Fichtean epistemology and theory of drives, whenever he is discussing the narrowly aesthetic (i.e. the experience of beauty), in this treatise, Schiller's views are, in the main, derivatively Kantian. His talk in the above passage, of aesthetic play involving 'utter repose' and 'supreme agitation', presages his discussion in the next Letter of two types of existential beauty, viz. 'melting' and 'energizing' beauty, respectively. It is to these that we now turn.

LETTER 16

Two Existential Types of Beauty : 'Energizing' and 'Melting' Beauty

Schiller tells us that the ideal of Beauty, as the correlative of the ideal play-drive, involves the perfect union and balance of sensuous content and rational form. However, in reality, either form or sensuous content predominates in beautiful objects, with the consequence that our experience is always of one of two existential types of beauty.

> 'We have seen how beauty results from the reciprocal action of two opposed drives . . .' 'The highest ideal of Beauty is, therefore, to be sought in the most perfect possible union and equilibrium of reality and form. This equilibrium . . . remains no more than an Idea, which can never be fully realized in actuality. For in actuality we shall always be left with a preponderance of the one element over the other . . . in which now reality, now form, will predominate.' '. . . beauty in experience will be eternally twofold . . .' (L16:1)

It was disclosed in L15:2, that beauty is the objective correlative of the play-drive. Beauty pertains to beautiful objects, whereas the play-drive is our subjective experience of either creating or contemplating such objects. Thus, when in the above passage, Schiller says that ideal Beauty is the 'equilibrium of reality and form', implying balanced proportions of these two aspects of the beautiful object, he is putting forward a view which corresponds to the balanced reciprocal relationship of the form and sense drives in the ideal play-drive. Schiller's aesthetic model of Beauty thus corresponds to, or to be more accurate, derives from, his psychological model of subjective harmony. A balanced reciprocity is postulated, within the subject (between the sense/and form drives); within the object of beauty (between its sensuous/and formal aspects); and between subject and object (in the play-drive's production/and contemplation of beautiful objects).

The symmetry within, and correspondence between, the aesthetic and psychological models here, is later adjusted by Schiller, to create asymmetry whilst maintaining correspondence. In L22:5, he makes the

art object 'unbalanced', as form-dominated; leading to the psychological dominance of the form-drive, with rationality and morality as revised ends for man in the treatise. Thus, the ideal of equilibria in both subject and object, put forward here in Letter 16, is effectively lost from L22:5 onwards.

As the objective correlative of the play-drive, the beautiful object has a twofold effect upon our reciprocally related primary drives. Beauty simultaneously 'tenses' (or strengthens) both drives, as each provokes the other to greater activity, and 'releases' (or weakens) both drives, as each gives its opposite a checking power over itself.

> '. . . we must expect from beauty at once a releasing and a tensing effect : a releasing effect in order to keep both the sense-drive and the form-drive within proper bounds; a tensing effect, in order to keep both at full strength.' (L16:2)

Schiller may have derived the idea of a simultaneous tension and relaxation of both sides of our being, from a seemingly unimportant passage in Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, in which Kant describes the psychological effect of hearing a joke recited:

> '. . . the joke must have something in it capable of momentarily deceiving us. Hence, when the semblance vanishes into nothing, the mind looks back in order to try it over again, and thus by a rapidly succeeding tension and relaxation it is jerked to and fro and put in oscillation.'[1]

The parallel increases, because in Letter 26, Schiller will describe artistic beauty as aesthetic 'semblance' (cf. L26:5). In addition, in L16:1, Schiller twice employs the term 'oscillation', to describe the relation of sense and form in existential beauty.

Although ideally, Beauty will release and tense both primary drives simultaneously, to the same degree, in reality, Schiller tells us, the different types of beauty will either tense more than release/, or release more than tense, as 'energizing'[2]/and 'melting' beauty respectively,

> '[Ideally,] Beauty is to release by tensing both natures uniformly, and to tense by releasing both natures uniformly.'

> 'But [in] experience . . . it will always happen that to a greater or lesser degree, a preponderance entails a deficiency, and a deficiency a preponderance.' (L16:2)

Now following the earlier discussion, in L16:1, of the reality of beauty involving either a form or sense dominated object, one would have expected Schiller to now assert a direct causal connection between the domination of form/or sensuous content in the beautiful object, and the preponderance of a tensing/or releasing effect on our primary drives. The form dominated object could strengthen the form-drive, our more active aspect, having a tensing effect; the sensuously dominated object could strengthen the sense-drive, our more passive aspect, having a releasing effect. However, Schiller wants an overall tensing or overall relaxing effect on both drives, and says nothing in concrete terms about the features of the object that might produce either overall effect. (This means also, that his discussion in L16:1, of the beautiful object as being in practice either formally or sensuously dominated, does not clearly connect with his discussion of energizing or melting beauty, and so appears to be a somewhat tangential introduction to the main topic at issue in the Letter.)

It is interesting that Schiller does not classify beauty objectively, by the predominance of form or content in the object, but rather subjectively, by its effects upon our psyche (as 'melting' or 'energizing' our two primary drives). He follows Kant in understanding beauty primarily in terms of subjective experience. This contrasts with, for example, Hegel's aesthetics, in which major divisions of art into Symbolic, Classical and Romantic, are made with reference to the three possible relations of form and content in the art object itself.[3]

The ideal of Beauty involves a perfectly balanced unity of form/and sensuous content, and corresponds to a perfectly reciprocal play-drive relationship of the form and sense drives, in which they are both equally tensed and relaxed. In reality, however, beautiful objects are unbalanced in their relation of form and sensuous content, the play drive is unbalanced in its relation of the two primary drives, and presumably, the effect of these two imbalances is a predominance of either a tensing or relaxing effect on both drives. It is not clear though, from Schiller's account, whether the overall tensing or releasing effect is due to an existing imbalance of primary drives, or is the result of experiencing an unbalanced object of beauty.

Presumably it is both, as the latter would be created by the former (except in the case of natural beauty).[4] However, Schiller in this Letter only asserts that there 'is' an energizing and a melting type of beauty, and does not explain what their causes are.

> 'Ideal Beauty, though one and indivisible, exhibits under different aspects a melting as well as an energizing attribute; but in experience there actually is a melting and an energizing type of beauty.' (L16:2)

But in the next Letter, Schiller does describe the causes of melting beauty, in very general terms, as due to the effects of different predominances of sense and form in the object[5], so that an objective causal explanation of melting and energizing beauty has some warrant.

In this Letter, Schiller partially resolves the fundamental problem raised in the last Letter, as to how the play-drive and beauty can be both an end/and means. For here, Schiller describes existential types of beauty and experiential types of play-drive, which in their imbalances, clearly fall short of the ideal concepts of both. This confirms the interpretation that Schiller wants to argue for a progression towards ideal ends via imperfect means. (In Letters 24, 26 and 27, Schiller sketches a psychological history of man, in which we see an increasing adequacy of both aesthetic forms and aesthetic experiences, culminating in life in the Aesthetic State.)

Both energizing and melting beauty can, in Schiller's view, have an overall negative effect upon character.[6] Energizing beauty strengthens both drives, but the overall effect is a hardening of our sensuous side, a tendency to savagery, for our sensuous side profits most from the increase in strength. The effect of melting beauty is to relax both of our drives, physical and moral, but again the greatest loss is to our sensuous being, so that our character becomes enervated, soft and lethargic.

> 'Energizing beauty can no more preserve man from a certain residue of savagery and hardness than melting beauty can protect him from a certain degree of effeminacy and enervation.'
> '. . . the effect of the former is to brace his nature, both physical and moral . . . [but] it can happen all too easily that . . . our brute nature profit[s most] from an increase of

> strength . . .' 'And because the effect of melting beauty is to relax our nature, physical and moral, it happens no less easily that energy of feeling is stifled . . . [and] character too shares the loss of power . . .' '. . . [Gentleness degenerates] into softness . . . into apathy . . .' (L16:3)

It is curious that although both drives and sides of our being are said to be either strengthened or weakened, by each type of beauty, nevertheless it is the sensuous side which is affected most. This is presumably because it is the most affectable, being the most receptive to external impressions. However, Schiller himself provides us with no explanation for this.

Schiller scholars have noticed that after Letter 17, he omits energizing beauty from further discussion in the treatise. The reason for this, I think, can be discerned from a passage in this Letter. For the mass of men who are dominated by their sensuous nature, or for the ruling classes and intelligentsia who are dominated by their rational nature (cf. the 'savage'/'barbarian' distinction of L4:6), melting beauty by itself can weaken the overpowerful nature, and thus allow the suppressed nature the opportunity to develop.[7] Energizing beauty is apparently only required for those presumably very few men who, through frequent exposure to beauty, are in a state of equilibrium between their sensuous and formal natures.

> 'The man who lives under the constraint of either matter or forms is, therefore, in need of melting beauty . . .' 'The man who lives under the indulgent sway of taste [the harmony of matter and form] is in need of energizing beauty . . .' (L16:3)

The man of taste, contemplative of beauty, and in a 'happy medium' removed from the constraints of rational laws or nature, is in need of jolting out of his apathetic state of 'indifference'.[8] Clearly, Schiller can only envisage a very minor role in 'aesthetic psychotherapy', as we may call it, for energizing beauty. The vast majority of men are not in a state of psychological harmony and balance, but require melting beauty to reduce either rational or sensuous predominances in their character. Thus in Letter 17, Schiller will only discuss the ability of melting beauty to act as a corrective to one-sidedness of character. (Perhaps another reason why Schiller will

concentrate upon the effects of melting beauty, is that it weakens the drives, making harmony between them more obviously possible. The strengthening of the power of the drives by energizing beauty, may have made it a little more difficult for Schiller to plausibly demonstrate his overall thesis that beauty can restore psychological harmony.)

In Letter 10, Schiller put forward various viewpoints concerning the positive value or the harmful effects of beauty. He did not himself take a view in this debate, but instead took a view of it, telling us of the need to understand beauty from a transcendental philosophical perspective, viz. in relation to the Idea of Beauty. Having transcendentally 'deduced' the Idea of Beauty in Letter 15, he now re-asserts the importance of this transcendent concept for understanding existential beauty. He makes the point that disagreements over the influence of beauty and the value of aesthetic culture, are principally due to people not differentiating the two forms in which the Idea of Beauty exists, and their different psychological effects. The value of each type of beauty will be relative to the type of human character it is experienced by.[9] (In this, Schiller implicitly equates aesthetic value with what is of psychological value.)

> '. . . the discrepancy commonly met with in the judgements people make about the influence of beauty, and in the value they attach to aesthetic culture. The discrepancy is explained once we remember that, in experience, there are two types of beauty . . .' 'And the discrepancy is resolved once we distinguish a twofold need in man to which that twofold beauty corresponds.' (L16:4)

Schiller concludes the Letter with a brief methodological notice:

> 'In the rest of my inquiry I shall . . . setting out from the two species of beauty, move upwards to the generic concept of it. I shall examine the effects of melting beauty on those who are tensed, and the effects of energizing beauty on those who are relaxed, in order finally to dissolve both those contrary modes of beauty in the unity of Ideal Beauty . . .' (L16:5)

There is a logical difficulty in Schiller's stated aim here. It is

not at all clear how two existential types of beauty could be 'dissolved' into an a priori transcendent Idea, or pure rational concept of Beauty. Another logical peculiarity arises from Schiller's talk of the relationship of energizing and melting beauty to/the Idea of Beauty, as one of 'two species of beauty' to/their 'generic concept'. Now a genus includes what is common to the totality of its species, and cannot be regarded as a primitive concept which is 'one and indivisible', as when Schiller tells us that

> 'Beauty as Idea, therefore, can never be other than one and indivisible . . .' (L16:1)
> 'Ideal Beauty, though one and indivisible . . .' (L16:2)

In addition, the concept of a 'genus' relates to a natural kind, viz. is an empirical universality, which is inappropriately terminologically identified by Schiller with an a priori transcendent Idea. In seeking to relate the Idea of Beauty to energizing and melting beauty, by the device of 'empiricizing' the former, to become a genus in relation to its species, Schiller conflates logical and empirical forms of universality.

In this Letter, Schiller has moved from the transcendent plane of Letters 11 to 15, in which he established an a priori model of our essential nature and its drives (Letters 11 to 14), and an a priori model of the essential structure of Beauty (Letter 15). He has now moved into the existential domain, principally to deal with practical psychological concerns. His concern in this Letter has been to lay the groundwork for Letter 17, in which he will explore the process of aesthetic psychotherapy. He has already said a little in this Letter concerning how aesthetic education can utilize each type of beauty to act as a psychological corrective to imbalances of character. Melting beauty is therapeutic to those who are too tensed; energizing beauty is therapeutic to those who are too relaxed.[10] Clearly, Schiller does not see the negative effects on our sensuous nature of either type of beauty (which he discussed in L16:3), as a serious obstacle to their use as carefully employed correctives. Presumably, it is a matter of not over-correcting character into the opposite one-sidedness, or of not 'correcting' the wrong side of our character. But how do we establish precisely who needs what type of beauty? and how 'much' of it, in terms of quality and quantity? Schiller provides us with no

practicable criteria, either for accurate psychological diagnosis, or for aesthetic prescription. His approach continues to be, essentially, that of a speculative psychology, with little provided in the way of empirical corroboration, and with a lot more assertion than logical reasoning.

LETTER 17

Aesthetic Psychotherapy : Through Melting Beauty as 'Tranquil Form' or 'Living Image'

Letter 17 is essentially a short extension to Letter 16, adding little new information, except to briefly discuss two specific types of melting beauty. Now Schiller, as we saw in L15:4, has a concept of psychological 'perfection', which is related to, but is nevertheless essentially different from, Kant's concept of moral perfection. (For Schiller, psychological perfection is no more than conducive to moral willing; while Kant's moral will, with its rational domination, involves psychological disharmony.) Psychological perfection, for Schiller, involves the ideal of fullness of human being, resting on the dynamic interrelation of man's sensuous and rational natures, with their respective drives interfunctioning in a balanced reciprocity (in the play-drive).

Schiller now describes two basic types of psychological imperfection which can occur. Firstly, psychological disharmony may occur due to one of the primary drives being too tensed or strong, dominating our whole being. By implication, the other drive is simultaneously too relaxed or weak, unable to limit the range and intensity of the other drive. Secondly, psychological imperfection occurs when both our sensuous and rational natures are too weak and lack any drive. (Schiller does not diagnose as an imperfection, a position in which both primary drives are strong, as for him this conforms to the ideal of the play-drive.)

> '. . . if man's perfection resides in the harmonious energy of his sensuous and spiritual powers, he can, in fact, only fall short of this perfection, either through lack of harmony or through lack of energy.' '. . . man [is] either in a state of tension or in a state of relaxation, according as the one-sided

> activity of certain of his powers is disturbing the harmony of his being, or the unity of his nature is founded upon the uniform enfeeblement of his sensuous and spiritual powers. Both these contrasting types of limitation are . . . removed by beauty, which restores harmony to him who is over-tensed, and energy to him who is relaxed . . .' (L17:2)

Beauty then, can act psychotherapeutically[1] to correct either type of imperfection : melting beauty can relax the over-tensed individual, with an over-strong nature or drive; energizing beauty can vivify the over-relaxed individual, both of whose natures and drives are weak.

Schiller tells us that all beautiful objects are less than ideal, and are limited to being either energizing or melting beauty. (Which they are, is something determined subjectively, by a meta-judgement of our own psychological balance in the course of, or immediately after, aesthetic experience; cf. L22:4.) Such less than ideal, limited beauty, is created by less than ideal, psychologically imperfect men : by artists who themselves tend towards either sensuousness or rationality.

> 'Beauty will . . . in actuality never show herself except as a particular and limited species, never as a pure genus . . .' '. . . it is . . . man himself who transfers to her the imperfections of his own individuality, who by his subjective limitation perpetually stands in the way of her perfection, and reduces the absolute [unlimited] Ideal to two limited types of manifestation.' (L17:3)

In an interesting passage, near to the end of this Letter, Schiller tells us that

> '[Beauty] is dependent on [the human material] offered her by either the formlessness of nature or the unnaturalness of civilization, she will in both cases still bear traces of her origins, and tend to lose herself in the one case, more in material life, in the other, more in pure and abstract form.' (L17:4)

In other words, art produced by sensuously dominated men, will tend to be heavily imbued with sensuous content, whilst the rationally dominated and enervated human product of civilization, will produce

art works which are highly abstract and formalist in character.[2]

Schiller describes the problem of over-tension as a disharmonizing one-sidedness, in which either thought or feeling becomes an individual's dominant mode of activity. In this, the individual comes under the constraint of either rational laws or natural causality. He can only be fully self-determining and free, if both aspects of his full human nature equally determine his activity. Freedom thus rests on the balance of two kinds of necessity.

> 'I call a man tense when he is under the compulsion of thought, no less than . . . of feeling. Exclusive domination by either of his two basic drives is for him a state of constraint . . . and freedom lies only in the co-operation of both his natures.' (L17:4)

Nevertheless, as we will see presently, Schiller does not allow this 'co-operation' to involve reason being conditioned by nature.

Schiller next proceeds to discuss the two species of melting beauty : 'tranquil form' and 'living image'. Whilst describing them as different types of beautiful object, Schiller's principal concern is with their different subjective effects. Their objective differences are described in only very general and abstract terms, and nothing is disclosed concerning the particular concrete features of either type of object, which causes their respective psychological effects.

> 'The man one-sidedly dominated by feeling, or the sensuously tensed man, will be released and set free by means of form; the man one-sidedly dominated by law, or the spiritually tensed man, will be released and set free by means of matter.' '. . . to be adequate to this twofold task, melting beauty will therefore reveal herself under two different guises. First, as tranquil form, she will assuage the violence of life, and pave the way which leads from sensation to thought.[3] Secondly, as living image, she will arm abstract form with sensuous power, lead concept back to intuition, and law back to feeling.' (L17:4)

Both forms of psychological disharmony are described as being corrected by a process of 'releasing'. The sensuously tensed man is

'released' by a beautiful object manifesting a tranquil form. The spiritually tensed man is 'released' by a beautiful object manifesting matter as a vibrant living image, in which presumably, the beautiful object's form is heavily imbued with a vivid sensuous content.

It is notable how when Schiller talks in the above passage of the ability of tranquil form to 'assuage the violence of life' (or sense), and of living image having the ability to 'arm' abstract form 'with sensuous power', we see again (as in L16:3), how it is our sensuous nature which is most susceptible to being affected by beauty. Here, either type of melting beauty acts as a psychotherapeutical corrective to an over-tensed drive, by weakening or strengthening the sense-drive. In both cases, the influence on our rational nature is described as only indirect : a matter of either weakening sense, so as to allow rationality the opportunity to develop; or of strengthening sense, to balance a powerful rationality. The effect of tranquil form or living image, is not to directly strengthen or weaken our rational being in a positive way, but is one of indirectly influencing it in a negative way, by altering our sensuous nature's strength. Thus Schiller talks of tranquil form as directly and positively weakening our sensuous nature, to 'assuage the violence of life', so as to merely 'pave the way' for thought to develop. Similarly, living image arms or enhances our 'sensuous power', merely to 'lead concept back to intuition'.

Now apart from the fact that Schiller sees our sensuous nature, qua receptive, as the most affectable, there is perhaps another reason why Schiller only wants beauty to affect our rational nature indirectly and negatively, through the adjustment of our sensuous power. This is a matter, I think, of Schiller being mindful of the Kantian insistence on the autonomy of our rational being. Clearly, there would be a strong implication of heteronomy, if an external sensuous object, albeit a beautiful object, was able to directly exert a positive effect on our rationality. It would imply that an object in the world of spatio-temporal natural causes, was able to directly and positively act successfully as a cause, in a relationship where our reason would be a mere effect. On Kantian grounds, reason is unconditioned by the phenomenal world, by natural causation. Thus for all his concern with achieving psychological harmony, Schiller retains a Kantian view of the need for reason to be unconditioned by nature, in order to ensure the moral autonomy of the human subject.

The importance, in order to achieve a certain definite type of

adjustment to our psychological balance of drives, as to whether the beautiful object is dominated by form/or by sensuous content (as tranquil form/or living image, respectively), is now much more clear than it was in Letter 16. Yet, in Letter 22, we will see Schiller clearly asserting the need for an unbalanced, form-dominated art object (L22:5), precisely to avoid psychological imbalances of the drives. Indeed, the emphasis of Letters 22 onwards, is on the need for form in general : subjectively, in the development of the form-drive; and objectively, as the aesthetic aspect of objects. Thus Schiller will appear to move away from the ideals of his balanced psychological model (Letter 14), and his balanced aesthetic model (Letter 15). In the latter, ideal Beauty was described as the perfect union and 'equilibrium' of form and sensuous content (L16:1). But form comes to dominate his theory of the art object (in Letter 22), and his theory of aesthetic semblance (in Letter 26).

Referring to the different releasing effects of beauty as tranquil form/or as living image, Schiller tells us that

> 'The first of these services she renders to natural man, the second to civilized man.' (L17:4)

It is because Schiller views the mass of men as more or less 'savages', who are dominated by their sensuous nature, that from Letter 22 onwards, he concentrates on the educative effect of beauty only as tranquil form. He leaves behind much of the psychologistic terminology of Letters 16 and 17, with the various types of therapeutic beauty distinguished therein, and instead refers simply to 'beauty'. It would seem from the formalist position he adopts in his description of the art object in Letter 22, and of aesthetic semblance in Letter 26,that he is concentrating on the educative requirement of the majority of men for tranquil form. If this interpretation is correct, then Schiller does not contradict his concept of ideal Beauty (of Letter 15), with its perfect 'equilibrium' of form and content. The alteration in his emphasis in Letters 22 onwards, is partly explicable as due to his principal theoretical interests becoming more practically orientated, towards the process of aesthetic education. In Letters 22 and 26, we will see an examination of the type of formal beauty required for the psycho-ethical reform of the mass of mankind.

PART THREE

The Psycho-Historical Development of Man

(Letters 18 to 27)

LETTER 18

The Concept of a Psychological 'Middle State'. Criticism of Empiricist and Rationalist Aesthetics

For Schiller, as we have seen, beauty is able to act as a psychotherapeutical corrective to disharmony between our sensuous and rational natures. It is able to lead the sensuous man to thought, and the rational man to feeling, (not to an opposite imbalance, but to an equilibrium between our natures and their respective drives).

> 'By means of beauty sensuous man is led to form and thought; by means of beauty spiritual man is brought back to matter and restored to the world of sense.' (L18:1)

It is to the nature of this state of equilibrium that Schiller now turns. He calls it a 'middle state', lying somehow between sense and reason, and between a passive and an active disposition of character. In inducing us into this 'middle state', beauty is said to be linking what Schiller conceives of as two inherently opposed activities : feeling/and thinking.

> '. . . there must be a state midway between matter and form, passivity and activity, and . . . it is into this middle state that beauty transports us.' 'Beauty links the two opposite conditions of feeling and thinking[1]. . .' (L18:2)

Clearly, there is a need for an exploration of the nature of this 'middle state'. One may wonder whether it is, for example, a neutral 'point of indifference'[2]; or a tenuous holding together of two opposite conditions which are pulling apart; or a synthesis in which differences are sublated; or perhaps the two factors are simply done away with, and lost in an empty third neutral state. At various points, Schiller appears to adopt each of these positions.

Schiller talks here, as though he were, in the 'middle state', introducing a major new concept, but in reality, he is about to re-examine and further develop the already familiar concept of the play-drive, though now from the standpoint of Fichtean epistemology, rather than purely within the framework of a speculative psychological

theory of drives (as in Letter 14). (The term 'play-drive' itself is left behind, in favour of such synonymous substitutes as 'middle state', 'middle disposition', 'aesthetic state' and 'aesthetic condition'.) This re-examination and development, is only announced in this Letter; it will receive a protracted philosophical treatment over the course of the next three Letters (Letters 19 to 21).

Schiller tells us that we must commence the exploration of the middle state, by fully acknowledging the real opposition of thought and feeling, reason and sense. We must take their distinction seriously, or else any unity we achieve philosophically, will be by sleight-of-hand, a confused unity, which unites factors which were never really allowed to be opposed in the first place. The main philosophical task which Schiller now sets for himself, is to establish precisely how beauty can possibly unite what he views as two inherently opposed conditions. He tells us from the outset, that such a unity can only be effected by beauty having the ability to radically alter their inherent characters.

> 'Beauty, it was said, unites two conditions which are diametrically opposed and can never become One. It is from this opposition that we have to start; and we must first grasp it, and acknowledge it, in all its unmitigated rigour, so that these two conditions are distinguished with the utmost precision; otherwise we shall only succeed in confusing but never in uniting them. In the second place, it was said, beauty unites these two opposed conditions and thus destroys the opposition. Since, however, both conditions remain everlastingly opposed to each other, there is no way of uniting them except by destroying them.' (L18:4)

The influence of Kant can be seen here, in Schiller's description of the 'everlasting' opposition of reason and sense.

Schiller describes the philosophical task of bringing reason and sense into a relationship of unity, in rather extreme terms:

> '. . . there is no other way of uniting them except by destroying them. Our . . . task, therefore, is to make this union complete . . . with such unmitigated thoroughness that both these conditions totally disappear in a third without leaving any

> trace of division behind in the new whole that has been made . . .' (L18:4)

Here, Schiller tells us that what he now chooses to call 'conditions', viz. thinking and feeling, rather than 'natures' or 'drives' (as ever, he keeps altering his terminology, whilst basically meaning the same thing), will not just be externally related in an 'equilibrium', in a 'balance of powers' arrangement (as was the case with the concept of the ideal play-drive, in Letter 14), but they will be 'destroyed' and 'disappear' in a 'third' condition which will be a'new whole'. This talk of 'destroying' the opposed principles to achieve a 'complete' union, appears to be a movement from the play-drive's equilibrium, to a 'middle state' of synthesis; from a balanced external relationship of factors, to a simple unity in which each loses its separate identity. However, Wilkinson and Willoughby may be causing Schiller's position here to appear more extreme than it really is, for they translate 'aufgehoben' as 'destroying'.[3] Had they chosen the term 'sublating' instead, this would have implied that reason and sense retain their qualities to some extent within a third synthetical condition (rather than lose them altogether). This would enable us to interpret Schiller's position in a more plausible way, and one which more closely corresponds to what he actually will do.

The philosophical task which Schiller has set himself here, is not consummated until Letter 27. In L27:4, by reducing the opposition of our sensuous/and rational natures to the 'aesthetic play' of imagination/and understanding, respectively, the opposition of reason and sense does indeed totally disappear in a third psychological condition. But this is only achieved by the (sleight-of-hand?) device of reducing the scale of the opposition involved, to become one which is merely between two cognitive faculties. Such a 'new whole', is only a microcosmic unity of the more fundamental division of our rational and sensuous natures, which was operative in earlier Letters.

Half-way through paragraph 4 of this Letter, Schiller suddenly completely changes the subject of discussion, from his own philosophical task (for Letters 19 to 21), to instead deal with what he sees as two opposing methodologies in aesthetics. He proceeds to enter into a brief criticism of empiricist and rationalist aesthetics, which have, as he sees it, one-sided and therefore incomplete understandings of beauty. Empiricist aesthetics, he tells us, has a simple wholistic perspective

of both aesthetic experience and beauty, based upon the immediacy of feeling : focusing on the general sensuous characteristics of beautiful objects which evoke certain sensations in their perceiver. In contrast, rationalist aestheticians engage in a complex dissection of beauty and aesthetic experience, analysing the whole into discrete parts, and seeking concepts which are clearly distinct.

> 'Those . . . philosophers who, in reflecting on this matter, entrust themselves blindly to the guidance of their feeling, can arrive at no concept of beauty, because in the totality of their sensuous impression of it they can distinguish no separate elements. Those others, who take intellect as their exclusive guide, can never arrive at any concept of beauty, because in the totality which constitutes it they can discern nothing else but the parts, so that spirit and matter, even when most perfectly fused, remain for them eternally distinct.'[4] (L18:4)

Schiller conceives of his own methodology as enjoying the advantages of both approaches (whilst presumably, avoiding their respective defects). He tells us that he will examine the necessary conceptual distinctions and oppositions which the intellect makes in aesthetical matters, but will then also seek to draw them together into a unity, by means of an examination of the effect of beauty upon our sensuous nature. (He thus proposes to adopt each method separately, in an alternate manner, and will not attempt a synthesis of them.)

> 'We shall avoid the rocks on which both [rationalist and empiricist aesthetics] have foundered if we start from the two elements [form and sensuous content] into which beauty can be divided when considered by the intellect, but subsequently ascend to the pure aesthetic unity through which it works upon our feeling, and in which the two conditions previously described [of thought and feeling,] completely disappear.' (L18:4)

After Schiller's statement here, of his proposed methodology, it is interesting to consider whether he will actually carry out his stated intention. In Letter 22 (concerned with the art object), he does distinguish the 'two elements' (form and sensuous content), 'into which

beauty can be divided', and 'subsequently' establishes their form-dominated 'aesthetic unity'. The exploration of how beauty 'works upon our feeling', occurs throughout Letters 23 to 27. In these Letters, he examines from a variety of perspectives (historical, moral and psychological), the effect of formal beauty on our sensuous being : particularly the ability of beautiful forms to moderate feeling and sense, so as to provide the opportunity for our rational being and its form-drive to develop. Finally, in Letter 27, in the concept of aesthetic play, 'the two conditions' of thought and feeling 'disappear' as opposed conditions. Thus Schiller does more-or-less execute his announced methodological intention, of firstly conceptually analysing beauty (in the manner of rationalist aesthetics), and then secondly, studying the (moderating) effect of beauty on our sentient being (in the manner of empiricist aesthetics).[5]

What Schiller has done in this Letter, is announce the programme for the remainder of the treatise. In his earlier discussion in the Letter, of the 'middle state', he announced the general content and method of Letters 19 to 21. Following his criticisms of rationalist and empiricist aesthetics, he has announced the general content and method of Letters 22 to 27. Letter 18 is thus what we might call a 'signpost' Letter. Its function in this respect, corresponds to that of Letter 10, which set out his programme for Letters 11 to 17. Letters 10 and 18 are the only 'signpost' Letters in the treatise, and are located at turning-points in its content and methodology.

LETTER 19

Fichtean Epistemology : The Ego's Freedom Rests Upon Limitation

Schiller commences his exploration of the psychological 'middle state', by distinguishing what he calls two modes of 'determinability', viz. two fundamental ways in which man has the ability to be determined. Man has the potential to be either passively determined by the sensuous (his own natural being and external nature); or, he may be actively self-determining, internally or externally forming the sensuous, in thinking or willing, respectively.

'We can distinguish in man as such two different states of

determinability, the one passive, the other active . . .'
(L19:1)

Schiller proceeds to briefly outline the development of these two modes of determination, in a way which is simultaneously an account of the psychological development of the individual, and also a 'history' of the development of the psychological powers of the human race.[1] The mind 'begins' by being in a state of empty 'indeterminacy', in which it is simply not determined in any manner at all, but somehow subsists as a pure potential being. In the next stage of its development, the mind becomes externally determined by the sensuous, and acquires a content through its receptivity to sense-impressions.

'The condition of the human mind before it is determined by sense-impressions at all, is one of unlimited determinability.' '. . . [a] condition of complete absence of determination . . .' (L19:2)

'Now comes the moment when sense is to be stirred . . .' 'A perception is to be born in him. What in the preceding state . . . was nothing but empty potential, now becomes an effective force and acquires a content.' '. . . it is only . . . through the surrender of our unconditional determinability that we achieve determination.' (L19:3)

Now such external determination, implies something internal is being so determined. Receptivity to the externally sensuous, implies an internal non-sensuous receiver : the non-ego implies the ego. To experience the external as an 'other', presupposes the conscious distinction of self from not-self.

'. . . mere exclusion [of the sensuous] would never . . . produce reality, nor mere sensation ever give birth to perception, unless something existed from which to exclude, unless through some autonomous act of the mind the negating were referred to something positive . . .' 'This activity of the psyche we call judging or thinking . . .' (L19:4)

Thus arises, in Schiller's view, the self-determining activity of the ego, or as he puts it, the autonomous activity of the psyche. This now

active relation to what is received via sense, involves the ego organizing the non-ego, forming its multiplicity of sense-impressions into a unity, through the concepts and laws employed in thinking and judging.

The development which Schiller has briefly sketched-out here, involves a movement through three stages : 1) Non-determination ('unlimited determinability'). 2) External determination by the sensuous. 3) Self-determination (in which the sensuous is formed by the self). Clearly, stage 3) presupposes stage 2), and it is this point that Schiller is most concerned to bring out in this Letter, viz. that our freedom or complete self-determination rests upon the necessity of limitation by the sensuous, incorporates the sensuous, and so is not a purely rational self-determination. In this Letter, Schiller wants to distance himself from Kant's concept of a purely rational freedom, and instead put forward a more wholistic model of a freedom which necessarily rests on the harmonious balance of both our rational and sensuous natures. (In a sense, what Schiller is doing, is borrowing loosely from Fichtean epistemology[2], to attack Kantian morality.)

The development of the mind from the mere passive reception of sense-impressions, to the activity of forming the sensuous, is described by Schiller as a transition from feeling to thinking. Now, adopting a Kantian view of their relationship, Schiller tells us that the 'gulf' between feeling and thought, is not one which can be 'bridged' by beauty, but only by reason, which again following Kant, he describes as the 'absolute' (or unconditioned) faculty. (Beauty may, however, assist the transition from feeling to thought, by relaxing the power of sense; cf. 'tranquil form' in L17:4.)

> 'When . . . it is asserted of the beautiful that it provides man with a transition from feeling to thinking, this must in no sense be taken to mean that beauty could ever bridge the gulf separating feeling from thinking, passivity from activity. This gulf is infinite[3] . . . without the intervention of some new and independent [autonomous] faculty . . .' 'Thought is the spontaneous act of this absolute faculty.' (L19:6)

In this passage, Schiller appears to move from a Fichtean, to a more Kantian perspective, particularly in the radical opposition he postulates between feeling and thought (or nature and reason). He tells

us that this opposition is ultimately bridged by reason itself, with the unsatisfactory result that 'a party to the dispute', as it were, part of the psychological dualistic problem, is put forward as the solution to it. The real point of this passage, is that Schiller wishes to maintain both the Kantian opposition of nature and reason, and the Kantian primacy of reason in their relationship, so as to make the development from sensuous to rational human being, a movement self-determined by man's rationality, rather than one externally determined by a beautiful object, as this would threaten the autonomy of the ego.[4] Suddenly then, Schiller has reverted to Kantian concerns (albeit temporarily), whilst in the midst of a development largely couched in Fichtean terms.

There is some inconsistency between Schiller's statement above (in L19:6), based on a Kantian radical opposition of reason and sense, and Schiller's theoretical practice in this treatise, which assumes the possibility of a more harmonious relationship between reason and sense. In particular, Schiller's model of psycho-historical development, rests upon an implicitly Fichtean view of the relationship of nature and reason[5], in order to facilitate a continuous gradual evolution from sense/to rationality which incorporates sense. This development (which is given a much fuller treatment in Letters 24, 26 and 27), discloses no great 'leap' between feeling and thinking as a result of a Kantian 'gulf' between nature and reason. Moreover, as Schiller makes clear later (in L20:1, and L26:1), man's psycho-historical development is grounded in nature, is a natural development of increasing rationality, assisted by aesthetic experience. This is a position far removed from Kant's, and emphasizes the temporal priority of nature. However, when describing aesthetic experience per se, in terms of our subjective experience of beauty, Schiller tends to take up a more Kantian position. Thus whilst Schiller's theory of drives, and theory of knowledge, are loosely based on those of Fichte[6], his aesthetic theory is explicitly derived from Kant.

Schiller continues his discussion of the 'absolute faculty' of reason, telling us that

> 'The autonomy with which it operates excludes all outside influence; and it is not by providing an aid to thought . . . but merely by furnishing the thinking faculty with the freedom to express itself according to its own laws, that beauty can

> become a means of leading man from matter to form, from feeling to law, from a limited to an absolute existence.' (L19:6)

Here, Schiller appears to disagree with Kant's view in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, that aesthetic experience of beauty is 'subjectively final' for (or promotes), cognition in general. Kant had the experience of beauty induce an optimal proportionate relation of faculties for general cognitive purposes, in his concept of the 'common sense'.[7] In Schiller's view, reason's autonomy means that its thinking process, per se, does not require external aids. The value of beauty, is rather in promoting a general rational psychological development, in a twofold way. Negatively, as 'tranquil form' (cf. L17:4), beauty reduces the power of sense, and provides the opportunity for an implicit rationality to develop. More positively (as Schiller later describes in L26:8), the aesthetic reformation of 'natural' forms, develops our rational ability to express ourselves independently of what nature provides. In the above passage, Schiller particularly emphasizes beauty's value in

> '. . . furnishing the thinking faculty with the freedom to express itself . . .' (L19:6)

Its positive value, in terms of rational development, is thus in providing a sensuous medium for self-expression (in artistic production), facilitating the development of self-consciousness, a development which will be presently stated to be the condition of all moral volition (in L19:11 and 12).

Schiller continues this discussion of how beauty may assist our rational psychological development, by facing up to the problem it implies for mind's rational autonomy in relation to nature.

> 'But this presupposes that the freedom of the thinking powers could be inhibited, which seems to contradict the notion of an autonomous faculty.' '. . . we misconstrue the very nature of mind if we attribute to sensuous passions the power of being able to suppress the freedom of the spirit positively.' (L19:7)

Schiller admits that talk of difficulty in the development of thought from sense, and of the need for beauty to aid the transition by lessening the power of sense, makes it appear as if the rational mind

can be hindered by nature, is not fully autonomous in relation to nature. His employment of the term 'inhibited' here, provides us with a clue as to how we might resolve this difficulty. As with Kant's concept of the 'dependent' will[8], we may admit that sense can in practice 'hinder' or 'clog' an activity which in principle is autonomous. Schiller's own resolution to the problem is peculiar, viz. that any sensuous impediment is autonomously self-willed:

> '. . . the senses can never set themselves up against man as a power, unless the spirit has of its own free will renounced all desire to prove itself such.' (L19:7)

In other words, the determination of reason by sense, is a self-determined external determination : a matter of a weak spirit allowing itself to be heteronomously affected.

Schiller next proceeds to summarise his derivatively Fichtean theory of knowledge : The ego's rational activity rests upon the basis of the passive reception of external sensuous material to reform. Its freedom or self-determination, and its absolute character (as embracing itself and the not-self in its complete activity), rests upon the limitation of external determination by the not-self. Put in the most simple terms, the rational activities of the mind (thinking and rational willing), require external sensuous 'raw material' to work upon:

> 'The finite mind is that which cannot become active except through being passive, which only attains to the absolute by means of limitation, and only acts and fashions inasmuch as it receives material to fashion.' (L19:9)

At this point, Schiller connects the passive self/and the active self, (the self involved in limitation/and the self involved in absolute self-determining activity), with the sense-drive/and the form-drive, respectively:

> '. . . mind will accordingly combine with the drive towards form, or towards the absolute, a drive towards matter, or towards limitation, these latter being the conditions without which it could neither possess nor satisfy the first of these drives.' (L19:9)

Here, the sense-drive is re-defined in wider terms, as a drive not merely to matter, but to limitation. The form-drive is similarly widened in meaning, to become a drive towards absoluteness. Now, given what Schiller has already said (in Fichtean terms), about self-determination resting upon external determination and limitation, he has now indirectly provided another demonstration (in addition to that of L13:3), that the primary drives only fully function in a relationship of co-operation : a relationship in which the form-drive needs, and is conditioned by, the sense-drive. Contrary to Kant, therefore, our rational being in practice rests upon our natural being; our freedom rests upon necessity; and our 'higher' rational activities presuppose (rather than oppose, as in Kant), our 'lower' sensuous ones.[9]

Schiller now reiterates the position established in Letter 14, that the two primary drives in their full development, cancel out each other, qua drives or compulsions. They do not cease to exist, but are mutually limiting, and prevent the psyche from being dominated by either exclusively. However, whereas in Letter 14, it was the 'play-drive' that represented their harmonious equilibrium, and in Letter 18 it was a third neutral 'middle state', now we are told it is 'the will' which stands 'between' the primary drives, free from determination by either; and as the sole power which limits them.

> '. . . these two primary drives . . . just because both . . . strive towards opposite ends, these two compulsions cancel each other out, and the will maintains perfect freedom between them. It is, then, the will which acts as a power . . . vis-à-vis both drives; but neither of these can of itself act as a power against the other.' (L19:10)

The view expressed here, that neither primary drive can act as a power against the other, is at variance with the way their equilibrium was established in L14:1. Now it is the will which limits the drives, not each other in a 'balance of powers' relationship as before. Schiller's statement that only the will is a 'power' in its relationship to the drives, is strange. What is the difference between a 'drive' and a 'power'? Are the drives powerless? Schiller appears to be in a muddle here. Moreover, the will is conceived by Schiller as active and reforming, and consequently really ought to be closely related to the form-drive on Schiller's terms, rather than somehow located 'between'

the drives. And what meaning can we assign to a spatial concept like 'between' in this context? What does it mean to say a psychological item subsists 'between' two other psychological items? Schiller's solution to the age-old philosophical problem of freedom versus necessity, or free will versus determinism, on closer inspection, raises more problems than it solves.

In the last two paragraphs of this Letter (L19:11 and 12), Schiller discusses the importance of the development of self-consciousness. He begins by telling us that

> 'It is a necessity outside us which, through the medium of sensation, determines our Condition, our existence in time.' 'And it is no less a necessity within us which, at the instance of sensation and in opposition to it, awakens our Personality; [and] self-awareness . . .' 'Only of him who is conscious of himself can we demand Reason, that is, absolute consistency and universality of consciousness . . .' (L19:11)

We are thus subject to two kinds of necessity : natural and rational necessity. The external necessity of nature imposes itself upon us via our sensuous nature's receptivity. Rational necessity is a logical or moral necessity of our own, which arises from our negative response to natural necessity, as we seek to overcome the latter's alien determination. The ego's self-consciousness, is the prerequisite of consistent universal willing[10], and of the unity of knowing, and it arises from awareness of the self as being distinct from, and opposed to, the not-self. The influence of Fichtean epistemology is evident in this grounding of moral willing, rational knowing, and self-consciousness, in the ego's negative response to the non-ego, as our rational being strives to overcome the barrier of opposition constituted by sensuous nature and its alien necessity.

In Schiller's view, the self-conscious ego provides an ongoing unity for all experience. It is the unity at the centre of all experience, and the formative unifier of what is experienced, giving unity and identity to all acts of cognition and volition.

> '. . . self-consciousness . . . once its immutable unity is established, there is also established a law of unity for everything which is there for man, and for everything which is

> to come about through him, i.e., for all his knowing and for all his doing.' (L19:11)

Schiller's discussion here of the unity of self-consciousness, owes much to Kant's postulation of the ego as the transcendental unity of apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason.[11] However, Schiller's view of the origin of self-consciousness, leads him to oppose Kant's concept of the moral will in the Critique of Practical Reason, for Schiller has the moral will depend on the achievement of self-consciousness, which itself depends upon sensuous experience of external nature. There is thus a sense in which one can say that for Schiller, the moral will is grounded in the sensible rather than in the supersensible (as it was for Kant). However, to be fair, one must remember that Schiller arrives at this position from a consideration of the temporal priority of nature in our psychological development, whilst Kant, in contrast, was concerned with the transcendental logical priority of the a priori ground of the possibility of moral volition.

Schiller closely associates sensation with the sense-drive, and self-consciousness with the development of the form-drive. Through sensation, man becomes aware of his existential being in the world. Through self-consciousness, he becomes aware of his ability to determine himself in knowing and willing, (i.e. aware of his self-determinability, or his 'absolute' existence).

> '. . . once [sensation and self-consciousness] have come into being . . . man has, through the medium of sensation, acquired awareness of a determinate existence; once he has, through self-consciousness, acquired awareness of his absolute existence, then these two basic drives are quickened . . .'
> '. . . only . . . when both have come into existence, is the basis of man's humanity established. Until this has happened, everything in him takes place according to the law of [natural] necessity. But now the hand of nature is withdrawn from him . . .' (L19:12)

Basic human being then, rests upon the existence of both natures and drives. As our sensuous nature and its drive are always already 'there', as it were, the basis of humanity comes about through the development of the form-drive, to counterbalance the previously exclusively dominant

sense-drive. The development of the form-drive also represents the overcoming of exclusive determination by natural necessity, by countering it with a rational necessity of our own (self) determination. Thus the development of the form-drive, becomes equated by Schiller, with the transition from a natural condition to humanity.

The simultaneous determination of the individual by natural necessity, and his (self) determination by rational necessity, involves an opposition of two contrary necessities, which in Schiller's view, gives rise to freedom.

> '. . . as soon as two opposing fundamental drives are active within him, both lose their compulsion, and the opposition of two necessities gives rise to freedom.' (L19:12)

In Schiller's view, the drives through which we experience these necessities, may develop to achieve an equilibrious relationship, whereby they cancel out each other's influence, leaving the will free from compulsory determination by either. This establishes a new mode of 'indeterminacy', resting upon the simultaneous experience of two modes of determination, and which is thus essentially different from the empty indeterminacy we began the Letter with (in L19:2), which was merely a state of complete non-determination. Schiller will explore this doubly determined indeterminacy, in the next two Letters (Letters 20 and 21), as the 'aesthetic condition' of the psyche.

LETTER 20

The Aesthetic Condition of the Psyche (I)

In Letter 20, Schiller discusses the development of the twofoldly determined psychological condition of indetermination, which he introduced at the end of Letter 19. He begins, by restating his concept of psychological freedom:

> '[Freedom] arises only when man is a complete being, when both his fundamental drives are fully developed; it will, therefore, be lacking as long as he is incomplete, as long as one of the two drives is excluded . . .' (L20:1)

Freedom thus rests upon psychological wholeness (a wholeness which, as Schiller made clear in Letter 6, modern society deprives the individual of, through the specialization of social functions and psychological faculties, that it imposes upon its members). For Schiller, freedom presupposes the absence of constraint upon the psyche, by either of our natures and their respective drives. This condition is only achieved when both primary drives are fully developed, to the point where they counterbalance each other's determination of the psyche.

It is important to notice Schiller's use of the term 'arises' in the above passage. In Letter 21, Schiller will make it clear that freedom arises from this equilibrious condition, which provides only its basis. More particularly, this condition frees the psyche from sensuous determination, and leaves it free to choose whether to determine itself either rationally or sensuously in its willing. In allowing man to choose rational volition (by removing sensuous impediments thereto), this condition makes him potentially free. However, only if he then wills rationally, does he become actually free. (This difference between potential and actual freedom will be discussed by Schiller in L21:4 and 5).

In Letter 19, we saw how Schiller operated a three stage model of psychological development, in which man moves from 1) the non-determination of 'pure determinability'; to 2) sensuous external determination (and the domination of the sense-drive); to 3) rational self-determination (and the domination of the form-drive). Schiller now emphasizes the temporal order of these stages of development:

> 'Now we can, in fact, in the species as a whole, as well as in the individual human being, point to a moment in which man is not yet complete, and in which one of his two drives is exclusively active within him. We know . . . that he proceeds from limitation to infinity. The sensuous drive, therefore, comes into operation earlier than the rational, because sensation precedes consciousness, and it is this [temporal] priority of the sensuous drive which provides the clue to the whole history of human freedom.'[1] (L20:2)
>
> '. . . freedom is itself an effect of Nature . . . and not the work of Man . . .' (L20:1)

Now for Schiller, the whole purpose of the process of aesthetic education, is to assist man's progression from stage 2) to stage 3) in the aforementioned model of psychological development. In this process, the 'aesthetic condition' of the psyche is viewed by him, not as itself an end, but rather as a means for enabling man to become rational and moral (and thus to meet the psycho-ethical prerequisite for the political transformation of the Natural State into the Moral State, as described in Letter 3).

> '. . . there is . . . a moment in which the life-impulse, just because the form-impulse is not yet running counter to it, operates as nature and as necessity; a moment in which the life of sense is a power . . .' 'But in the state of reflection into which he is now to pass, it will be precisely the opposite : Reason is to be a power, and a logical or moral necessity to take the place of that physical necessity.' (L20:3)

It would appear from this passage, that Schiller's ideal of psychological harmony, involving the equilibrious relation of both our natures and drives, (an ideal which largely occupied Letters 13 to 17), is not to be viewed as itself an end for man, but rather as merely a temporary means for breaking the power of sense, in order to install rational self-determination in its place. Rational domination of the psyche, is to replace sensuous domination : we are to merely move from one type of psychological one-sidedness to another, in which a transitional balanced psychological condition is to be sacrificed for rational freedom (of a Kantian kind). Now whilst this may serve the political goal of creating the Moral State, and preserve a Kantian conception of morality, it sacrifices balanced character at the psychological level, and devalues the aesthetic to being ultimately a politically and morally useful means. We know from Schiller's Fichtean epistemology in Letter 19, that he does not intend our rational activity to be purely rational, and that it must rest upon and incorporate sense. Nevertheless, it is clear from the above passage, that the position of sense is to be secondary to reason, as subordinated within an unbalanced relationship of necessary co-operation, rather than one of equilibrious harmony.

The 'aesthetic condition' of the psyche, represents the introduction of a fourth stage into Schiller's model of man's temporal psychological

development (a stage which is located between stages 2) and 3)). Now Schiller takes the peculiar view, that the transition from the domination of the psyche by sense, to its domination by reason, is one which cannot take place directly. The transition necessarily rests upon the temporary suspension of the sense-drive:

> '. . . sensation as a power must first be destroyed before law can be enthroned as such.' '. . . something which was there must first cease to be. Man cannot pass directly from feeling to thought; he must first take one step backwards, since only through one determination being annulled again can a contrary determination take its place.' (L20:3)

This condition, in which the sense-drive is 'annulled' and is to 'cease to be', is considered by Schiller to be part of the 'aesthetic condition' of the psyche, and a necessary prelude to that condition's full development. Prima facie, it appears to be at variance with his earlier descriptions of the 'play-drive' and the 'middle state', in which both drives, including the sense-drive, were fully developed, and only by interfunctioning in a dynamic reciprocity, were able to limit each other, so as to leave the psyche or will free 'between' them. However, it is necessary to distinguish what Schiller regards as the philosophical ideal of a perfectly equilibrious play-drive (and here, the psychological ideal of a balanced 'aesthetic condition' of the psyche), from the reality of an unbalanced play-drive (and here, an unbalanced 'aesthetic condition'), which latter are required for a practical educative purpose : in order that the mass of mankind may progress from being 'savages' who are dominated by their sensuous being, towards a more ideal psychologically balanced condition, and thence to a rational and moral condition. In the case of the play-drive and the aesthetic condition, we progress to the balanced ideal via imperfect unbalanced means. Schiller's principal concern in this Letter, is with how aesthetic experience can begin a development towards this balance, from man's initially sensuously dominated condition.

Schiller sees the fully developed aesthetic condition as involving a counterbalancing of both the sensuous and rational determination of the psyche, which cancels out determination as such of either kind, whilst yet allowing us to have the fullest possible sensuous and conceptual content:

> 'In order to exchange passivity [to sense] for [rational] autonomy . . . man must therefore be momentarily free of all determination whatsoever, and pass through a state of pure determinability.' '. . . it is a question of combining . . . sheer absence of [sensuous and rational] determination . . . with the greatest possible [sensuous and conceptual] content . . .' (L20:3)

This equilibrious condition is, however, only attained through the modification of our sensuous determination. Although we are to retain a sensuous content, the sense-drive as a drive or power, is to be temporarily annulled:

> 'The determination he has [already] received through sensation must therefore be preserved . . . but at the same time it must, inasmuch as it is limitation, be annulled, since an unlimited [self] determinability is to come into existence. The problem is, therefore, at one and the same time to destroy and to maintain the [sensuous] determination of the [psyche's] condition - and this is possible in one way only : by confronting it with another [rational] determination.' (L20:3)

Now a problem arises at this point, as to how Schiller conceives of the means whereby the sensuous determination of the psyche by the sense-drive is to be annulled. In the last sentence quoted above, Schiller implies that sensuous determination cannot be annulled until rational determination is in place to counterbalance it. But how do we arrive at this position of counterbalance in the first place? Earlier, in L20:3, Schiller told us that

> '. . . only through one determination being annulled . . . can a contrary determination take its place.' (L20:3)

In other words, the existing dominant sense-drive, must first be suppressed, in order to allow the form-drive to even develop at all. This suppression characterizes the development of the aesthetic condition, while the counterbalancing of modes of determination pertains to the fully developed aesthetic condition. The first creates a balanced aesthetic condition; the second maintains it once

established. (Again, this parallels the relationship between the unbalanced play-drive involved in aesthetic psychotherapy in Letters 16 and 17, and the balanced ideal play-drive of Letter 14, which the former aims to attain.)

In L20:3, Schiller appears to move away from the Fichtean epistemology of the last Letter to some extent. It now seems that the achievement of rational (self) determination and the development of the form-drive, require the annulling of sensuous external determination and the sense-drive. In Letter 19, rational self-determination was described in Fichtean terms as resting upon sensuous external determination; and the form-drive was described as resting upon the sense-drive.[2] Now however, the form-drive is to be developed independently of the sense-drive, in the latter's absence. However, in emphasizing that the determination already received through sensation must be preserved, Schiller retains a Fichtean view of the necessary sensuous basis of rational activity. It is the sense-drive, and its determining power vis-à-vis the psyche which is to be annulled, not sense as such nor the need for a sensuous content.

The overall meaning of what Schiller is saying in the above rather difficult passages quoted from L20:3, can perhaps be rendered more clearly, if we drop his somewhat confusing talk about various types of 'determination', 'determinability', etc., and consider the development described purely in terms of the drives. Now Schiller takes the view that the sense-drive must be counterbalanced by the development of the form-drive. The latter, however, cannot satisfactorily develop against the dominant position of an already established sense-drive, unless the sense-drive is temporarily suspended as a drive, by the minimization of the psyche's receptivity to sense. (In Letter 22, it will be disclosed that such suspension is effected through the psyche being confronted in perception with a form dominated object, whose sensuous content is minimized, viz. by an art object manifesting the beauty of 'tranquil form'.)

Once, in this way, the form-drive is enabled to develop, it becomes strong enough to counterbalance a restored sense-drive[3], so that the aesthetic condition assumes a more balanced structure, in which sense and reason cancel out each other as determining forces. The psyche becomes free from physical and moral constraints, and yet is able to be actively physical and moral. It is only constraint and determination as such that are removed. The psyche is enabled to choose whether to

act in a sensuous or a rational way, without being under the compulsion of either natural or moral necessity:

> 'Our psyche passes, then, from sensation to thought via a middle disposition in which sense and reason are both active at the same time.' '. . . they cancel each other out as determining forces . . .' 'This middle disposition, in which the psyche is subject neither to physical nor to moral constraint, and yet is active in both . . . [is] a free disposition . . .' '. . . this condition of real and active determinability [is] the aesthetic.' (L20:4)

Now if we compare this description in L20:4 of a balanced aesthetic condition, with Schiller's statements in L20:3 concerning the need for the sense-drive and its determination to be 'destroyed', 'cease to be', and be 'annulled', it becomes more clear that Schiller conceives of the aesthetic condition as moving through two phases : from (a) an unbalanced condition, in which the sense-drive is suppressed in order to allow the form-drive to develop; to (b) a balanced condition of the two drives, which is the basis of the psyche's freedom.[4] The psychological movement through (a) and (b) here, is seen by Schiller as occurring quickly, for earlier he talked of the aesthetic condition as being one in which

> '. . . man must therefore be momentarily free of all determination whatsoever, and pass through a state of pure determinability.' (L20:3)

But how might such a rapidly two-phased aesthetic condition be experienced in practice? Here we can only speculate, lacking any concrete discussion of it by Schiller. Presumably, when confronted by the kind of form-dominated beautiful object that Schiller advocates as necessary (in L22:5), one's initial response to it will be to focus on its formal characteristics : its shape, outline, layering, etc., at both the level of the whole object and its infra-formal features. Then, as our attention lingers on such features, we start to become aware of the object's more sensuous aspects : the interplay of light, harmony and colour; noticing how the colours 'sit upon' one another, to complement or contrast, and so on. Now this sounds like a reasonably

plausible description of any aesthetic engagement with an object of beauty, and in this light, Schiller's theory of a two-phase aesthetic condition is not as strange as it may at first appear, when considered only in the highly abstract terms that he employs. Schiller is concerned to overcome the sensuous predisposition most men (as 'savages'), will bring to aesthetic (or any) experience; he is concerned to avoid a response which judges beauty merely in terms of the sensuously agreeable. This can only be avoided by a form-dominated art object which encourages an initially more formal response by us, one which is able to lessen our tendency to sensuous response, but which then leads us on into a more psychologically balanced aesthetic response.

In a footnote at the end of Letter 20, Schiller informs us that the object of the balanced aesthetic condition relates to the whole of our being : all our faculties, natures and drives.

> 'Everything which is capable of phenomenal manifestation may . . .' '. . . relate to the totality of our various functions without being a definite object for any single one of them : that is its aesthetic character. A man can please us . . . without our taking into consideration in judging him any law or any purpose, please us simply as we contemplate him . . .' '. . . [in this] we are judging him aesthetically.' (L20:4, fn.)

Here, Schiller explicitly adopts a Kantian view of aesthetic experience, as involving a judgement which does not involve definite concepts[5] of 'any law or any purpose'. What is interesting, is Schiller's suggestion that 'everything which is capable of phenomenal manifestation', viz. any kind of phenomenal object, is capable of furnishing us with an aesthetic experience, is capable of evoking an aesthetic response, or at the very least, is capable of being judged aesthetically by us. Thus again, as in our discussion in Letter 15, we see that Schiller operates a very wide conception of the 'aesthetic' (which he closely associates with the formal aspect[6] of phenomena, an aspect all phenomena have, in varying degrees of aesthetic quality).

Schiller emphasizes that despite not being explicitly informed by definite concepts, the aesthetic condition of the psyche is not an arbitrary disposition. Although the aesthetic condition of the psyche involves neither natural nor rational determination, it does nevertheless

still implicitly involve concepts. It does not, however, involve our explicit awareness of such concepts.

> '. . . our psyche in the aesthetic state does indeed act freely, is in the highest degree free from all compulsion, but is in no wise free from laws[7]; and . . . this aesthetic freedom is distinguishable from logical necessity in thinking, or moral necessity in willing, only by the fact that the laws according to which the psyche . . . behaves do not become apparent as such, and . . . never appear as a constraint.'[8] (L20:4, fn.)

What Schiller is doing in this footnote, is considering (in a rather abstract way), how we experience the second phase of the aesthetic condition. It is a balanced psychological condition, in which although both the form-drive and the sense-drive are operative, they cancel each other out as determining forces, so that the psyche experiences sense and concepts in an indeterminate manner. Thus although the beautiful object is experienced sensuously, and although concepts are involved in its perception, neither is experienced in a determinate, viz. particular and definite, way. The 'indeterminacy' of the psyche, in the second and balanced phase of the aesthetic condition, is thus implicitly connected by Schiller with Kant's theory of the pure judgement of taste : which similarly does not involve a definite concept[9] or a particular sensuous pleasure[10], and yet nevertheless, involves both concepts and sense, in the 'free play' of the understanding and imagination. It would appear, therefore, that Schiller modelled the psychologically balanced 'aesthetic condition' of 'indeterminacy', upon Kant's theory of the aesthetic 'free play' of the faculties of concepts and sense, in the Critique of Judgement, recasting Kant's theory into his own model of psychological development, with its terminology of drives and different modes of determination and indeterminacy.[11]

LETTER 21

The Aesthetic Condition of the Psyche (II)

In Letter 21, Schiller continues his discussion of the aesthetic condition of the psyche, concentrating upon its fully developed

equilibrious mode, and in particular, upon its role in grounding freedom. He begins by telling us, that just as there are two ways in which the psyche can be determined (i.e., either sensuously or rationally), there are also two modes in which it can be indeterminate, or in what he calls a state of 'pure determinability'. The psyche may be so 'determinable', either when it is an empty indeterminacy, which is potentially determinable by any content whatsoever; or, when it is already possessed of a determinate content, but is fully receptive to any further mode of determination, viz. is totally open to receiving sense-impressions and concepts. The former condition of 'determinability', was that described as the first stage of man's psychological development in Letter 19.[1] The latter condition of 'determinability', is the aesthetic condition of the psyche. It is (unlike the former state), not an empty indeterminacy; but is rather totally determined : allowing itself to be sensuously and rationally determined without limitation.

> 'The psyche may be said to be determinable . . . inasmuch as it is determined in a way which does not exclude anything, i.e., when the determination it undergoes is of a kind which does not involve limitation.' '. . . [This] is aesthetic determinability (it has no limits, because it embraces all reality).' (L21:2)

In Schiller's view, the psyche in the aesthetic condition is, in principle, capable of being determined by everything, and may have an 'infinite abundance' of content within it. 'Aesthetic determinability', viz. the ability of the psyche in the aesthetic condition to be determined, excludes determination by anything in particular : whether it be by any one limited sensuous object or feature of the same, or by any one definite concept. (This again reflects Kant's theory of the pure judgement of taste, in the Critique of Judgement[2]). It is, instead, a condition in which the psyche has the capacity to be completely open to sensuous and rational content in general : a condition of total receptivity.

> '. . . the aesthetic disposition is in respect of determinability . . . negation by virtue of the infinite abundance within it.' '. . . aesthetic determinability has one single point of contact with mere indetermination - viz., that both exclude any determinate mode of existence - while in all other respects they

> are to each other as nothing is to everything, hence, utterly and entirely different.' '. . . aesthetic freedom of determination . . . must be regarded as an infinity filled with content . . .' (L21:3)

In the aesthetic condition, man is not internally determined by anything in particular, in terms of cognizing some particular sensuous or definite conceptual content. Nor is he determined to be anything in particular externally, by realizing himself through willing in some particular way. Instead it is man in his wholeness that is determined, in aesthetic contemplation : through the experience of beauty, all his powers are reorientated into a harmonious equilibrium.

> 'In the aesthetic state, then, man is Nought, if we are thinking of any particular result rather than of the totality of his powers . . .' (L21:4)

The main point that Schiller has been making so far, in the first half of this Letter, is that the overall effect of experiencing beauty is not something determinate, i.e. definite and particular, for either knowing or willing. It is rather a state of freedom from such limited activities. Man is raised to an unlimited (all-embracing) contemplative condition : to a highly receptive state of openness to the rational and sensuous determination of all his faculties and drives.

Now bearing in mind that the 'aesthetic condition' of the psyche is supposed to be a developed and sophisticated form of the earlier concept of the 'play-drive', Schiller's discussion of it here in Letters 20 and 21, is rather one-sided. The play-drive was described in L14:4 as being both the basis of artistic production, and as activated in the course of aesthetic contemplation. Schiller's entire emphasis now, however, is upon the aesthetic condition as a mode of totally receptive contemplation. It is not clear at this stage, how this state could be the basis of artistic production. It may be that the artist, free from determinate concepts (concerning e.g. utility, purpose, and possession), and also free from determinate sensuous content (allowing his imagination to form his 'material' mentally, rather than allowing himself to be confined by the limits of existing 'natural' structures), produces in a 'free' way. This is, in fact, what Schiller will argue in Letter 26, so it seems that he delays his discussion of the aesthetic

condition as the psychological basis of artistic production, until he has spent a number of Letters (20 to 25), discussing the psychological process involved in aesthetic contemplation, and its psycho-ethical consequences.

Having discussed the aesthetic condition as the state of aesthetic contemplation, Schiller proceeds in the second half of this Letter, to argue for its ability to be the psychological basis of freedom. He commences by reminding us that the complete experience of beauty, by developing the equilibrious aesthetic condition, produces in us a freedom from any particular sensuous or definite rational content. It is thus unproductive of any particular result for our knowing or willing:

> '[Beauty] accomplishes no particular purpose, neither intellectual nor moral; it discovers no individual truth, helps us to perform no individual duty[3] . . .' (L21:4)

The overall effect of what Schiller calls 'aesthetic culture' or 'aesthetic education', viz. of the influence of beauty on the process of psychological development, is thus to leave the will free from the domination and constraint of either of the primary drives, so putting man back into a similar position of 'open' potential to that which he enjoyed before he was determined by either drive at all. From this restored position of potential being, man is enabled to realize himself, free from determinate sensuous or rational impediments, to achieve what Schiller calls his 'actuality', or that which he 'ought to be', viz. to realize himself in a way which through its wholeness and psychological balance, realizes his fundamental human nature (realizes the Idea of Human Being).

> 'By means of aesthetic culture . . . nothing more is achieved by it than that he is henceforth enabled . . . to make of himself what he will - that the freedom to be what he ought to be is completely restored to him.' (L21:4)

The aesthetic condition, then, is seen by Schiller as removing sensuous and rational constraints upon the psyche in its willing, to leave it fully self-determinable : restoring its potential to realize itself without sensuous or rational impediments which 'close down' its

potential to some extent, one way or the other. (The idea that the rational may, as much as the sensuous, be an impediment to the will, and thus a constraint upon our freedom, highlights Schiller's much more cautious approach to the concept of a purely rational freedom, an approach which distinguishes him from Kant.)

Schiller's argument that beauty may psychologically ground freedom, appears to rest upon the idea that objects which are beautiful should have neither an explicit (or 'striking') particular sensuous content/, nor should they explicitly convey some ('powerful') definite conceptual content, which would one-sidedly develop the sense-drive/or the form-drive respectively, in a way which would prevent the equilibrium of drives which characterizes the aesthetic condition, from becoming established. Now in practice, such a view would place some peculiar restrictions upon what we would normally want to include under the category 'beautiful object'. Moreover, the idea that a beautiful object is one which avoids conveying to us any determinate sensuous or conceptual content, carries with it the odd implication that what is conveyed is an indeterminate, i.e. indefinite (or even vague ?) content. On a generous view, we can see how this theory might apply to abstract visual art and to orchestral music, where form preponderates over any kind of content. But it is a view of beauty and of the aesthetic condition itself, which leaves little room for the literary arts, other than poetry. Dramatic works and novels, clearly do convey to us, predominately, definite concepts, in the form of spoken or written words. Even with the visual arts, can we really say that a particular art object, qua an object, is not experienced as a definite, limited, particular sensuous item? (as well as being something which may transcend such a limit). In music, operas, oratorios and masses, all convey large numbers of definite concepts, in the explicit form of sung words. The idea that the psyche can, through the experience of beauty, be free from determinate sensuous or rational contents of an explicit and definite kind, does not therefore appear to be plausible. Schiller will directly address himself to this problem in the next Letter (22), and will put forward two arguments, that while the psyche in the aesthetic condition is totally open to rational or sensuous content and thus determination, in beautiful art such determination 1), is ideally cancelled out by a balance of both kinds of content, in which there is a total appeal to all our faculties simultaneously (L22:4); and 2), is suppressed by the predominance of form in the object (L22:5). The main

emphasis in Letter 22 is on argument 2), which essentially involves the idea that by being dominated by form, both the sensuous and rational contents of art are rendered merely implicit. However, in the types of art that I have mentioned here, it is clear that in many objects which we would want to call 'beautiful', form rarely does render sensuous or rational content implicit. These contents are arguably significant aspects of what constitutes aesthetic experience, and thus should not have their role minimized in any adequate conception of either the 'aesthetic condition' or the 'beautiful' itself.

In Schiller's view, aesthetic experience restores the freedom and full humanity which are lost by the exclusive domination of nature or reason, not only when one dominates the whole mind, but where the realm of one is not tempered and balanced by the activity of the other in that realm, viz. when our sensuous nature is uninfluenced by reason, or our rationality does not incorporate sense, but seeks to function entirely independently.

> '. . . it was precisely of this freedom that he was deprived by the one-sided constraint of nature in the field of sensation and by the exclusive authority of reason in the realm of thought . . . the power which is restored to him in the aesthetic mode . . . [is] the gift of [full] humanity itself.' (L21:5)

Now the intermixing of reason and sense into each other's realms, which Schiller here implies is a necessary part of full human being, seems to go against his earlier view of the necessity for them to maintain separate domains of activity, even whilst interfunctioning in co-operation:

> 'Both drives . . . need to have limits set to them . . . the sense-drive so it does not encroach upon the domain of law, the formal drive so that it does not encroach on that of feeling.' (L13:6)

Schiller sees the aesthetic condition as giving man a full and balanced human nature. But the unlimited openness or 'determinability' upon which this state rests, means that as soon as man does in fact realize or 'determine' himself in any manner at all, he loses his full humanity and becomes limited, by being involved in either a

predominantly sensuous or rational mode of activity, in a particular or definite way. As soon as he uses his freedom to move from potentiality to actuality, to realize his humanity, he is - as a finite being, confined to acting within a particular space and time - bound to lose his fullness and become only partially human. This leads Schiller to assert the need for a permanent recourse to aesthetic experience, in order to continually restore man to psychological wholeness, pure determinability and potential being, after each fragmentary mode of only partial self-realization.

> '. . . he possesses this [full] humanity in potentia before every determinate condition into which he can conceivably enter. But he loses it in practice with every determinate condition into which he does enter.' '. . . this humanity must be restored to him each time anew through the life of the aesthetic.' (L21:5)

In a footnote, Schiller says that in any kind of psychological movement from a condition of sensation to/one of thought, no matter how rapid, we always necessarily pass through the aesthetic condition:

> '. . . the rapidity with which certain types pass from sensation to thought . . . scarcely - if indeed at all - allows them to become aware of the aesthetic mode through which they must in that time necessarily pass.' (L21:5, fn.)

This suggests that the aesthetic condition of the psyche is a necessary psychological stage which we may perhaps frequently experience, as part of our everyday cognitive process[4], rather than being some rare experience of high level contemplation. (If this is Schiller's view, it has some similarity with Kant's view in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgement, where he says that we often fail to notice the pleasure attendant upon the achievement of the aim of knowledge, because of its familiarity, being so much a part of our everyday cognitive experience.)[5]

In the same footnote, Schiller puts forward the view that in practice, people vary considerably in their ability to linger in, and thus to enjoy, the aesthetic condition:

> ' [Certain] natures cannot for any length of time tolerate the

> state of indetermination, but press impatiently for some result which in the state of aesthetic limitlessness they cannot find. In others, by contrast, who find enjoyment more in the feeling of total capacity than in any single action, the aesthetic state tends to spread itself over a much wider area [of life]. Much as the former dread emptiness, just as little are the latter capable of tolerating limitation.' (L21:5, fn.)

Schiller here describes the man who enjoys lingering in the aesthetic condition, as one who wishes to remain conscious of his total capacity, who finds it intolerable to determine himself in any particular way (as realization requires), and who seeks to aestheticize other domains of experience. This is the type of personality that Hegel had in mind, in his critique of the concept of the 'beautiful soul', in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).[6] The beautiful soul was a concept that Schiller himself did much to promote in his treatise entitled On Grace and Dignity (1793), written less than two years before the Aesthetic Letters appeared in public. Hegel criticized the beautiful soul for dwelling in a state of indeterminate limitlessness, enjoying the feeling of its universal potential, but actually achieving nothing, for any determinate realization would put an end to this state as such. In short, the condition of the beautiful soul, in itself, is totally unproductive.[7]

In this Letter, Schiller has attempted to argue that beauty provides us with the potential for becoming fully human in actuality, by creating the psychological pre-condition of such a complete realization. But his view that any realization, involves some loss of our full humanity, means that this potential can never be fully realized. The aesthetic condition's psychological wholeness and its equilibrium of natures and drives, is lost, whenever we attempt to realize in some limited and particular way, a condition which essentially involves being unlimited. We thus seem to be caught-up in the contradiction of attempting to realize that which, in the very process of its realization, is necessarily lost. Schiller's response to this problem, is recurrent aesthetic psychotherapy, to keep restoring us to full humanity. But this perpetual returning to potential being, does not of itself, help us to realize that which is lost whenever we try to realize it. Prima facie, therefore, Schiller's concept of the aesthetic condition appears to suffer from the same unrealizable and unproductive character, as the

'beautiful soul' concept that Hegel criticized.

However, it is possible to interpret Schiller in a plausible manner, which extricates him from one criticism that attaches to the beautiful soul concept, by viewing the aesthetic condition as at least being productive. This involves the idea that particular acts of knowing and willing benefit by proceeding from such a psychologically whole and balanced basis, retaining a more complete and balanced character, than would have been the case, if they had not had such an origin. Any act of self-realization will necessarily involve particular feelings, definite thoughts, and limited actions; but by proceeding from the basis of the aesthetic condition, such inevitable limitations of the psyche, will be less than otherwise would have been the case. There is also a necessity to return to the aesthetic condition after such (less) limited realizations, in order to restore the psychological basis of further broader and more balanced modes of cognition and volition. Consequently, there is a permanent psychological need for intermittent aesthetic experiences (even if only of the rapid and unconscious type, that Schiller mentioned in L21:5, fn.), in the course of everyday cognition and volition, involving an oscillation between aesthetic psychological wholeness and/particular limited acts of knowing and willing. Now if we take this view of the interrelation of aesthetic/and mundane experience, in which the former to some extent carries over into ordinary acts of knowing and willing, then Schiller cannot be criticized for having created, in the aesthetic condition, a sterile 'beautiful soul' concept.

Schiller, then, recognized the inevitability of fragmentary modes of self-realization in the world, and allowed for them by realistically integrating psychologically unbalanced and partial activities into his view of activity which occurs from the basis of a psychologically balanced aesthetic condition. The most he offers is an oscillation between psychological equilibrium/and disequilibrium (in which the latter will be limited in its scope, by the pre-existing equilibrium). Schiller, then, does not argue for the desirability, or even the possibility, of a permanent psychological equilibrium of the kind associated with the concept of the beautiful soul. It would appear that he rejected such a concept, as being unviable both for the individual and for society.[8]

In the remaining Letters of the treatise, it will become clear that Schiller views aesthetic experience as being not merely psychologically

restorative,but also as positively feeding into, and modifying the form of, ordinary modes of experience. In entering into particular acts of knowing and willing from the basis of the aesthetic condition, such activities are more inclined to involve the co-operation of both our natures. In knowledge, it may bring together both rationalist and empiricist standpoints (as Schiller described himself as doing in L18:4), or it may render science into common sense (cf. L27:11). In willing, it may harmonize our rational and sensuous natures, promoting a 'noble' natural inclination to perform our rational moral duty (as Schiller will describe in Letter 23). However, whilst Schiller conceives of the aesthetic condition as thus positively modifying the psychological form of knowing and willing in other domains of experience, he does not conceive of it as providing any kind of substitute for the substantive and integral content of these domains. Earlier in this Letter, Schiller told us that

> '[Beauty] accomplishes no particular purpose, neither intellectual nor moral; it discovers no individual truth, helps us to perform no individual duty . . .' (L21:4)

We can now see more clearly what this statement means. The aesthetic condition of the psyche is to be the full and balanced basis of particular acts of knowing and willing, merely by harmoniously modifying their psychological form. By harmonizing reason and sense, it will predispose us towards truth in knowing, and morality in willing, but it will not itself provide the content of either truth or morality.[9]

LETTER 22

The Art Object

In Letters 20 and 21, Schiller explored the aesthetic condition of the psyche purely as a subjective state. In this Letter, he proceeds to relate this state to that which evokes it, viz. to the art object. In doing so, he will not discuss any particular concrete features of art objects, but will merely make general statements about the reciprocal relationship of subject and object in determining more or less equilibrious psychological states. His principal concern is to

argue for the necessity that any determinate sensuous or rational content in the art object, should be balanced in its psychological appeal (by being addressed to all our faculties simultaneously), through both types of content being rendered implicit by the predominance of form in the art object.

Schiller commences by reminding us that in the aesthetic condition, the psyche is meant to be free from the limitation that arises from any particular sensuous or rational determination, with all its powers interfunctioning in a state of active receptivity:[1]

> '. . . the aesthetic mode of the psyche is to be regarded as . . . the absence of all limitation and . . . the sum total of the powers . . . are conjointly active within it.' (L22:1)

It becomes more clear that Schiller conceives of the aesthetic condition as beneficially carrying over into ordinary acts of knowing and willing, when he tells us that

> '. . . a disposition of the psyche which removes all limitations from the totality of human nature must necessarily remove them from every individual manifestation of it as well.' (L22:1)

Any particular act of knowing or willing, if it proceeds from the aesthetic condition, will partake of the latter's psychological wholeness and balance. Schiller's statement that the aesthetic disposition 'removes all limitations from the totality of our human nature', appears to overlook his position in L14:1 and 2, that such full humanity rests upon the mutual limitation of each drive. Our overall freedom from the exclusive limitation or constraint upon the psyche of one drive, is a limitlessness which itself rests upon limitation : the limit of each drive by the other, whereby they cancel out each other as determining forces.

In Schiller's view, any disposition of the psyche, other than the aesthetic, necessarily involves a merely limited exercise of our psychological powers.

> 'Every other way of exercising its functions endows the psyche with some special aptitude – but only at the cost of some special limitation; the aesthetic alone leads to the absence

of all limitation.' (L22:1)

The development of some limiting aptitude referred to here, is explained by Schiller in the following way. Experiences which are predominantly sensuous, have the psychological effect of limiting our capacity for intellectual exertion. Experiences which develop and exercise our intellectual powers, involving abstract conceptualization, limit our capacity for feeling and sensuous experience.

> 'That which flatters our senses in immediate sensation . . . [has the effect of] rendering us proportionately less fitted for [mental] exertion. That which tenses our intellectual powers and invites them to form abstract concepts . . . [has the effect of] depriving us of sensibility . . .' (L22:2)

In contrast, Schiller tells us, the experience of beauty places us in a condition of actively receptive equilibrium (the aesthetic condition), from which we can proceed equally to engage in abstract reasoning or simple apprehension of the sensuous.

> 'If, by contrast, we have surrendered to the enjoyment of genuine beauty, we are at such a moment master in equal degree of our passive and of our active powers, and we shall with equal ease turn to . . . the discursions of abstract thought or to the direct contemplation of phenomena.' (L22:2)

Schiller proceeds to connect the aesthetic condition with the ideal art object. The true work of art, he tells us, has the effect of establishing in the mind a limitless equilibrium, involving both intellectual power and sensuous vigour. He believes that we can utilize the degree to which this psychological state is produced in us by a work of art, as a criterion for evaluating it. Schiller thus provides a subjective criterion for evaluating art, in terms of art's psychological effects. If an aesthetic experience does not establish psychological equilibrium, but leaves us principally inclined either to thought or to feeling, then such experience is not what he calls a 'pure' aesthetic experience.

> 'This lofty equanimity and freedom of the mind, combined with

> power and vigour, is the mood in which a genuine work of art should release us, and there is no more certain touchstone of true aesthetic excellence. If, after enjoyment of this kind, we find ourselves disposed to prefer some particular mode of feeling or action, but unfitted or disinclined for another, this may serve as infallible proof that we have not had a purely aesthetic experience . . .' (L22:3)

If our aesthetic experience is not of such a 'pure' kind, Schiller tells us that the psychological disequilibrium involved may have three causes: 1) The art object may be unbalanced, with a predominance of either sensuous or rational content in it. 2) Our psychological disposition prior to aesthetic experience may have been unbalanced, with a predominance of either the sensuous or formal drive in it, modifying our response. 3) Both objective cause 1), and subjective cause 2), may simultaneously interact in reciprocity.

> '. . . [if] we have not had a purely aesthetic experience . . . the cause lies in the object or in our own response or, as is almost always the case, in both at once.' (L22:3)

If the cause is reciprocal (3), presumably there may be either some exacerbation, or cancelling out, of the domination of one drive or the other. For example, a conceptually dominated art object may restore equilibrium to a psychological pre-condition characterized by the domination of the sense-drive. The therapeutical functioning of beauty described in Letter 17, would seem to require what Schiller here implies would be merely an 'impure' aesthetic experience. An unbalanced psychological effect is surely necessary in order to 'release' whichever drive is too 'tense' or strong, (cf. L17:4). What Schiller here calls a 'pure' aesthetic experience, would not be capable of functioning psychotherapeutically (in the way the mass of mankind require), but could only maintain (a rarely) existing equilibrium.

However, what Schiller has been describing as a 'pure aesthetic experience', is the psychological effect of the ideal art object. Thus he proceeds to tell us that

> '. . . in actuality no purely aesthetic effect is ever to be met with . . . the excellence of a work of art can never consist in

> anything more than a high approximation to that ideal of aesthetic purity; and whatever the degree of freedom . . . we shall . . . leave it in a particular mood and with some definite bias.' (L22:4)

The 'excellence' of a work of art is a matter of the degree to which it provides us with a 'pure' aesthetic experience. In reality, any aesthetic experience will leave us in either a passive or an active mood, and with a bias towards either feeling or thought. Aesthetic evaluation involves an introspective psychological self-assessment of our own 'mood' and 'bias'.

> 'The more general the mood and the less limited the bias produced in us by any particular art, or by any particular product of the same, then the nobler that art and the more excellent that product will be.' (L22:4)

The 'excellence' of a type of art, or of a particular work of art, is something which we can subjectively evaluate in terms of its psychological effect upon us. The evaluation of art is not directed at any characteristics or features of the art object, but is directed inwards at our own psychological condition.[2] In taking up this position, Schiller appears to completely equate what is of aesthetic value with what is of psychological value.

Schiller proceeds next to briefly consider the main types of art, with regard to the partiality or fullness of their psychological appeal to our faculties. He tells us that music appeals most to the senses, poetry to the imagination, and sculpture to the intellect.

> '. . . even the most ethereal music has . . . an even greater affinity with the senses than true aesthetic freedom really allows; . . . even the most successful poem partakes more of the arbitrary and casual play of the imagination . . . than the inner lawfulness of the truly beautiful really permits; . . . even the most excellent sculpture . . . does, by virtue of its conceptual precision, border upon the austerity of science.' (L22:4)

Now in Schiller's view, these narrow affinities can be overcome by the

skilled artist. He has the ability to widen the psychological appeal of a type of art, so as to make it address other faculties, and thereby increase its 'excellence', viz. its psychological value in developing equilibrium and wholeness.

> 'Nevertheless, the greater the degree of excellence attained by a work in any of these three arts, the more these particular affinities will disappear . . .' (L22:4)

Such widening of affinities, will involve music being as heavily imbued with form as possible. The plastic arts (including sculpture), must be made to appeal to us sensuously, and not primarily conceptually. Poetry must not just appeal to the imagination, but also to feeling and the intellect.

> 'Music . . . must become sheer form . . .' 'The plastic arts . . . must . . . move us by the immediacy of their sensuous presence. Poetry . . . must grip us powerfully as music does, but at the same time, like the plastic arts, surround us with serene clarity.' (L22:4)

Schiller does not say how, in concrete terms, any of these suggested remedies are to be produced, and again confines himself to discussing art in terms of its psychological effects. It is notable that in this discussion, Schiller has moved from his own relatively simple psychological model of two fundamental natures and drives, to adopt the Kantian division of faculties. This has been necessitated by three main types of art, requiring to be specifically connected with a corresponding number of different psychological powers.

Schiller tells us that the criterion for evaluating 'style' in a type of art, lies in the degree to which the limits of that type of art have been diminished, as assessed by the generality of its psychological appeal.

> 'This, precisely, is the mark of perfect style in each and every art : that it is able to remove the specific limitations of the art in question . . . [and] is able to confer upon it a more general character.' (L22:4)

This 'more general character', does not involve any transcendence of objective frontiers between types of art[3], but refers to the ability of an art form to subjectively appeal to the totality of our faculties.

If it is possible to talk of Schiller having a concept of the 'judgement of taste', it would appear to involve a detached higher level judgement (or metajudgement), which we make of our own psychological state in the course of, or immediately after, having an aesthetic experience. In the aesthetic condition, we contemplate an object of beauty in the special aesthetic attitude of active receptivity, and assess it by exploring its features at the level of consciousness. However, we superimpose over this aesthetic judgement in the narrow sense, an assessment of our own degree of psychological wholeness and balance, at the level of self-consciousness. This second judgement, not the first, is seen by Schiller as the level at which we are able to adequately assess 'excellence' and 'style' in art. Thus what we would ordinarily think of as the psychological locus of the judgement of taste, for Schiller has only a preliminary and subordinate function, to lead into or psychologically ground a higher level metajudgement where aesthetic and psychological assessments merge. Consciousness of the art object in aesthetic contemplation, functions as a pre-condition to self-consciousness of our own psychological state. Schiller's concept of the judgement of taste then, if we draw together and make explicit what underlies his discussion so far in this Letter, would appear to take the form of a two level psycho-aesthetic judgement.

Having completed his discussion of the need for any determinate sensuous or rational content in art to be balanced in its psychological appeal, by being addressed to all our faculties simultaneously, Schiller now proceeds to discuss the means whereby this result may be achieved : through both types of content being rendered implicit by the predominance of form in the art object.

> 'In a truly successful work of art the contents should effect nothing, the form everything; for only through the form is the whole man affected, through the subject-matter, by contrast, only one or other of his functions. Subject-matter . . . always has a limiting effect upon the mind, and it is only from form that true aesthetic freedom can be looked for.' (L22:5)

The skilful artist can make form absorb both types of content, so that

they become sublated within it and rendered implicit:

> '. . . the master in any art . . . can make his form consume his material . . .' (L22:5)

In the two passages quoted above, Schiller follows Kant to some extent, in ascribing to the formal qualities of an art object, the source of its aesthetic value[4]; a value, again like Kant, seen in purely subjective terms. For Kant, the formal character of beauty enables aesthetic experience to be disinterested in sense, providing us with a non-sensuous pleasure which promotes morality.[5] For Schiller, form functions by appealing psychologically to all our drives and faculties, whereas some determinate 'subject-matter', viz. some definite conceptual or particular sensuous content, appeals to one drive or the other, or to a particular faculty. Thus whilst for Kant, form promotes morality, for Schiller form is conducive to psychological equilibrium and wholeness.[6]

Schiller takes the view that both rational conceptual content and sensuous material content in art, are always limiting to the psyche, through their appeal to either the form-drive or the sense-drive respectively, (or to the faculties of reason or sense). If the psyche is to be unlimited in aesthetic experience, on the basis of a total equilibrium of natures and drives, then he argues that form must dominate the art object. However, this view appears to involve artificially detaching form from our rationality and the form-drive, i.e. from that nature and drive by which it is constructed in the process of knowing, or reconstructed in the process of artistic production. In his discussion of 'aesthetic semblance' in Letter 26, Schiller (following Kant), clearly conceives of form as being something of our own active construction, and not something which we merely passively receive from nature (cf. L26:4 and 8). The active reconstruction of form in artistic production, is executed by the rationally informed aesthetic imagination, which Schiller carefully distinguishes from the formless natural imagination (cf. L27:4). Even though Schiller conceives of the aesthetic imagination as interlinking reason and sense, the emphasis is on the need for it to be law governed (cf. L27:4, fn.). It does not, then, seem plausible for Schiller here in Letter 22, to pretend that form is somehow detached from having any special affinity with our rational nature and the form-drive, in order that he can give it a neutral status which will not especially appeal to and develop the

form-drive, (a development which might hinder psychological equilibrium from becoming established). Schiller is, of course, correct to distinguish form as such from concepts, as being a much more implicit mode of rationality than the latter. Nevertheless, even an implicit rational structuring of the sensuously existential, entails that form and the forming process are much more closely allied with our rational nature and the form-drive, than with our sensuous nature and the sense-drive. The artist's skilful utilization of form may well render both concepts (i.e. explicit rationality), and sensuous features in an art object, more implicit, but it is a process of rendering which is principally executed by our rational nature, and whose formal result will have a closer affinity with that nature and the form-drive.

Schiller's position concerning the psychological neutrality of form, is not only somewhat implausible, but is also arguably unnecessary. In Letters 3, 4 and 9, the general purpose of aesthetic education was stated to be to make sensuous man become rational and moral, and consequently to be capable of creating a durable Moral State. In terms of this educational programme, it would actually be helpful if form endowed the art object with the biased effect of developing our rationality. Instead, Schiller has form function to have an equal affinity with both primary drives, and thereby engage them simultaneously, so as to limit each other. If Schiller allowed form to be rationally biased in its psychological effect, it would, of course, only worsen the psychological disequilibrium of those men whom Schiller refers to as enervated 'barbarians' (cf. L4:6). Ultimately underlying Schiller's rather strained theory of form's psychological neutrality, is his Kantian concern that if the art object did have the effect of positively and directly developing our rationality (rather than doing so negatively and indirectly by limiting sensuous hindrances to its development, in the shape of a dominant sense-drive), it would undermine the autonomous status of our rational being.

Schiller's whole theory of aesthetic education initially appears to involve some compromising of the autonomy of the psyche, for it invests the art object with the ability to effect modifications in our psychological condition, which in turn effects consequential modes of knowing and willing. However, in the concept of 'aesthetic semblance', in Letter 26, Schiller will make it clear that whether we are involved in contemplating or producing art which is form-dominated, we are dealing with something of our own making (cf. L26:8). In so far as our

psychological state is 'determined' as a result of encounter with an aesthetic semblance, it is through interacting with a medium which is essentially of our own, and which thus leaves us self-determined (or autonomous) in relation to it.

Schiller takes the view that not only should aesthetic experience leave the psyche autonomous, in the way we have seen, but that art itself should be autonomous vis-à-vis other domains of experience; it should be an end in itself. It must not, he tells us, serve some particular aim such as inducing pathos, or teaching, or morally improving us. These all entail limiting the psyche's orientation.

> 'Arts which affect the passions . . . are not entirely free arts since they are enlisted in the service of a particular aim (that of pathos) . . .' 'No less self-contradictory is the notion of a fine art which teaches (didactic) or improves (moral); for nothing is more at variance with the concept of beauty than the notion of giving the psyche any definite bias.' (L22:5)

One might, perhaps, think that Schiller himself is guilty of seeking to make fine art serve ends outside its own domain, by functioning to make man more rational and moral, and capable of political reform. However, Schiller conceives of the relationship of art to moral improvement and political reform, as involving only general aims to be achieved indirectly through the psychological effect of form in art, and not as involving particular aims (moral precepts, or a political manifesto, or constitutional proposals), to be directly achieved through some explicit conceptual content expressed in art works.[7] (Schiller's view of the necessary autonomy of art in this respect, is a topic he will return to again in L26:10 and 11.) The precise nature of the relationship between aesthetic education and moral improvement, is the issue to which Schiller will turn his attention in the next Letter (Letter 23).

By arguing in this Letter that the art object should be form dominated, Schiller is not saying that a work of art should not have any sensuous or rational content, but that these should be organized so as to leave us in a condition of psychological equilibrium in, or immediately after, their experience. The aim of carefully contriving an art object's psychological effect in order to produce a balanced

response, is seen by Schiller as being achieved through form dominating both types of content, to render them relatively implicit. However, it is not at all clear from anything that Schiller has said in this Letter, just why it is that if an object is form dominated, it will produce a balanced response, activating both drives so that they counterbalance each other. We may find ourselves asking what is so special about form, that enables it to engage both drives simultaneously? For the answer to this question, we have to go back to the epistemological position Schiller expressed in Letter 19. There it was disclosed that the psyche's formative activity rests upon the passive reception of a sensuous content (as 'raw material' to form).

> 'The finite mind is that which cannot become active except through being passive, which only attains to the absolute by means of limitation, and only acts and fashions [or forms] inasmuch as it receives material to fashion.' '. . . mind will accordingly combine with the drive towards form, or towards the absolute, a drive towards matter, or towards limitation, these latter being the conditions without which it could neither possess nor satisfy the first of these drives.' (L19:9)

The relevance of this passage to the current context of discussion, is that it implies that we cannot discern or create form without apprehending a sensuous content, and that both drives are necessarily engaged in this process. However, Schiller does not hereby tell us why the drives are necessarily engaged simultaneously (and not say alternately, as in Fichte's theory of drives in The Science of Knowledge), or why they are engaged to an equal extent (so as to counterbalance one another, and produce the equilibrious aesthetic condition). We must, therefore, conclude that much of what Schiller says in this Letter about the psychological effect of form in art, does not go beyond being a series of assertions.

In order to encourage both drives to be engaged simultaneously and (roughly) to the same extent, Schiller would perhaps have done better to argue for the art object to be endowed with equally powerful conceptual and sensuous contents, (something like a Wagner music drama perhaps). This would involve making both types of content as explicit as possible. In other words, Schiller should have argued for the

maximization, rather than the minimization, of the psychological effects of both types of content in art. The overall effect produced in us, would more closely conform to the ideal of man's psychological perfection which Schiller expressed in Letter 17:

> '. . . man's perfection resides in the harmonious energy of his sensuous and spiritual powers . . .' (L17:2)

Schiller's own position in Letter 22, in which form 'consumes' both types of content, rendering them merely implicit, would seem to produce a psychological situation in which

> '. . . the unity of his nature is founded upon the uniform enfeeblement of his sensuous and spiritual powers.' (L17:2)

Schiller's description of the ideal art object in Letter 22, makes it become rather anaemic and indeterminate in character, producing an effect which would leave us in need of 'energizing beauty' (cf. L17:2). Schiller seems to have followed Kant into a rather empty aesthetic formalism where art is concerned. The reason for this would appear to be Schiller's overriding concern to ensure that psychological harmony is produced by aesthetic experience. Two weakened natures and drives, may more obviously be reconciled than two dynamic ones. Thus Schiller's moral and political aims in the treatise, have led him to produce a theory of the ideal art object which reduces it to being anaemic and formalist in character in the end.

LETTER 23

The Aesthetic Development of 'Noble' Moral Volition

In this Letter, Schiller's perspective returns to the practical educative role of the aesthetic, as the means whereby the mass of mankind, dominated by their sensuous nature, may become rational and moral. Whereas in the last Letter the 'aesthetic' was discussed in the narrow terms of types of art and the ideal art object, in this Letter the 'aesthetic' is conceived of in a much less ideal, and at the same time broader way, as being 'form' in general, in the sense simply

of order, structure and harmony of any kind. Schiller will argue in this Letter, that through an 'aesthetic' education in this wider sense, our sensuous nature may be 'formed' in a way which both facilitates the development of an as yet merely dormant rational nature (by diminishing sensuous hindrances to its development), and ensures that our sensuous nature will, once reason is developed, be more compatible with the latter, and capable of interrelating with it in a relatively harmonious manner.

Schiller begins by reminding us that the transition from the life of sense, passivity and feeling, to a life of active rational cognition and volition, is a movement which can only be effected through the mediation of a 'middle state' of aesthetic freedom, viz. by passing through the aesthetic condition of the psyche.

> 'The transition from a passive state of feeling to an active state of thinking and willing cannot, then, take place except <u>via</u> a middle state of aesthetic freedom.' (L23:2)

Schiller further reiterates that the aesthetic condition of the psyche does not involve explicit definite concepts. Consequently, it can provide us with neither intellectual insights nor moral convictions. Nevertheless, he asserts, it is the necessary psychological pre-condition of us having any rational concepts or moral principles (for sensuous man, left to himself, is unable to attain to either).

> '. . . although this state can of itself decide nothing as regards either our insights or our convictions . . . it is nevertheless the necessary pre-condition of our attaining to any insight or conviction at all.' '. . . there is no other way of making sensuous man rational except by first making him aesthetic.' (L23:2)

Schiller then continues, telling us that

> '. . . beauty can produce no result, neither for the understanding nor for the will[1] . . . it merely imparts the power to do both . . .' (L23:3)

In his reference here to beauty imparting 'the power' to understand

and will, Schiller is saying that aesthetic experience psychologically promotes the general purpose of knowing and willing. This is because the aesthetic condition involves an equilibrious relationship between our drives and faculties, which to some extent beneficially carries over into ordinary particular acts of knowing and willing. (This is similar to Kant's idea in the Critique of Judgement, that the 'free play' of the faculties of imagination and understanding evoked by beauty, is 'subjectively final' for, viz. promotes the end of, cognition in general.)[2]

Schiller proceeds to argue that if the sensuously dominated man is ever to rise to truth in his knowing, he must develop the ability to think autonomously, and not merely be passively recipient of a multiplicity of external sense-impressions. The development of active autonomy in knowing and willing, does not involve doing away with this passive receptivity, but rather the superimposed development of an active rational (self) determination, involving internally and externally forming the material so received. Now Schiller takes the view that man has within him, even in his natural sensuous state, an implicit rational nature. The development of this potentially active rational nature, in a way which will allow the individual to remain passively recipient of sense-impressions (which, as Schiller made clear in Letter 19, is the necessary basis of him having a content to actively form), is brought about through an aesthetic education towards the aesthetic condition, wherein man becomes passively and actively determined simultaneously (through the equilibrium of his primary drives effected by experiencing a form dominated object).

> 'Truth is not . . . like . . . the physical existence of things, [something which] can simply be received from without. It is something produced by our thinking faculty, autonomously . . .' 'And it is precisely this autonomy, this freedom, which is lacking in sensuous man. Sensuous man is already(physically speaking) determined, and . . . no longer possesses free determinability. This lost determinability he will first have to recover before he can exchange his passive determination for an active one. But he cannot recover it except by . . . already possessing within himself the active determination towards which he is to proceed.' 'He will . . . need to be at oneand the same time passively, and actively, determined; that is to

say, he will have to become aesthetic.' (L23:4)

The process of aesthetic education begins with the development of reason within the context of our still being dominated by sense. It involves our sensuous nature being formed to become a 'second nature' of a more rational kind, compatible with reason itself.

> 'Through the aesthetic modulation of the psyche, then, the autonomy of reason is already opened up within the domain of sense itself, the dominion of sensation already broken within its own frontiers . . .' (L23:5)

As we saw in Letter 20, the sense-drive must be suspended as a determining power vis-à-vis the psyche, before reason can begin to develop. Schiller is thus here describing the earliest phase of the development of the aesthetic condition, which will lead sensuous man towards its fully equilibrious mode. The 'aesthetic education' described in this Letter is really proto-aesthetic, being carried out by the psyche internally forming or structuring our sensuous nature, rather than effected by an externally formed art object evoking the fully-fledged aesthetic condition of the psyche.

Schiller tells us that the transition from man's sensuous state to the aesthetic condition, is a more difficult transition than the later one from the aesthetic condition to a rational and moral state. The former involves enlarging man's nature by developing his implicit rationality, and at the same time reforming his sensuous nature by imbuing it with order and structure, to make it less contingent in character, less of an immediate hindrance to rational development, and ultimately more compatible with our rational nature when this is developed to explicit existence. The later transition, from the aesthetic to a rational and moral condition, can be relatively easily executed by man's then powerful free will, which would no longer be hindered by an opposed sensuous nature.

> 'The step from the aesthetic to the logical and moral state . . . is . . . infinitely easier than was the step from the physical state to the aesthetic . . .' 'The former step man can accomplish simply of his own free will . . . it merely involves . . . fragmenting his nature, not enlarging it . . .' '. . . the step

> from brute matter to beauty . . . must first be facilitated by the grace of Nature . . .' 'To obtain the same results from sensuous man we must first alter his very nature.' (L23:5)

In this passage, we see further evidence of Schiller's continuing concern that the process of aesthetic education, viz. of aesthetically effected psychological development, should not involve any infringement of our rational autonomy. Once reason is established as a power qua the form-drive, its further psychological development and external realization, is achieved by its own self-determination, without the need for aesthetic assistance. Schiller's statement in the above passage that the step to the 'moral state' involves 'fragmenting' man's nature, would appear to be an implicit criticism of Kant's moral philosophy, with its view that the moral will involves the opposition of reason and our sensuous nature.

It is clear that Schiller conceives of the crucial and distinct role of aesthetic education as being solely to reform man's sensuous nature, initially (in this Letter), by imbuing it with form, viz. with order and structure, in place of its natural formlessness, its blind force and contingency.

> 'It is, therefore, one of the most important tasks of [aesthetic] education to subject man to form even in his purely physical life . . .' (L23:6)

Schiller appears to view such aesthetic education as a basic human right. He tells us that no individual should be left merely subject to nature's blind forces, its alien necessity. The individual's knowing and willing should attain a universal character, so that it may conform to that of the rest of mankind. (This is a similar view to Kant's idea of our judgement being rendered more universal by reference to the 'public sense'[3]). In other words, from dependence upon nature, man must be raised to rational self-determination. (Schiller here adopts a more Kantian view of the relationship between reason and nature, where they are seen in opposed terms with regard to the basis of human freedom.)

> 'If man is, in every single case, to possess the power of enlarging his judgement and his will into the judgement of the species as a whole; if . . . out of every dependent condition

> be able to wing his way towards autonomy and freedom : then we must see to it that he is in no single moment of his life . . . merely subservient to the law of nature.' (L23:6)

If the individual is to transcend the limitation of merely realizing natural ends (in which his physical needs provide the entire content of his volitional purposes), to attain the autonomy of willing rational purposes which he gives to himself, then he must, whilst within the constraints of the former condition, commence to realize even his natural needs with an element of choice and self-determination, by imparting to their satisfaction some order and form.

> 'If he is to be fit and ready to raise himself out of the restricted cycle of natural ends towards rational purposes, then he must already have prepared himself for the latter within the limits of the former, and have realized his physical destiny with a certain freedom of the spirit, that is, in accordance with the laws of beauty [or form].' (L23:6)

Now what Schiller appears to have in mind here, is the concept of well-being, viz. the co-ordinated and systematized satisfaction of natural needs, which imparts some degree of form and thus implicit rationality, to what would otherwise be the formless satisfaction of blindly followed natural impulses as they contingently arise.[4] The imparting of form to the process of natural need satisfaction, is at this stage, purely an internal formative process, in which the psyche introduces some order and organization into the impulses, achieving a degree of self-determination by its choice.[5] Only much later in man's psychological development does he impart form in an explicitly aesthetic sense, to the external manner of need satisfaction (cf. L27:2 and 5).

The satisfaction of natural needs in a way which imparts to the process some order and form, i.e. some degree of rationality, does not in Schiller's view, involve the suppression of the integral character of our sensuous nature. From the 'point of view', as it were, of our sensuous nature, it is a matter of indifference whether our natural needs are satisfied in a purely sensuous way, with ourselves acting as a mere part of nature (caught up as a blindly acting force in a network of forces), or whether we transcend natural causality and satisfy our natural needs so as to achieve some degree of rational freedom whilst

still within the domain of nature.

> 'And this he can indeed accomplish without in the least acting counter to his physical ends.' '. . . for his physical destiny it is a matter of complete indifference whether . . . he realizes it merely as sensuous being and natural force (i.e. as a force which only reacts as it is acted upon), or whether he will at the same time realize it as absolute force and rational being . . .' (L23:7)

Schiller now introduces a moral dimension to the discussion, and tells us that man is raised to what he calls 'nobility' of nature, when he imports order and form into the satisfaction of his natural desires, and thus achieves a degree of self-determination in a realm where the moral law does not require him to extend the jurisdiction of rational form.

> '. . . it dignifies and exalts him to strive for order, harmony, and infinite freedom in those matters where the common man is content . . . to satisfy his legitimate [natural] desires.' '. . . in the sphere of . . . well being, form has every right to exist . . .' (L23:7)

The references in this passage to 'order', 'well-being' and 'form', in connection with man's natural desires, confirms that at this stage, Schiller is not talking about imparting form to the external manner in which we satisfy our needs (as in e.g. graceful modes of eating). He has in mind a purely internal formation of our natural impulses by the psyche, as the earliest and most rudimentary form the (aesthetic) formation process can take, but one which is a necessary prelude to later more advanced and explicitly aesthetic formative processes. The only limited rational character of well-being, will be discussed by Schiller in the next Letter (in L24:5).

In Schiller's view, rationality must be introduced into our sensuous nature itself, at an early stage of our psychological development, and not merely be later externally imposed upon it, in a moral 'war' between two independently fully developed sensuous and rational natures. Our moral life must begin within the domain of our physical life:

> 'It is . . . in the . . . sphere of physical life, that man must make a start upon his moral life[6] . . .' 'The [moral] law of his will he must apply even to his inclinations . . .' (L23:8)

There is in what Schiller is saying here, an implicit criticism of the Kantian conception of morality, which sees self-determination and rational form as only needing to be forcefully imposed upon our natural being ab extra, without recognizing the practical need for the latter to attain some degree of rational form within its own realm, if morality is to have a psychologically secure basis, and be realizable in a way which does not involve fragmenting our human nature.

In a footnote, Schiller tells us that within the terms of the Kantian moral philosophy, the concept of the 'moral will' requires only that the will itself should be rational in character, not our natural inclinations and impulses as such. Now Schiller takes the view that by imparting form and thus implicit rationality to our natural desires and impulses, their opposition and hindrance to reason is diminished; their quasi-rational quality gives them a compatibility with the demands of moral reason, which enables them to assist its realization. In other words, our natural inclinations may become 'moral inclinations', as it were, providing us with a tendency towards what Schiller terms 'noble' conduct, in which we are naturally and spontaneously moral.[7]

> '. . . carrying out the physical in an aesthetic [formed] manner, is . . . to exceed duty, since [moral] duty can only prescribe that the will be sacred [or rational], but not that nature itself shall have taken on sacral [rational] character.' '. . . such conduct we call noble.' (L23:7, fn. 2)
>
> '. . . we do not prize noble conduct because it surpasses the nature of its subject - on the contrary, it must flow freely and without constraint out of this - but because it surpasses . . . its physical end and passes beyond this into the realm of mind.' (L23:7, fn. 3)

Schiller proceeds to distinguish 'noble' moral willing from that which he calls 'sublime':

> 'Noble conduct is to be distinguished from sublime conduct. The first transcends moral obligation . . .' '. . . [the latter]

> exceeds . . . our experience of the . . . strength of the human will.' (L23:7, fn. 3)

By developing 'moral inclinations', and thus a 'noble' nature, we can avoid the need for 'sublime' superhuman moral willing, i.e. the attempt to externally impose rational moral principles of action upon an unformed and psychologically independent sensuous nature.

> 'He must learn to desire more nobly, so that he may not need to will sublimely.'[8] (L23:8)

Sublime moral willing is the kind of moral willing Schiller implicitly identifies with Kant's moral philosophy, with its eternal opposition between rational moral duty and natural inclination. He implies that the Kantian moral will is a psychological impossibility, exceeding 'our experience of the . . . strength of the human will'[9] (L23:7, fn. 3). It is thus unable to provide, in practical terms, a sound basis for a realistic and realizable morality. Only the semi-rationalization of our sensuous nature to render it more compatible with the demands of moral reason[10], can provide such a basis for morality. In the same way that in Schiller's epistemology (in Letter 19), rational cognition rests upon the basis of a co-operative relationship with sensuous apprehension, so too in Schiller's moral philosophy, rational volition rests upon the basis of a co-operative relationship with a compatible sensuous nature. In other words, for Schiller, moral freedom is only achievable through psychological harmony.[11]

Within the context of Schiller's revised four stage model of man's psychological development (in Letter 20), what Schiller has argued in Letter 23, is that a very basic type of 'aesthetic' education[12], involving the forming of our natural inclinations, enables the development of our inner rational and moral life to proceed, less hindered by an incompatible and dominant sensuous nature. Schiller is proposing the means whereby man may begin the process of developing from being dominated by his sensuous being towards the aesthetic condition proper. The particular means for achieving this initial development discussed here in Letter 23, do not appear to be 'aesthetic' according to any conventional meaning of the term. However, for Schiller, form is precisely the quality which is capable of endowing anything at all with the attribute 'aesthetic' : whether the phenomenon in question

is an art object (as in Letter 22), or man's sensuous being (here in Letter 23), or the political State (in Letter 27). Indeed it is notable how in this Letter, Schiller has argued for a similar form domination of man's inner sensuous content, viz. his natural impulses and inclinations, as in Letter 22 he argued the artist should impose upon the external sensuous content of the art object if it is to be ideally beautiful.

The stage in man's psychological development considered in this Letter, should be viewed as being proto-aesthetic[13] : a condition which lies somewhere between a purely sensuous mode of being, and attaining to the equilibrious aesthetic condition of the psyche. Schiller argues that by imparting form to man's 'outer' phenomenal (or sensible) being, the way is opened up for his 'inner' rational (or supersensible) being to develop, less hindered by an incompatible and dominant sensuous nature:

> '[Learning to desire more nobly] is brought about by means of aesthetic education, which . . . in the form it gives to outer life, already opens up the inner.' (L23:8)

Although, as we shall see in the next Letter (Letter 24), the sensuous domination of the psyche is not immediately abolished by this formative process, at least our sensuous nature is rendered compatible enough with our rational being, to allow the process of rational psychological development to proceed.

LETTER 24

The Psycho-Historical Development of Man (I) : Reason's Development Perverted by Nature

Although we have been following an outline account of man's psycho-historical development ever since Letter 19, it is only now that this history begins in earnest. In Letters 19 to 21, Schiller was principally concerned to justify his model of psychological development, particularly its aesthetic 'middle state', in terms of a derivatively Fichtean epistemology. In Letter 22, he focused on the role played by the art object in evoking this middle state, and discussed the

psychological criteria for evaluating types of art and particular art works. In Letter 23, although Schiller described man's initial process of rational development, as involving the systematization of natural impulses in 'well-being', he then looked well ahead to how this very preliminary mode of 'aesthetic' education has important long-term beneficial consequences for morality, through ultimately developing a 'noble' moral disposition of character. Thus the outline account of man's psycho-historical development has, up until now, been sidetracked into theoretical justifications of Schiller's psychological model of development, his aesthetic model of ideal art, and his moral philosophy. In the next Letter (Letter 25), we will again have to follow a diversion into the moral domain, before Schiller returns to complete the story of man's psychological development in Letters 26 and 27. Thus Schiller's account of the psychological history of man is essentially concentrated into Letters 24, 26 and 27 (with other Letters, from Letter 19 onwards, primarily serving to justify the conceptual apparatus employed in the outline of this development).

Schiller begins Letter 24, by re-affirming the necessity of his model of man's psycho-historical development, but it is now revised by being reduced to a three stage model. The first stage discussed in Letters 19 to 21, viz. the stage of man's pure potential state of being prior to any mode of determination at all, is now omitted by Schiller from his model. This is presumably because the stage in question was a logical abstraction, a merely postulated pre-condition, whereas Schiller's theoretical interests from Letter 23 onwards, are orientated to the practical educative role of the aesthetic, and thus to stages of development which, in his view, actually exist over time.

> 'We can, then, distinguish three different moments or stages of development through which both the individual and the species as a whole must pass, inevitably and in a definite order, if they are to complete the full cycle of their destiny.' 'Man in his physical state merely suffers the dominion of nature, he emancipates himself from this dominion in the aesthetic state, and he acquires mastery over it in the moral.' (L24:1)

A difficulty arises with both Schiller's model of, and his outline account of, man's psycho-historical development, in that they are much more obviously psychological than historical. His language, in the

course of their descriptive elaboration, is usually couched in terms of the individual. The social dimension of psychological development, and the notion of a psychological development of the species, are secondary. Schiller's model and his outline account have more plausibility at the level of individual psychological development, than they do at the (supposedly simultaneous) level of the psycho-historical development of the species.[1]

A further problem arises when one attempts to view the process of psychological development described by Schiller, in historical and species terms. Given that Schiller considers the mass of contemporary mankind to be merely 'savages' dominated by their sensuous being (cf. L5:4), the aesthetic stage of the species development must, like the moral stage, be located at some time in the future. Two of the three stages of development, therefore, which are asserted to be 'inevitable' and to occur in a necessary 'definite order' (in L24:1), are in the future. Schiller is thus getting close to involving himself, by implication, in the philosophically illegitimate process of predicting the future course of man's species development (albeit in the most general terms). Schiller gets into this position by making claims which endow what is essentially a model of individual psychological development, with a species significance and a historical dimension; at the same time, transferring a psychological necessity in the stages of development of the former model, to become a necessity in the process of historical development. In other words, if we draw out the full implications of Schiller's position, we see he gets close to a position which involves a psychologically based historicism[2] : transposing psychological necessity into historical necessity, as he claims a species significance and an historical dimension for a model of individual psychological development.

Schiller begins the main argument of the Letter with a detailed speculative 'description' of the cognitive and volitional standpoint of the purely sensuous man, inhabiting a 'state of nature'. He tells us that the purely sensuous man is caught up in the process of unceasingly satisfying his physical needs. He satisfies himself only as a particular natural being, before he has a 'self' proper, viz. a self-conscious ego, to realize. His volition is a lawless licence, not the true freedom of rational self-determination via the moral law. He is enslaved to his passions and impulses, rather than governed by rational concepts or moral precepts (in 'rule-governed' behaviour).

He experiences the world as a blind alien necessity, not as an 'object' (which would presuppose that he is a self-conscious 'subject'):

> 'What is man before . . . form [or the aesthetic] tempers the savagery of life? A monotonous round of ends . . . self-seeking, and yet without a Self[3]; lawless, yet without Freedom; a slave, yet to no Rule. At this stage the world is for him merely Fate, not yet Object . . .' (L24:2)

Such an individual experiences phenomena as particular isolated items, unrelated to other items and to other experiences. Lacking rational necessity in his cognition and volition, lacking any sense of his own continuing unity and identity, he is unable to organize and unify his transient experiences of phenomena into a co-ordinated system of knowledge. His attitude to what he experiences is negative : either fleeing from natural phenomena as threats, or consuming them as objects of desire. His relation to what he experiences is always one merely of direct physical contact, unmediated by rational thought.

> 'Each phenomenon stands before him, isolated and cut off from all other things . . .' '. . . with the lack of necessity within him, there is none outside of him either, to connect the changing forms into a universe . . .' 'Either he hurls himself upon objects to devour them in an access of desire; or . . . he thrusts them away in horror. In either case his relation to the world of sense is that of immediate contact . . .' (L24:2)

The sensuously dominated individual can do no more than respond to the endless demands of his physical needs, which only find a natural limit in the satiation of appetite or in his exhaustion:

> '. . . ceaselessly tortured by imperious needs, he finds rest nowhere but in exhaustion, and limits nowhere but in spent desire.' (L24:2)

The individual only begins to emerge from this submergence in, and slavery to, nature, as he becomes self-conscious, and able to distinguish himself from nature, self from not-self:

> '. . . he gropes his way through the darkness of his life until . . . he learns through reflection to distinguish himself from things . . .' (L24:2)

Schiller admits that the picture he has drawn of a 'state of nature' is a rational construct rather than based upon historical fact.[4] However, he maintains it is relevant to our understanding of man's psychology, for man always retains a natural aspect to his being to some extent.

> 'This state of brute nature is not, I admit, to be found exactly as I have presented it here among any particular people or in any particular age. It is purely an Idea . . .' 'Man . . . was never in such a completely animal condition; but he has . . . never entirely escaped from it.' (L24:3)

Schiller reminds us that man's being is a combination of nature/and reason. Morality requires these two aspects of our being to be distinguished; but psychological harmony requires their equilibrious interrelation:

> '. . . man . . . unites in his nature the highest and the lowest; and if his moral dignity depends on his distinguishing strictly between the one and the other, his hope of . . . blessedness [or psychological harmony] depends on a due and proper reconciliation of the opposites he has distinguished.' (L24:3)

It is the function of aesthetic education to harmoniously reconcile the principle of moral freedom with the principle of psychological harmony:

> 'An [aesthetic] education which is to bring his [moral] dignity into harmony with his happiness [or psychological harmony] will, therefore, have to see to it that those two principles are maintained in their utmost purity even while they are being most intimately fused.' (L24:3)

Such a fusion of the principles of freedom and harmony, which avoids a confused moral aestheticism, occurs as we saw in Letter 23, when we develop a natural inclination to perform our rational moral duty, viz.

develop a 'noble' disposition of character.

In the rest of Letter 24, Schiller describes the psychological situations which occur when reason first develops,within a context still dominated by sense. We see the negative effects upon our rational being of its emergence still being overwhelmingly conditioned by nature. Reason's initial emergence from a psychological state of purely sensuous domination, at first functions to make matters worse : the dominion of sense becomes absolute, through reason's own regulative demand for completeness in knowing and absoluteness in willing, being perverted by a still dominant sense-drive to its own material ends.

> 'The first appearance of Reason in man does not necessarily imply that he has started to become truly human.' '. . . the first thing reason does is to make him utterly dependent upon his senses . . .' 'It is . . . through the demand for the Absolute . . . that Reason make itself known in man.' '. . . it can, through a misunderstanding (almost unavoidable in this early epoch of prevailing materiality), be directed towards physical life . . .' (L24:4)

Schiller closely follows Kant's critical philosophy in telling us that the demand of reason is for completeness of cognition[5] and absoluteness in volition. This he asserts, again following Kant, can only be attained by leaving behind the finite realm of the phenomenal and sensible, and by raising our cognition to the Ideas of reason[6], and our volition to determination by the supersensible moral law:

> '[The demand for the Absolute should] force him to leave the physical altogether, and ascend out of a limited reality into the realm of Ideas.' '. . . and lead him upwards from the sensuous world towards an Ideal world . . .' (L24:4)

However, when man is almost totally under the sway of sense, the urge to complete knowledge and unconditioned willing becomes misdirected, by being converted by his sensuous being into a drive to achieve the most full and unlimited physical life. (The precise psychological process of this conversion is not described by Schiller.) Instead of directing his cognition to truth and his volition to morality, reason drives sensuous man into an unlimited striving for the total physical

satisfaction of all his natural instinctive needs.

> 'In the very midst of his animality the drive towards the Absolute . . . is directed merely towards the material and the temporal . . . he will . . . be led to strive . . . after an unfailing supply of matter . . .' 'That very drive which, applied to his thinking and activity, was meant to lead him to truth and morality, brought now to bear upon his passivity and feeling, produces nothing but unlimited longing and absolute instinctual need.' (L24:5)

It is notable how in this passage, Schiller identifies Kant's concept of reason's regulative demands upon our cognitive and volitional processes, with the form-drive (which, as in L19:9, is described as the drive 'towards the absolute'). Thus Schiller adopts Kant's concept, and then adapts it : by giving it a physiological dimension, and converting it into a fundamental psychological drive.

The individual proceeds to embark upon the process of endlessly seeking the unlimited total satisfaction of all his physical needs (in the form of 'well-being'), in a realm where all is limited and finite. The pursuit of such satisfaction, can in practice only take the form of endless particular and partial satisfactions. The individual's striving must be unlimited, and his satisfactions be each limited, for (in Kantian terms), he cannot ever achieve an unlimited or absolute realization purely within the conditioned phenomenal realm.

> 'An unlimited perpetuation of being and well-being . . . is an ideal which belongs to appetite alone, hence a demand which can only be made by an animality striving towards the Absolute.'[7] (L24:5)

Such an individual never achieves the goal of realizing a limited end, in the way that even animals are able to do. Instead, he seeks an 'infinite' satisfaction made up of endless finite satisfactions. The 'ideal' or general end he pursues, is just an endless repetition of what he already has.

> 'Thus, without gaining anything for his humanity . . . man merely loses thereby the happy limitation of the animal . . . in favour of longings for what is not, yet without seeking in all those

limitless vistas anything but the here and now he already knows.' (L24:5)

At a further stage of development, sensuous man begins to use his intellect, relating phenomena in terms of a nexus of causes and effects. Reason's regulative demand for completeness in knowledge (in the shape of the form-drive towards the absolute), leads the individual to seek an unconditioned causal explanation for phenomena:

> 'As soon as man has begun to use his intellect, and to connect the phenomena around him in the relation of cause and effect, Reason . . . presses for an absolute connexion and an unconditioned cause.' (L24:6)

But instead of rising to the realm of rational Ideas, to the domain of the supersensible, sensuously dominated man, not yet capable of such abstraction, seeking and failing to find an unconditioned cause in the world of external sensuous phenomena, seeks and finds it in the world of his own internal sensuous being, viz. in his feelings.

> 'This, strictly speaking, would be the point at which he ought to leave the world of sense altogether, and soar upwards to the realm of pure Ideas; for the intellect remains eternally confined within the realm of the conditioned . . .' 'But since the man with whom we are here concerned is not yet capable of such abstraction, that which he cannot find in his sphere of empirical knowledge, and does not yet seek beyond it in the sphere of pure Reason, he will seek beneath it in his sphere of feeling and, to all appearances, find it.' (L24:6)

The arbitrariness of feeling, is thus the perverted form his search for the unconditioned ends in. Instead of a postulated first cause or final cause, we have that which is seemingly 'unconditioned' by having no cause whatever in its absolute contingency.

> '. . . this world of sense shows him nothing which might be its own cause . . . but it does show him something which knows of no cause and obeys no law. Since, then, he cannot appease his inquiring intellect by evoking any ultimate and inward cause,

> he manages at least to silence it with the notion of no-cause . . .' (L24:6)

How he feels about the world, and in particular, what he happens to feel is to his own advantage, is to be the arbitrary criterion of a perverse 'truth' and 'morality', the principle-less principle by which he indeterminately determines his cognition and volition:

> 'Because the life of sense knows no purpose other than its own advantage, and feels driven by no cause other than blind chance, he makes the former into the arbiter of his actions and the latter into the sovereign ruler of the world.' (L24:6)

At a still further stage in the development of reason in sensuous man, the individual becomes aware of the moral law. Reason now seeks to enjoin upon him an absolutely rational mode of volition. However, the precepts of the moral law to sensuously dominated man, can only appear as external constraints upon his 'freedom'.

> 'Even . . . the moral law, when it first makes its appearance in the life of sense, cannot escape such perversion. Since its voice is merely inhibitory, and against the interest of his animal self-love, it is bound to seem like something external to himself . . .' '. . . he merely feels the fetters which reason lays upon him . . .' (L24:7)

Sensuous man, using his intellect, proceeds to degrade the status of the moral law. As he bases his knowledge only upon sensuous experience, he sees merely how his sensuous being temporally precedes his consciousness of the moral law. He proceeds to view the moral law as a positive creation by either men or God at some time in history; not as an eternally valid means of attaining to true freedom of volition, but the product of an accidental event in human history. The absolute validity of the moral law, is thus reduced to a moral relativism.

> 'Because in his experience the sense-drive precedes the moral, he assigns to the [moral] law of necessity a beginning in time too, a positive origin, and . . . makes the unchangeable and eternal in himself into an accidental product of the transient. He

> persuades himself into regarding the concepts of right and wrong as statutes introduced by some will, not as something valid in themselves for all eternity.' (L24:7)

The moral rationality of man may be 'taken out' of him and assigned to God, with the moral law's postulated origin in a transcendent God. The moral law of human reason may become viewed as being the divine law of God. The moral law is effectively temporalized and relativized, as the laws of morality become regarded as being divine laws which are 'revealed' in religion at a certain time or times in history.

> '. . . in the explanation of the moral world, he goes beyond Reason and forfeits his humanity by seeking a Godhead . . .'
> '. . . man considers laws which were not binding from all eternity as not . . . binding to all eternity either.' (L24:7)

(In this passage, as well as in his talk of religious divinities as being human 'projections' in L6:3 and L25:3, one can detect in Schiller a rather unsympathetic attitude to the truth claims of religion.)

Schiller concludes Letter 24 by summarizing the nature of the development which we have followed in it, and by pointing to its general cause. He tells us that the perversions of rationality that we have observed, are all consequences of that natural state in which the sense-drive dominates the form-drive.

> '. . . these deviations are . . . all attendant upon his physical condition, since in all of them the life-impulse plays the master over the form-impulse.' (L24:8)

In the purely sensuous man, nature dominates him with a blind necessity. But in the sensuous man in whom an infant reason develops, a reason still in nature and not yet developed to independence out of nature, the rational and moral aspect of his character is simply perversely pressed into the service of the physical. Whether in his purely sensuous state, or in that condition in which reason commences its subordinated development, man remains locked into the sensible world, confined to its limits and subjected to natural compulsion.

> 'Whether it . . . be that reason has not yet made its voice heard

> in man, and the physical still rules him with blind necessity; or that reason has not yet sufficiently purified itself of sense, and the moral is still at the service of the physical : in either case the sole principle prevailing within him is a material one, and man is, at least in his ultimate tendency, a creature of sense . . .' (L24:8)

Although most of the content of Letter 24 is reasonably easy to follow with regard to its meaning,nevertheless it does raise three main difficulties. In the first place, it is not at all clear why any of the sub-stages of development discussed are necessary. They are speculative 'descriptions', rather than logically 'deduced' in any way. The account may be interesting and contain certain psychological insights, but it is not philosophically compelling : things could be otherwise than as described.[8]

A second difficulty with Schiller's account of man's early psychological development in this Letter, is that some of the stages of development described, along with their attendant 'perversions', appear too advanced for sensuous man to be likely to encounter. Here, one thinks particularly of sensuous man (the 'savage' of L4:6), searching for an unconditioned causal explanation of the phenomenal world; or of him being aware of the moral law to the extent of being concerned to degrade its theoretical status. The functioning of the intellect, and of both theoretical and practical reason, seem to be too advanced for such an early stage of psychological development. The levels of development described towards the end of the Letter, occur implausibly soon after Schiller has described man's semi-animalistic condition in a 'state of nature'. From semi-animality to worrying about the status of the moral law, represents a considerable leap forward in man's development (over a few paragraphs). In addition, the kind of intellectual and moral considerations raised in this Letter, would be more likely to occur and be of interest to the 'barbarian' intelligentsia, rather than to the 'savage' masses (whom, we were told in L8:6, are too 'exhausted by the struggle for existence' to think for themselves, and leave the thinking to others : to the intelligentsia of State and church).

Finally, a third possible difficulty with Schiller's account arises over whether his description in this Letter of nature's ability to pervert the course of man's rational development, does not involve simultaneously such a high level of sensuous hindrance and rational

impotence, as to subvert the autonomous status of reason. However, the fact that in later Letters, Schiller will describe reason's eventually successful emergence out of sense to attain independence, demonstrates that, in principle, what has been described in this Letter is a high level of hindrance rather than heteronomy.

It should be noted however, that the epistemology of Letter 19 entails that for Schiller, there can be no complete autonomy or total independence of reason from nature. The highest state of rational freedom rests upon a physical substructure, a harmonious relation to our natural being (cf. L19:9). Schiller thus gives full recognition to the fact that we are not 'pure', but rather embodied, rational beings. The crucial role of aesthetic education is to create harmony between our rational and sensuous natures, whilst simultaneously liberating reason from the early hindrances that our sensuous nature imposes upon it. Thus man's psycho-historical development involves a movement towards a condition of relative autonomy, with Schiller ultimately sacrificing the Kantian notion of reason's absolute autonomy, in the interest of psychological harmony (and the realizable 'noble' morality which stems from it).

A notable feature of Letter 24 has been how Schiller has simply taken over a number of Kantian conceptions without acknowledging the fact, or justifying his employment of the concepts concerned, or even showing much concern as to whether they are congruent to the philosophical or psychological framework established in previous Letters. For example, we have seen references in this Letter to the 'realm of Ideas' (L24:4), and to 'the pure Ideas' to be found 'in the sphere of Pure Reason' (L24:6). Here, Kant's Ideas of theoretical reason, which are epistemologically regulative in status, are borrowed by Schiller without acknowledgment or theoretical justification, and apparently without concern that they are considerably different in logical status from his own earlier rather more Platonic Ideas of Human Being and Beauty (employed in Letters 10, 14 and 15), which had an objective ontological status (placing Schiller, in contrast to Kant, in a position of proto-absolute idealism). Moreover, again in contrast to Kant, for Schiller such Ideas may be cognized by means of a transcendental deduction (cf. L10:7). We are now entering a phase of the Letters in which the influence of Kant becomes more pronounced, and that of Fichte (which was so powerful in Letter 19), all but disappears. Even some features of Schiller's own theoretical framework begin to somewhat fade

from the foreground. Thus, for example, talk of the drives becomes increasingly rare and token, as the Kantian faculties increasingly take over the theoretical terrain of the last few Letters. Most notable of all, a more Kantian understanding of the subjective aspect of aesthetic experience[9], will become visible over the next few Letters.

LETTER 25

Aesthetic Contemplation. Beauty as a 'Bridge' Between Nature and Freedom

Having described in Letter 24 the natural state, in which man is dominated by his sensuous being, Schiller now proceeds to describe the nature of the transition from this to the aesthetic 'middle state' of man's psychological development. Letter 25 is divided into two parts. There is, firstly, an initial discussion of what is psychologically involved in 'contemplation', (developing a concept put forward in L15:5). The second half of the Letter, is concerned with reiterating how the contemplation of beauty specifically, has the ability to effect an harmonious interfunctioning of our rational and sensuous natures, (a topic already discussed a number of times, most notably in Letter 14 under the concept of the play-drive), which promotes the possibility of moral volition. There is thus not a great deal which is new in this Letter, and it seems to function principally pedagogically, to renew the reader's faith in the educative effect or developmental power of the aesthetic, following Schiller's rather graphic descriptions ofthe high level of sensuous hindrance to, and perversion of reason, in the last Letter.

Schiller commences the Letter by emphasizing that it is the development of self-consciousness which is the critical point in man's psychological development, the point at which he definitely overcomes his subordination to nature. The development of self-consciousness is closely associated by Schiller with the development of a capacity for contemplation, which rests upon the ability to view phenomenal objects with a certain degree of psychological distance from, and disinterest in, their sensuous being.[1] Schiller tells us that a degree of liberation from the sensuous is presupposed by the capacity to simply contemplate an object. In his purely natural state, man was undifferentiated from the world of immediate sense-impressions around him, which he simply

passively received in a life of pure feeling. At the aesthetic stage of development, he distinguishes the self from the not-self, as the subject in relation to a world of phenomenal objects.

> 'As long as man, in that first physical state, is merely a passive recipient of the world of sense, i.e., does no more than feel, he is still completely One with that world . . .' 'Only when, at the aesthetic stage, he puts it outside himself, or contemplates it, does his personality differentiate itself from it, and a world becomes manifest to him because he has ceased to be One with it.' (L25:1)

The ability to contemplate an 'object', is seen by Schiller as the first manifestation of self-consciousness and relative autonomy in relation to the sensuous realm.

> 'Contemplation (or reflection) is the first liberal relation which man establishes with the universe around him. If desire seizes directly upon its object, contemplation removes its object to a distance . . . putting it beyond the reach of passion.' L25:2)

The 'liberal relation' Schiller refers to here, involves a freedom from attachment to the sensuous. Whereas desire 'seizes directly' upon its object's sensuous being, contemplation focuses on its object's form, apprehending this indirectly, through the object's sensuous being. Now Schiller here is simultaneously employing concepts of both psychical distance[2] from, and disinterest in, the sensuous, as being essentially involved in the process of contemplating any kind of phenomenal object. He does not specify that the object in question must necessarily be beautiful for this to occur. However, presumably the process described would surely be assisted if the object were to be beautiful. One would expect certain types of object to be more or less conducive to being apprehended with the necessary lack of desire to create the disinterestedness and distance which are essential components of contemplation. However, Schiller does not (as yet) argue this, and instead appears to view the ability to develop a contemplative attitude to objects as a subjective facility that is independent of the nature of the phenomenal object before us. In other words, for Schiller

contemplation is a perceptual capability which is subjectively developed rather than objectively evoked.

Now such a broadly referenced concept of contemplation corresponds to the view which Schiller expressed in Letter 20, that

> 'Everything which is capable of phenomenal manifestation may . . .' '. . . relate to the totality of our various functions without being a definite object for any single one of them : that is its aesthetic character. A man can please us . . . without our taking into consideration in judging him any law or any purpose, please us simply as we contemplate him . . .' '. . . we are judging him aesthetically.' (L20:4, fn.)

In this passage, Schiller is not saying that all phenomenal objects are beautiful or aesthetically pleasing, but rather that all phenomenal objects have a formal aspect[3] which may be contemplated and judged aesthetically. The passage also shows that Schiller's concept of contemplation involves a disinterest not merely in an object's sensuous being, but also in its rational or conceptual character.[4] (In this position, he is merely following Kant's distinction between judgements of 'taste', and judgements concerned with the sensuously 'agreeable' or rationally 'perfect', in the Critique of Judgement.)[5]

It is also important to remember that for Schiller, the aesthetic condition is not a rare psychological state of high level contemplation, but rather a frequently and rapidly experienced aspect of our everyday ordinary cognitive processes. Thus in Letter 21, he told us that

> '. . . the rapidity with which certain types pass from sensation to thought or decision scarcely - if indeed at all - allows them to become aware of the aesthetic mode through which they must in that time necessarily pass.' (L21:5, fn.)

And here in Letter 25, Schiller says

> 'In a general way, then, those three moments which I mentioned at the beginning of the twenty-fourth Letter [viz. the physical, aesthetic and moral states] may well be considered as three different epochs, if we are thinking either of the development of mankind as a whole, or of the whole development of a single

> individual; but they are also to be distinguished in each single act of perception[6], and are, in a word, the necessary conditions of all knowledge which comes to us through the senses.' (L25:1, fn.)

It is important, therefore, if we are to comprehend Schiller's concept of contemplation, that it is not viewed in narrowly aesthetic terms, as being involved only in the perception and appreciation of beauty and art. For Schiller, the concept of contemplation appears to function epistemologically, to denote a certain perceptual relation of the subject to any kind of object. However, in Letter 26, Schiller will make it clear that such a perceptual relation (involving distance and disinterestedness), attains its most complete or ideal form in the contemplation of aesthetic semblances, viz. art objects.[7] Thus, as with his concepts of the 'play-drive' and the 'aesthetic condition' of the psyche, Schiller operates both a wider and narrower meaning, or less and more ideal, concept of contemplation.

In Schiller's view, when the individual achieves the ability to contemplate an object, this marks a major point of transition in his psychological development. The individual becomes self-conscious and self-determining in his perceptual relation to the externally sensuous. He is involved in forming the sense-impressions he receives, so that he is at once actively self-determining and passively externally determined. In other words, he is in that condition of active receptivity which in L20:4 Schiller described as the distinct quality of the 'aesthetic disposition' of the psyche.

Schiller proceeds to describe the effect in experience of this active forming process. He tells us that through the development of the capacity for contemplation, the multiplicity and flux of sense-impressions becomes stilled, both spatially and temporally, by being subjectively structured. As the individual focuses his consciousness upon phenomena, he forms representational images of them in his imagination, and apprehends their form, where before he experienced only a chaos of sensuous matter:

> 'In his senses there results a momentary peace; time itself, the eternally moving, stands still; and, as the divergent rays of consciousness converge, there is reflected against a background of transcience an image of the infinite, namely form.' '. . . the storm of the universe abates and the contending forces of nature come to rest between stable confines.' (L25:2)

Schiller here does not distinguish or relate the respective roles of the imagination and the understanding in the process of synthesizing the manifold in perception, and it is not entirely clear whether, as indicated here, it is the imagination which gives form to sense-impressions, or whether it is the understanding's conceptual thought, as the rest of this Letter strongly suggests.

It is worth examining more closely the above passage, for it is rich in meaning. The passage may, I think, be plausibly interpreted in two ways : 1) It may refer to how we develop the ability to represent objects in the form of imaginative images, and so extract them from the flux of external space and time, recollecting them into the relative permanence of our imaginary internal 'space' and 'time'. Alternatively, 2), Schiller may be putting forward the notion which underlies Plato's allegory of the cave (in The Republic)[8] : that any given phenomenon is an image of an infinite transcendent Form. On this view, the phenomenal form we apprehend in consciousness is a mere reflection (or poor copy) of some intelligible pure Form or Idea. This involves the Platonic and Kantian notion that the phenomenal world has its ultimate ground in a noumenal dimension. The passage above then, may be interpreted as being either an epistemological statement concerning the role of the imagination in the cognitive process, and in particular its function in forming representational images; or as being an ontological statement, asserting that any given finite phenomenon is a reflection of an infinite transcendent Form. It seems quite possible that Schiller intends to suggest both of these meanings, for they are not incompatible with each other, and accord with positions that he takes up elsewhere in the treatise. (Cf. L27:4 on the imagination; cf. L9:3 and 4 for a Platonic ontology.)

In the aesthetic condition of actively recipient contemplation, the individual is no longer dominated by nature, merely passively receiving it in sense. Instead, he dominates the sensuous by imposing form upon it in the process of thinking:

> 'From being a slave of nature, which he remains as long as he merely feels it, man becomes its law giver from the moment he begins to think it. That which hitherto merely dominated him as force, now stands before his eyes as object.' '. . . he imparts form to matter . . . and man gives evidence of his freedom precisely by giving form to that which is formless.'

'. . . he knows how to give it form and convert it into an object of his contemplation.' (L25:3)

Whereas in L25:2, Schiller appeared to be assigning to the imaginative forming of representational images alone, the process of imparting form to a manifold of sense-impressions, in the passage above, and in the rest of this Letter, it is a function which Schiller closely associates with thinking, and thus the rationally informed imagination (a view confirmed and developed in L27:4).

In the passage quoted above, Schiller follows Kant's epistemology, in the view that the object in itself is formless, and that it is we who impose form upon it. However, Schiller differs from Kant to some extent in how he conceives of form being so imposed. In particular, he does not adopt Kant's a priori teleological principle of reflective judgements in the Critique of Judgement[9], as being involved in this process. Schiller, in the passage above, appears to connect the imparting of form principally with the process of thinking. This connection again casts doubt upon his position in Letter 22[10] that form is somehow detached from having any special affinity with our rationality, so enabling a form dominated art object to be neutral in its psychological appeal to the primary drives, or to the faculties of sense and reason.

Moreover, if form is primarily the product of thinking, how can its creation and contemplation be part of a discrete aesthetic 'middle state', which is psychologically distinct from the rational state in which we are involved in rational cognition? Schiller's answer, given in Letter 20, was in terms of the rationality and concepts involved in the aesthetic condition being only implicit (cf. L20:4, fn., last sentence). In Letter 22, we were also told that form is able to render a conceptual rational content implicit in an art object.[11] Now Kant's notion of beauty as purposive form apprehended without any determinate concept of a purpose[12], can be seen as underlying Schiller's position here. But without taking on Kant's a priori teleological principle, Schiller has no theoretical justification for derivatively employing such a conception of form.

Schiller might perhaps have done better to argue that form is produced solely by the specific synthesizing function performed by the imagination, viz. the forming of representational images, without the understanding and its concepts entering into the process. (This was

the position he initially appeared to be taking up earlier, in L25:2). In this way, form would be related only to the process of apprehension (rather than principally to rational comprehension), and as such, could have been more suitably connected by Schiller with a state of aesthetic contemplation which lies somewhere 'between' the sensuous and rational conditions of the psyche. As it is, when Schiller comes shortly to discuss the process of rational thinking per se (in L25:5), he can only view this as involving a thorough-going abstraction from the sensuous, in order to make it psychologically distinct from the kind of sense forming thought that he has assigned to contemplation in the aesthetic condition. By means of this distinction, it is also possible for the aesthetic condition, as involving thought and sense, to be portrayed as the more psychologically balanced and desirable state.

In Schiller's view, the individual in the aesthetic condition of actively receptive contemplation, not only asserts his cognitive[13] autonomy in relation to nature, through his ability to impose form upon it in the process of thinking, but in addition, he develops a volitional autonomy which overcomes natural causation in his own sensuous being, as the latter becomes rationally formed to be 'nobly' inclined to morality:

> 'Once he begins to assert his [cognitive] independence in the face of nature as phenomenon, then he also asserts his [moral volitional] dignity vis-à-vis nature as [a blind] force, and with noble [inclined nature, in] freedom rises in revolt against his ancient gods [or determining natural forces].' (L25:3)

As man becomes self-conscious of his cognitive and volitional autonomy, he comes to recognize in nature the formal imprint of his own mind : the subjective forms of his thought, and the objective forms created by his will:

> 'Now [his ancient natural gods] . . . surprise him with his own image by revealing themselves as projections [or rational constructions] of his own mind.' (L25:3)

Schiller here is simultaneously making an epistemological statement, and a subsidiary statement about religious divinities being projections of the human mind (as in L6:3). As nature itself becomes cognitively less alien to man, his image of the divine reflects this, and moves

from being viewed as a blind force, to a spiritual pantheon, possessed of human qualities and rational purposes. This particular transition in religious conceptions, is historically identified by Schiller with the surpassing of oriental divinities by the gods of Greece:

> 'The monstrous divinity of the Oriental, which rules the world with the blind strength of a beast of prey, shrinks in the imagination of the Greeks into the friendly contours of a human being.' (L25:3)

Schiller admits that in considering the relative autonomy of knowing and willing which arises from the formation process which is involved in the aesthetic contemplative relation to nature, he has shown the stage of psychological development which sensuous man must attain to, but without demonstrating precisely how he develops towards it from out of the sensuous hindrances and perversions which we saw a nascent reason encountering in the natural state (in Letter 24).

> '. . . a sudden leap of this kind is contrary to human nature, and in order to keep step with this latter we shall have to turn back once more to the world of sense.' (L25:4)

However, the detailed description of the transition from man's sensuous state is not provided by Schiller until early in the next Letter (in L26:2), for he first proceeds in the rest of this Letter, to again discuss in general terms how beauty, by its own harmonious combination of sense and form, is able to effect a corresponding psychological harmony within man, between his sensuous and rational natures. Beauty is able to assist man to develop from being dominated by sense, to a naturally moral condition, in which our rationality rests upon a reformed sensuous substructure.

Schiller considers now the narrower, more ideal meaning of 'contemplation', as the contemplation specifically of beautiful objects. This involves a discussion of what is involved, psychologically, in the subjective experience of beauty. He begins by reminding us that as with aesthetic contemplation in the wider meaning already discussed, the aesthetic contemplation of beauty involves an actively receptive psychological condition, in which we form in thought what we receive in sense. The contemplation of beauty thus subjectively combines both

thought and sense:

> 'Beauty is . . . the work of free contemplation, and with it we do indeed enter upon the world of ideas - but . . . without . . . leaving behind the world of sense[14], as is the case when we proceed to knowledge of truth.' (L25:5)

In retaining a sensuous aspect, the contemplation of beauty is distinguished by Schiller from the discovery of truth. Truth is identified by Schiller with Kant's notion of a supersensible domain : the source of both theoretical reason's Ideas, and practical reason's moral law. Truth or the supersensible, can only be postulated cognitively, or determined volitionally, by abstraction from what is sensuous:

> 'Truth is the pure product of abstracting from everything which is material and contingent; it is . . . pure and unadulterated . . . pure autonomous activity without any admixture of passivity.' (L25:5)

However, in a difficult passage, Schiller tells us that we may derive an intellectual pleasure from admiring a system of ideas, or what he calls a 'rational unity'. Similarly, we may develop a moral feeling of respect for the rationality of the moral law, and through it check our natural inclinations, so as to bring our sensuous being into line with pure thought:

> 'True, even from the highest abstractions, there is a way back to sense; for thought affects our inner life of feeling, and the perception of logical and moral unity passes over into a feeling of sensuous congruence.' (L25:5)

Schiller's implicit reference here to moral feeling, is another example of him borrowing in a rather casual way from Kant's critical philosophy (in this case from the Critique of Practical Reason)[15], without any acknowledgement, or any attempt to justify his employment of the concept concerned within the context of his own theoretical framework in this treatise.

Schiller proceeds to argue that we cannot, in practice, psychologically

distinguish our perception of beauty in an object, from our subjective feeling of aesthetic pleasure. The perception of beauty in a phenomenal object, like all perception, simultaneously involves the passive reception of sense-impressions and their active formation in thought. The feeling of aesthetic pleasure, arises from contemplating an object, whose form is subjectively determined by thought.[16] Both the relationship of thought and feeling, and of subject and object in aesthetic experience, are thus regarded by Schiller as being reciprocal:

> '. . . it would be a vain undertaking to try to clear our perception of beauty [in an object] of these connexions with [subjective] feeling - which is why it will not do to think of the one as the effect of the other, but [it] is imperative to consider each as being . . . reciprocally, both effect and cause.' (L25:5)

Schiller is here perhaps also implicitly criticising both the contrasting views of Burke and Kant[17], concerning the cause or ground of our aesthetic experience of beauty. Burke made certain sensuous characteristics of the object the cause of such experience; whilst Kant argued for a subjective cause, by grounding the judgement of taste upon a feeling of pleasure which arises from the 'free play' of our faculties of imagination and understanding.[18]

Schiller develops the idea of the double reciprocal influence of subject and object, and of thought and feeling, in the determination of beauty, in a long and difficult passage:

> 'In the delight we take in beauty . . . no . . . succession of activity and passivity can be discerned; reflection is here . . . completely interfused with feeling . . .' 'Beauty, then, is indeed an object for us, because reflection is the condition of our having any sensation of it; but it is at the same time a state of the perceiving subject, because feeling is a condition of our having any perception of it.' '. . . beauty is indeed form, because we contemplate it; but it is at the same time life [sensuousness], because we feel it.' (L25:5)

The meaning of this passage is as follows. Unlike intellectual pleasure and moral feeling, beauty does not involve the succession of rational

thought by sensuous feeling, but rather a pleasure which results from the simultaneous reciprocal relation of thought and feeling. Beauty presupposes a beautiful object, as we must distinguish in our formative thought, something to have a sensation of, or a subjective feeling in response to. Beauty is also a product of the psychological state of the subject who perceives the object, for our sensuous receptivity and feelings provide the basis and content of our thought's forming process (cf. L19:9). What we contemplate in beauty is an object's form; what we feel in aesthetic experience is sensuous : beauty is itself thus both formal and sensuous.[19]

Schiller now proceeds to develop the discussion in the Letter from the psychology of the experience of contemplating beauty, to its morally educative effect. He begins by reiterating the point just made : that our experience of beauty involves both passivity to sense and the activity of thought; and that the object of beauty, in itself, appears to be a combination of matter and form. Now the point Schiller goes on to make from this, is that our subjective experience, in the contemplation of beauty, demonstrates that it is possible for self-determining rationality (or thought), to maintain a relative autonomy, whilst combined with and resting upon the sensuous. In addition, the apparent structure of the beautiful object puts before us a symbol that the moral will can be realized qua rational, whilst combined with and resting upon our sensuous nature.

> '. . . beauty provides us with triumphant proof that passivity by no means excludes activity, nor matter form . . . that, in consequence, the moral freedom of man is by no means abrogated through his inevitable dependence upon physical things.' (L25:6)

Now it may be here, that we can at last see what Schiller meant in L9:7, where he urged the young artist to create in beauty a symbol of morality. This is effected not by embodying moral themes in art's content; but more simply, in its harmonious phenomenal structural relation of form and sensuous content, the beautiful object is a symbol of the harmonious psychological structural relation of reason and sense in the 'noble' moral will.[20]

Schiller believes that understood in this way, beauty can overcome the problem of the moral will's realization posed by a dualistic conception of morality like Kant's, in which reason and sense are

opposed to each other, in an antithesis of duty and inclination. Philosophers like Kant, postulate the moral will as a condition of our volitional freedom and rational autonomy. However, they do not show how the moral will can in practice be realized in the sensuous domain it has been made autonomous from. In Schiller's view, it is not adequate to simply say that men will realize the moral law because they have an absolute moral obligation to do so. It is necessary to show how, in practical terms, the moral law can be realized in and through the sensuous it is opposed to and cut off from.

> '. . . analytical philosophers [like Kant] are unable to adduce any better proof that pure reason [or the moral will] can in practice be realized in human kind than that this is in fact enjoined upon them.' (L25:6)

(In his criticism of Kant's moral philosophy here, Schiller correctly to my mind, ignores Kant's theoretical device of employing moral feeling in order to provide a connection between moral reason and our sensuous inclinations, in which moral feeling acts as a checking 'agent' for the former upon the latter. Such a device merely shifts rather than solves the problem of how in an epistemologically dualistic philosophy which postulates two worlds - the supersensible/and sensible - it is possible to overcome the problem of how pure rational thought could determine sensuous feeling.)

Schiller sees his concept of beauty as solving the problem of the moral will's realization, through the arguments put forward in this Letter that 1), the beautiful object is an educative external symbol, which puts before us 'proof' of the possibility of the harmonious unity of rational form and sensuous matter; and 2), that beauty is capable of psychologically effecting in us - in the course of aesthetic experience - a harmonious relation of our rational and sensuous natures.

> '. . . since in the enjoyment of beauty . . . an actual union and interchange between matter and form [in the object], passivity and activity [in the subject], momentarily takes place, the compatibility of our two natures, the practicability of the infinite [moral law] being realized in the finite [sensible domain] . . . is thereby actually proven.'[21] (L25:6)

These two arguments should be understood in the context of others put forward earlier in the treatise, which expressed the view that by recurrent recourse to aesthetic experience (L21:5), both of our natures may be re-orientated out of opposition (L14:6), or one-sided domination (17:4), into a state of equilibrious harmony (L20:4), which provides the psychological pre-condition (L22:1) of a realistic and realizable 'noble' morality (L23:7, fns. 2 & 3).

Schiller concludes the Letter, by affirming that in his theory of psychological development, beauty is the bridge between nature and freedom.[22] The transition from the sensuous state to man's moral condition, is effected through beauty rendering the two conditions compatible (not by rendering them into a neutral condition, but by encouraging them to interfunction whilst retaining their independent integral characters).

> 'We need, then, no longer feel at a loss for a way which might lead us from our dependence upon sense towards moral freedom, since beauty offers us an instance of the latter being perfectly compatible with the former . . .' '. . . if [man] is already free while still in association with sense, as the fact of beauty teaches . . . then there can no longer be any question of how . . . in his thinking and willing, he is to offer resistance to the life of sense, since this has already happened in beauty.' (L25:7)

The 'resistance to the life of sense' referred to here, has 'already happened' in our experience of beauty, because aesthetic contemplation involves a psychological process in which man, whilst still sensuous (receptive to sense-impressions), is also rationally self-determining (imposing form upon what he senses). For Schiller, beauty is the bridge between nature and freedom, because it simultaneously symbolizes and effects a psychological state in which rational self-determination is compatible with our dependence on sensuous being. The question of how the sensuous individual can raise himself to the moral standpoint, is solved in the symbolic model of the psychological structure of this standpoint, shown in the apparent phenomenal structure of the beautiful object; and by the psychological re-structuring effected in the contemplative experience of such an object.

Now there appears, prima facie, to be two flaws in Schiller's

arguments concerning beauty here. Firstly, any kind of phenomenal object is a relation of form and matter (and not merely beautiful objects), and so capable of being a phenomenal symbol of the psychological structure of the 'noble' moral will. However, Schiller I think would argue that only beautiful objects are sufficiently form dominated in their harmonious relation to the sensuous (cf. L22:5), to fully reflect the rational domination which pertains even to the 'noble' moral will in its harmonious relation to its physical substructure. Secondly, Schiller appears to forget that earlier in this Letter, he has already allowed 'contemplation' in the widest sense, of any kind of phenomenal object, to involve the interfunctioning of thought and sense, so that he can hardly make the contemplation of beauty uniquely educative in this respect. However, it should be remembered that when discussing contemplation in this wider sense, he did suggest that both distance and disinterestedness were essential components of it (in L25:2). Now I think Schiller would want to argue that such component moments reach their most complete form only in our contemplation of beauty. The uniqueness of beauty in this respect, will be a significant part of the argument of the next Letter (26), which deals with Schiller's theory of 'aesthetic semblance'.

LETTER 26

Man's Psycho-Historical Development (II). The Nature of Aesthetic Semblance

In Letters 24 and 25, Schiller described the ability to self-consciously distinguish the self from the not-self, as the transitional point at which man emerges from his sensuous natural state, (cf. L24:2, last sentence; and L25:1). In Letter 25, self-consciousness was closely associated with the contemplative ability to distance oneself from an object, and to be relatively disinterested in its sensuous character. Here in Letter 26, the importance of detaching our contemplation of an object from definite conceptual or particular sensuous considerations, is developed further into a theory of artistic production : in which we deliberately create, or rather re-create for contemplation, objects of a type which will be more conducive to evoking an aesthetic attitude involving both psychical distance and disinterestedness. Schiller terms such special objects

'aesthetic semblances', by which, put most simply, he means art objects. In now turning attention to the artistic production of aesthetic semblances, Schiller locates it as a stage in man's psycho-historical development, and understands it against the background of a simplified Kantian epistemology. We follow a fairly abstract discussion of the psychological foundations of the process of artistic re-creation, rather than a concrete consideration of the practical skills and techniques involved in artistic production as such.

The full meaning of the term 'aesthetic semblance' is only gradually disclosed by Schiller as this Letter unfolds. It is more convenient, however, to seek to comprehend the concept before proceeding any further. Now although the concept of aesthetic semblance refers to art objects, it cannot be fully understood in abstraction from a certain theory concerning the process of artistic production (which itself rests upon a Kantian epistemology). This theory views aesthetic semblance as a product of the following process : It involves 1) the mental abstraction of form from an existential phenomenon; 2) such form is then creatively re-formed by the imagination; 3) it is then re-presented, through being embodied in some form dominated medium of a different kind from its sensuous origin. The process, in short, involves the abstraction, re-formation, and re-presentation of form. The majority of the content of this Letter will be concerned with outlining the psychological development of the capacity to perform the first two parts of this threefold process. (The third part was dealt with in Letter 22, in Schiller's discussion of the art object.)

In addition to its meaning as being a creatively re-formed form, the concept of aesthetic semblance also involves the notion of it being an illusory appearance, in view of its detachment from sensuous reality, and its predominantly formal character. However, Schiller is careful to distinguish aesthetic semblance from a deceptive illusion, trick or error. He distinguishes aesthetic semblance which is known and loved as an aesthetically pleasing illusion, from a logical semblance by which we are deceived concerning empirical existence or conceptual validity. An aesthetic semblance does not claim to present reality or truth.

> '. . . I am here concerned with . . . aesthetic semblance (which we [consciously] distinguish from actuality and truth) and not logical semblance . . . semblance, therefore, which we love just because it is semblance, and not because we take it to be

> something better. Only the first is play, whereas the latter is mere deception.' (L26:5)

The early part of Letter 26 is concerned with describing how the development of the psyche from the sensuous state into the aesthetic condition, is effected by nature itself : through evoking an interest and delight in the apparent forms of natural beauty; and also by the development of our natural senses. Schiller begins by referring to nature's role in man's psychological development, in only the most general terms:

> '. . . [as] it is the aesthetic mode of the psyche which first gives rise to freedom, it is obvious that it cannot itself derive from freedom and cannot, in consequence, be of moral origin. It must be a gift of nature . . .' (L26:1)

Schiller here eschews a teleological approach to understanding man's psycho-historical development, in favour of efficient causation. That which we are to become (i.e. moral), is not the final cause of the movement of becoming towards it. This position would appear to contrast with that of Kant. For Kant, aesthetic judgements of taste are ultimately grounded upon the apprehension of the purposive forms produced by the a priori teleological principle of reflective judgements.[1] Such judgements, being grounded in the a priori, and being the result of theoretical reason's regulation of our faculty of judgement, are grounded in the supersensible.[2] This process has a deeper raison d'être, as part of the general 'economy of reason', in promoting the realization of the moral will.[3] The moral will is for Kant the teleological end of the universe (in the Critique of Teleological Judgement)[4], so that in so far as aesthetic experience promotes moral feeling[5], it has a teleological purpose. Thus, whereas for Schiller the aesthetic condition of the psyche develops temporally and psychologically out of sensuous experience, for Kant aesthetic judgements are ultimately teleologically grounded in reason and the supersensible.

In Schiller's view, man first begins to emerge from nature and to become human, when he becomes self-conscious and social, both of which involve the development of language, in order to signify our thoughts to ourselves and to express them to others:

> '. . . man . . . [finds] humanity within himself - but only . . . where . . . he discourses silently with himself and . . . with all the rest of his kind, only there will the tender blossom of beauty unfold.' (L26:2)

Now the experience of beauty begins to 'unfold' at first in the shape of natural beauty, which presents us with aesthetically pleasing phenomenal configurations in the very midst of the sensuous domain itself. The perception of such forms, develops the sense-drive and the form-drive to interfunction in an actively receptive equilibrium:

> '. . . [where in] nature . . . form triumphant ennobles even the lowest orders of creation . . . where out of [natural] life itself the sanctity of [rational] order springs . . . here alone will sense and spirit, the receptive and the formative power, develop in that happy equilibrium which is the soul of beauty and the condition of all humanity.' (L26:2)

Schiller has now described the emergence of man from out of a state involving the domination of sense. The transition is effected through 1), the development of self-consciousness, language and sociability; and 2), by apprehending the apparent forms of natural beauty.[6] There is an implied psychological connection between 1) and 2) here : Through 1), the individual develops the ability to think and thus form objects in cognitive experience. He is then in a psychological position to 2), perceive and contemplate phenomenal forms in nature. A further psychological connection is implied by Schiller here prefacing his discussion of aesthetic semblance in this Letter, by a consideration of the effects of apprehending natural beauty. It would seem that the beauty of nature must first educate man to contemplate and enjoy form, before he can create, contemplate and enjoy aesthetically, beautiful art objects. For Schiller, natural beauty provides man's first aesthetic education (in the narrow sense, related to beauty), which his second through art psychologically presupposes, for natural beauty plays a vital role in the equilibrious development of our psychological powers. It is the first mode of genuinely aesthetic education we experience, and one which is not merely proto-aesthetic, as was 'well-being' in Letter 23. (It is notable that in the treatise as a whole, Schiller emphasizes art in discussing the aesthetic experience of beauty, and in contrast to Kant

in the Critique of Judgement, the role of natural beauty is neglected, except in the paragraph under consideration here.)

The ability to take pleasure in contemplating the purely formal characteristics of phenomenal objects, and to deliberately display aesthetically pleasing natural forms[7] in order to provide such pleasure, is seen by Schiller as marking a major point of transition in man's psychological development:

> 'And what are the outward and visible signs of the savage's entry upon humanity?' '. . . delight in semblance, and a propensity to ornamentation and play.' (L26:3)

The 'delight in semblance' referred to here, is only achieved when man attains a degree of freedom from the sensuous : when his imagination is no longer merely pressed into the service of satisfying sensuous needs:

> '. . . indifference to reality and interest in semblance may be regarded as a genuine enlargement of humanity and a decisive step towards culture.' '. . . this affords evidence of outward freedom : for as long as necessity dictates, and need drives, imagination remains tied to reality with powerful bonds . . .' (L26:4)

Interest and delight in semblance is also a manifestation of inner psychological freedom, as we become self-conscious of the independent power of the imagination to form images without direct reference to external nature:

> 'But it affords evidence, too, of inner freedom, since it makes us aware of a power which is able to move of its own accord, independently of any material stimulus from without . . .' (L26:4)

Aesthetic contemplation has now been described as involving not merely a negative disinterest in the sensuous nature (and in L20:4 fn., the rational character) of an object, but also a simultaneous positive 'interest'in form or semblance (L26:4). Thus in Schiller's view, aesthetic contemplation is not a totally disinterested experience. Now we may wonder whether such an interest in form, does not necessarily involve an interest in the rational character of an object : in the

inevitable at least minimal recognition of a certain phenomenal configuration as pertaining to a particular natural species or artistic genre, so that intellectual and aesthetic pleasures psychologically merge; or, perhaps, aesthetic pleasure is really nothing more than implicit intellectual pleasure, corresponding to the implicit rationality of the form contemplated.

Employing a simplified Kantian epistemology, Schiller states that we can distinguish the sensuous matter which pertains to an object in itself, from its apparent form, which is determined by our own perceptual activity. Now the point Schiller is really making here, concerns our freedom and autonomy in relation to aesthetic semblances. In contemplating such forms, we encounter something which is essentially of our own making. We delight in the product of our actively receptive perceptual process, not something which is nature's and which we simply passively receive.

> 'The reality of things is the work of things themselves; the semblance of things is the work of man; and a nature which delights in semblance is no longer taking pleasure in what it receives, but in what it does.' (L26:4)

Schiller continues to emphasize that the transition from the natural state into the aesthetic condition is effected by nature. He has already discussed the role of natural beautiful forms in educating us to delight in contemplating form for its own sake. Now he describes the role played by our natural senses in enabling us to perceive such form:

> 'It is nature herself which raises man from reality to semblance, by furnishing him with two senses which lead him to knowledge of the real world through semblance alone.' (L26:6)

Schiller proceeds to distinguish the higher senses of visual and aural perception, from the lower more animal senses.[8] The development of the former senses is of those whose contact with sensuous phenomena is indirect, mediated by thought imposing form upon what is sensed, and creating simultaneously both a physical and psychical distance between subject and object. The object is perceived as having a formal structure, and not simply as a sense-datum as with the lower senses.

> 'In the case of the eye and the ear, [nature] herself has driven

> importunate matter back from the organs of sense, and the object, with which in the case of our more animal senses we have direct contact, is set at a distance from us. What we actually see with the eye is something different from the sensation we receive; for the mind leaps out across light to objects.' '. . . the object of eye and ear [is] a form that we engender.' (L26:6)

Now the perceptual ability to subjectively impose form upon objects through the higher senses, leads in Schiller's view, to the development of an artistic ability to abstract what has been so imposed, and to treat form independently of its original apparent sensuous 'embodiment'. The capacity for imitative art at first arises, (but later, form is treated more autonomously, and is creatively re-formed without reference to nature).

> 'Once man has got to the point of distinguishing semblance from reality, form from body, he is also in a position to abstract the one from the other . . .' 'The capacity for imitative art is thus given with the capacity for form in general . . .' (L26:7)

Schiller thus conceives of the capacity for artistic creation, as an almost natural further development, in objective and volitional terms, of our ordinary cognitive processes of perception (in which we impose form upon an object subjectively), and of abstraction (in which we detach such form subjectively).

Schiller tells us that in creatively handling form, the subject manifests his independence from nature and its laws, by re-forming it imaginatively to conform to laws of his own[9], altering without hindrance the apparent 'natural' structure of the form's original sensuous 'embodiment':

> 'With unrestricted freedom, he is able, can he but imagine them together, actually to join together things which nature put asunder; and conversely, to separate, can he but abstract them in his mind, things which nature has joined together.' (L26:8)

The degree of creative freedom exercised in this process of imaginatively re-forming form[10], is a function of the extent to which the artist abstracts form from its original sensuous 'embodiment':

> '. . . the more scrupulously he separates form from substance . . . the more complete the autonomy he is able to give to the former . . .'[11] (L26:9)

There are two related kinds of autonomy involved here : the freedom of the imagination from sensuous constraints upon its creativity; and the independence of form or semblance from its original sensuous 'existence'. The freedom of the imagination, and our autonomy in an aesthetic domain where our laws operate (albeit implicitly), is facilitated by lessening the dependence of aesthetic semblance upon sense.

In Schiller's view, the nature of aesthetic semblance necessarily imposes limitations upon the proper activity of the artist, and in particular, upon what is a proper subject for artistic representation. The need for semblance to be such, is for form to be detached from its sensuous 'origin'. Consequently, the artist must not claim that the ideal world he presents has reality, or relevance to reality (by being aimed at effecting some political, moral or social change). The artist must not allow his autonomous semblance to become crudely 're-attached' to sensuous existence, by either seeking to make semblance determine existence (as in ideological art), or by letting existence determine semblance (as in merely imitative or naturalistic art which, by its dependence upon the sensuous, limits the scope of imaginative freedom). Aesthetic semblance must be honest (not claim reality), and autonomous (not depend upon reality for its effect).

> '. . . the poet transgresses his proper limits, alike when he attributes existence to his ideal world, as when he aims at bringing about some determinate existence by means of it.'
> '. . .(encroaching with his ideal upon the territory of experience, and presuming to determine actual existence by means of what is merely possible) or . . .(allowing experience to encroach upon the territory of the ideal, and restricting the [imaginatively] possible to the conditions of the actual).' (L26:10)
>
> 'Only inasmuch as it is honest (expressly renounces all claims to reality), and only inasmuch as it is autonomous (dispenses with all support from reality), is semblance aesthetic.'[12] (L26:11)

However, Schiller does realistically allow aesthetic semblance to have a material aspect : the necessary medium for the re-presentation of a creatively re-formed form. But, as we saw in L22:5, form should predominate and subordinate sense in an art object. In addition, Schiller now tells us, we must subjectively abstract from the sensuous aspect of such an object, if our judgement of it is to be aesthetic in character:

> 'This does not, of course, imply that an object in which we discover aesthetic semblance must be devoid of reality[13]; all that is required is that our judgement of it should take no account of that reality; for inasmuch as it does take account of it, it is not an aesthetic judgement.' (L26:11)

Here, Schiller is, to some extent, following Kant's theory of the judgement of taste in the Critique of Judgement. For Kant the 'pure' judgement of beauty or 'taste', necessarily involves a disinterest in the sensuous and rational character of an object.[14] The judgement of taste rests upon the 'free play' of the faculties of imagination and understanding, and such free play is hindered by considerations of a determinate sensuous or rational kind engaging these faculties. This happens when a judgement of rational 'perfection' or of the sensuously 'agreeable' enters into the aesthetic judgement of taste, becoming psychologically conjoined with it. Different types of object are more or less conducive to evoking such 'impure' or conflated judgements, leading Kant to distinguish 'dependent' and 'free' types of beauty. In the experience of dependent beauty, our judgement of taste psychologically 'trails in the wake' of a judgement of perfection.[15] Recognizing that a good deal of art will fall under the category of dependent beauty (in its purposively and thus conceptually contrived character), Kant also talks of the necessity to acquire the ability to abstract from determinate sensuous and rational considerations, in order to focus upon an object's purely formal character.[16]

Elaborating upon the need to acquire the ability to abstract from sense and to focus upon form, Schiller tells us that if we delight more in a beautiful woman herself than in a picture of one, then she is not, for us, an autonomous semblance. Whatever the character of the object before us, if our aesthetic judgement is not 'pure', because sensuous consderations have entered into it, then the object is not for us an

aesthetic semblance:

> 'The beauty of a living woman will please us as well, or even a little better, than a mere painting of one equally beautiful; but inasmuch as the living beauty pleases better than the painted, she is no longer pleasing us as an autonomous semblance, no longer pleasing the purely aesthetic sense.' '. . . the appeal . . . even by living things must be through sheer appearance . . .' (L26:11)

However, the process of abstracting from sense to focus upon form, is more difficult in the case of a predominantly sensuous natural object, than it is with a form dominated art object:

> 'But it does . . . require an incomparably higher degree of aesthetic culture to perceive nothing but sheer semblance in what is actually alive, than it does to dispense with the element of life in sheer semblance.'[17] (L26:11)

Clearly, then, certain types of object are more conducive than others to being formally contemplated, and judged in a purely aesthetic manner, with art objects enjoying an advantage in this respect over objects of natural beauty.[18]

Schiller has already described the necessary objective prerequisites for satisfactory aesthetic experience : in terms of a form dominated object (L22:5), and the need for aesthetic semblance to be 'honest' and 'autonomous' vis-à-vis reality (L26:11). Now in the three quotations above, he has in addition described the subjective prerequisite for a genuinely aesthetic experience : in the need for our aesthetic judgement to be purified of sensuous considerations, and to be concerned only with the contemplation of form.

Schiller does then, to some extent, follow Kant's distinction between 'pure' and 'impure' judgements of taste, and between 'free' and 'dependent' beauty (with the latter re-termed by Schiller 'autonomous' and 'dependent' semblance). However, Schiller's emphasis, whether considering the purity of aesthetic judgements, or the autonomy of aesthetic semblances, is upon disinterest in, and distance from, the sensuous. In contrast, Kant places an equal emphasis upon aesthetic judgements of taste being disinterested in both sensuous and conceptual

considerations of a definite kind; and Kant conceives of the distinction between dependent and free beauty, mainly in terms of whether an object does or does not evoke an explicit definite concept in our aesthetic judgement of it.[19]

Now two problems appear to arise from Schiller allowing that a beautiful woman, i.e. an object of natural beauty, may be an autonomous semblance, if only our judgement of her is purified of sensuous considerations. Firstly, Schiller overlooks the view he took in this Letter concerning the necessity for aesthetic semblance to be an imaginatively re-formed form (cf. L26:8, 10 & 11), and thus to be an art object. Such imaginative re-creation was earlier described as being a necessary part of the process of distancing form from sense, so as to endow aesthetic semblance with an autonomous appearance (cf. L26:11). The apparent forms of natural beauty, which are apprehended without imaginative re-formation, in their close relation to the sensuous, should be regarded by Schiller as 'dependent' semblances, irrespective of the purity of our aesthetic judgement of them. The contemplation of natural beauty would seem to involve 'restricting the imaginatively possible to the conditions of the actual' (L26:10). Objects of natural beauty, including a beautiful woman, do not 'dispense with all support from reality', in the way that Schiller earlier described (in L26:11) as being a necessary condition of semblance being both 'autonomous' and 'aesthetic'.

The second problem, arises from the fact that in his discussion of the beautiful woman, Schiller appears to make the character of the object (as being either an autonomous or dependent semblance), depend wholly upon the nature of our judgement of it (whether it is pure or impure, respectively).[20] Such an emphasis upon the subjective determination of the character of an object of beauty, is inconsistent with his otherwise reciprocal view in the treatise, concerning the complex causal relationship between subject and object in aesthetic experience, (cf. L25:5). This view was expressed in a way relevant to the discussion here, in Letter 22, when Schiller told us:

> '. . . that we have not had a purely aesthetic experience - whether the cause lies in the object or in our own response or, as is almost always the case, in both at once.' (L22:3)

A problem of a different kind arises in connection with Schiller's

concept of aesthetic judgement in L26:11, when we compare it to the description of the process involved in evaluating an art object given in L22:4, which took the form of a metajudgement of our own psychological state in the course of, or immediately after, aesthetic experience. Now the latter judgement must involve an assessment of our feelings, and be signified to ourselves in thoughts, viz. it is necessarily of a determinate sensuous and conceptual character. Such a mode of psycho-aesthetic assessment, would be considered as 'impure' or conflated in character, in terms of the concept of aesthetic judgement put forward in L26:11. Moreover, such a metajudgement is essentially involved in an introspective psychological self-assessment, and is not principally concerned with contemplating the formal character of an object. There is, then, some inconsistency between the earlier and later views of the process of aesthetic assessment and evaluation that Schiller puts forward in the treatise : as to whether or not the process involves determinate feelings and thoughts; and as to whether it is principally subjectively or objectively referenced.

In the next Letter (27), Schiller will return to a subject he has not dealt with since Letter 9, viz. the socially beneficial effects of the aesthetic, (cf. L9:1 & 2). However, we are now presented with a brief preview of this later discussion, as he tells us that when an individual or a people have developed to the stage when they can delight in creating and contemplating honest and autonomous aesthetic semblances, they show a spirit of freedom and self-determination in relation to all that is sensuous : the conduct of life is governed by the moral law; honour is more important than material gain; rational thought is valued more than mere sensuous pleasure; belief in the immortality of the soul is preferred to hopes of achieving happiness in the finite sensuous realm.

> 'In whatever individual or whole people we find this honest and autonomous kind of semblance . . . we shall see actual life governed by the ideal, honour triumphant over possessions, thought over enjoyment, dreams of immortality over existence.' (L26:12).

In contrast, those who confuse reality and semblance, are hypocrites in the moral sphere, and lack all freedom of imagination in the aesthetic domain:

> '. . . single individuals, as well as whole peoples, who either

> eke out reality with semblance, or (aesthetic) semblance with reality - the two often go together - give evidence alike of their moral worthlessness and of their aesthetic incapacity.' (L26:12)

Schiller concludes Letter 26 by responding to the views of those who criticize aesthetic semblance precisely because of its detachment from sensuous reality. Such critics consider that art distracts men from serious concerns : they view art and beauty as superficial and frivolous, as a danger to moral sincerity, educating men to value appearances rather than real moral merit, and thus encouraging hypocrisy. Now Schiller tells us that these 'moralizers', as he calls them, only allow art a place as 'dependent' semblance, viz. as serving some definite aim in relation to existential reality[21] (such as, presumably, moral improvement[22], or reinforcing religious doctrines).

> 'Nothing is more common than to hear certain shallow critics of our age voicing the complaint that . . . Being is neglected for the sake of Seeming.' '. . . these . . . moralizers tend to . . . reproach the age not only for dishonest but for honest semblance too. And even the exceptions they might possibly be prepared to make for the sake of beauty refer rather to dependent than to autonomous, semblance.' (L26:14)

Schiller proceeds to defend art as meeting a profound psychological need in man. He asserts (in a way strikingly similar to Nietzsche more than half a century later)[23], that art fills a psychic void and idealizes a harsh reality. We need its psychotherapeutic illusions, which are harmless to truth and morality, as we know we are, and want to be, 'deluded' by them.[24]

> '. . . they . . . inveigh against that beneficent semblance with which we fill out our emptiness and cover up our wretchedness, and against that ideal semblance which ennobles the reality of common day.'[25] (L26:14)

Schiller seems to suggest that art is a necessary self-conscious flight from reality. But for Schiller, the so-called 'reality' involved, which the critics of art cling to, is itself in a fundamental sense unreal or

untrue. The sensible realm is not reality; the supersensible domain alone is the haven of truth and source of morality. We should not respect matter as 'reality'; it is a mere means to the realization of supersensible ends.

> '. . . they show a respect for substance as such which is unworthy of man, who is meant to value matter only to the extent that it is capable of taking on form and extending the realm of Ideas.' (L26:14)

In Schiller's view, we are, as a matter of fact, a long way from having enough detachment from 'reality' in our aesthetic judgements. Our appreciation of aesthetic forms is hindered by considerations of possession (especially where natural beauty is concerned); and by judgements of logical finality (enquiring into purposes, where art is concerned). We tie the imagination to determinate sensuous and conceptual concerns, instead of leaving it free to spontaneously and creatively 'play'.

> '. . . we have not yet attained to the level of pure semblance at all . . .' '. . . we cannot enjoy the beauty of living nature without coveting it, or admire the beauty of imitative art without inquiring after its purpose . . . we still refuse imagination any absolute legislative rights of her own . . .' (L26:14)

We can summarize Schiller's arguments in defence of aesthetic semblance against its critics (including those whose similar views were considered in L10:4, 5 & 6), in the following way : 1) Such critics wish to only allow dependent forms of beauty, serving existential ends; 2) they fail to see the profound psychological need we have for art and beauty, in order to fill a psychic void and to idealize a harsh reality; 3) they demonstrate a concern and respect for a 'reality' which, from a metaphysical standpoint, is ultimately unreal; 4) far from being too detached from reality, the quality of our aesthetic response demonstrates an attachment to determinate sensuous and conceptual considerations which hinders our imaginative freedom. With these four negative arguments in defence of art and beauty, Schiller to some extent supplements his earlier 'transcendental proof' (in Letters 11 to 16) of beauty's necessity and importance : its psychological value in making us complete

and balanced human beings, (in which Beauty was seen as a necessary condition of the full realization of the Idea of Human Being). However, we must regard the four supplementary arguments advanced here as being merely assertive in character; while the 'transcendental proof' was based upon a speculative psychology which it is impossible to either validate or invalidate, being neither logically deduced nor empirically corroborated.

In Letter 26, the role of the play-drive becomes problematic. In L14:3, it was described as involving the harmonious interfunctioning of the form and sense drives; while in L16:2 and L17:2, it was described as a dynamic interplay between two fully developed and equilibrious powers. However, the pre-eminance given to form in Schiller's theory of the art object (Letter 22), in his theory of aesthetic contemplation (Letter 25), and now in his theory of aesthetic semblance (Letter 26), leaves little scope for a balanced role for the sense-drive. The imbalance began to enter into Schiller's aesthetic theory, with the unbalanced art object of Letter 22, in which form predominated. From that point onwards, it was inevitable that Schiller's theories of aesthetic contemplation and of aesthetic semblance would also be unbalanced by being form dominated. An unbalanced, form dominated art object, was bound on Schiller's terms (in which the art object has psychological effects), to lead to unbalanced aesthetic experience. By the time we reach the end of Letter 26, sense has been thoroughly subordinated to form, in both the subjective and objective aspects of aesthetic experience. As a result, the aesthetic condition of the psyche is not (despite various statements in Letters 18, 20, and 21), an equilibrious 'middle state', but rather a state dominated by the form-drive. It is also difficult to see how Schiller's concept of freedom as resting upon the counterbalancing of the form and sense drives, in which rational and natural necessity cancel out each other's determination of the will (cf. L19:10 & 12; L20:4), can survive the increasing formalism of his general aesthetic theory. The concept of the play-drive, then, is effectively redundant by Letter 26, and Schiller has instead turned to a much more Kantian view of aesthetic experience, as involving : the appreciation of the purely formal aspect of objects; disinterested 'pure' aesthetic judgements; a distinction of 'free' and 'dependent' beauty (or autonomous and dependent semblance); and the 'free play' of the imagination. The Kantian understanding of aesthetic experience, will be completed in Letter 27, as the concept of aesthetic play, becomes the

free play of the imagination with the faculty of the understanding.

Briefly reviewing the structure of the treatise as a whole, it is now possible to re-divide it into three different (though related) philosophical contexts : Letters 1 to 18 express and seek to prove, Schillerian ideals (of freedom, harmony and wholeness); Letters 19 to 21 rest upon a derivatively Fichtean epistemology; Letters 22 to 27 represent the introduction of an increasingly Kantian view of beauty and aesthetic experience. It is as though as the treatise progressed, Schiller began to doubt his philosophical ability to prove the theoretical necessity and practical viability of his ideals, and increasingly looked to one, and then the other, of his two great philosophical contemporaries, for assistance in bringing his philosophical enterprise to a successful conclusion.

LETTER 27

Man's Psycho-Historical Development (III). The Aesthetic Imagination. The Aesthetic State.

In Letter 27, Schiller continues to describe man's psycho-historical development, bringing it to a conclusion in the concept of the Aesthetic State. In Letter 26, Schiller to some extent moved prematurely ahead in describing the process of man's development, as he was principally concerned there to provide an account of the psychological foundation of artistic production, to follow his consideration of aesthetic contemplation in Letter 25. Although the development of man's capacity to create aesthetic semblance was located in the context of his psycho-historical progress, it becomes clear in Letter 27 that man has first to create and enjoy 'dependent' semblance, specifically in the shape of formally pleasing artifacts of primarily sensuous utility, before he becomes interested in creating and contemplating 'autonomous' aesthetic semblance, i.e. objects of fine art.

In this Letter, we will follow a progression of aesthetic forms, corresponding to man's psychological development. Schiller sees the growth of rationality in man's life generally, as being reciprocally related to his ability to create and enjoy contemplating increasingly autonomous forms of aesthetic semblance. The growth of rationality in sensuous man, involves a decreasing dependence upon the merely sensuous

in all aspects of his life, and this is reflected in his increasing ability to create and contemplate more formal types of beauty, which are detached from considerations of sensuous utility. At the same time, the externally aesthetic, internally reforms the character of man himself. Beyond this, however, Schiller goes further, and asserts that the personal relations of men and women, and the social relations of classes in society, are also raised to a more harmonious and rational form. Individual psychological harmony is translated into general social harmony. Schiller moves from viewing the process of aesthetic education primarily in individual psychological terms, to consider its social consequences. In this Letter, therefore, we will observe a hierarchy of aesthetic forms corresponding to man's psycho-historical progress : involving a gradation from dependent to autonomous semblance; from external forms of beauty, to the internal formation of man's character; and from personal psychological harmony, to social harmony in an Aesthetic State.

In the midst of the above development, however, Schiller introduces a rather tangential discussion of the aesthetic imagination. In Letter 26, Schiller stressed the need for imaginative freedom, as a condition of creating and contemplating autonomous aesthetic semblance. He will continue this discussion where he left it, and argue that this is not an arbitrary lawless freedom, but rather a controlled freedom within rational limits, as the imagination co-operates with the understanding, by being informed by the latter's concepts. This derivatively Kantian theory of the aesthetic 'free play' of the imagination and understanding[1], sits rather uneasily in this Letter, and it would have been more coherently located with the discussions in Letter 25 of aesthetic contemplation, and in Letter 26 of the process of imaginative reformation involved in artistic production.

Schiller commences Letter 27 by stating that the creation and contemplation of autonomous aesthetic semblance, presupposes a level of psychological development at which man has left behind a mode of life in which both his cognition and volition are passively dominated by the sensuous:

> 'To strive after autonomous semblance demands higher powers of abstraction . . . more energy of will, than man ever needs when he confines himself to reality; and he must already have left this reality behind if he would arrive at that kind of semblance.' (L27:1)

As the first traces of an interest in semblance appear in the life of man, such semblance takes a conditioned form, being involved in the satisfaction of his sensuous needs, as a kind of appendage. Delight in semblance is mixed with pleasure taken in the satisfaction of his sensuous needs. (In Kantian terms, aesthetic judgements of taste are psychologically conflated with judgements of the sensuously agreeable.)[2]

> 'Chained as he is to the material world, man subordinates semblance to [sensuous] ends of his own long before he allows it autonomous existence in the ideal realm of art.[3] For this latter to happen a complete revolution in his whole way of feeling is required . . .' (L27:1)

Schiller refers here to the need for man to fundamentally change his 'whole way of feeling'. What he means by this, is that for semblance to become autonomous from considerations of sensuous utility, man must rationalize his sensibility, and develop the capacity to take pleasure in form per se, and not primarily in the sensuous being of objects, with form merely 'added on', as a pleasant 'optional extra', as it were.

The ability to make a 'pure' judgement of taste, in Kantian terms, viz. to be able to appreciate the purely formal characteristics of an object, in a way which is disinterested in sense, and unconditioned by utilitarian purposes[4], is associated by Schiller with the achievement of full humanity:

> 'Wherever, then, we find traces of a disinterested and unconditional appreciation of pure semblance, we may infer that a revolution of this order has taken place in his nature, and that he has started to become truly human.' (L27:1)

The quality of aesthetic experience thus becomes an indicator of progress achieved in man's natural development of increasing rationality. We saw in the last Letter (26), how man's rational development is initially sponsored by nature (through natural beauty and our higher natural senses).[5] The aesthetic not only assists man's further development from sensuousness to rationality, it also indicates his progress in this process, by the quality or 'purity' of his aesthetic experience : the degree to which he is able to create and contemplate pure forms[6] (or autonomous semblance). The aesthetic, therefore, is viewed by Schiller

as being both a cause and effect of man's psycho-historical development : assisting and manifesting it.

The first manifestations of an interest in form as such, occur within a context still dominated by sensuous concerns. At this stage, form functions to merely embellish man's sensuous existence. However, a certain sacrifice of cognitive and volitional activity which could be directed solely towards satisfying sensuous needs, is involved in modifying features of his sensuous existence to make them become formally pleasing. This is an important step forward : from man's activity being entirely limited to acquiring the means of, and actually satisfying, purely sensuous needs, he is now set on a course of development which is ultimately unlimited by the sensuous.

> 'Traces of this kind are, however, actually to be found even in his first crude attempts at embellishing his existence, attempts made even at the risk of possibly worsening it from the material point of view.' '. . . a breach has been effected in the cycle of his animal behaviour, and he finds himself set upon a path to which there is no end.' (L27:1)

Man first attains some limited freedom from sensuous needs by acquiring an abundance of the means of satisfying them (or what Schiller calls a 'superfluity of material things'). In the next stage of his development, man also seeks a means of satisfying his nascent form-drive by a 'superfluity in material things' : in the shape of the pleasing formal appearance which may be found in, or else given to, objects of sensuous utility.

> 'Not just content with what satisfies nature, and meets his instinctual needs, he demands something over and above this : to begin with, admittedly, only a superfluity of material things, in order to . . . ensure enjoyment beyond the satisfaction of immediate needs; soon, however, a superfluity in material things, an aesthetic surplus, in order to satisfy the formal impulse too . . .' (L27:2)

A 'superfluity of material things' increases the quantity of pleasure man enjoys, as he has both current pleasure from actually satisfying his sensuous needs and, in addition, he has the pleasure of anticipating

their future satisfaction. However, a 'superfluity in material things' goes beyond this, and effects a qualitative change in the nature of his pleasure. Man now develops the capacity for non-sensuous pleasure (albeit limited in scope, by being as yet, still conjoined with sensuous pleasure).

> 'By merely gathering supplies around him for future use, and enjoying them in anticipation, he does, it is true, transcend the present moment . . .' 'He enjoys more, but he does not enjoy differently. But when he also lets form enter into his enjoyment, and begins to notice the outward appearance of the things which satisfy his desires, then he has not merely enhanced his enjoyment in scope and degree, but also ennobled it in kind.' (L27:2)

As a prelude to discussing the aesthetic imagination, Schiller proceeds to distinguish what he calls 'physical play' from 'aesthetic play'. The former is something that even animals may rise to, and is a formless self-expressive activity, which rests upon the relative freedom from natural necessity which may be achieved through acquiring an abundance of the means of satisfying sensuous needs.

> 'When the lion is not gnawed by hunger . . . his idle strength creates an object for itself : he fills the echoing desert with a roaring that speaks defiance, and his exuberant energy enjoys its self in purposeless display.' 'Without doubt there is freedom in these activities; but not freedom from compulsion altogether, merely from . . . compulsion from without. An animal may be said to be at work, when the stimulus to activity is some lack; it may be said to be at play, when the stimulus is sheer plenitude of vitality . . .' (L27:3)

Schiller sees the limited self-expressive activity of animals (and even vegetation), as resting upon freedom from immediate wants. But the modes of expression involved are purposeless and formless. Although free from external compulsion, they are still governed by the instincts of internal nature. Now Schiller's whole purpose in getting involved in a dubious discussion about the natural 'self'-expressive activity of animals, is to prepare us for the next paragraph which deals with the

human imagination, and where he will stress the need for it to get beyond natural play of a formless kind, and instead to work in co-operation with the faculty of concepts (the understanding).

Schiller begins his discussion of the imagination by considering what he calls its 'material play'. This is a formless, free association of images. Although the imagination in this condition operates independently of the need for external stimuli, and is thus free from external nature, it is not free from the influence of our internal sensuous nature. It is, therefore, only semi-autonomous from nature, and such material play is regarded by Schiller as equivalent in rational status to animal self-expression based upon natural instinct.

> '. . . [man's] imagination . . . has its . . . material play, an activity in which, without any reference to form, it simply delights in its own . . . unfettered power.' '. . . in a free association of images, such play . . . belongs merely to his animal life, and simply affords evidence of his liberation from all external physical compulsion, without as yet warranting the inference that there is any autonomous shaping power within him.' (L27:4)

In order for the imagination to become more independent from nature, and to be definitely creative, the faculty of concepts, i.e. the understanding, must impose form, unity and structure, upon the flux of transient images:

> 'From this play . . . to be explained by purely natural laws, the imagination . . . makes the leap to aesthetic play.' '. . . a completely new power now goes into action : for here, for the first time, mind takes a hand as lawgiver . . . subjects the arbitrary activity of the imagination to its own . . . unity, introduces its own autonomy into the transient, and its own infinity into the life of sense.' (L27:4)

Schiller's claim, in the above passage, that this development is something radically new, happening 'here, for the first time', is greatly exaggerated, for it is barely distinguishable from the perceptual process whereby form was imposed upon a manifold of sense-impressions, by the rationally informed imagination in L25:2 & 3.

The ordinary cognitive process of synthesizing the manifold in perception has already been described as involving the co-operation of the imagination and 'thought'. This was not described as 'aesthetic play', as presumably it is an earnest process of cognition, aimed at attaining knowledge, and employing explicit definite concepts. However, Schiller should now clearly differentiate aesthetic play from the ordinary cognitive perceptual process (which also involves the co-operation of the imagination and understanding). One way for him to do this, would be to say that aesthetic play involves only a 'loose' co-operation, in which the imagination is implicitly informed by a multiplicity of relatively indefinite concepts of the understanding.[7] Now while there is some evidence for this being Schiller's position in L20:4, fn.,[8] there is no clear statement of it being so in this Letter, where it really ought to be. Thus Schiller fails to adequately differentiate the ordinary co-operation of the imagination and understanding involved in the perceptual process in general, from its specifically aesthetic mode. Not for the first time in this treatise, Schiller fails to adequately delimit the aesthetic domain of human experience.

It is worth recalling that in Letter 25, Schiller explicitly incorporated the aesthetic mode of perception into every act of general perception:

> 'In a general way, then, those three moments which I mentioned at the beginning of the twenty-fourth Letter [the sensuous, aesthetic, and rational conditions of the psyche] . . . are also to be distinguished in each single act of perception, and are, in a word, the necessary conditions of all knowledge which comes to us through the senses.' (L25:1, fn.)

As much general perception is of a more or less earnest kind, it is not clear how aesthetic 'play' is involved in it. Schiller either eradicates play from the aesthetic relationship of the imagination and understanding (for it is not clear how any play is involved in the rationally informed imagination he describes in L27:4), or else he makes all general perception involve an element of aesthetic play. The latter would seem to be his position, but either way, aesthetic perception becomes blurred into general perception. Although the notions of 'disinterestedness' and psychical 'distance' (in Letter 25), may, prima facie, appear to

assist Schiller to psychologically distinguish aesthetic perception from other modes of perception, it must be remembered that in the first half of Letter 25, he allowed ordinary non-aesthetic 'contemplation' to also have these attributes to a lesser extent. In the end then, the difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic modes of perception is, for Schiller, a matter merely of the degrees of play, disinterestedness and distance involved. There is no absolute psychological distinction between the two types of perception, only a blurred shading into each other.

In a footnote, Schiller proceeds to reiterate that the development of the imagination's ability to initially engage in a formless natural play, is a partial liberation from nature qua external. But in this semi-autonomous state, freed from nature's alien laws, but not yet governed by laws of the understanding, the imagination is a lawless power, not yet capable of creating anything definite. Only by being related to the 'faculty for ideas', i.e. the understanding[9], does the imagination become incorporated into the process of the mind's rational self-determination, free from natural limitations and ordered by form:

> 'Most of the imaginative play which goes on in everyday life is . . .' '. . . independence of the fantasy from external stimuli, which constitutes at least the negative condition of its creative power.' '. . . before the imagination, in its productive capacity, can act according to its own laws, it must first, in its reproductive procedures, have freed itself from alien laws.[10] From mere lawlessness to autonomous law-giving from within . . . a completely new power, the faculty for ideas, must first be brought into play.' (L27:4, fn.)

Schiller talks about the imagination, in co-operation with the understanding, rising above mere formless 'physical play' to 'aesthetic play' with form. Then in the same paragraph, just two sentences after this reference to the 'aesthetic play' of the imagination, as he commences to describe the first aesthetic manifestations of this more rational imagination, Schiller refers to the 'aesthetic play-drive':

> 'From this play . . . to be explained by purely natural laws, the imagination . . . makes the leap to aesthetic play.' 'The aesthetic play-drive . . . will in its first attempts be scarcely

> recognizable, since the physical play-drive . . . constantly gets in the way.' (L27:4)

In the context of L27:4, no break in meaning between the two terms 'aesthetic play' and 'aesthetic play-drive' is apparent, and they seem to function synonymously. Thus we see the 'aesthetic play' of the imagination (based on Kant's notion of the 'free play' of imagination and understanding in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement)[11], become equated with Schiller's earlier concept of the 'play-drive'. The latter has now, however, been transmuted, with the scope of the unity it effects considerably reduced. Whereas in Letter 14, the play-drive interrelated and harmonized our rational and sensuous natures and their respective drives, here in Letter 27 the interrelation and harmony effected is limited to embracing two mental faculties. The full range of man's physical sensuous nature, has been effectively reduced by Schiller to the imagination, a mere faculty of sense. The fundamental division within man, between his rational and sensuous natures (a division which the whole treatise is concerned with overcoming), has now been reduced to a resolvable 'tiff' between two mental faculties, which are really on the same side of this division.[12]

Schiller proceeds to tell us that the play-drive, which earlier in the treatise was that in which the form-drive and the sense-drive were able to work without difficulty 'in concert' (cf. L14:3), is at first inhibited by a 'physical play-drive'. There occurs a mixture of aesthetic play/and material play : presumably, of the imagination with the understanding/, and of just the imagination on its own; resulting in the creation or contemplation of beauty in conjunction with the sensuously agreeable : a hybrid form of dependent semblance (in which the formal is dominated by the sensuous), the product of a hybrid imagination.

> 'The aesthetic play-drive . . . will in its first attempts be scarcely recognizable, since the physical play-drive . . . constantly gets in the way. Hence we see uncultivated taste first seizing upon what is new and startling - on the colourful, fantastic, . . .' 'It fashions grotesque shapes, loves swift transitions, exuberant forms, glaring contrasts, garish lights . . .' 'At this stage what man calls beautiful is only what excites him, what offers him material . . .' (L27:4)

However, it is not clear from anything Schiller says here, precisely how these two different conditions of the imagination subsist together. It would seem that they must be alternate lawful/lawless conditions, each of short temporal duration, as they cannot be psychologically simultaneous states. (Schiller himself provides no explanation as to how one form of imaginative play 'gets in the way' of another, and confines himself to describing its aesthetic manifestations.)

The general direction of man's psycho-historical development, is away from natural external determination, towards rational self-determination. This is reflected in a movement beyond the creation and enjoyment of artifacts whose primary purpose is sensuous utility, towards modes of aesthetic self-expression. The individual begins to surround himself with artifacts in which beauty of form has become a major consideration in their conception, creation and ownership; and where such form, by its own harmonious combination with matter (cf. L25:6), externally expresses man in his wholeness (as mind, body, and spirit):

> 'The things he possesses, the things he produces, may no longer bear upon them the marks of their use, their form no longer be merely a timid expression of their function; in addition to the service they exist to render, they must . . . reflect the genial mind which conceived them, the loving hand which wrought them, the . . . liberal spirit which chose and displayed them.'[13] L27:5)

From this, man moves on to modes of aesthetic self-expression which are more autonomous from sensuous concerns. He proceeds to create and contemplate objects which are simply beautiful, and of no utility, viz. fine art objects:

> 'Not content with introducing aesthetic superfluity into objects of necessity, the play-drive as it becomes ever freer finally tears itself away from the fetters of utility altogether, and beauty in and for itself alone begins to be an object of his striving.' (L27:5)

We are now following a process of development in which not only does aesthetic semblance become more autonomous from sensuous utility, but

in which it moves from external objective forms, to more internal psychological forms. The aesthetic is reciprocally related to man's process of psycho-historical development : not merely externally expressing it, but also in turn, re-acting back upon him himself : re-forming his own nature, to take on a more harmonious and rational form. (There is nothing new in this position, for Schiller has already fully discussed the psychological process involved in this interior reformation, in Letters 20 and 21, which dealt with the aesthetic condition of the psyche.) There occurs a process whereby form becomes progressively internalized (as the form-drive develops).

> 'And as form gradually comes upon him from without - in his dwelling, his household goods, and his apparel - so finally it begins to take possession of him himself, transforming at first only the outer, but ultimately the inner man too.' (L27:6)

It is at first the external aspects of man's being, such as bodily movements, which are endowed with form:

> 'Unco-ordinated leaps of joy turn into dance, the unformed movements of the body into the graceful and harmonious language of gesture.' (L27:6)

Eventually, however, harmonious form enters into man's psychological constitution. Having already discussed this particular subject (in Letters 14, 20, 21 & 23), Schiller presumably sees no need to do so again now. Instead, he immediately commences a counter-movement, of a different type, from the inner to the outer : from the aesthetically formed person, to his inter-personal relations, and finally to man's social relations. In this movement, we follow a process whereby individual psychological harmony finds a wider social expression.

Schiller begins by describing the transformation of the personal relation of the individual man and woman, from a relationship initially dominated by natural desire, to one based upon love and free will:

> 'Now compulsion of a lovelier kind binds the sexes together . . .' '. . . the eye, less troubled now by passion, can apprehend the form of the beloved . . .' 'Desire . . . is exalted into love, once humanity has dawned in its object; and a base advantage over

> sense [the sensuous being of the other] is now disdained for the sake of a nobler victory [winning] over [the other's] will.' (L27:7)

The physical sexual relation develops into a relationship in which the other person is no longer an object of sense (a mere sex-object). A base advantage over the physical being of the other (by which sexual desire is satisfied), becomes transformed instead into a matter of winning over the will of the other (as love is given volitionally). This entails pleasing the other person by our rational or formal being, by our beauty of soul, and not by merely being a blind physical force (simply pleasing the other sexually). The whole relationship shifts from one based upon nature and sense, to one of mind and form.

> '. . . lust he can steal, but love must come as a gift. For this loftier prize he can only contend by virtue of form, never by virtue of matter. From being a force impinging upon feeling, he must become a form confronting the mind . . .' (L27:7)

In the remainder of Letter 27, Schiller will proceed to make explicit the social, ethical, and political implications, of his general theory of aesthetic education, which since Letter 11, has been primarily couched in terms of the psychology of the individual. He begins by making the bold claim that beauty is able to resolve conflict in the 'complex whole of society'. He initially attempts to justify this claim by asserting that precisely the same harmonizing and rationalizing effects which form has in reconciling the sexes at the level of the individual man and woman, can be 'writ-large', so to speak, at the level of society and its conflicts. This view rests upon the assumption that social conflict is closely analagous to the conflict between the sexes. Both types of conflict, in Schiller's view, are between gentleness and violence:

> '. . . beauty resolves the conflict . . . in the complex whole of society, endeavouring to reconcile the gentle with the violent in the moral world after the pattern of the free union it there contrives between the strength of man and the gentleness of woman.' (L27:7)

One way, perhaps, to make sense of what Schiller is saying here, is to

see the conflict between the violent/and the gentle in society as a whole, as being between the two types of people or classes who for Schiller comprise society, i.e. the 'savage' masses/and the enervated 'barbarian' ruling class and intelligentsia.[14] But here we can only speculate, as Schiller simply does not say enough to base a firm interpretation upon.

We have already noted that Schiller's general aesthetic theory in this treatise is unbalanced, by being form dominated. Now we also find that his ideal of social harmony involves the triumph of form, rationality and gentleness:

> 'Now weakness becomes sacred, and unbridled strength dishonourable . . .' (L27:7)

In L10:5 & 6, Schiller talked of the 'enervating influence' of beauty as being a 'threat to the true civilization of man', which rests upon 'energy of character'. Schiller's description of a harmonious civilized society in L27:7 (last three sentences), would seem to ironically confirm the earlier more cautious view of beauty's effects.

The last three pages of the treatise are very densely written. Not only are they rich in subject-matter, but they rely heavily on the Kantian critical philosophy for their framework, a reliance made more difficult than usual to discern due to Schiller's usage of a series of unnecessarily obscure images and metaphors. We are entering into one of the hardest parts of the whole treatise, where Schiller says a good deal that is important in a very short space.

Borrowing from Kant's notion of two 'realms' of being, Schiller tells us that the aesthetic domain lies within both the sensible world (the realm of nature and its blind forces), and within the supersensible world (the realm of morality and its rational moral law). It does not lie 'between' them (as some kind of neutral 'point of indifference'), but works within them, as a realm of beautiful forms, the creation and contemplation of which, psychologically releases us from the limitation placed upon our wholeness by an untempered sensuous nature, or by a one-sided purely rational morality. Through the psychologically harmonizing effect of the experience of beauty, the opposition of nature and reason is mitigated : man's sensuous nature is made more rational and moral, enabling morality to be less opposed to sense.[15]

> 'In the midst of the fearful kingdom of forces, and in the midst of the sacred kingdom of laws, the aesthetic impulse to form is at work, unnoticed, on the building of a third joyous kingdom of . . . semblance, in which man is . . . released from . . . constraint . . . in the physical and in the moral sphere.' (L27:8)

Schiller's reference here to 'the aesthetic impulse to form' being at work creating the realm of aesthetic semblance, is rather revealing. It would seem that the play-drive, which we have already seen reduced from the interfunctioning of our sensuous and rational natures (in Letter 14), to the free play of two cognitive faculties (in L27:4), is now equated with the 'aesthetic impulse to form', i.e. the form-drive. This makes it even more clear that the process of aesthetic education does not balance the sense-drive with the form-drive in a third play-drive, but involves an aesthetically assisted natural evolution of increasing rationality, in which man develops from being dominated by the sense-drive, to becoming dominated by the form-drive : moving from one mode of psychological one-sidedness to another. The form-drive is developed at the expense of an increasingly suppressed sense-drive throughout all the Letters that deal with man's psycho-historical development. Consequently, what Schiller unwittingly describes in this treatise, is a course of psychological development which transforms the sensuous 'savage' into an enervated 'barbarian'.

In Schiller's view, man's natural, rational, and aesthetic psychological conditions, may be given objective realization in three forms of political or social life : the Natural State, the Moral State, and the Aesthetic State, respectively. We have encountered the first two types of State before, in Letters 3, 4 & 5, where Schiller pondered the means whereby man might meet the psycho-ethical prerequisite for abolishing the Natural State in order to securely found a durable Moral State. We were told that a 'third character' of man (L3:5), would be needed as a 'support' to 'ensure the continuance of society' (L3:4), whilst this process of political change was being effected. This 'third character' of man became the aesthetically formed 'noble' moral will, in Letter 23.[16] Now Schiller goes further, and talks of an 'Aesthetic State' playing a key role in the process of political change. The notion of an Aesthetic State appears for the first time in this Letter. It will become clear that its role is supportive, as a society of aesthetically

formed, psychologically harmonious, and morally ennobled individuals, who are the basis of a political Moral State. The Aesthetic State is really what we might call an 'Aesthetic Society'. It is not a temporary transitional political structure, but rather provides a permanent social psycho-ethical underpinning for the political Moral State. Thus the goal of man's psycho-historical development, and of aesthetic education, remains the same as Schiller stated in Letter 3, viz. to replace the current Natural State with a Moral State. The notion of the Aesthetic State does not contradict this aim; it rather demonstrates, for Schiller, its real possibility.

Schiller's notion of the Natural State is best understood in relation to the then common concept of 'civil society' : a dynamic economic system for satisfying sensuous needs, regulated by positive laws which principally serve to merely enforce individual rights of property and contract.[17] In the Natural State, the unlimited activity of each individual to selfishly satisfy his own sensuous needs (cf. L24:5), is ultimately limited only by the blind forces of the market, and by the physical coercion of the State machine (cf. L5:4). In the Moral State, Man as universal, as represented by the State (cf. L4:2 & 5), externally imposes rational limits upon the individual's natural desires, by positive laws which embody the moral law. In the Aesthetic State, man is predisposed to moral volition, by the ennobling effect of form upon his sensuous nature (cf. Letter 23). Moral freedom is achieved through an aesthetically effected psychological freedom and harmony within each individual:

> 'If in the dynamic [Natural] State of rights it is as force that one man encounters another, and imposes limits upon his activities; if in the ethical [Moral] State of duties Man [as universal] sets himself over against [individual] man with all the majesty of the [moral] law, and puts a curb upon his desires; in those circles where conduct is governed by beauty, in the Aesthetic State, none may appear to the other except as form[ed] . . .' 'To bestow freedom by means of freedom is the fundamental law of this kingdom.' (L27:9)

Schiller next proceeds to distinguish the three types of State in terms of the three bases of social life they involve : something akin to the 'invisible hand' notion of Adam Smith and late eighteenth century

political economy[18]; the 'general will' concept of Rousseau[19]; Schiller's own idea of the aesthetically ennobled moral will.[20] Schiller indicates the degree to which each of these principles is capable of raising man from selfish individualism towards social life, by making rhetorical usage of the three related logical concepts of the 'possible', the 'necessary', and the 'actual'.[21] He says that the Natural State makes social life a possibility, as the selfish particularity of each individual is limited by that of others in a natural equilibrium. In the Moral State, social behaviour results from the necessity of moral obligation, externally imposed upon the individual, to conform his volition with the general will of all. In the Aesthetic State, through the process of aesthetic education, the will of the individual is naturally in 'noble' conformity with the general will of society. Social behaviour becomes an actuality, as the individual's sensuous nature has been internally formed by beauty to assume a more rational, universal, and thus social character.[22]

> 'The dynamic [Natural] State can merely make society possible, by letting one nature be curbed by another[23]; the ethical [Moral] State can merely make it (morally) necessary, by subjecting the individual will to the general; the Aesthetic State alone can make it actual, because it consummates the will of the whole through the nature of the individual.' '. . . beauty alone can confer upon him a social character.' (L27:10)

In what Schiller says about the Aesthetic State here, he appears to confuse the will of all (the 'general will' of Rousseau), with the inherently universal will (the 'pure rational will' of Kant).[24] He conflates an empirical concept and a transcendental (a priori) logical concept. Allness is assumed to be equivalent to universality, as if the latter were merely a quantitative matter. Moreover, Schiller does not allow that the general will of society may be evil and irrational. He also assumes social conformity by the individual is automatically a good thing, forgetting that artists are frequently social non-conformists, as he himself implied was necessary in Letter 9, when he said:

> 'But how is the artist to protect himself against the corruption of the age which besets him on all sides? By disdaining its

opinion.' (L9:5)

'Live with your century; but do not be its creature. Work for your contemporaries; but create what they need, not what they praise.' (L9:7)

Schiller has asserted that the effect of beauty is to endow the individual with a social character, and to conform his volition with the general will of society. He sees the aesthetically 'ennobled' individual will, as the basis of an harmonious aesthetic society (or Aesthetic State), which is in turn the secure 'support' for the Moral State. The Moral State is not securely established if it merely attempts to externally impose moral willing upon its citizens via positive laws which embody the moral law. Its citizens must, within themselves, be already psychologically predisposed to moral volition, through being aesthetically formed from sensuousness to rationality. Schiller thus grounds the Moral State in the psychological state of the individuals who comprise it.

This emphasis upon the psychology of the individual, is also found as Schiller now attempts to explain why the aesthetic experience of beauty is the source of social harmony. He tells us that

'Taste alone brings harmony into society, because it fosters harmony in the individual.' (L27:10)

Now in taking this view, Schiller appears to assume that 'society' is simply the sum of all the individuals who comprise it, and that it has no substantive being of its own. He does not consider the psychological effects of society upon the individual (and not merely vice versa). He says nothing about the roles of religion, ideology and mythology, in shaping the mental outlook and character of the individual. Nor does he allow that social disharmony may be deeply rooted in objective factors : in institutional structures, or in economic relations of a contradictory character (e.g., between labour and capital, and between consumers and producers). Schiller's view, that social harmony/or disharmony, is rooted in individual psychological harmony/or disharmony, is at once reductionist and naive. It seems quite probable that the objectively grounded factors producing social disharmony, would at least counter, if not largely negate, any harmonizing effect produced by beauty, whether at the level of social relations, or in the psychology of the individual.

Schiller seeks to explain how beauty can harmonize both the individual and society, by making an implicit usage of Kant's notion of the 'subjective universality' of aesthetic judgements of taste (in the Critique of Judgement).[25] The psychological structure and functioning of the mind (which was outlined in the a priori psychological model presented in Letters 11 to 14), is common to all men by virtue of their humanity, so that the aesthetic mode of the psyche is, in principle, universal. By virtue of having a sensuous and a rational nature, all men can aesthetically play, and so harmoniously interrelate these two natures. Whereas all other modes of perception are private in character, and of either a predominantly sensuous or rational type, aesthetic perception simultaneously makes man whole, by harmoniously interrelating both his natures, and also unites society, by facilitating social intercourse on the basis of a universally sharable mode of individual experience.

> 'All other forms of perception divide man, because they are founded exclusively either upon the sensuous or upon the spiritual part of his being; only the aesthetic mode of perception makes of him a whole, because both his natures must be in harmony to achieve it. All other forms of communication divide society because they relate exclusively either to the private receptivity or to the private proficiency of its individual members, hence to that which distinguishes man from man; only the aesthetic mode of communication unites society, because it relates to that which is common to all.' (L27:10)

However, we may seriously doubt the validity of Schiller's claim here, that the aesthetic makes man whole, 'because both his natures must be in harmony to achieve it'. Schiller's reference here to aesthetic experience in terms of 'the aesthetic mode of perception' is revealing. It serves to highlight what we saw earlier, in L27:4 & fn. : that for Schiller, aesthetic experience only relates the mental faculties of sense (imagination), and reason (understanding); it does not make us whole by effecting a harmonious unity between our physical being and our mental being. Psychological harmony is one thing; a greater harmony between our 'natures' (as Schiller claims is effected), viz. between our psychological being and our physiological being, is quite another thing. It is this latter harmony which Schiller neglects, due to his

failure to take full account of the body. Like many idealist philosophers, Schiller does not take on board the full consequences of the fact that man is an embodied rational being. Consequently, his later emphasis is on bifurcation and its overcoming being a purely psychological problem, requiring a psychological solution.

In Schiller's view, all other modes of experience besides the aesthetic, fail to make us whole, and fail in their privacy to facilitate a universal communication on the basis of an experience sharable by all. The pleasures of sense are purely private. The pleasures of rational knowledge (or theoretical reason), are dependent upon private proficiency, particularly skills of abstraction. Only aesthetic pleasure is private and subjective, as well as, in principle, public and inter-subjective.[26]

> 'The pleasures of the senses we enjoy merely as individuals . . . hence we cannot make the pleasures of sense universal . . .'
>
> '. . . we cannot make the pleasures of reason universal, because we cannot eliminate traces of individuality from the judgements of others . . .' 'Beauty alone do we enjoy at once as individual and as genus . . .' (L27:10)

Schiller continues his discussion of the degree to which sensuous, rational, and aesthetic modes of experience, are each capable of providing a universally sharable pleasure.[27] However, he now replaces the pleasures of knowledge (or theoretical reason), with the happiness which ought to result from virtue, viz. from moral willing (or practical reason). He begins by stating that the 'good of the senses', i.e. the agreeable, affords only a private, purely sensuous pleasure, which is socially exclusive:

> 'The good of the senses can only make one man happy, since it is founded on appropriation, and this always involves exclusion; and it can only make this one man one-sidedly happy, since his Personality has no part in it.' (L27:10)

This view that the personality is not involved in sensuous pleasure, rests upon a rather extreme psychological dualism, which reverts to the rigid distinction Schiller made in Letter 11 between the 'person' and 'condition', (a distinction he later modified in the Fichtean

epistemology of Letter 19).

Continuing to distinguish between sensuous, rational, and aesthetic modes of pleasure, in terms of their degree of universality, Schiller tells us that the 'absolute good', i.e. moral perfection, although in principle producing a universal happiness, cannot do so in practice, for it is impossible for all men to achieve, since it requires a degree of self-denial few are capable of; (cf. L23:7, fn. 3: '[Sublime conduct] exceeds . . . our experience of the . . . strength of the human will'). Moreover, the coincidence of virtue and happiness is contingent for finite rational beings like ourselves inhabiting the realm of nature, (cf. Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, Bk. II, Ch. 2, Section V).[28] Schiller thus concludes that only the aesthetic experience of beauty can provide a form of happiness which all men are capable of enjoying.

> 'Absolute good can only bring happiness under conditions which we cannot presume to be universal; for . . . [it is] the prize of abnegation . . . [and] only the pure in heart believe in the pure will. Beauty alone makes the whole world happy, and each and every being forgets its limitations while under its spell.' (L27:10)

However, we may wonder whether, like the happiness which ought to result from moral virtue, the universality of the pleasure which arises from the aesthetic experience of beauty,is also something which is only true in principle, and not in practice : for, as a matter of fact, many people may either have only limited taste, or even no taste at all. The 'lower and more numerous classes' (L5:4), who are 'savages' (L4:6), dominated by their sensuous being, would be likely only to seek sensuously agreeable forms of hybrid beauty or dependent semblance, as their 'physical play-drive' 'gets in the way' of their 'aesthetic play-drive' (cf. L27:4, p. 211). Schiller's theory of an aesthetically effected social harmony, does not allow for the fact that individuals and classes in society will not psychologically develop at a uniform rate of progress. He assumes that all members of society will simultaneously be capable of the same quality of aesthetic experience, achieving psychological wholeness, and interrelating harmoniously. The construction of Schiller's argument in L27:10, as he distinguishes major modes of pleasurable experience in terms of their universal sharability, involves a degree of legerdomain : for whilst he considers the empirical conditions which

place practical restrictions upon the universality of both sensuous and rational types of pleasure, he completely exempts his discussion of aesthetic pleasure from any examination of the empirical factors which would limit its universality.[29]

It is worth looking briefly again at the last sentence of the above passage, where Schiller says that

> 'Beauty alone makes the whole world happy, and each and every being forgets its limitations while under its spell.'[30] (L27:10)

What Schiller says here about beauty, makes it only a subjective (albeit inter-subjective), means for achieving social harmony. There is no talk here of any need for social and political reform of an objective, institutional kind, (including the earlier stated need to 'abolish' the Natural State; cf. L3:4). It would seem that beauty can overcome what may be objectively grounded limitations on man's wholeness, by subjectively fleeing from or forgetting them. Beauty is described in a way which makes it become abberational and narcotic, achieving social harmony and happiness only for as long as we are 'under its spell'. Such a transient psychological state does not sound like a satisfactory 'support' for a durable Moral State.

Schiller next proceeds to describe the relationship between the aesthetic domain and the two Kantian 'realms' of the supersensible and the sensible. He tells us that the aesthetic domain is a 'third realm' which extends right as far as 'the point' where each of the other two realms have their legislative authority. (This corresponds to the view he expressed in L27:8, where he said that the aesthetic domain is 'in the midst' of, viz. is immanent to, each of the other two realms.) Schiller's point now, is to reiterate that the aesthetic cannot legislate in either the domain of reason or that of nature : it cannot determine the content of either cognitive truth, or of the moral law[31]; not can it determine nature's own laws. All the aesthetic can do (through the psychological reformation effected by the experience of beauty), is to temper the harshness of the moral law, so that it does not simply suppress our sensuous nature; and 'ennoble' our sensuous being, so that it becomes naturally inclined to perform moral duty.

> '. . . the realm of aesthetic semblance extends . . .' '. . .

> upwards to the point where reason [the realm of the supersensible] governs with unconditioned necessity, and all that is mere matter ceases to be. It stretches downwards to the point [the realm of the sensible] where natural impulse reigns with blind compulsion, and form has not yet begun to appear. And even at these furthermost confines, where taste is deprived of all legislative power, it still does not allow the executive power to be wrested from it.[32]' 'Duty . . . must moderate the . . . tone of its precepts . . . and show greater respect for nature through a nobler confidence in her willingness to obey them.' (L27:11)

Returning to the concept of the Aesthetic State, Schiller proceeds to draw a rather dubious analogy between the political ruler's relation to the people of such a society, and the artist's relation to the matter he forms.[33] While not pleasing as an analogy, it does enable Schiller to affirm (albeit obscurely), his faith in the French Revolution's ideals of equal rights and democracy, as features of the Aesthetic State.

> 'In the Aesthetic State . . . even the tool which serves - is a free citizen, having equal rights with the noblest; and the mind, which would force the patient mass beneath the yoke of its purposes, must here first obtain its assent.' (L27:11)

Here at the end of Letter 27, Schiller talks both about the Aesthetic State in terms which make it an ideal (in L27:11), and about the possibility of its real existence (in L27:12). The Aesthetic State is best understood as an ideal form of society : an ideal which, like moral perfection, we can aim and progress towards, rather than ever fully realize. It may achieve, according to Schiller, only a limited realization in small groups of aesthetically formed individuals, rather than a complete realization in society as a whole:

> 'But does such a State of Aesthetic Semblance really exist?'
> '. . . as a realized fact, we are likely to find it . . . only in some few chosen circles[34], where conduct is governed . . . by the aesthetic nature . . .' (L27:12)

What is particularly revealing is that in his description of these microcosms of the Aesthetic State, there is no talk of a political kind. They are described in terms with which we are already familiar, viz. in terms of psychological harmony and noble moral willing. We are told that men in such 'circles' will

> '. . . make their way, with undismayed simplicity and tranquil innocence [Greek wholeness][35] . . . free alike of the [natural] compulsion to infringe the freedom of others in order to assert their own, as of the necessity to shed their dignity [moral destiny] in order to manifest grace [natural nobility].'[36] (L27:12)

In the reality of the Aesthetic State, then, men attain a psychological condition in which they are free from natural compulsion in the determination of their volition. They achieve a psychological balance in which they do not need to sacrifice man's moral vocation (the need for rational willing), in order to live in harmony with sensuous feeling. The main feature of the Aesthetic State which emerges from this, is that it is a psychologically based moral way of life, rather than a political institution or State as such.

The non-political, non-institutional character of the Aesthetic State, is also revealed in Schiller's statement that

> 'Here, therefore, in the realm of aesthetic semblance, we find that ideal of equality fulfilled which the enthusiast would fain see realized in substance.' (L27:11)

The ideal of equality is 'fulfilled' in principle in the aesthetic domain, rather than 'realized' in practice in the political realm. The latter is the aim of the 'enthusiast' or zealous social reformer. The 'equality' Schiller has in mind here, is an aesthetic rather than political or economic one : the availability to all, in principle, of that pleasurable experience which alone makes us psychologically balanced and complete human beings. The Aesthetic State is a society of aesthetically formed, psychologically harmonious, and morally ennobled individuals, in which men achieve 'equality' by virtue of the inter-subjective universality of aesthetic experience.

Although the Aesthetic State is an ideal social form, rather than a

political State, it does have political consequences, for in so far as it finds further realization, through its 'circles' extending to embrace more of society, then it would make possible the transformation from the Natural State to the Moral State (fulfilling the aim expressed in L3:2). In Letter 4, Schiller made it clear that the Moral State, in order to be securely established, would need to rest upon a society of morally reformed individuals, whose willing has become 'ennobled' to be naturally inclined to morality:

> 'The setting up of a Moral State involves being able to count on the moral law as an effective force . . .' '. . . to be able to count on man's moral behaviour . . . he will have to be led by his very impulses to the kind of conduct which is bound to proceed from a moral character.' '. . . this can only be brought about through both these motive forces, inclination and duty, producing completely identical results in the world of phenomena . . . through impulse being sufficiently in harmony with reason . . .' (L4:1)

Such psychologically harmonious and morally ennobled individuals, would willingly obey the rational laws of the Moral State, for

> 'Once man is inwardly at one with himself . . . the [Moral] State will be merely the interpreter of his own finest instinct, a clearer formulation of his own sense of what is right.' (L4:5)

The Moral State and the Natural State, are each the political institutions governing a specific type of society : the Aesthetic State, and civil society, respectively. But whereas the Moral State would relate organically to the aesthetic society it governed, with the political ruler readily obtaining the assent of the people for its rational laws (cf. the analogy in L27:11), the Natural State in contrast, is mechanically related to civil society, externally imposing its laws by physical coercion (L27:9), as it seeks to hold together a disintegrating social structure (L5:4). Whereas the sharability of aesthetic pleasure produces a society of individuals able to harmoniously interrelate as whole human beings (L27:10); the specialization of the faculties within individuals, and of social functions between different classes, divides civil society (L6:3, 6 & 7),

so that the Natural State does not rest upon a fundamental consensus amongst those whom it abstractly governs (L6:9).

What is ultimately most important about the aesthetic experience of beauty, in Schiller's view, is not that its pleasure as such is sharable, but that the psychotherapeutic effect of this pleasure is universally available, in order to overcome any form of psychological one-sidedness or bifurcation (cf. Letters 16 and 17). The more complete and balanced modes of ordinary cognition and volition which indirectly follow from aesthetic experience (cf. L22:1), have a positively beneficial effect on all aspects of man's social and political life (cf. L27:7). The 'equality' which is 'fulfilled' in the 'realm of aesthetic semblance' (L27:11), provides the means for achieving a society (the 'Aesthetic State'), of psychologically harmonious and morally ennobled individuals, capable of supporting the Moral State, by willingly obeying its moral positive laws.

There is little evidence in the text of the Aesthetic Letters to support the view that Schiller conceived of the Aesthetic State as being a political State in its own right, rather than as a social support for the Moral State. Those many Schiller scholars who interpret the Aesthetic State politically[37], are forced to view the treatise as involving a serious inconsistency, or a major modification, between the aim expressed in Letter 3 of abolishing the Natural State in order to establish a durable Moral State, and the view which they construct, that Schiller later saw the need for a further political development beyond the Moral State, in the Aesthetic State.[38] Some view the Aesthetic State as providing a dialectical synthesis of the Natural State and the Moral State[39], after the pattern of the harmonious interrelation which the aesthetic condition of the psyche (supposedly) effects between our sensuous and rational 'natures'.[40] However, the aesthetic condition per se is not realizable (L21:5), and cannot itself produce anything determinate for our cognition or volition (L21:4). Thus the aesthetic condition of the psyche cannot be viewed as being capable of creating a directly corresponding objective political institution.[41] Moreover, in order to correspond with, or be the objective expression of, the aesthetic psychological condition, the Aesthetic State would itself have to be an 'unlimited determinability'[42], giving rise to nothing determinate[43], etc., a wholly untenable type of political State.

However, the greatest defect of all such views, is that they

explicitly contradict Schiller's clearly expressed position in the early Letters (particularly Letters 3 and 4), by changing the goal of man's psycho-historical development from the Moral State to the Aesthetic State (whilst assigning this contradiction and change to Schiller himself).[44] In interpreting Schiller's concept of the Aesthetic State, it would seem more sensible to do so in a way which does not allow a few sentences at the end of the last Letter, to overturn the whole course of the argument put forward by him from Letter 3 to Letter 9. The much longer and more clear argument of these Letters, should shape how we interpret the very short and somewhat ambiguous remarks that Schiller makes concerning the Aesthetic State at the end of Letter 27. It is better to interpret Schiller, wherever possible, not as changing his mind, or as contradicting himself, but as being generally coherent and consistent in the work. In this way, the earlier Letters of the treatise provide an important means for establishing the meaning of its end.

In conclusion, therefore, the aesthetic is never meant by Schiller to be more than an inter-subjective means for effecting the psycho-ethical reform of man's character. The aesthetic does not itself supply the political end of man's psycho-historical development, supplanting the Moral State. Its role, as the title of the treatise makes clear, is 'the aesthetic education of man'.

CONCLUSION

An Overall View and Evaluation of the Aesthetic Letters

Following our detailed examination of the Aesthetic Letters, the first part of this conclusion will consist of a recapitulation of the main arguments in each Letter, so as to provide an overall view of Schiller's general line of argument in the treatise. In the second part, I propose to briefly evaluate the treatise, by identifying those specific theories which appear to be of greatest value, in terms of their contemporary aesthetical and political relevance, and their potential for further fruitful theoretical development.

I

(Letter 1) Schiller acknowledges his dependence upon Kantian philosophical principles. He pays tribute to Kant's moral philosophy, as clearly expressing in a conceptual form, those moral instincts by which nature has implicitly guided men for centuries. However, the technical form of philosophy only informs man's intellect, leaving his sentient being uneducated. Schiller thus implicitly opens up a division between man's rational and sensuous natures.

(Letter 2) Schiller criticizes the materialistic and utilitarian ethos of contemporary civilization, and sees it as a threat to art. He contrasts the general focus of men on the material, with true art's transcendence of the limitations of sense. Art is, nevertheless, relevant to life, for the aesthetic experience of beauty is the prerequisite for man achieving moral and political freedom.

(Letter 3) Schiller distinguishes the contemporary Natural State (governed by blind forces and serving to merely satisfy man's physical being), from the Moral State (a hypothetical State governed by rational principles). There is a moral imperative to abolish the Natural State and replace it with the Moral State, for the former is at variance with man's moral being. The creation of the Moral State can neither be accomplished by man's selfish natural being, nor by his moral being, which has yet to be formed. A 'third character' of man is required, which will develop man's moral nature, and harmonize it with his sensuous nature.

(Letter 4) The Moral State can only be securely established if men

become naturally moral : if they are naturally inclined to perform their rational moral duty. Man's sensuous nature is a legitimate part of his whole being, and morality is one-sided if it involves its suppression. The State is similarly defective if social harmony is achieved only by suppressing the natural variety of individuals. The individual will find in the Moral State's positive laws, the embodiment of the moral law of his own reason. Schiller identifies two types of psychological one-sidedness : reason may dominate feeling (in the 'barbarian'); or feeling may dominate reason (in the 'savage'). The achievement of freedom in a Moral State requires a wholeness of character which overcomes both types of one-sidedness.

(Letter 5) The moral undevelopment of modern man excludes any immediate large scale and durable political reform. The 'barbarian' upper classes are sunk in depravity and lethargy, while the 'savage' lower classes are occupied in pursuing the satisfaction of their animal nature. The Natural State is forced to resort to physical coercion to hold such a society together, for it is becoming disorganized and atomistic. The social system is grounded in individual egotism. New artificial needs are constantly generated. Social control through public opinion and ridicule, along with an ethic of passive obedience, and fear of losing material possessions, ensure personal and social development remain frozen.

(Letter 6) Schiller continues his critique of contemporary civilization, focusing upon the specialization of psychological faculties and social functions it imposes upon individuals. He identifies two primary causes of modern psycho-social diremption : a) the development of analytical thought and the empirical sciences, leading to mental specialization; b) the State, which has disorganized society into separate classes and occupational groups, which insist that the individual develops specialist skills. The resulting social atomization reciprocally effects the State, which losing sight of the individual, has to govern through various abstract categories and rational constructs. The State becomes an external machine in relation to its citizens, incapable of bonding them together organically. But such psycho-social fragmentation has been both inevitable and, for the species as a whole, desirable, for it has enabled human knowledge across a wide front to advance, and facilitated the development of man's manifold potentialities. Nevertheless, it is wrong that individuals should have to sacrifice the happiness which stems from being a complete human

being. Only through art will we find a means to reconcile progress and human wholeness.

(Letter 7) There is no political solution to the problem of individual and social fragmentation, for the Natural State is a major cause of the problem, while the founding of a Moral State presupposes that men have become moral. As the mass of men are 'savages', current attempts at political reform are chimerical. Political reform presupposes men who have harmoniously integrated their sensuous and rational natures, and are thus capable of naturally being moral. In short, political reform presupposes the psycho-ethical reform of the individual.

(Letter 8) Having ruled out the State as an instrument for achieving freedom, Schiller considers the possible roles of reason and philosophy in man's transformation from a natural to a moral life. Reason, per-se, can do no more than discover the precepts of the moral law; it cannot overcome our sensuous nature to realize this law with certainty, on a general social scale. Reason must work on sense indirectly, using feeling itself, through the development of a rational drive. We cannot, then,morally reform the individual through his reason alone. Moreover, it is either inactive, or exhausted by the labour process, in the 'savage' masses; or it is irrationally active in producing or reproducing mythologies, in the 'barbarian' intelligentsia and ruling classes of State and church. Men of both kinds require a powerful moral education, based on feeling not abstract precepts. The capacity to feel must be developed, so that men will translate moral precepts into practice.

(Letter 9) It is fine art which provides a powerful means for morally reforming the individual that is independent of the negative influences of society and State. Schiller makes art independent of temporal limitations and deficiencies, by postulating atemporal Ideas of Art and Beauty, which are perennial and not confined to any particular time. The true artist should be detached from his own time, disdaining its opinions, and ensuring the formal aspect of his work transcends confinement to the taste of his age. Through its ability to preserve past truth, art can rescue a currently degraded humanity, by confronting it with immortal exemplars. Art can bypass the corruptions and prejudices of man's intellect, by gaining direct access to his sentient being, and effect a powerful reformation of his whole character by working from his physical substructure.

(Letter 10) We cannot simply assume the effect of art and beauty is always beneficial. Experience shows beauty fosters a mentality emphasizing form and appearance, at the expense of content and what is real. Concern with the aesthetic may hinder judgements of moral value, for outer impression ignores merit, and most vices are compatible with a pleasing appearance. History shows art flourishing in societies when political freedom and morality are in decline. However, the evaluation of beauty should not be approached solely through experience, and historical interpretation of its supposed causes and effects. We must discover and evaluate the concept of Beauty via a 'transcendental' investigation. In Schiller's procedure,this involves establishing what is the universal essence of human nature, and then seeing what is a logical and psychological condition of it achieving fullness of development. (His answer will be that complete and balanced human being requires the psychological effect of experiencing an ideal form of beauty. He will work from a), an a priori model of the essence of Human Being in Letters 11 to 14; to b), a corresponding a priori model of ideal Beauty in Letter 15; to c), an a posteriori model of the essential structure of existential beauty in Letter 16.)

(Letter 11) Schiller distinguishes the 'person' (the rational self, the ego or 'I'), and the 'condition' (the body and external sensuous world, or the non-ego). The person has an atemporal transcendent being which endures, while the condition is temporal and changing. The activities of the person or ego are all possible because of the existence of the non-ego or condition. Personality per se is only potential being, devoid of reality. Its existence and realization are only possible as a phenomenal being, in a particular condition in time. The ego receives external reality into itself through the process of perception, remaining constant while forming this material into a unity. The ego also has a formative tendency directed outwards to reform externality, and in so doing, to realize itself. These two formative processes are the fundamental 'laws of our sensuo-rational nature'.

(Letter 12) Man is impelled by two opposite drives : the 'sense-drive' and the 'form-drive'. The sense-drive, proceeding from man's sensuous nature, seeks to confine him to a life dominated by material reality. The sense-drive is essential to man's phenomenal existence, and to his rational being achieving realization. The form-drive, proceeding from man's rational nature, his ego or personality, seeks to introduce unity and form into his manifold

sensuous experiences. In knowing, it seeks rational truth; in willing, it seeks to realize the moral law. The form-drive rescues man's sensuous nature from the limitation of a purely material existence, by involving it in the process of rational knowing and moral willing.

(Letter 13) The two primary drives are essentially compatible, and must interfunction if either is to fully carry out its own function. They do not naturally encroach upon each other, but civilization, in its departure from nature, has confused their spheres of operation. The ideal relation of the drives is reciprocal, as mutually subordinated, facilitating the co-ordinated activity and realization of the whole man. Education must develop both drives, within their proper spheres, by fully developing our capacities to feel and to reason. Our sensuous nature needs to be developed extensively, in order to be receptive to apprehending the maximum variety of sensuous experience. Our rational nature needs to be intensively developed, to comprehend and unify the material apprehended by our sensuous nature.

(Letter 14) Through the experience of a certain type of (beautiful) symbolic object, the two primary drives develop to co-operate in concerted activity, giving rise to a secondary drive, the psychological product of their combined activity : the 'play-drive'. (The play-drive is the psychological basis of aesthetic contemplation and artistic production.) The sense-drive subjects the ego or psyche to natural necessity, while the form-drive subjects it to rational or moral necessity. The combination of primary drives in the play-drive, develops and strengthens each of man's natures, so as to be capable of limiting the drive of its opposite nature. The drives thus mitigate each other's power, reducing their opposed compulsions to complementary tendencies. Feeling is rendered compatible with morality, and vice versa.

(Letter 15) Schiller is concerned in this Letter with the transcendental deduction of the Idea of Beauty from the Idea of Human Being, viz. from the a priori model of our fundamental human nature which he believes he has established in Letters 11 to 14. He begins by asserting the objective correlative of the play-drive is Beauty, tersely defined as 'living form'. However, the mere conjunction of form and material content, while necessary, is not sufficient, to produce beauty. The process whereby they become sufficient, in their mutual relation, is unknowable. We can only recognize beauty in experience, a posteriori, not formulate it in advance, a priori. The play-drive is a logical necessity for the coherence of the concept or Idea of Human Being, and

also a psychological necessity in order to make existential human nature complete. The term 'play' is justified as indicating the harmonious co-operation the play-drive creates between the two sides of our being. Schiller distinguishes the aesthetic attitude of 'play' towards objects, from the non-aesthetic attitude of 'earnestness' in which we relate to them as sensuously 'agreeable', or as rationally 'good' and 'perfect', viz. in a preponderantly sensuous or rational engagement, in contrast to the play-drive's balanced encounter. In reality, our experience of the play-drive and beauty will be defective, due to either sensuous or rational preponderances in the subject or object. Schiller concludes by asserting a very close connection between aesthetic play and the achievement of full humanity : each is a condition of the other.

(Letter 16) Ideally, Beauty has a twofold effect upon our reciprocally related primary drives : it simultaneously 'tenses' or strengthens both drives, and 'releases' or weakens them to the same degree. In reality, however, beauty will either tense more than release, or release more than tense, as 'energizing' and 'melting' beauty, respectively. Although both drives are either strengthened or weakened, the sense-drive is affected most. Disagreements over the value of aesthetic experience, are principally due to not differentiating these two forms in which the Idea of Beauty exists, and their different psychological effects. The value of each will be relative to the type of character it is experienced by.

(Letter 17) Two basic types of psychological imperfection occur in man : 1) Psychological disharmony, due to one of the primary drives being too tensed or strong, dominating the whole of his being. 2) Both the sensuous and rational natures may be too weak. Beauty can act psychotherapeutically to correct either type of imperfection : melting beauty can relax an over-strong nature or drive; energizing beauty can vivify the individual in whom both drives are weak. Focusing on the problem of an over-tensed drive, the sensuously tensed man may be released by a beautiful object manifesting a 'tranquil form'. The spiritually tensed man may be released by a beautiful object manifesting matter as a vibrant 'living image' (in which form is heavily imbued with a vivid sensuous content). These two species of melting beauty, act by weakening or strengthening the sense-drive. Their influence on man's rational nature is only indirect : a matter of either weakening sense, to allow rationality the opportunity to develop; or of

strengthening sense, to balance a powerful rationality.

(Letter 18) There is a 'middle state' lying between a passive, sensuously recipient, and an active, rationally formative state. In inducing us into this middle state, beauty links the two inherently opposed activities of feeling and thinking. The philosophical task Schiller sets for Letters 19 to 21, is to establish how beauty can unite such opposed conditions. Schiller next criticizes empiricist and rationalist aesthetics, as having one-sided and incomplete understandings of beauty. Empiricist aesthetics focuses on the general sensuous characteristics of beautiful objects which evoke certain sensations in their perceiver. Rationalist aestheticians engage in a complex dissection of beauty and aesthetic experience, analysing the whole into discrete parts. Schiller proposes (in Letters 22 to 27), to adopt both methods, alternately : he will examine the necessary conceptual distinctions the intellect makes in aesthetical matters; but also seek to draw them into a unity, by examining the effect of beauty upon our sensuous nature.

(Letter 19) Schiller briefly outlines a three stage model of the psychological development of the individual. 1) The mind 'begins' by being in a state in which it is not determined in any manner at all, but is pure potential being. 2) The mind becomes passively externally determined by the sensuous, acquiring a content through its receptivity to sense-impressions. 3) There arises the self-determining activity of the ego, as it forms the multiplicity of sense-impressions into a unity, through the concepts employed in thinking and judging. Stage 3) presupposes stage 2), viz. the ego's rational activity rests upon the basis of the passive reception of external material to form. Schiller connects the passively recipient, and rationally active phases, with the sense and form drives, respectively, enabling him to argue that the form-drive rests upon the sense-drive, and thus the primary drives only fully function in a relationship of co-operation.

(Letter 20) The 'aesthetic condition' of the psyche is a fourth stage in man's psychological development, located between stages 2) and 3) in the model of Letter 19. The purpose of aesthetic education is to assist man's progression from stage 2) to 3). The aesthetic condition of the psyche is thus not itself an end, but rather a means for enabling man to become more rational and moral. It involves two phases : (a), an unbalanced condition, in which the sense-drive is suppressed to allow the form-drive to develop; and (b), a balanced condition of the two

primary drives, which is the basis of the psyche's freedom. Schiller argues that the transition from the sensuous to the rational condition cannot take place directly. The form-drive cannot satisfactorily develop against the dominant position of an already established sense-drive, unless the latter is temporarily suspended as a drive, by the minimization of the psyche's receptivity to sense. The form-drive is enabled to develop so it becomes strong enough to counterbalance a restored sense-drive, so that the aesthetic condition assumes a more balanced psychological structure,in which reason and sense cancel each other out as determining forces. The psyche then becomes free to choose whether to know or act in a sensuous or rational way, without being under the compulsion of either natural or moral necessity.

(Letter 21) Schiller continues his discussion of the aesthetic condition of the psyche, focusing on its fully developed equilibrious mode, and in particular, upon its role in grounding freedom. The overall effect of experiencing beauty is not something determinate, i.e. definite and particular, for either knowing or willing. It is rather a state of freedom from such limited activities. Man is raised to an unlimited contemplative condition : to a highly receptive state of openness to the rational, and sensuous determination of all his drives and faculties. The overall effect of aesthetic experience is to leave the will free from the domination and constraint of either primary drive, so putting man back into a similar position of 'open' potential, to that which he enjoyed before he was determined by either drive at all. From this position of potential being, man is enabled to realize himself in a way which, through its wholeness and psychological balance, realizes his fundamental human nature. However, as soon as man attempts to realize himself, he loses his full humanity and becomes limited, by being involved in either a predominantly sensuous or rational mode of activity, in a particular and definite way. There is thus a need for a permanent recourse to aesthetic experience, in order to continually restore man to psychological wholeness and potential being, after each fragmentary mode of only partial self-realization.

(Letter 22) Both the sensuous and rational contents in an art object should be balanced in their psychological appeal, by being simultaneously addressed to all our faculties, through both types of content being rendered implicit by the predominance of form in the art object. If aesthetic experience does not establish psychological equilibrium, but leaves us principally inclined either to thought or

to feeling, it is not a 'pure' aesthetic experience (caused either by the object, our response, or both). In reality, any aesthetic experience will leave us to some extent in either a passive or an active mood, with a bias towards feeling or thought. Aesthetic evaluation involves an introspective psychological assessment of such mood and bias. It is thus not directed at any characteristics of the art object, but at our own psychological condition. The criterion for evaluating 'style' in a type of art, lies in its ability to appeal to the totality of our faculties. The skilful artist utilizes form to absorb both sensuous and conceptual contents in an art object, so that they become sublated within it and rendered implicit. Form appeals psychologically to all our drives and faculties, whereas some definite conceptual or particular sensuous content, appeals to one drive or the other, or to a particular faculty. Form alone is conducive to psychological equilibrium and wholeness. The art object should thus be form dominated.

(Letter 23) Schiller next discusses the practical educative role of the aesthetic, as the means whereby the mass of mankind, dominated by their sensuous nature, may become rational and moral. He conceives of the 'aesthetic' in a broad way, as form in general, in the sense of order, structure, and harmony. The process of aesthetic education begins with our sensuous nature being formed to become a 'second nature' of a more rational kind, compatible with reason itself. The individual, in order to transcend the limitation of merely realizing natural ends, must begin to realize them with an element of choice and self-determination. This involves 'well-being', viz. the co-ordinated and systematized satisfaction of natural needs, which imparts some degree of form and thus implicit rationality, to what would otherwise be the formless satisfaction of blindly followed natural impulses as they contingently arise. Moral life must begin within the domain of physical life. By imparting form and thus implicit rationality to our natural impulses, their opposition and hindrance to reason is diminished; they become more compatible with the demands of moral reason, enabling them to assist its realization. A tendency towards 'noble' conduct results, in which man is naturally and spontaneously moral. By developing a 'noble' nature, we can avoid the need for 'sublime' superhuman moral willing (in which we attempt to externally impose moral principles upon an unformed and psychologically independent sensuous nature). Moral volition comes to rest more securely on the basis of a co-operative relationship with a

compatible sensuous nature.

(Letter 24) An account of the psycho-historical development of the individual and species begins with the purely sensuous man, inhabiting a 'state of nature'. He experiences phenomena as isolated transient items, being unable to organize them into a system of knowledge. He can do no more than respond to the endless demands of his physical needs, which only find a natural limit in his exhaustion. As reason emerges from such a psychological state, it at first functions to make matters worse : reason's regulative demand for completeness in knowing and for unconditioned willing, is converted by man's sensuous being into a drive to achieve the unlimited satisfaction of his physical needs. At a further stage of development, sensuous man uses his intellect to causally relate phenomena. Reason's regulative demand for completeness in knowledge, leads the individual to seek an unconditioned causal explanation for phenomena. Failing to find it in the world of external sensuous phenomena, he finds it in his own feelings (which are unconditioned by having no cause, in their contingency). How he feels, becomes the arbitrary criterion of a perverse 'truth' and 'morality'. At a further stage in the development of reason in sensuous man, he becomes aware of the moral law. The precepts of the moral law appear to him merely as fetters on his 'freedom'. He degrades the status of the moral law, viewing it as a positive creation at some time in history. The perverted course of sensuous man's 'rational' development, results from the sense-drive dominating the form-drive, so that the rational aspect of his character is pressed into the service of the physical.

(Letter 25) Schiller next considers 'contemplation' in general ; and also how the contemplation of beauty specifically, effects an harmonious interfunctioning of our rational and sensuous natures, promoting moral volition. The point at which man emerges from submergence in nature is when he distinguishes the self from the not-self : manifesting self-consciousness, and a relative autonomy from the sensuous realm. It is closely associated with the emergence of a capacity for contemplation : the ability to view phenomenal objects with a degree of psychological distance from, and disinterest in, their sensuous being. Man now becomes cognitively self-determining in relation to the externally sensuous : the multiplicity and flux of sense-impressions becomes subjectively structured, as he forms representational images of phenomena in his imagination, and imposes form upon the sensuous by the process of thought. Now the contemplation

of beauty specifically, has a twofold morally educative effect :
1) In its harmonious phenomenal relation of form and sensuous content, the beautiful object is an educative external symbol of the harmonious psychological relation of reason and sense in the 'noble' moral will.
2) Aesthetic contemplation involves a psychological process in which man, while still sensuous (receptive to sense-impressions), is also rationally self-determining (imposing form upon what he senses). Beauty is the 'bridge' between nature and freedom, because it simultaneously symbolizes and effects a psychological state in which rational self-determination is compatible with our dependence on sensuous being.

(Letter 26) Schiller presents a theory concerning the artistic production of 'aesthetic semblance' (or art objects), locating it as a stage in man's psycho-historical development. The development of the psyche from the sensuous state into the aesthetic condition, is effected by nature itself. Nature presents man with aesthetically pleasing phenomenal configurations, the perception of which, develops the primary drives to interfunction in equilibrium. In addition, the higher natural senses of visual and aural perception, have a relation to sensuous phenomena which is mediated by thought, imposing form upon what is sensed. Now this leads to an artistic ability to abstract what has been so imposed, and to treat form independently of its original apparent sensuous 'embodiment'. The capacity for imitative art at first arises, but later, form is treated more autonomously, and is creatively re-formed by the imagination without reference to nature. The degree of creative freedom exercised in this process, is a function of the extent the artist abstracts from the sensuous. He should not allow existence to determine semblance (as in imitative art); nor should he seek to make semblance determine existence (as in ideological art). Aesthetic semblance must have a sensuous aspect (the necessary medium of re-presentation), but we must abstract from this if our judgement is to be purely aesthetic in character.

(Letter 27) Schiller's account of man's psycho-historical development continues. As the first traces of an interest in semblance appear in man's life,it takes a conditioned form, being involved in the satisfaction of his sensuous needs. Man achieves some limited freedom from sensuous needs by acquiring an abundance of the means of satisfying them. When he also seeks to satisfy his nascent form-drive, by a pleasing formal appearance in objects of sensuous utility, he enhances the quality of pleasure. Man's imagination develops some independence

from the sensuous, by engaging in 'material play' : a formless, free association of images, without need for external stimuli. But for the imagination to become definitely creative, it must co-operate in 'aesthetic play' with the faculty of concepts (the understanding), with the latter imposing form upon the train of transient images.

Beauty of form now becomes a major consideration in the creation and ownership of artifacts. Man moves on to create and contemplate objects which are simply beautiful and of no utility, viz. fine art objects. At the same time, the externally aesthetic increasingly reforms man himself. Form becomes progressively internalized : at first in the external aspects of man's being (in graceful bodily movements), and then in his psychological constitution (as the form-drive develops, to counterbalance the sense-drive, so that the individual achieves psychological harmony). Individual psychological harmony finds a wider expression : The relationship of the individual man and woman is transformed from one initially dominated by natural desire, to one based upon love and free will. Beauty also resolves social conflict by uniting society on the basis of a universally sharable mode of individual experience.

Finally, Schiller distinguishes three types of State. In the Natural State (or civil society), each individual's activity to satisfy his own sensuous needs is limited only by the blind forces of the market and physical coercion of the State. The Moral State externally imposes rational limits upon the individual's natural desires, by positive laws which embody the moral law. In the Aesthetic State, man is predisposed to moral volition by the ennobling effect of aesthetic form upon his sensuous nature. The Aesthetic State is a society of aesthetically formed, psychologically harmonious, and morally ennobled individuals, who provide the psycho-ethical support for a durable Moral State. The Moral State is not securely established if it merely attempts to externally impose moral willing upon its citizens via positive laws which embody the moral law; they must be already psychologically predisposed to moral volition. In reality, however, the Aesthetic State can only achieve a limited realization in small groups of individuals.

II

The treatise contains a multitude of insights into the cultural and psycho-social deficiencies of western civilization[1], and insights into the nature of aesthetic experience. What is of particular value, and where Schiller provides material for further development by aestheticians and political theorists alike, is the threefold way in which he relates the aesthetic to other domains of human experience.

Firstly, aesthetic perception is integrated into the process of ordinary perception, and made a common feature of everyday experience. Aesthetic experience is not, for Schiller, some high level mode of contemplation, a specially demarcated domain, confined to special times and places (e.g. art galleries, concert halls, and nature parks). Instead, it may be found in every single act of perception[2], as we constantly encounter phenomena, and whether consciously or unconsciously[3], aesthetically judge them.[4] Aesthetic experience often is unexpected, unplanned, novel and startling, catching us unawares whilst occupied in some mundane activity. Schiller's theory of aesthetic perception goes some way towards explaining this phenomenon, and to demystifying the spatio-temporal and psychological loci of aesthetic experience.

Secondly, Schiller throws useful light on how the aesthetic psychological condition relates to determinate, viz. to particular and definite, acts of cognition and volition. He sees the aesthetic condition as grounding more psychologically complete and balanced modes of ordinary knowing and willing[5], so that the aesthetic feeds positively into our everyday activities, enhancing their quality.[6] He provides a theoretical explanation for the psychological value we intuitively feel the aesthetic has for us, and demonstrates it to be a vital part of a fully human life. He shows that it is not merely a superfluous leisure pursuit, but rather a re-vitalizing and re-creative psychological restorative; and a preparative[7], for qualitatively enhanced knowing and willing in all aspects of private and social life.[8]

Thirdly, Schiller illuminates the relationship of the aesthetic to the political, helping to resolve a problem which has particularly perplexed Marxist aestheticians. Schiller does not make the content of art explicitly political (as in e.g., the demand for 'socialist realism' by Stalinist States). Neither does he make the content of art,

as ideal, implicitly contrast with a harsh reality, provoking us to reform the latter (the view of Marcuse[9]). He does not talk of integrating imaginative artistic production into the general process of production (like Benjamin[10]), a view unrealistically ignoring the imperative of profit maximization inherent to capitalism.[11] In Schiller's view, it is by being ideally beautiful, i.e. by simply being good art, in a predominantly formal sense, that the aesthetic is able to restore a psychological wholeness which morally reforms man's character, enabling him to enact durable political reform.[12]

Now Schiller's political aesthetic theory may be further fruitfully developed, to allow the contrast experienced between aesthetically effected psychological wholeness/and our everyday psycho-social fragmentation, to involve not only an aspect of aesthetic pleasure, but also an aspect of intellectual pain, so that we are sublimely[13] educated to a heightened awareness of socio-political deficiencies (to the causes[14] of the contrast). Aesthetic experience may thus be 'consciousness raising', overcoming the various forms of 'false consciousness' engendered by the dominant ideologies and mythologies in society (e.g., consumerism = happiness), urging us to revolt against the established social dis-order, and to create the conditions for more complete and balanced modes of psycho-social life.

What is striking about Schiller's account of the ills of society, is its modern relevance. His solution to these ills, in terms of the need for psycho-ethical reform, rather than for political reform on its own, has some appeal following the general moral failure of the many twentieth century experiments in socio-political reform (ranging through Stalinism and fascism, to social democratic Keynesianism, and neo-conservative Friedmanism[15]). In the aftermath of the French Revolution, Schiller saw the inadequacy of one dimensional purely political or economic revolutions. Schiller did not reject political revolution (the Natural State must be 'abolished'), but saw the need for it to be underpinned by psychological and ethical revolutions in man's individual and social being : a three dimensional revolution.[16]

In conclusion, therefore, while Schiller's specific aesthetic theories of beauty, art, and the nature of aesthetic experience per se, with their emphasis on form, disinterestedness, and imaginative play, seem to advance little beyond Kant[17]; and while his epistemology and theory of drives appear not to advance much beyond Fichte; his social critique, his integration of the aesthetic into all domains of

experience, and his three dimensional theory of psycho-ethical-political revolution, make a valuable contribution to opening up a much broader view of what can, and should be, encompassed by aesthetics.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. I follow Wilkinson & Willoughby in referring to Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man by the shortened title, the Aesthetic Letters. All references to, and quotations from, the Aesthetic Letters (with the exception of one indicated in Letter 14), are from J. C. F. Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man, ed. & trans. E. M. Wilkinson & L. A. Willoughby (Oxford Univ. Press, 1967).
2. See Wilkinson & Willoughby's introduction, ibid., p. xlviii, where they refer to various letters Schiller wrote to Körner and Goethe, affirming that the structure of the treatise as a whole is unassailable, that it has an inner consistency, and a 'rigour governing its organization' (letter to Goethe, 27/2/1795).
3. Ibid., p. lxi.
4. Schiller edited the journal Die Horen for his publisher Cotta. For the history of the text of the Aesthetic Letters, see ibid., appendix I : 'The Text and its Story', pp. 334-7.
5. There is a case, prima facie, for including here the book by J. M. Ellis, Schiller's 'Kalliasbrief' and the Study of his Aesthetic Theory (Mouton; The Hague, 1976). However, apart from a penetrating first chapter discussing the defective methodologies employed by many Schiller scholars, the rest of the book is devoted to Schiller's Kallias letters (1793), rather than to his aesthetics in general. It contains only occasional brief references to the Aesthetic Letters, and consequently, is not of great relevance to us here.
6. S. S. Kerry, Schiller's Writings on Aesthetics (Manchester Univ. Press, 1961).
7. R. D. Miller, Schiller and the Ideal of Freedom (Oxford Univ. Press, 1970).
8. Wilkinson & Willoughby, op. cit., pp. xcvii ff.
9. Ibid., pp. lxviii-lxxiii; also appendix III, pp. 348-50.
10. Ibid., pp. cxxxiii ff.
11. Ibid., pp. lxxxi ff.
12. Ibid., commentary, pp. 292-3.
13. Kerry, op. cit., ch. V.
14. Ellis, op. cit., points out how 'For some critics the two sides, poet and philosopher, correspond fairly exactly to "incorrect" and

"correct". This is especially true for the Kantians, for whom the poet failed to understand Kant, with the result that, having begun within the sound Kantian position, he merely made mistakes when he tried to contribute anything for himself' (pp. 17-18). Kerry rightly receives criticism from Ellis along these lines, as does Dieter Henrich (p. 40), for his article 'Beauty and Freedom : Schiller's Struggle with Kant's Aesthetics', Essays in Kant's Aesthetics, eds. T. Cohen & P. Guyer (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 237-57. Similarly criticized (p. 46, fn.), is Eva Schaper's 'Friedrich Schiller : Adventures of a Kantian', British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 4, 1964.

15. Ellis, op. cit., p. 30, is again perceptively critical here: '. . . there have been so many studies which have examined the genesis of the texts, and so few examining the texts themselves.' Such studies fall into '. . . the genetic fallacy (in diagnosing which one applies the principle that there is no valid inference from the origins of a thing to its nature).'

16. Miller, op. cit., pp. 106-124.

17. For this curt treatment of Letter 27, see ibid., the bottom of p. 123.

18. D. Regin, Freedom and Dignity : The Historical and Philosophical Thought of Schiller (Martinus Nijhoff; The Hague, 1965).

19. V. Rippere, Schiller and Alienation (Peter Lang; Berne, 1981).

20. A. Savile, Aesthetic Reconstructions : The Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant and Schiller (Blackwell, 1988), chs. 7-8, pp. 195-254.

21. M. Podro, The Manifold in Perception (Oxford Univ. Press, 1972), chs. iii & iv.

22. Schiller's review article of Matthisson's nature or landscape poetry (1794). No English translation exists, and Podro's treatment of it is the main source available. See Podro, ibid., pp. 42 ff.

23. P. J. Kain, Schiller, Hegel, and Marx : State, Society and the Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient Greece (McGill-Queen's Univ. Press; Kingston & Montreal, 1982), ch. 1: 'Schiller'.

24. According to A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, ed. J. A. H. Murray, the words 'focused' or 'focusing' may be used with either one 's' or two, but the use of two is the more 'irregular'. I will therefore use one 's' in both words throughout this work. See ibid., vol. iv, p. 377 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1897).

25. E. Schaper, 'Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Schiller', British Journal of Aesthetics, Summer 1985, pp. 166-7.

26. K. Dewhurst & N. Reeves, eds. & trans., Friedrich Schiller : Medicine, Psychology and Literature (Sandford Publications, Oxford, 1978).

27. Schiller attended the Duke of Württemberg's Military Academy in Stuttgart, 1773-80 (aged 14-21), initially training in law, but after 2 years transferring to medicine. He became a regimental doctor on leaving the academy in 1780.

28. W. Grossman, 'The Idea of Cultural Evolution in Schiller's Aesthetic Education', Germanic Review, vol. 34, 1959.

29. L. A. Willoughby, 'Schiller on Man's Education to Freedom through Knowledge', Germanic Review, vol. 29, 1954.

30. E. Schaper, 'Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Schiller', op. cit.

31. H. S. Reiss, 'The Concept of the Aesthetic State in the Work of Schiller and Novalis', Publications of the English Goethe Society, vol. 26, 1957.

32. E. M. Wilkinson & L. A. Willoughby, 'The Whole Man in Schiller's Theory of Culture and Society : On the Virtue of a Plurality of Models', in S. S. Prawer, R. Hinton Thomas, & L. Forster (eds.), Essays in German Language, Culture and Society (Univ. of London Institute for German Studies, 1969), pp. 177-210.

33. I. Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford Univ. Press, 1952). The work is divided into 2 parts : Part 1, the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgement'; Part 2, the Critique of Teleological Judgement'.

34. David Hume (1711-1776), British Empiricist; most influential work : A Treatise of Human Nature (1738-40) in 3 vols.

35. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith (Macmillan, 1929).

36. I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck (Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).

37. The moral dimension underlying the Critique of Judgement is brought out clearly in P. Crowther, The Kantian Sublime : From Morality to Art (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989). See esp. ch. 'Kant's Aesthetic Theory and its Moral Significance'. This brings out the metaphysical, teleological, and analogical linkages Kant makes between nature and morality in the third Critique as a whole.

38. See Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Introduction, section iv, pp. 18-20, for the distinction between 'reflective' and 'determinant' judgements.

39. Ibid., Introduction, section v, pp. 20-26.
40. Ibid., Part 2, section 25, pp. 108-9.
41. Ibid., Part 2, section 23, pp. 99-100.
42. Ibid., Introduction, p. 39 (where Kant makes his initial claim concerning this connection). See Part 1, section 59, pp. 221-25, for the psychological connection between natural beauty and morality made via analogies, and p. 227 (last para.).
43. Ibid., Introduction, section viii, pp. 33-36.
44. Kant's arguments in support of these five features of judgements of taste, occupy the whole of Book One of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement : 'Analytic of the Beautiful', pp. 41-89.
45. Ibid., Part 1, section 11, pp. 62-63.
46. Ibid., Part 1, section 9, p. 58.
47. Ibid., Part 1, section 45, pp. 166-167.
48. Ibid., Part 1, sections 46 & 47, pp. 168-172.
49. Ibid., Part 1, section 49, pp. 175-179.
50. Ibid., Part 1, section 16, pp. 72-74.
51. Ibid., Part 1, section 48, p. 173 (lines 10-12); section 42, p. 158 (line 30).

PART ONE

LETTER 1

1. I have provided each Letter with a title, to indicate its general contents.
2. See L1:4 (viz., Letter 1, para. 4, in Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit.).
3. Letter to Körner, 10/11/1794 : 'That I have advanced as propositions many ideas of Kant without proving them, was unavoidable in so circumscribed a notice of a subject which comprises the entire man'. Correspondence of Schiller with Körner, trans. L. Simpson, 3 vols. (London, 1849), vol. 2, p. 298. Also, letter to Körner, 19/12/1794 : 'Your reproach that I am treading in Kant's footsteps, will be more applicable in this second part than to the first . . .' Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 304-5. (The 'second part' referred to here, being the second instalment in The Horen, viz. L10-16).
4. The part played by the traditional notion of natural law in Schiller's thinking on social, ethical, and political issues, is briefly discussed

by W. Witte, 'Law and Order in Schiller's Thought', Modern Language Review, vol. 1, 1955, pp. 296-297.
5. Kerry, op. cit., p. 131, describes Schiller as 'using abstract terms in an essentially poetic manner'. Grossman, op. cit., p. 45, refers to Schiller as a 'philosopher poet'.
6. Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., p. cxxvii), take the view that 'Schiller is not just out to construct his own system of abstract relations; nor, as is more often alleged, out to engage the total psyche of the reader . . .' 'He is out to do both things at once . . .'

LETTER 2

1. Schiller's concept of the Ideal will be explored in the examination of L4, 9, & 10.
2. Cf. L27:10, p. 217 (last sentence).
3. This idea is developed in Schiller's theory of 'aesthetic semblance' in L26. See, e.g., L26:8 (p. 197).
4. J.-J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750), trans. G. D. H. Cole (in The Social Contract and Discourses, Dent, 1973). A. Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), ed. D. Forbes (Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1966). E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), ed. Conor Cruise O'Brien (Penguin Books, 1969).

LETTER 3

1. Schiller's notion of the 'Natural State' will also be examined in our discussion of L6, L27:9 & 10.
2. Schiller probably has in mind here, those models of a 'state of nature' involving social contracts, found in Hobbes Leviathan (1651), and Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1690), amongst others. Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., p. 225), see Rousseau as providing the relevant model here. However, Rousseau in The Social Contract (1762), used the idea of a 'state of nature', not to support the contemporary State via a social contract theory, but to argue for certain inalienable rights man has, and can claim against the contemporary State, e.g., that the people are ultimately the sovereign.

3. Grossman, op. cit., p. 41, confuses the contemporary Natural State with the historical fiction of a 'state of nature'. Schaper too ('Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Schiller', op. cit.), talks of the Natural State as a state of nature (in the manner of Hobbes' 'war of all against all'). More strangely, Schaper describes what Schiller makes clear (in L3:3) is a moral ideal, i.e. the Rational or Moral State, as having already come into being historically, and as having been somehow 'superimposed' over the Natural State. Referring to the early Letters of the treatise, she tells us 'these Letters give a semi-historical account of how the "state of reason" gradually superimposed itself on the "state of nature" . . .' (p. 159). For Schiller, the Rational State has not 'superimposed' itself on the Natural State, but is the future ideal form of the State which aesthetically educated men will be in a psycho-ethical condition to replace the current Natural State with.

4. Adam Ferguson, by whom Schiller seems to have been greatly influenced, in his An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), op. cit., also explicitly rejected the state of nature/social contract apparatus, proclaiming simply 'Man is born in society and there remains' (p. 16). Cf. Schiller, L3:2 (first sentence), where man 'awakes' and 'finds himself - in the State' (p. 11).

5. Schiller says little about the attributes of the Moral State (and what little he does say, is not found until L27:9 & 10). It is as though he expects us to be familiar with the concept. This could be the case, for his notion of the Moral State would seem to be based partly on Rousseau's 'general will' in The Social Contract, (see esp. L27:9 & 10); and partly on ideas expressed by Kant in his then widely known Idea for a Universal History (1784). According to Kain, op. cit., p. 28, Kant took the view that 'a society of men driven together by natural feeling (need) is to be transformed into a moral whole, into a society based on practical principles. Society moves towards this end, toward a society of the greatest freedom, the greatest morality, and the fullest development of all human capacities'. '. . . man must produce for himself anything that goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence.' Note the imperative here. Kain gives as his source : Kant's Idea for a Universal History, in Kant's Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 44-45, 47-48. Reiss ('The Concept of the Aesthetic State in the Work of Schiller and Novalis', op. cit., pp. 29-30), also believes Schiller's concept of the Moral State is based

on Kant's philosophy of history and political philosophy. As we will see, from Schiller's few remarks concerning the Moral State, its chief characteristic is that it will be governed by positive laws that embody the moral law. There will be a coincidence between the general will of society (expressed in such laws), and the individual moral will (cf. L27:9 & 10), and thus a bringing together of the moral principles of Rousseau and Kant.

6. i.e. 'civil society', the level at which economic activity operates within the Natural State, satisfying the needs of man's 'physical being'. This must be retained, whilst its externally related political machinery, the Natural State, is 'abolished'.

7. Grossman, op. cit.,p. 44, mistakenly asserts that Schiller sees the 'importance of renouncing the satisfaction of physical wants for the sake of cultural evolution'. Schiller's view, is that man's physical needs must be satisfied before moral progress is possible. Cf. Schiller, On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), trans. J. A. Elias, in German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism, ed. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), p. 221 : '. . . above all else nature must be satisfied before the mind can make its demands'.

LETTER 4

1. There is some continuity here with Schiller's earlier views in On Grace and Dignity (1793), trans. anon., in Essays Aesthetical and Philosophical (Böhn's Standard Library, 1875), pp. 168-223, esp. pp. 198-203, passim., e.g. '. . . when morality has become to him a second nature, it is then only that it is secure . . .' (p. 200).

2. Prima facie, a Platonic objective idealism lies behind Schiller's use of the terms 'Idea' or 'Ideal'. In his discussion of the Idea of Art in L9, and the Idea of Beauty in L10, 15, & 16, it is clear that they have a transcendent status. In L17:2, Schiller distinguishes the 'region of Ideas' from 'the stage of reality'. The problem is that they also have an immanent status, and Schiller talks of the existential 'realization' of these Ideas (in e.g., L16:1), so taking him beyond Platonic or neo-Platonic notions of mere vague participation of reality in transcendent Forms. This dual transcendent and immanent status points, as Lukács has recognized (in Goethe and His Age, Merlin, 1968), towards a proto-Hegelian absolute idealism.

There is also some connection with Kant's notion of Ideas, but as we

will see shortly, the link is with practical reason's ideal, i.e. moral perfection, not with the Ideas of theoretical reason. Kant discusses the latter in the Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., pp. 308-326. His position is concisely expressed by him as follows: 'I understand by Idea a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience. Thus the pure concepts of reason, now under discussion are transcendental ideas.' 'The objective employment of pure concepts of reason is always transcendent, while that of the pure concepts of understanding must, in accordance with their nature, and inasmuch as their application is solely to possible experience, be always immanent.' Ibid., p. 318 (A327). Kant's Ideas of reason are transcendent, as they are regulative of the operations of the understanding, directing the employment of the latter's immanent concepts (which provide constitutive knowledge), to achieve an absolute or unconditioned totality in the synthesis of conditions (ibid., p. 318). Now Schiller goes well beyond this, for his Ideas are not merely transcendentally regulative, in an epistemological sense (cf. L10:7). They also have an objective ontological being, achieving degrees of 'realization' in the existential.

It was in his Kallias Letters (1793) to Körner, that Schiller explicitly expressed an objective idealism, in his notion of beauty as 'freedom in appearance', involving the conformity of an object's 'technical form' to its own 'essential nature'. The notion of objective essences, which exist independently of our a priori construing, is found in the later Kallias Letters, following Körner's criticism of his earlier letters for grounding beauty in the a priori construing of the subject, contrary to Schiller's declared aim of defining an objective criterion of beauty. There is some shift back, in the Aesthetic Letters (in L26), to an object's form being construed a priori, and thus to a Kantian epistemology. Yet, alongside this, there is talk of the Idea of Art existing over time, independent of human caprice (L9:3). We have to examine each usage of the terms Idea or Ideal, as it occurs, and cannot assume a uniform usage by Schiller.

3. Schiller explains the notion of 'ennoblement' in L23.
4. Such a defective education is described in L13:4 fn. 3, (i.e. Letter 13, para. 4, footnote 3).
5. Wilhelm Reich, The Psychology of Fascism (Penguin Books, 1979).
6. See Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 40, p. 151 (lines 16-28).

7. Throughout On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, Schiller implicitly operates the idea of the 'naive' poet and 'realist' personality type being guided by natural law, while the 'sentimental' poet and 'idealist' character, is conscious of the moral law. Man must be morally guided by one or the other, or be adrift without a law. Cf. op. cit., p. 220.

8. Cf. L1:4. Cf. also, L8:1 & 3, where discussing the role of philosophy, Schiller says 'Reason has accomplished all that she can accomplish by discovering the [moral] law and [theoretically] establishing it.' (L8:3).

9. See the brief characterization of the 'Ethical State' in L27:9.

10. The fact that Schiller talks here of what the State 'will have to' do, emphasizes that he is talking about the future Moral State, which will have to 'ruthlessly trample' underfoot the kind of individualism which is rife in the society governed by the Natural State (cf. L5:5, 'egotism has founded its system'). Such ruthless trampling by the State, could only be effected by the positive law, but Schiller's reference to its 'solemn rigour' recalls Kant's manner of talking about the moral law. This again indicates the identity of moral law and positive law in the Moral State.

11. The distinction between the 'savage' and 'barbarian' is later modified to become the 'realist' and 'idealist' personality types described in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), op. cit., pp. 224-232.

12. Chiefly in L15, 22, & 25.

13. This is a reference to beauty, and gives us an early foretaste of the formalist view of beauty Schiller will adopt in his later Letters (commencing in L22:5).

14. Reiss, op. cit., pp. 30-33, argues that Schiller's plays too, show his 'awareness of the psychological basis of political relations'. '. . . in all Schiller's plays the problem of freedom is seen in psychological terms' (p. 31). Referring to Schiller's plays, Reiss tells is that 'for Schiller, conflict always arises from a struggle between the two conflicting tendencies in the human personality', i.e., 'the sensuous and intellectual aspects of the human personality. We have thus a series of characters embodying either of these two aspects none of whom is capable of integration' (p. 32). Reiss sees the Aesthetic Letters as a continuation of Schiller's dramatic interest in this dualism, but expressed in Kantian philosophical terms.

LETTER 5

1. Cf. Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), op. cit., p. 19, who similarly describes 'the loosening of the bands of commercial society'.
2. It is clear here, that Schiller distinguishes the Natural State per se (which in L3:3, first sentence, is referred to as 'a political body'), from civil society (or the 'civil order' as he calls it in L5:4), which released from the former's 'controls', is becoming ever more atomized.
3. According to Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit., p. 127, at the military academy Schiller became familiar with the writings of Christian Garve (1742-98). They refer to Garve's '. . . portrait of how the growing economic structure of a society produces new needs and new wishes in a self-generating process . . .'
4. Especially Rousseau's Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750). Another important influence was probably Ferguson, op. cit., whose Essay contains much moralistic criticism of the emerging commercial society of Schiller's times.
5. However, whilst Rousseau may have been a primary source, Vicky Rippere, Schiller and Alienation, op. cit., demonstrates that Schiller's social critique is drawn from a large number of contemporary sources, in a then fairly commonplace debate about the virtues and vices of modern civilization. She shows that Schiller's criticisms were not, in fact, particularly original.

LETTER 6

1. Cf. Schiller, On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, op. cit., p. 213: 'Let the [sentimental poet] not lead us backward to our childhood [Greece], but rather forward into our maturity in order to permit us to perceive that higher harmony . . .'
2. According to Michael Jones, 'Twilight of the Gods : The Greeks in Schiller and Lukács' (Germanic Review, vol. 59, 1984), Schiller merely made use of what he knew was a mythical ideal of ancient Greece, in order to criticize contemporary society. Schiller did not expect his statements concerning Greece to be taken literally; the myth of Greece was a critical device, not a historical fact. Jones' view rests upon speculation about what was 'really' in Schiller's mind, i.e. about what

his intentions were. Such speculations are notoriously difficult to verify.

3. Ancient Greece also functions as a lost psychological and social ideal in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, op. cit., pp. 189-190. The Greeks lived at one with nature, something which modern civilized man has lost and can only yearn for, as expressed in much 'sentimental' poetry.

4. The human creation of divinities, is an idea also suggested in the latter part of L24:7, where man '. . . forfeits his humanity by seeking a Godhead . . .', and in L25:3, when man's ancient gods reveal 'themselves as projections of his own mind'.

5. L. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity (1841). K. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844).

6. Prima facie, there is some contradiction here. But for Schiller, the apparent 'organization' of society into disparate classes and groups, essentially 'disorganizes' it, in the sense of transforming it from an organic unity into a mechanical system.

7. Viz., an organically interrelated whole.

8. Schiller's critique of contemporary society (governed by the Natural State), was probably influenced by his reading of the Scottish political economist and moralist, Adam Ferguson (1723-1816). (Ferguson graduated from St Andrews University in 1742, was professor of moral philosophy in Edinburgh University, and is thought to have attended Adam Smith's lectures on political economy in the 1760s, at Glasgow University.) The Natural State is the 'political body' (L3:3) governing civil society (the emerging commercial society and capitalist economy). Compare the passages quoted from L6:7 & 8, with Ferguson's description of commercial society: 'Many mechanical arts succeed best under the total suppression of sentiment and reason; and ignorance is the mother of industry as well as superstition . . . Manufactures accordingly prosper most when the mind is least consulted, and where the workshop may, without any great effort, be considered as an engine, the parts of which are men . . . Thinking itself in this age of separations may become a particular craft.' An Essay on the History of Civil Society, op. cit., p. 185. For Ferguson's influence on Schiller, see R. Plant, Hegel (George Allen & Unwin, 1973), pp. 21-23; also Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit., pp. 123-5.

9. It is not clear what Schiller means by 'primitive morality' here. Given the context, I take it to mean a narrowly personal morality, concerned with e.g., controlling one's own impulses, and not extending

beyond (at best) family welfare. It is morality which has no genuinely social dimension. One thinks of Hegel's distinction in the Philosophy of Right (1821), trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), between individualistic morality and social ethical life (moralität/and sittlichkeit). The latter presupposes a rational social order (see ibid., p. 319, note 75), viz. something like life in Schiller's Rational or Moral State.

10. Cf. L22:2, 'That which tenses our intellectual powers and invites them to form abstract concepts . . . [has the effect of] depriving us of sensibility . . .'

11. Cf. On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, op. cit., p. 211, where Schiller says that while recognizing modern man's estrangement from nature, we must not overlook civilization's advantages. He criticizes poetic idylls which talk of a past golden age: 'Set before the beginnings of civilization, they exclude together with its disadvantages all its advantages . . .'

12. Kant, in his Idea for a Universal History, and in Perpetual Peace, had argued that man's faculties and capacities could be developed historically only through their mutual opposition. Schiller was familiar with this view : according to Regin, op. cit., pp. 56–7, for the occasion of his inaugural address as professor of history at the University of Jena (May 1789), 'Schiller had almost mechanically followed Reinhold's advice and read Kant's two essays concerning history'. See Idea for a Universal History, and Perpetual Peace, in Kant's Political Writings, ed. H. R. Reiss, op. cit., pp. 44–45, 109–14.

13. J. J. Winckelmann, Thoughts on the Imitation of the Painting and Sculpture of the Greeks (1755), in Nisbet (ed.), op. cit., pp. 32–54. Ferguson, op. cit., would also be influential here, for he too contrasted modern fragmented man with the ancient Greek's wholeness.

LETTER 7

1. Adam Ferguson, in his Institutes of Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh, 1769; ed. & trans. into German by C. Garve, 1772), took the view that the constitution of a State depends on the citizens who inhabit it. According to Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit., 'Ferguson's ideas on government derive directly from his ethics and these are based on empirical, observationalist psychology. The view that political structures depend in the last analysis on the psychological make-up of

their members was of formative influence on Schiller.' In the Aesthetic Letters 'this fusion of psychology and politics is basic . . .' (p. 125). '. . . Schiller knew Garve's notes on Ferguson almost by heart' (p. 123).

2. For Kant, while a wholly rational being (a 'holy will'), can will a rational act as a matter of course, an imperfectly rational finite creature, in contrast, is beset by distracting sensuous impulses, which make moral actions a matter of obligation. A will is made 'dependent' by the empirical fact that its rational being is combined with, and hindered by, sensuous impulses. See Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (Harper & Row, 1964), p. 107.

3. I use these terms to emphasize that in these earlier Letters of the treatise, Schiller's programme is to reconcile man's rational and sensuous natures, not merely his rational and sensuous faculties. As the Letters proceed, he does move from a wider Cartesian to a narrower Kantian dualism, but at this stage, as Dewhurst & Reeves put it (op. cit., p. 358), Schiller wants 'to fuse Kantian transcendental freedom with his own earlier concept of psycho-physical . . . balance'. Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., p. xxxiii), tell us that for Schiller, 'the notion of the human mind as . . . reciprocally related to the physical organism, was and remained a genuine interest . . .'

4. See L8:6, and Schiller's talk of the 'obscure ideas', 'convenient images', and 'fond delusions', (provided by 'State and Priesthood'), which many 'people prefer' to 'the rays of truth'.

5. Schaper ('Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Schiller', op. cit., p. 157), overstates the political dimension of the Aesthetic Letters when she says that 'the first ten Letters are almost exclusively concerned with political organization and . . . various forms of government'.

LETTER 8

1. See Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, op. cit., p. 64: '. . . a will which is good . . .' '. . . must be the highest good and the condition of all the rest . . .'

2. See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, op. cit., pp. 76-79: '. . . a feeling of respect for the moral law . . . can be called a moral feeling'. '[Thus the moral law] has an influence on the sensibility of the subject and effects a feeling which promotes the influence of the

law on the will' (p. 78). 'This feeling, under the name of moral feeling, is therefore produced solely by reason' (p. 79).

3. In L20 & 21, Schiller will argue that the form-drive of our rational nature, develops via aesthetic experience, to counterbalance (and thus 'check') the sense-drive of our sensuous nature, thereby promoting the possibility of moral volition. In the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, Kant argues that aesthetic experience promotes moral feeling (which checks our sensuous impulses, and so assists the realization of the moral will). There is thus some broad parallel between Schiller and Kant here.

4. See Schiller, On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), op. cit., pp. 221-222: 'The state of mind of most people is on the one hand intensive and exhausting labour, on the other, enervating indulgence.' '. . . nothing is more disadvantageous for sensibility to the truly beautiful than both these all-too-common frames of mind among men.' 'Beauty . . . can . . . be perceived and appreciated only under the condition that he employ all his powers fully and freely.' 'The relaxation that nature demands after every sustained effort and also takes without invitation (and only for such moments does one reserve the enjoyment of beautiful works), is so little favourable to aesthetic judgement . . .'

LETTER 9

1. Perhaps 'positive' constraint here, refers to existential limitations in general. However, the context supplied by the next two sentences, indicates that Schiller's concern is with the limits imposed by the political legislator, and thus by positive laws.

2. It may be worthwhile briefly outlining the more radically transcendent Idea of Beauty put forward by Plato, in order to facilitate comparison with Schiller's views of beauty and the role of the artist, in this Letter. Plato's sense of the Idea was unambiguous : it was the Idea of all beauty, incorporeal and transcendent with respect to any form. The works of the artist were 'true' in the sense of corresponding to a transcendent reality. For Plato, beauty involves correspondence to an Idea, viz. beauty as truth. Plato preferred to think of beauty as participation in the Beautiful, which was thought to derive from the Idea of the Good. The Platonic Idea very much dignified the role of the artist, since it implicitly granted him access to the world of pure

Forms; but it also confounded the visual and intelligible, raising the question of the boundary between them. The artist's 'higher' kind of imitation bypassed the imperfect sensible form in favour of the intelligible. It was difficult to explain such departures into the merely possible without recourse to other ideas such as 'furor' (or madness). [A summary of relevant points taken from D. Summers, Michelangelo and the Language of Art (Princeton Univ. Press, 1981), passim.]

3. The tendency to simply dismiss Schiller's ideas as being 'poetic' is deplored by Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., p. xcix).

4. e.g. S. S. Kerry, 'The Artist's Intuition in Schiller's Aesthetic Philosophy', Publications of the English Goethe Society, vol. 28, 1959, p. 80.

5. There are some similarities between Schiller's views concerning beauty and the effects of aesthetic experience, and the ideas of Plotinus. Plotinus takes from Plato the belief that the Forms are ideal archetypes of the visible world's furniture. Beauty is a sensuous form by which a transcendent Form of Idea is revealed to contemplation by art. Beauty of form results from the participation of an object's form in ideal Form. There is a hierarchy of beauty, and above beautiful sensuous forms is beauty of soul. The way to beauty of soul is through the harmonization of inner discord within the soul. Plotinus describes a progression by which we ascend from the experience of sensuous beauty, through moral perfection, to cognitive truth. Now in L27, Schiller provides a similar picture of development, from apprehending sensuous forms, to psychological harmony and an inner beauty of soul, to an aesthetic society in which the 'mysteries of science' have entered into 'broad daylight' (L27:11). We are talking of some degree of parallel here, between Schiller and another thinker, not an identity of conceptions. Large differences remain between Schiller and Plotinus. For a clear and concise account of the aesthetic thought of Plotinus, see M. C. Beardsley, Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present (Univ. of Alabama Press, 1975), pp. 78-87. (I have followed Beardsley closely above.)

6. The picture is complicated because on occasions, Schiller uses the Idea, and especially the term 'Ideal', in a Kantian sense, as the ideal of practical reason, viz. moral perfection, or the moral will. Some of the different Platonic and Kantian employments of the terms Idea or

Ideal by Schiller, are briefly referred to by Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., glossary, p. 317). An additional problem arises from Schiller not always employing Kantian or Platonic notions separately. The intermixing of Kantian and Platonic conceptions is recognized by Michael Podro, op. cit., who tells us that Schiller's '. . . general view of human development, both through history and through the lives of individuals, is simultaneously Kantian and Platonic' (p. 47). Finally, a further complication in Schiller's use of the terms Idea or Ideal, arises from what Lukács, op. cit., has recognized as Schiller's proto-absolute idealism, in which the Idea has an objective ontological status (as in Schiller's Kallias letters : see my note 2, to L4), with Schiller talking of their 'realization' and actuality. The conflation of these different meanings of the Ideal by Schiller in the Aesthetic Letters, leaves open an ambiguity which means each usage has to be examined separately for its meaning. There is no overall meaning used in a uniform way on all occasions.

7. Cf. Plotinus : the painter in his picture may capture and exhibit transcendent Form more fully than it was manifested in the form of a sensuous object. The artist thus goes beyond the mere imitation of existential form, and instead idealizes the original to exhibit its Form more fully. See Beardsley, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

8. Cf. Plotinus : it is necessary to become morally perfect in order to be able to know Beauty. See Beardsley, op. cit., p. 84.

9. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 59, pp. 221-225.

10. Cf. Schiller, On the Pathetic, trans. J. Weiss, in The Philosophical and Aesthetic Letters and Essays of Schiller (Chapman, 1845): 'The representation of the supersensuous is the final end of art, and the tragic art in particular effects this by making objective to us [our] moral independence of nature's laws, in the condition of emotion' (p. 213). Schiller illustrates this, following Lessing, by referring to the Laocoon group (p. 223).

11. In L25:6 & 7, Schiller will argue that a beautiful object, by its own harmonious relation of form and content, puts before us an external symbol of the inner harmony of reason and sense in the 'noble' moral will. But this is not the same as making the 'Necessary and the Eternal', i.e. the supersensible moral law itself, into an external symbol.

12. The transcendent Idea of Beauty inhabits the same supersensible realm as the moral law.

13. This psychological linkage of beauty and morality, is effected through the aesthetic experience of beauty harmonizing man's rational and sensuous natures, so that he is predisposed to moral volition. See L25:4-7.

14. See my note 4, to L8, above.

15. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 59, pp. 221-225. The linkage between beauty and morality made by Kant in this section is by way of analogies between them. (The arguments are not taken up by Schiller.)

PART TWO

LETTER 10

1. This position contrasts with that expressed by Schiller in On The Sublime (1801), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 259), where beauty's educative role has to be complemented by that of the sublime : 'The sublime must be added to the beautiful, in order to complete the totality of aesthetic education.' 'Only if sublimity is wedded to beauty, and our susceptibility for both is equally developed, are we finished citizens of nature.'

2. An allusion to Rousseau's Discourse on the Arts and Sciences (1750).

3. A reference to Plato's The Republic (esp. book ten).

4. Throughout paras. 2-6 of this Letter, the criticisms of beauty's effects function rhetorically. Schiller advances arguments which he intends to counter later in the treatise (most explicitly in L16:4, L26:13 & 14).

5. In contrast, this was seen as an advantage of the aesthetic in On the Stage as a Moral Institution (1784), (in Böhn, op. cit.): 'opinions about government and classes might be reformed by the stage.' '. . . helping the nation to agree in opinions and inclinations' (p. 338). The essay puts forward the idea of art's value for producing social harmony, resting on an aesthetically induced fundamental consensus; and the idea of art's value in providing an escape from a harsh reality: 'when we are disgusted with the world . . . we dream of another sphere . . .' (p. 339).

6. This criticism is countered in L26:13.

7. Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), op. cit., passim.

8. Later, in L16:2 & 3, Schiller will counter this view by revealing the ability of beauty to restore energy of character to those lacking

it (through 'energizing' beauty).

9. Savile (op. cit., p. 198), misquotes the original German words here. Schiller's 'vernunftbegriff', becomes 'verstandesbegriff der Schönheit', so making the Idea of Beauty into a 'pure concept of the understanding', instead of an Idea of reason as Schiller intends. Savile's view would mean that the Idea of Beauty provides us with constitutive knowledge of the beautiful, rather than merely regulating the understanding's employment of concepts, as Schiller implies by saying it 'regulates our judgement'.

10. Not in Kant's sense of 'immanent', i.e. a concept which gives us constitutive knowledge. Schiller's Idea of Beauty is immanent in the sense that it achieves degrees of realization in beautiful objects. It also functions to regulate the process of apprehending beauty - as part of man's mental apparatus. (On both counts, therefore, it is not 'transcendent' in the radically Platonic sense.) Schiller's position would seem to be one of proto-absolute idealism : in which the Idea of Beauty has both an objective ontological status, and a subjective epistemological function (like the categories in Hegel's Logic).

11. We cannot cognize, i.e. know, an Idea in experience. (Yet, in L16:5, Schiller will talk of the Idea of Beauty's existential 'species'.)

12. In the Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., Kant says: '. . . the pure concepts of reason . . . are transcendental Ideas' (p. 318). 'No objective deduction, such as we have been able to give of the categories [of understanding], is, strictly speaking, possible in the case of these transcendental Ideas' (p. 324; B393). For Kant it is possible to derive the categories from experience, as they are presupposed by the shape of experience; it is not possible to arrive at Ideas (whether of 'Beauty' or of 'Human Being'), by means of a transcendental deduction from experience, for there are no corresponding shapes of experience: 'Just because they are only Ideas they have, in fact, no relation to any object which could be given as coinciding with them' (p. 324; B393).

13. This, in the simplest terms, is Schiller's ostensible aim over the next six Letters. However, in practice, the concept of beauty is not shown to be a logical condition of the concept of human being; rather existential beauty is asserted to be an a posteriori condition of man attaining a complete and balanced psychological state.

14. Ellis (op. cit., p. 89 fn.), thinks that Schiller does not really do anything a priori at all: '. . . in the Aesthetic Letters, when at the end of the tenth Letter Schiller announces that his concept of

beauty will not be derived from experience, but will be a "pure rational concept", he in fact moves to empirical statements of a more abstract nature, not to purely a priori statements.'

15. Nevertheless, Kant does so move. According to L. W. Beck (Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, op. cit., p. vii), 'the method of the Critiques. . . is synthetic. That is, they begin with principles and thence proceed to the experiences which they organize, govern, and render intelligible.' However, in Kant's defence, 'before' the first two Critiques, he provides separate shorter works (the Prolegomena, and Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, respectively), which '. . . follow the analytical or regressive method; they begin with experience and regress upon its a priori presuppositions or principles without which it would not be possible to have that kind of experience' (ibid.). Now whilst these preparatory works may allow us to see how Kant gets from experience to the a priori, they cannot prevent him from carefully selecting the 'experience' which is his point of departure.

16. 'That which is absolute', and 'the necessary conditions' of existence, become the 'person' and 'condition', respectively, in L11.

17. This expression emphasizes the essentially psychological character of Schiller's theoretical enterprise over the next few Letters. We will follow 'Schiller's . . . endevour to present an essentially psychological analysis of mind in Kantian a priori terms . . .' (Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit., p. 358).

18. The 'pure rational concept of Beauty' is assertively disclosed in L15:2, where it is defined as 'living form'. The ability of beauty to induce harmony between man's two natures, rests on more specific assertions concerning the psychological effects of two types of existential beauty ('energizing' and 'melting' beauty) in L16 & 17.

LETTER 11

1. J. G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge (1794), ed. & trans. P. Heath & J. Lachs (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982).

2. The rational self, ego, or person, transcends any one of its particular temporal experiences; but it is also immanent, as an embodied rational being, involved in each of its particular temporal experiences.

3. We find an early presaging of the person/condition distinction (made before Schiller read either Kant or Fichte), in his military academy dissertation The Philosophy of Physiology (1779), (in Dewhurst & Reeves,

op. cit., pp. 149-165). 'A perception is nothing but an alteration in the soul, which is the same as a change in the world, and in the course of which the soul distinguishes its own self from that change.' '. . . only my personality separates my self from it and makes me aware that it is an external change' (p. 157). In other words, the person can distinguish the self from changes of condition in itself. This implies the person transcends each of the externally determined alterations of its condition.

4. Schiller may have been wary of what Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (op. cit., pp. 328 ff., esp. A341-344), regarded as the fallacious abstract reasoning involved in 'the rational doctrine of the soul', in which the soul is conceived of as 'substance'.

5. That is, created by rational causation.

6. There is some ambiguity concerning the status of the 'absolute ego' in The Science of Knowledge. In later lectures and essays, Fichte was at pains to gradually make it explicitly into God. But in the 1794 first edition, with which Schiller was familiar (referring to it approvingly in L13:2 fn.), it is the unitary unconditioned self, (whose primordial self-limiting activity gives rise to the finite ego and the non-ego).

7. We have now arrived at a position in which the 'person' is self-grounded or absolute being, and the 'condition' is grounded in time. The distinction between the absolute and time, is also found in a letter from Schiller to Körner, 19/12/1794, concerning the Aesthetic Letters (referred to as his 'system'). 'The system turns upon the idea of reciprocal action between the absolute and finite - of the definitions of liberty and of time.' In Simpson, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 304-305.

8. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., pp. 135-161.

9. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 104.

10. An allusion to the immortality of the soul.

11. Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 318, B383: 'Reason accordingly occupies itself solely with the employment of understanding . . . in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction towards a certain unity . . . in such a manner as to unite all the acts of the understanding in respect of every object, into an absolute whole.'

12. Cf. e.g., Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 231: '. . . in relation to a possible object, the pure self-reverting activity of the self is a striving; and . . . an infinite striving at that. This boundless striving carried to infinity is the condition of the possibility of any object whatsoever . . .'

13. In L13:3, Schiller will begin to equate, and so reduce, our sensuous and rational natures to the faculties of sense and reason. Thus what commences as an a priori model of Human Being (in L11 & 12), becomes reduced to an a priori model of the mind (L13 ff). Simultaneously, Schiller's aim in the treatise moves, implicitly, from psycho-physiological balance to merely one of psychological equilibrium.

14. Referring to the Aesthetic Letters, in his letter to Goethe, 7/1/1795, Schiller writes: 'As the beautiful itself is derived from man as a whole, so my analysis of it is drawn from my own whole being.' In L. D. Schmitz, Correspondence Between Schiller and Goethe, (Böhn's Standard Library, George Bell & Sons, 1877 & 1879), vol. 1, p. 45, Letter 40.

15. E. Schaper ('Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Schiller', op. cit., p. 162), also describes Schiller's method in this part of the treatise as being a speculative psychology: 'We cannot take what follows as descriptive psychology . . .' 'It is, at best, highly speculative . . .' To describe what Schiller does in L11-17 as a 'speculative psychology', is simply to emphasize that he is engaged in a highly conjectural theoretical exploration of the essence of man, from an empirical basis which is, and remains, remote. It is worth noting that because it does have some empirical basis (in Schiller's self-observation), his a priori model of the essence of human being does not fall under the heading of what Kant criticized as 'rational psychology' (Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 329, A342).

LETTER 12

1. The striving for complete realization, and domination of our being, by each primary drive, is described in general terms in L12:1 & 4, but is later illustrated in some detail in L24. It is already implicit, as achieved results, in the one-sided natures of the 'savage' and 'barbarian' in L4:6.

2. Much depends here, of course, upon how the German word 'trieb' is translated. In examining Schiller's view here, I am endorsing Wilkinson & Willoughby's general translation of the term 'trieb' as 'drive' (in Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., passim.), and rejecting the alternative renderings of Miller (op. cit., pp. 111-112), who refers to the drives as 'impulses', and Regin (op. cit., p. 125), who refers to them as 'urges'. The most bizarre renderings of the drives are provided

by B. R. Headstrom, 'The Aesthetic Writings of Schiller' (The Open Court, vol. 43, 1929, p. 242), for whom the sense-drive, the form-drive, and the play-drive, are respectively, the 'thing-bent', the 'form-bent', and (a little perversely), the 'play-bent'.

3. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, op. cit., pp. 76-79. Although Kant explains the cause of moral feeling (as being produced by practical reason, not pathologically), he does not explain its pathological effect, i.e. how reason can produce a sensuous feeling, and how, even if it is a special type of intellectual feeling, it is able to have an effect on our sensuous impulses. Somewhere along the line of Kant's reasoning, a 'jump' is made over what he himself (in the Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Introduction, p. 14) calls the 'great gulf fixed' between the supersensible/and the sensible, or between reason/and sense.

4. e.g. in L13:3, L15:2, L27:4 & fn.

5. See e.g., my discussions of L12:4 & 5, presently.

6. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (1807), trans. J. B. Baillie (George Allen & Unwin, 1931). Cf. ch. 'Sense-Certainty', esp. pp. 149-150.

7. Because Miller (op. cit., p. 111) translates 'trieb' as 'impulse', he wrongly criticizes Schiller for reducing man's rational nature to a mere impulse, so depriving reason of its absolute character.

8. Cf. L11:6 & 8.

9. G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, op. cit., p. 10: 'What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.' The correspondence which Hegel here describes as achieved, is for Schiller the rational end of the form-drive.

10. Later in the treatise, (most notably in L27:4 & fn.), some of these separate Kantian faculties emerge in Schiller's own account.

11. Cf. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, op. cit., pp. 69-71, 88.

12. Ibid., p. 107.

13. Equilibrious: 'That is in a state of equilibrium; evenly balanced.' See A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, ed. J. A. H. Murray (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1897), vol. 3, p. 257.

14. A clear and concise account of the main principles of Fichte's The Science of Knowledge, can be found in op. cit., translator's preface, by J. Lachs. See esp. pp. xvii-xviii, for Fichte's theory of drives.

15. See Fichte, op. cit., pp. 284-286, for the drive to harmony or indetermination.

16. Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit., pp. 355-356, briefly consider whether Fichte was the source of Schiller's theory of drives, but relying on the authority of K. Tomaschek (writing in 1862!), take the view that Fichte 'saw only one fundamental drive, the autonomous activity of the self'. They even argue that Fichte probably derived his theory of drives from Schiller. However, Fichte's most recent translators (Heath & Lachs, 1970), in their preface to The Science of Knowledge, op. cit., clearly expound Fichte as operating 'two fundamental drives' (p. xvii).

LETTER 13

1. Wilkinson & Willoughby, 'The Whole Man in Schiller's Theory of Culture and Society', (op. cit., p. 191), argue that Goethe is the influence here, and ignore Fichte (despite Schiller's explicit acknowledgement of the latter). They refer to a scientific paper on the subordination and co-ordination of functions in living organisms, which Goethe sent to Schiller while he was writing the Aesthetic Letters. But for Schiller to have been greatly influenced in his view of man's essential nature, by the results of Goethe's biological enquiries into plants, would go against Schiller's general acceptance of Kant's view of human freedom. The biological would be associated by Schiller with the conditioned aspect of man; and could not provide a model applicable to the structure and functioning of the whole of our being. Moreover, Schiller sees himself in L11-14 as involved in a transcendental enquiry to establish an a priori model of the essence of human being; to incorporate the results of a posteriori biological enquiries into plants, would be incongruent to such a theoretical enterprise.

2. See my note 13, to L11, above.

3. In L12-21, Schiller operates a model of the mind primarily in terms of drives, with attempts to fit the Kantian faculties into it from time to time. But later, especially in L26 & 27, the Kantian faculties come more to the fore, with attempts to occasionally fit his earlier theory of drives onto them, (as in e.g. L27:4).

4. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., pp. 131-134 (A99-A103), pp. 143-144 (A119-121).

5. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, pp. 94-109. See esp. p. 99 (lines 13-27), and pp. 107 (line 27) to 108 (line 7).

6. Kant's pairing of apprehension and aesthetic comprehension in section 26 of the 'Analytic of the Sublime', directly parallels the

synthesis of imagination and reproduction in the Critique of Pure Reason, first edition.

7. Behind Schiller's criticism here, lies his view that morality must be developed from reforming man's sensuous nature per se, rather than by the latter's rational repression ab extra. In this respect, he was influenced by Ferguson's Institutes of Moral Philosophy (1769). Ferguson writes, e.g., 'Before we can ascertain rules of morality for mankind, the history of man's nature, his dispositions . . . should be known' (quoted in Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit., pp. 123-124).

LETTER 14

1. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, op. cit., pp. 126-127: 'But complete fitness of the will to the moral law is holiness, which is a perfection of which no rational being in the world of sense is at any time capable.' 'Only progress from lower to higher stages of moral perfection is possible to a rational but finite being.'

2. As being both perennial and existential.

3. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 21, p. 83 (esp. lines 23-32).

4. Unlike in his earlier philosophical writings, in the Aesthetic Letters, Schiller effectively excludes the possibility of morality being based solely upon our rational being, where, in the context under discussion here, the form-drive would suppress the sense-drive. Morality is only realistically possible, in practical terms, for finite rational beings, when the two primary drives are in harmony.(Cf. L23:7 fn. 3, where Schiller talks of rationally suppressive or 'sublime' moral volition, as exceeding our experience of the strength of the human will, viz. as being effectively a psychological impossibility.)

5. Wholistic : (adjective), being of a whole or complete character. See under 'Wholism', in A Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary, ed. R. W. Burchfield (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), vol. 4, p. 1288.

6. There is no complete translation of the Matthisson article in English. An account of some of its main points, in so far as they bear upon the development of Schiller's aesthetics, may be found in M. Podro, op. cit., pp. 42-46.

7. Quoted in M. Podro, ibid., p. 44.

8. Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 86 (lines 6-12): '. . . although in the apprehension of a given object of sense

[the imagination] is tied down to a definite form of this object, and to that extent, does not enjoy free play . . . still . . . the object may supply ready-made to the imagination just such a form . . . as the imagination, if it were left to itself, would freely project . . .' Schiller appears to be following Kant here closely.

9. See, e.g., Hegel, Philosophy of Right, op. cit., para. 261 Addition, p. 280.

10. Quoted in M. Podro, op. cit., p. 49. (My own insertions in square brackets, to elucidate the meaning.)

11. Schiller prefers the expression 'pure determinability', although he makes it clear in L20:3, that this involves man being '. . . momentarily free of all determination whatsoever . . .' (p. 141).

12. The nearest equivalent to the play-drive in Fichte's The Science of Knowledge, is the 'drive to harmony'. A similarity with L14:4 may be seen in the following passage: '. . . there will have to be evidence of a drive towards . . . harmony . . .' 'Harmony is provided by anything that can be reciprocally viewed as determinate and determinant.' 'A drive of this sort is to be found in the drive to indetermination.' 'This drive may be described as the self's drive to . . . completeness of the self within itself.' Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 284.

13. In Schiller's various descriptions of the relationship of the primary drives under the play-drive, he uses expressions such as e.g., acting 'in concert' (L14:5), 'reciprocal action' (L16:1), they 'co-operate within it' (L14:3), which make clear that whilst they interfunction, they do not interpenetrate : they remain externally related, and do not merge in a simple unity.

14. The form-drive is actively formative; the sense-drive is passively receptive (to sense-impressions). Their interrelation in the play-drive, produces a psychological condition of active or creative-receptivity, in which we actively respond to, and creatively form,what we receive in sense (cf. L26). Podro, op. cit., pp. 43-53, speculates how this might work in practice, in the aesthetic contemplation of art : by the (active) spontaneous drawing of analogies between (received) elements of an art object's formed content.

15. Wilkinson & Willoughby, Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., glossary, p. 313.

16. Cf. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, op. cit., p. 124: 'But to say that the self posits itself as determined obviously amounts to saying that the self determines itself.' 'The self determines itself by

an absolute activity.'

17. In aesthetic contemplation. Although in L14, Schiller merely refers to the object's special symbolic character (L14:2), in L15:2 it becomes clear that it is beauty that is the objective correlative of the play-drive.

LETTER 15

1. Savile (op. cit., p. 214), mistakenly asserts that living form has immediate application only to beauty in man, not to beauty in art or nature. Here, Schiller warns against such a view, and points to a possible example of living form in art, viz. in a work of sculpture.

2. Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Introduction, p. 32 (lines 25-27): '. . . one cannot determine a priori what object will be in accordance with taste or not - one must find out the object that is so . . .'

3. What Schiller is really getting at here, is that we cannot prescribe recipe 'rules' for producing beautiful art objects. But this need not prohibit him from providing a very general, purely conceptual definition of the Idea of Beauty, in terms of its essential metaphysical moments.

4. It is only here in L15:4, that Schiller comes anywhere near to providing the crucial deduction that was promised in L10:7 : 'This pure rational concept of Beauty . . . would . . . have to be discovered by a process of abstraction, and deduced from the sheer potentialities of our sensuou-rational nature. In a word, Beauty would have to be shown to be a necessary condition of Human Being.' The Idea of Beauty is to be deduced from the Idea of Human Being. However, in L15:4, it is not Beauty, but rather the play-drive, that is asserted to be necessary for complete human being. There is no 'deduction' ('transcendental', or otherwise), of Beauty as such. Schiller seems to believe that to demonstrate the necessity of the play-drive is, ipso facto, to deduce the pure rational concept of Beauty (by a kind of 'coat-tails' effect). It is assumed that to demonstrate the rational necessity of a certain end (the play-drive, or complete human being), is itself to demonstrate the necessity for a particular asserted means to that end (beauty). The 'transcendental deduction' of the Idea of Beauty that Schiller offers in this treatise, merely takes the form of a psychological assertion concerning the necessity of the play-drive for complete human being.

5. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, sections 2-5, pp. 42-50.

6. Schiller here uses the term 'play', not to directly refer to the play-drive's reciprocal relation of primary drives, but to denote what Kant (ibid.) calls a contemplative attitude of 'disinterest' in the real existence of an object. Simultaneously, Schiller's use of the term 'earnestness' roughly corresponds to what Kant calls having an 'interest' (sensuous or conceptual) in an object's real existence.

7. The play-drive is the psychological cause of the playful (or disinterested) aesthetic attitude to objects. It creates disinterest through a perfectly balanced rational and sensuous engagement (by the form and sense drives) with a formed sensuous content. Prima facie, this makes disinterest rest upon a total, but balanced, interest, of two types. But Schiller sees the interests here as cancelling-out each other qua interests, to create an overall disinterest (cf. L19:12, L20:4, & esp. L22:1). Just how such a perfect balance is created, rests upon assertions concerning the psychological effect of apprehending form, found with specific reference to art objects in L22. In Letters 22 onwards, however, Schiller does appear to shift his position from L14 & L15, to make both beauty and the play-drive (then termed the 'aesthetic condition of the psyche'), become form-dominated, rather than perfectly balanced.

8. Cf. L14:2, L15:4, and my discussion thereof.

9. Schiller, Aesthetic Letters, op. cit. p. 211.

10. 'With beauty man shall only play; and it is with beauty only that he shall play' (L15:8).

11. This is also indirectly supported by the discussion of inferior forms of merely 'agreeable' art, at the end of L27:4, which are products of an imperfect play-drive (the 'physical play-drive').

12. Schiller's very wide conception of the aesthetic, and of aesthetics itself, is a topic I will return to at the end of the conclusion to the present work.

13. Schiller only uses this term on one occasion in the treatise, in L15:9 (when describing the psychological condition of the Greek gods). He prefers to use the term 'pure determinability', rather than either 'indetermination' or 'indifference', although in the end, they all come to mean much the same thing.

14. See Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 179 (lines 5-13). Also, p. 64 (lines 3-11); p. 143 (lines 17-21).

LETTER 16

1. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 54, p. 201 (lines 4-9).
2. Miller (op. cit., p. 115), says that 'reading between the lines, one cannot help feeling that Schiller's rather unfortunate idea of energetic beauty is really a disguised form of the sublime'. This view is also held by Headstrom (op. cit., p. 242). But neither Miller nor Headstrom adequately justify this interpretation, and ultimately, it is difficult to see why Schiller, who was familiar with both Burke's and Kant's theories of the sublime, and had also written on the subject himself (1793), would not use the term 'sublime' if that is what he meant here.
3. G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford Univ. Press, 1975), vol. 1, Introduction, pp. 75-81.
4. Where we have not created an art object ourselves, an unbalanced psychological pre-condition may still lead us, in the course of aesthetic contemplation, to subjectively construe a beautiful object (of art, or in nature), as if it were unbalanced. Cf. L22:6, where Schiller describes how an habitually one-sided mode of perception, when brought to aesthetic experience, will affect our ability to perceive beauty in a balanced way.
5. In L17:4.
6. Miller (op. cit., pp. 114-115), interprets Schiller here as explaining why beauty has sometimes had the negative effects on human character in history which were described in L10:4-6. Miller sees this explanation as the main purpose of L16 & 17, and fails to see that their primary aim is more positive : to develop a theory of aesthetic psychotherapy.
7. This will become clear in L17:4.
8. Cf. Schiller, On the Dangers of Aesthetic Manners and Morals (1795), (in Weiss, op. cit., pp. 173-197). 'The immoderate propensity for the beautiful . . . vitiates the character, and causes us to neglect our duty.' 'And aesthetic refinement renders man prone to this dangerous extreme, as he commits himself, exclusively to the feeling of beauty, and makes taste the unrestrained legislator for his will' (p. 191).
9. A letter from Schiller to Goethe, 2/2/1798, illustrates this point. 'Your remarks on opera recalled to me some ideas which I discussed rather fully in my Aesthetic Letters.' '. . . I much prefer to see businessmen, and philistines in general, engaged with . . . playful

humour than idle worldlings, for with the latter the play is always without power and character. We ought always to be able to serve each party according to its need, and thus I would send the one to the opera and the other to see a tragedy.' In Schmitz, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 32, letter 422.

10. The distinction between energizing and melting beauty, finds implicit expression in three other works by Schiller. In On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. cit., p. 214), he describes the different psychological effects of experiencing two types of poetry: '. . . in [sentimental poetry] his mind is in motion, it is in tension, it wavers between conflicting feelings; whereas in [naive poetry] it is calm, relaxed, at one with itself and completely satisfied.' We can see a presaging of the psychotherapeutic functions of energizing and melting beauty, in On the Stage as a Moral Institution (1784), (in Böhn, op. cit., p. 339): 'Effeminate natures are steeled, savages made man . . .' Implicit in this too, is the barbarian/savage distinction of L4:6. In On Grace and Dignity (1793), (in Böhn, op. cit., p. 219), we find two types of 'grace' which, in their effects, correspond to energizing and melting beauty: 'There is a kind of grace which animates, and another which calms the heart.'

LETTER 17

1. The usage of the term 'psychotherapy' here, is unrelated to any particular, e.g. Freudian, theory of psychotherapy, extraneous to Schiller's own. Dewhurst & Reeves (op. cit., p. 359), use the similar expression 'psychic therapy', and see what they call Schiller's 'therapeutic considerations' in L17, as being rooted in the medical doctrines taught at the military academy.

2. Presumably, then, we must rely on great art preserved from the past (cf. L9:4), particularly that of ancient Greece (cf. L15:9), to provide modern fragmented men with beautiful art of an ideally balanced kind. However, as we will see shortly, aesthetic psychotherapy is effected through unbalanced types of beauty.

3. Cf. Schiller's military academy dissertation, On the Connection Between the Animal and Spiritual Nature of Man (1780), in Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit.: 'music mollifies savages, beauty and harmony ennoble manners and taste, and art leads the way to science and morals' (p. 268). 'The relaxation of man's animal nature is . . . a source of

perfection' (p. 281). However, in the dissertation, the psychotherapeutic function of beauty in the Aesthetic Letters, is principally assigned to sleep, through which, 'the harmony of our psychic processes is recreated . . .' 'Sleep . . . restores all things to equilibrium . . . .' (p. 284).

PART THREE

LETTER 18

1. Cf. Schiller, On the Stage as a Moral Institution (1784), (in Böhn, op. cit., p. 333): 'Man, neither altogether satisfied with the senses, nor for ever capable of thought, wanted a middle state, a bridge between the two states, bringing them into harmony. Beauty and aesthetics supplied that for him.' Cf. also Schiller, On Grace and Dignity (1793), (in Böhn, op. cit., p. 197): '. . . we shall find the beautiful between two extremes, between . . . the domination exercised by the mind, and the . . . domination exercised by instinct.' Schiller then talks of '. . . the third state . . . that in which reason and the senses, duty and inclination, are in harmony . . .'
2. Although this expression is not used by Schiller, it does convey the position of the psyche in the 'aesthetic condition' in L20 & 21. (The expression is one frequently found in Schelling's philosophy of identity, 1801-1804.)
3. Schiller, Aesthetic Letters, op. cit.: Cf. p. 124 (line 1, last word), with p. 125 (line 2, first word).
4. In one of his Kallias letters (1793) to Körner, Schiller had made a more complex fourfold methodological distinction within aesthetics. These are here reduced to two. The philosophers named as rationalists of one kind or another in the letter concerned, were Baumgarten, Mendelssohn, and Kant; whilst Burke was identified on the empiricist side. See letter to Körner, 25/1/1793, quoted in Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics (Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1979), p. 104.
5. In following after a rational analysis of beauty, the 'empiricism' involved here is only a second order one, viz. it does not involve first order empirical observation and induction. In a later letter to Goethe, after similarly referring to the limitations of empiricism and rationalism, Schiller tersely describes the true method in philosophy: 'The pure phenomenon which, as I think, is one with the objective law

of nature, can be got at only by rational empiricism . . . [which] itself can never begin directly with empiricism.' Letter 44, 19/1/1798, in Schmitz, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 18. Talk here of the 'pure phenomenon', and the 'objective law of nature', provides more evidence of Schiller's absolute idealism. This is also coupled with talk, in the same letter to Goethe, of a dialectical method, adding credence to the view of him as a proto-Hegelian: 'The third category arises at all times from the union of the first with the second . . .' (ibid.). However, whilst we do see some evidence of dialectical relationships between concepts in the Aesthetic Letters, (in, e.g., the play-drive's relation to the primary drives), there is no systematic employment of a dialectical method (in the manner of Hegel). What makes the work so difficult, in fact, is Schiller's deployment of a variety of ever-changing methodologies, which are sometimes conflated (e.g. psychological/and transcendental), and even ultimately contradictory (as in his espousal of an absolute idealist ontology/and a Fichtean epistemology).

LETTER 19

1. This dual 'history' is simultaneously phylogenetic and ontogenetic : a mythical history of the psychological development of both the individual and human species. Here in L19, Schiller only briefly outlines the stages in his model of psychological development. In L20 & 21, he will focus, in abstract terms, on its aesthetic stage, before in L24, 26, & 27,providing a more detailed portrait of man's psycho-historical development.

2. What Schiller is primarily borrowing from Fichte here, is the general principle that freedom rests upon limitation, through the interdependence of the ego and the non-ego in the process of knowing and willing. In Schiller's terms, this becomes the interdependence of our rational and sensuous natures and their drives, in the process of rational knowing (e.g., L11:6, L13:3, L19:4), and in ('noble') moral willing (L23).

3. Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Introduction, p. 14: '. . . between the realm of . . . the sensible and the realm of . . . the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed . . .'

4. However, whilst seeking to preserve the ego from heteronomy as such, Schiller argues in this Letter, and generally in the treatise, only for a relative autonomy (which incorporates the sensuous), rather than an

absolute autonomy, for the ego or psyche in relation to nature and sense.

5. See F. Coplestone, A History of Philosophy (Image Books, 1965), vol. 7, Part 1, ch. 2, p. 77: 'Fichte tries to overcome the dichotomy, present in the Kantian philosophy, between the higher and lower nature of man, between man as a moral agent and man as a complex of instincts and impulses.' '. . . Fichte sees the moral life as a development out of the life of instinct and impulse rather than as a counterblast to it.'

6. Ultimately, Schiller's absolute idealism, with its objective ontological status for the Godhead (L11:6 & 7), and the Ideas (e.g., L9:3 & 4), rules out the full acceptance of Fichte's subjective idealism.

7. See Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 83.

8. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, op. cit., p. 107.

9. Cf. Schiller, On the Connection Between the Animal and Spiritual Nature of Man (1780), in Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit.: '. . . [man's animal nature] is the bed rock on which the constitution of our psychic instrument rests . . .' (p. 262). 'Animal drives arouse and develop spiritual drives' (p. 263). '. . . all the individual's mental faculties evolve from physical drives' (p. 265). '. . . Nature not only aroused these many drives in man in order to ensure his comfort, but . . . to set his drives in motion, to provide a thinking being with food for thought . . .' (p. 267).

10. Viz., willing of the kind required by the categorical imperative in Kant's moral philosophy. See Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, op. cit., pp. 69-71, 88.

11. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., pp. 135-161.

LETTER 20

1. Cf. Schiller, On the Connection Between the Animal and Spiritual Nature of Man, (1780), in Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit. In the introduction, Schiller presages L19:9 and L20:2, in emphasizing the importance of both man's rational and sensuous natures, and how morality and rationality rest upon our physical being: '. . . the intellect . . . denigrates one part of man . . . and tries to raise us to the level of ideal beings . . . a system which flatly contradicts our entire historical knowledge and philosophical understanding of how the individual and the whole race evolves, and which is quite incompatible with the limitation of the human soul.' '. . . the higher moral ends

. . . we achieve with the aid of our animal nature . . . their essential physical foundations . . .' (p. 257).

2. In L19:9.

3. Schiller does not explain how the sense-drive recovers from being suppressed. Presumably, since our sensuous nature is always 'there', as it were, the restoration of the sense-drive is a fairly automatic process, which occurs as we begin to also aesthetically apprehend the sensuous aspect of a beautiful object.

4. Grossman (op. cit., p. 44), while recognizing that the aesthetic condition has more than one phase, asserts that 'play is to Schiller the first phase in the aesthetic stage'. However, Schiller's view is that aesthetic play, properly speaking, presupposes a balanced rational and sensuous engagement with a beautiful object (cf. L27:4), and therefore pertains to the second phase of the aesthetic condition of the psyche.

5. Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, pp. 41, 48, 70 & 72.

6. This will become clear in L22 & L26.

7. See L27:4 & fn.

8. Cf. Schiller, On the Necessary Limits of the Beautiful, Especially in the Presentation of Philosophical Truths (Sept. 1795), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 138): 'True Beauty is based upon . . . the highest internal necessity; only this definiteness must wait to be found, rather than forcibly intrude itself. The highest conformity must exist there, but it must appear as nature. Such a product will fully satisfy the intellect as soon as it is studied - but exactly because it is truly beautiful, it does not intrude its conformity, nor address itself to the intellect in particular, but it speaks as a pure unity to the harmonizing whole of man.'

9. Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 58 (lines 8ff.).

10. For Kant, the pleasure involved in a judgement of taste is a general one, subjectively based on the harmonious disposition of the faculties of imagination and understanding. See ibid., p. 64 (lines 3ff.).

11. However, we should not overlook the general influence here also of Fichte, not directly upon Schiller's view of aesthetic experience per se, but on the underlying epistemology and, in particular, the theory of drives involved. The nearest equivalent to the play-drive in Fichte's The Science of Knowledge, is the 'drive to harmony' (op. cit., pp. 284-286). In Schiller's play-drive, the psyche is reciprocally passively determined through the sense-drive/and actively determining through the

form-drive. For Fichte, the drive to harmony is similarly '. . . provided by anything that can be reciprocally viewed as determinate and determinant.' 'A drive of this sort is to be found in the drive to indetermination' (ibid., p. 284). The connection between such 'indetermination' (or what Schiller calls the 'pure determinability' of the aesthetic condition of the psyche), and psychological wholeness, is also made by Fichte: 'This drive may be described as . . . the drive to absolute unity and completeness of the self within the self' (p. 284). Schiller will make it clear in L21:5, that the psychological harmony and wholeness achieved in the aesthetic condition of the psyche, is only a temporary one. We find Fichte similarly saying that 'The harmony exists, and . . . a feeling of contentment, of repletion, of utter completeness (which lasts only a moment, however) . . .' (p. 286). However, there is no indication that Fichte conceives of any of this in specifically aesthetic terms. The similarity between Schiller and Fichte is one of form, while between Schiller and Kant there is some correspondence of content (in their aesthetic theories).

LETTER 21

1. In L19:2.

2. See Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, pp. 43, 48–49. Unlike the agreeable or the good, '. . . the judgement of taste is simply contemplative, i.e. it is a judgement which is indifferent as to the existence of an object . . .' It is concerned only with the form of a representation, without subsuming it under a definite concept.

3. Cf. Schiller, On the Necessary Limits of the Beautiful, Especially in the Presentation of Philosophical Truths (1795), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 174): '. . . our knowledge is not extended by decisions of taste, and no cognition, not even of Beauty itself, is obtained by the perception of beauty. Where then cognition is the aim, taste can be of no service to us – at least no direct and immediate service; rather is cognition discontinued, just as long as we are occupied with beauty.' Given Schiller's view in L21:4, that the aesthetic condition does not produce any particular result for our knowing or willing, and so does not translate itself directly into ordinary experience in a concrete way, one cannot agree with Savile (op. cit., p. 202), that the 'aestheticization of experience' is an ideal for man, which is 'central' to the Aesthetic Letters.

4. This view receives firm support in L25:1, fn., where Schiller says that the aesthetic condition is '. . . to be distinguished in each single act of perception . . .' (p. 183).

5. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Introduction, pp. 27 (line 32)-28 (line 5).

6. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford Univ. Press, 1977), para. 658, p. 400.

7. See the description of the 'beautiful soul' in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, op. cit., para. 13 Addition, pp. 229-230: 'A will which resolves on nothing is no actual will . . .' 'The reason for indecision may also lie in a faintheartedness which knows that, in willing something determinate, it is engaging with finitude, imposing a barrier on itself and sacrificing the infinite; yet it will not renounce the totality after which it hankers. However "beautiful" such a disposition may be, it is nevertheless dead.'

8. Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., pp. lxxxi-lxxxvii), take a similar view of the indirect positive relation of the aesthetic condition of the psyche to other domains of experience, involved in what they term Schiller's 'doctrine of indirection'. Kain (op. cit., p. 19), informs us that 'Schiller's goal is to transform labour and make it more like play'. Schiller, however, sees aesthetic play alternating with earnest ordinary activities of knowing and willing, and does not want to aestheticize the rest of life, including the labour process. Willoughby, 'Schiller on Man's Education to Freedom Through Knowledge' (Germanic Review, vol. 29, 1954), recognizes that the aesthetic condition of the psyche is not, per se, to be extended to other realms of experience (p. 170), but is a predisposition which brings to each and all of them something of its openness (p. 171). Wilkinson & Willoughby, 'The Whole Man in Schiller's Theory of Culture and Society', op. cit., consider the possible ways the aesthetic condition may interrelate with other domains of experience. The article is flawed by the use of an artificially complex three layer model of interrelation, involving subordination/co-ordination/and superordination (based on a biological study Goethe sent to Schiller). However, they give a good account of the 'doctrine of indirection', telling us that through the aesthetic condition we are able 'to further the authenticity of determinate acts so that, despite the inevitable subordination of powers these entail, they may be performed with the full weight of the whole personality behind them' (p. 194).

9. Cf. Schiller, On the Moral Value of Aesthetic Manners and Morals (March 1796), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 201): 'Taste can favour moral conduct . . . but its influence can never create that which is moral.'

LETTER 22

1. See my note 14, to L14, above.
2. Cf. Schiller, On the Necessary Limits of the Beautiful, Especially in the Presentation of Philosophical Truths (Sept. 1795), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 174): 'As we can only perceive and not cognize beauty, we . . . refer its mode . . . but to our perceptive self.' 'We experience nothing in a beautiful object, but from it we experience a change in our condition.' Cf. also Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 42: 'This [feeling of pleasure or displeasure] denotes nothing in the object, but is a feeling the subject has of itself . . .'
3. Schiller is not suggesting the need for some kind of unification of the arts.
4. Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 67: 'In painting, sculpture, and in fact in all the . . . fine arts, the design is what is essential. Here it is not what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases by its form, that is the fundamental prerequisite for taste.' Savile (op. cit.), on a number of occasions asserts, without citing textual support, that Schiller rejected Kant's aesthetic formalism. Schiller's statements here in L22:5, are dismissed as a 'clumsy piece of bluster' (p. 242 fn.). However, this is no isolated momentary lapse by Schiller, as Savile implies. Cf. L10:4, '. . . taste is always concerned with form and never with content . . .' Cf. L26:11, on the need to abstract from the sensuous aspect of art works in a judgement of taste, for 'the appeal . . . must be through sheer appearance . . .' We must 'perceive nothing but sheer semblance . . .' The whole theory of aesthetic semblance in L26, rests on the idea of art as being predominantly formal. See also, Schiller, On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. cit., p. 198), where Schiller's aesthetic formalism leads him to place greater aesthetic value on comedy than tragedy: 'Since in judgements of taste the content is never taken into account, it follows naturally that the aesthetic value of these two genres stands in inverse proportion to their substantive significance.' See also, Schiller's letter to Goethe, 7/7/1797 (in Schmitz, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 353, letter 342): 'Many, I find err again in a different

manner, inasmuch as they refer the Idea of Beauty much more to the subject of a work of art than to the treatment of it . . .'

5. See Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 43 (disinterestedness); pp. 62-63 (the formal character of beauty); p. 118 line 29, to p. 119 line 11 (disinterestedness promotes moral feeling).

6. Through the psychologically harmonizing effect of the aesthetic, Schiller wants to draw our sensuous nature into morality (see L23); while Kant wants to aesthetically cultivate a disinterest in sense that promotes a morality which opposes the inclinations of sense.

7. Cf. Schiller, On the Pathetic (1793), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 238): 'To impart to men a moral culture, and to kindle national feelings in the citizen, is truly an honourable mission for the poet . . .' 'But that which would eminently prosper in a mediate connection with poetry, would have, in an immediate connection, but an ill success.' 'Its sphere of action is the totality of human nature, and so far as it has an influence upon the character, can it influence its single operations.'

LETTER 23

1. Cf. L21:4.

2. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 64 (lines 3-11), p. 83 (the common sense).

3. Ibid., p. 151 (lines 16-28).

4. Schiller will actually use the term 'well-being' in the next para. (L23:7), in connection with ordering or imposing form on our natural desires. In L24:5 (p. 177), he will describe well-being as a 'manifestation of reason' in the purely sensuous man, as he strives for absolute being.

5. Cf. Schiller, The Philosophy of Physiology (1779), (in Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit., p. 163), where Schiller describes the ability of the soul to 'choose' freely which 'material ideas' to concentrate upon, via 'attention'. Morality, resting on freedom, is dependent upon the soul's ability to engage in such attention. This earlier simple idea of choice, as involving inner self-determination by the soul, presages the psyche's organization of man's inner sensuous life in well-being, here in L23, whereby man is able to realize 'his physical destiny with a certain freedom of spirit . . .' (L23:6).

6. The importance of man's moral education beginning in his physical substructure, is an idea which Schiller maintains in On Naive and

Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. cit., p. 229): '. . . the idealist left to himself would just as little seek to cultivate the sensuous faculties or to educate man as a natural being; yet this is an equally substantial part of man's vocation and the condition of all moral ennoblement.'

7. This notion of the 'noble' moral will, is presaged in Schiller's On Grace and Dignity (1793), (in Böhn, op. cit., pp. 198 ff.), in such statements as: '. . . it is ordinarily more favourable to the conformity of acts with the [moral] law that inclination is on the side of duty' (p. 198). '. . . virtue is not anything else than an inclination for duty' (p. 199). '. . . when morality has become to him a second nature, it is then only that it is secure . . .' (p. 200). '. . . in a noble soul it is not this or that particular action, it is the entire character which is moral.' 'It is then in a noble soul that is found the true harmony between reason and sense, between inclination and duty . . .' (p. 203).

8. Regin (op. cit.), mistakenly refers on a number of occasions to Schiller's moral aim in the Aesthetic Letters as being the aesthetic cultivation of sublime character. (See e.g. p. 127.)

9. Cf. Schiller, On the Connection Between the Animal and Spiritual Nature of Man (1780), (in Dewhurst & Reeves, op. cit., p. 262): '. . . not even the spirit's most strenuous efforts can withstand the onslaught of animal feelings and, as they intensify, reason grows numb and the soul is forcibly enchained to the organism.' Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., p. xci), tell us Schiller objected to Kant's concept of the moral will because of '. . . its impracticability - an ideal of human conduct which lies outside the realm of genuine possibility because it is, in the last analysis, incompatible with human nature in its phenomenal existence'.

10. K. Wilcox, 'On Sublimation and Suppression in the Works of Schiller' (Germanic Review, vol. 55, 1980), argues that this semi-rationalization of our sensuous nature, involves its rational suppression, through the loss of its sensuous integrity. (Certainly, Schiller's notion of noble moral volition, does not involve a harmony of moral reason and natural impulse which is on equal terms, for our sensuous nature has to move towards becoming more rational, whilst moral reason does not have to become like our sensuous nature, or 'semi-naturalized', as it were. The 'harmony' in the 'noble' moral will, is achieved by a one-sided psychological development.)

11. This view represents a radical departure for Schiller from his views in earlier philosophical works, where generally he sees a complementary role for sublime moral willing, as and when necessary, alongside noble moral volition. Whereas, in the Aesthetic Letters, sublime willing is ruled out as impracticable, in On Grace and Dignity (1793), (in Böhn, op. cit.), it is regarded as a reserve position of rational domination to fall back on,on those occasions when psychological harmony puts moral freedom at risk (p. 216). In On the Dangers of Aesthetic Manners and Morals (Dec. 1795), (in Weiss, op. cit.), Schiller expresses a highly cautious view of noble moral volition: 'It is true [the aesthetic] succeeds in ennobling the desires, and bringing them into greater harmony with the demands of reason; but from this very success great danger may finally result for morality' (p. 191). '. . . it may happen that those impulses which before were only fearful through their blind violence, become far more dangerous to morality of character, through an appearance of dignity and an assumed authority, and exercise a far worse tyranny . . . beneath the mask of . . . nobleness' (p. 192). However, in On the Moral Value of Aesthetic Manners and Morals (March 1796), (in Weiss, op. cit.), it is again sublime moral willing which is seen as an insecure basis for morality: 'We can never expect human nature, so long as it is human nature, to act as pure reason, uniformly and steadfastly, without interruption or relapse, and never to offend against moral order' (p. 208). In On The Sublime (1801), (in Weiss, op. cit.), there is the need, on occasions, for psychologically disharmonious sublime moral willing to take over from harmonious noble willing. Schiller, then, wavers in his views between 1793-1801, as to the adequacy, on its own, of harmonious noble willing. We can view the Aesthetic Letters as involving a temporary optimism concerning such volition.

12. This entails a much wider conception of 'aesthetic education' than some commentators have recognized in the Aesthetic Letters. E.g., Grossman (op. cit., p. 43), talks only of art's educative effect, ignoring the vital early role of well-being, and reducing aesthetic education to art education. As Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., p. lxv) correctly point out: 'We are unlikely to grasp what Schiller was after if we suppose "artistic culture" is an adequate rendering of "aesthetic education". The latter was to begin far earlier than the contemplation or creation of works of art; it was also to extend far beyond it.'

13. Savile (op. cit., pp. 226 ff.), finds difficulty in understanding how man aesthetically develops a moral character. The problem arises, as he overlooks the role of well-being in proto-aesthetically educating man's sensuous nature, while he is still in a natural state. He misinterprets L23:6-8, as relating to giving an externally aesthetically pleasing form to our actions to realize our impulses (p. 227), rather than as an internal rational organization of the impulses by the psyche. He may have been misled by Schiller's footnotes to L23:7, which not only look ahead to the moral harmony which may result from the semi-rationalization of man's impulses, but also to the aesthetic forms created by the noble soul (in L27). As Schiller says in L23:7 fn. 1, such manifestations are the 'mark of a noble soul'. L23 is, in its main paras. (6-8), concerned with the formation of such a noble disposition, not with its later external aesthetic manifestations. Savile is led to incorrectly state (p. 242), that moral character is formed at the 'terminus' of the aesthetic stage of development, whereas the whole point of L23, is to argue that the essential foundation of a moral disposition is laid down earlier, by the rational formation of man's sensuous impulses at the physical stage of development.

LETTER 24

1. Wilkinson & Willoughby, 'The Whole Man in Schiller's Theory of Culture and Society', (op. cit., p. 182), see the general concept of a psychological history as being derived from Herder. However, Grossman (op. cit., p. 40), points instead to Lessing's Education of the Human Race (1780), as providing the relevant precedent. M. Jones (op. cit., p. 55), argues that Schiller presents an aesthetically orientated mythical history which reduces human history to aesthetic history : history becomes 'aestheticized'. K. Wilcox (op. cit.), believes that a psychological history of man may be elicited from Schiller's On Grace and Dignity (1793), similar to that in the Aesthetic Letters (1795). However, unlike the former work, there is no notion of a pre-established fundamental harmony between reason and nature in the psychological history presented in the Aesthetic Letters. Instead, we start from the purely sensuous man, and seek to develop his latent rationality, so as to establish such a harmony.

2. Historicism : 'The belief that an adequate understanding of the nature of anything and an adequate assessment of its value are to be

gained by considering it in terms of the place it occupied and the role it played within a process of development.' Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. P. Edwards (Macmillan, 1967), vol. 4, p. 24. Also : 'Concerned with the discovery of "laws of development" that govern the historical process and permit long term social forecasts and predictions.' A Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. A. Flew (Macmillan, 1979), p. 138.

3. Cf. L12:2 & fn.

4. Schiller's awareness here that he is only providing a rational model of development, not a history proper (in the sense of a chronological account of actual events based on historical evidence), invalidates Jones' criticism (see note 1 above), that he reduces human history to an aesthetic history. He is not concerned with human history in Jones' sense.

5. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 318 (A326, B383).

6. However, for Kant, while we may infer Ideas of theoretical reason, we cannot cognize them. See Kant, ibid., pp. 308-9 (A310-311, B368); pp. 318-19 (A327, B384).

7. Here, Schiller points to the only limited rational character of the standpoint of 'well-being' developed in L23. Whilst it sets us on the path to morality, by reducing sensuous hindrances to its development (in the form of naked blind impulses), it does not itself provide man's volition with rational purposes or moral ends. It merely provides sensuous man with a semi-rational form for pursuing purely natural ends, as he seeks to realize his physical needs in a systematic manner. Well-being may set man on a path to morality, but in itself, it is devoid of moral content, pertaining to sensible, not supersensible ends.

8. This is a criticism which can be made of the treatise as a whole, and was indeed made at the time by Schiller's friend Körner. Letter to Schiller, 16/7/1795, referring to the third and final batch of Letters (L17-27) published in The Horen a month earlier in June 1795: 'The last Letters gave me great satisfaction. The results seem to me of the highest importance; the deductions however, do not quite please me.' (In Simpson, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 5-6.) Also, letter to Schiller, 14/9/1795, passing judgement upon the Aesthetic Letters as a whole: '. . . here and there I miss precision and proof.' 'I should desire to see more clearness and precision, more conclusive evidences, and so forth.' (Ibid., vol. 3, p. 17.) Many modern readers will find themselves echoing Körner's sentiments here.

9. Viz., the psychology of aesthetic contemplation.

LETTER 25

1. This connection between self-consciousness, contemplation, distance and disinterestedness, is also very briefly noted by Miller (op. cit., p. 120).
2. Although Schiller only uses the term 'distance', there is a notable similarity between Schiller's idea and Edward Bullough's concept of 'psychical distance', in 'Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle', (British Journal of Psychology, vol. 5, 1912). Bullough described 'aesthetic consciousness' as 'distanced', to the extent that our engagement with an object is unconcerned with practical needs and ends. The similarity between Schiller and Bullough here, is noted by E. M. Wilkinson, 'Schiller's Concept of Schein in the Light of Recent Aesthetics', (German Quarterly, vol. 28, 1955, p. 219). See also Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., p. clxviii), where Bullough's work is said to owe a great deal to Schiller.
3. Although Schiller does not explicitly refer to 'form' here, it is clear from L22:5 that '. . . only through the form is the whole man affected . . .' and not simply '. . . one or other of his functions'.
4. In the reference to 'any law or purpose'.
5. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, sections 2-5, pp. 42-50.
6. Grossman (op. cit., p. 43), sees the aesthetic condition of the psyche only as a 'stage' in man's cultural evolution and, like many other commentators, ignores Schiller's point here that it is an integral component part of the complete process of perception. The aesthetic condition is not to be viewed simply as a discrete historical 'stage' in man's psychological development, but also as a permanently mediating moment in our total experience (once the aesthetic stage has been approximately attained, and we have left behind the purely physical state).
7. Cf. e.g., L26:11.
8. Plato, The Republic, trans. D. Lee (Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 316-325.
9. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Introduction, sections iv to vi, pp. 18-27, (esp. pp. 18, 23, 25, 27).
10. See L22:5, and my discussion thereof.

11. Ibid.

12. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 11, pp. 62-63.

13. Using the term 'cognitive' here to mean knowing in the widest sense, whether involving explicit or implicit concepts. (In Schiller's theory of contemplation, concepts are implicitly involved, and it is an integral part of the complete process of knowing; cf. L25:1 fn.)

14. Cf. Schiller, On Grace and Dignity (in Böhn, op. cit., p. 178): '. . . beauty belongs at the same time to . . . two worlds . . .' '. . . taste . . . holds at once the spiritual element and that of sense . . . these two natures, incompatible one with the other, approach in order to form in it a happy union.'

15. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, op. cit., pp. 76-79.

16. Or, to be more accurate, by the rationally informed imagination (as will be disclosed in L27:4 & fn.).

17. In Burke's A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), ed. J. T. Boulton (London, 1958); and in Kant's Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1.

18. Contrasting Schiller and Kant on this issue, Ellis (op. cit.), tells us, that Schiller '. . . is aware that beauty is a product of the mind and the object and so cannot exist without subjects. But he considers, rightly, that this does not exclude the examination of the structure of objects'. (Schiller considers their 'structure', understood in the most general sense, as the overall relationship between form and content in objects of art and beauty, in e.g. L15:2, L16:1, L17:4, L22:4 & 5, L25:5 & 6.) In contrast, 'Kant does not speak about the examination of objects, being content to point out the pre-conditions for observing beauty in the subject' (p. 123).

19. This twofold reciprocity of form and matter in the beautiful object, and thought and feeling in man, is an idea Schiller continued later in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. cit., p. 207): '. . . aesthetic content is contained only in the inmost combination of spirit and matter, and in the unified relation of a work to the faculties of feeling and ideas.'

20. Schiller's definition of beauty in his Kallias letters (1793), as 'freedom in appearance', also involves the beautiful object being an analogue for the moral will (and thus a symbol of morality). '. . . the beautiful world of sense [is] the happiest symbol of what the moral world should be, and every object about me . . . calls out "Be free

like me".' Kallias letter of 23/2/1793 (quoted in Headstrom, op. cit., p. 239). The form of the beautiful object has to appear free, despite sensuous hindrances (physical forces), by seeming to overcome them. The morality symbolized is thus one involving sublime moral willing. In the Aesthetic Letters, by contrast, the definition of beauty as 'living form' involves the harmony of form and matter in the object, symbolizing the harmony of reason and sense in the noble moral will. The disposition of the moral will symbolized by beauty in each of the two works is, therefore, quite different.

21. Cf. L14:2, 'Should there . . . be cases in which he were to have this twofold experience simultaneously, in which he were to be at once conscious of his freedom and sensible of his existence . . . the object which afforded him this vision would become for him a symbol of his accomplished destiny and . . . serve him as a manifestation of the infinite.'

22. This appears to contradict Schiller's earlier statement, in L19:6, that in no sense does beauty 'bridge the gulf' separating feeling from thinking. However, as Schiller there went on to say, 'beauty can become a means of leading man . . . from a limited to an absolute existence', 'not by providing an aid to thought' in a positive sense, but by providing reason with 'the freedom to express itself according to its own laws', viz., by diminishing sensuous hindrances to rational self-determination, through rendering our sensuous nature compatible with our rational being. Beauty thus provides a negative, indirect means, whereby reason is enabled to develop itself out of nature, to attain a relative autonomy.

LETTER 26

1. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Introduction, pp. 20-27, 30. Part 1, pp. 62-63.
2. Ibid., Part 1, pp. 206-209, 220 (line 20).
3. Ibid., Part 1, p. 224 (lines 20-22).
4. Ibid., Part 2, pp. 99-100, 108-109.
5. Ibid., Introduction, p. 39 (lines 8-14). Part 1, p. 119 (lines 7-11), pp. 224-225, 227 (last para.).
6. Like many other commentators, Savile (op. cit.) misses the role of natural beauty in L26:2, and wonders how a mysterious original 'gift of nature' gives rise to the play-drive (p. 230). Kerry (Schiller's

Writings on Aesthetics, op. cit.), also fails to notice the role of natural beauty in man's psychological development. Whereas Schiller sees natural beauty, and our natural senses (in L26:6), as encouraging such development, Kerry, more negatively, simply declares that 'nature does not prohibit higher activities' (p. 160).

7. Cf. L27:5, 'Now the ancient German goes in search of glossier skins, statelier antlers, more elaborate drinking horns; and the Caledonian selects for his feasts the prettiest shells'. At the stage Schiller is now talking about in L26:2 & 3, it is nature, not art, which provides forms for ornamental display and aesthetic pleasure.

8. This distinction has a long history. See D. Summers (op. cit., p. 353): 'According to Aristotle only the senses of sight and hearing were able to perceive the beautiful, and this was for reasons that were entirely consistent with the idea of beauty as proportion. Many authors repeated . . . that sight and hearing were the highest of the senses because they were the only ones to which the divine order of the world could be apparent. Augustine argued in this way, contributing to the widespread notion that hearing and sight were the more spiritual of the senses, while the other three, smell, taste and touch, were associated with the flesh.'

9. Underlying this is a distinction between the merely reproductive imagination/and the productive (or creative) imagination, which is found in Schiller's discussion of the aesthetic imagination in L27:4 fn: '. . . before the imagination, in its productive capacity, can act according to its own laws, it must first, in its reproductive procedures, have freed itself from alien laws.'

10. M-L. Waldeck, 'Shadows, Reflexions, Mirror Images and Virtual "Objects" in Die Künstler and their Relation to Schiller's Concept of "Schein"' (Modern Language Review, vol. 58, 1963), points out how some features of Schiller's theory of aesthetic semblance are presaged in his earlier poem The Artists (1789). However, she goes awry in understanding Schiller's theory principally in terms of optical illusion. E. M. Wilkinson (op. cit.), correctly emphasizes that the illusion in 'Schein' is '. . . something the artist creates, as a property of his work, not just a way of looking at it . . .' (p. 223). Wilkinson recognizes that Schiller's theory of aesthetic semblance is primarily concerned with the process of artistic production, rather than aesthetic contemplation (and optics). The business of the artist '. . . is to create a new dimension apart from the familiar world' (p. 225).

11. There is here a break with the theory of beauty in Schiller's Kallias letters (1793). There beauty was defined as 'freedom in appearance'. Initially, Schiller took the view that the appearance of freedom was conferred upon the object, a priori, by practical reason. However, as the Kallias letters progressed, and under critical pressure from Körner, he moved away from practical reason to the object itself (thus breaking the bonds of Kantian epistemology). If one can establish that an object's form has been determined by its own essential nature alone (and not by external physical forces, or by human purposes), then the object is beautiful. 'Freedom in appearance' involved the correspondence of an object's form to its own substantive nature. In contrast, Schiller's theory of aesthetic semblance in the Aesthetic Letters (1795), involves the freedom of form from what appears as its natural substantive being (L26:8 & 9), through the intervention of the 'outside' human activities of abstraction and imaginative re-formation. There is also a return within the general framework of Kantian epistemology, with the form of an object being the work of man (L26:4), who gives 'form to that which is formless' (L25:3). Dropped now is the Kallias idea of the object having an independent form of its own, more or less corresponding to some ontological 'essential nature'.

Now some scholars have failed to see this major shift in Schiller's viewpoint. According to Ellis (op. cit., p. 138), 'the theory of beauty in [the Aesthetic Letters] is not in any radical way different from the [Kallias letters]'. In the view of Schaper, 'Schiller's Kant : A Chapter in the History of Creative Misunderstanding' (Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, op. cit., ch. 5), in the Aesthetic Letters 'freedom in appearance' there becomes transposed into the key notion . . . of aesthetic semblance. Things in their natural state . . . appear to the senses as beautiful' (p. 116). However, for Schiller, there is no question of autonomous aesthetic semblance involving leaving objects 'in their natural state'. It is central to Schiller's theory of aesthetic semblance that our imagination creatively re-forms an abstracted phenomenal form. What Schaper describes, would be for Schiller 'dependent' semblance, not 'autonomous' aesthetic semblance, (see L26:10 & 11).

12. The need to dispense 'with all support from reality', and thus for material taken from external reality to be creatively reformed, rather than merely imitatively reproduced, is reflected in Schiller's discussion of 'elegy' in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. cit.,

p. 201): 'The external matter is, therefore, always indifferent in itself, since the poetic art can never employ it as it occurs, but only by means of what poetry makes of it does it receive poetic value.' Later in the same work, Schiller warns that '. . . the naive poetic spirit is in danger of nourishing itself all too much with common reality . . .', with the result that it '. . . achieves only the spiritless and ignoble expression of the actual . . .' (p. 217). In his discussion of dramatic poetry in On the Pathetic (1793), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 236), Schiller tells us that 'the pleasure we take in ideal characters loses nothing by the recollection that they are poetic fictions : for all aesthetic effect is based upon poetic, not upon historic, truth. But poetic truth does not consist in the fact that something has really happened but that it could happen'. Cf. Schiller, On The Tragic Art (1792), (Weiss, op. cit., p. 315): '. . . tragedy . . . differs from historic imitation.' 'If it pursued a historic design . . . it would be obliged to confine itself entirely to historic correctness.' 'It possesses freedom in imitation : it contains . . . . the obligation, to subordinate historic truth to the laws of poetry.' 'It betrays very narrow conceptions of the tragic art . . . to drag the tragic poet before the tribunal of history, and to demand instruction from him, who . . . is pledged for emotion and delight alone.'

13. Cf. Schiller, On the Sublime (1801), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 247): 'But after all, the semblance will still have a corporeity, in which it manifests itself, and so . . . a need remains for the existence of objects . . .'

14. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 2, pp. 42-44; section 5, pp. 48-50.

15. These points are made in ibid., Part 1, section 16, pp. 72-73. Kant gives flowers as an example of free beauty in nature, and 'music that is not set to words' as an example of free beauty in art. The beauty of a woman (see ibid., p. 73, line 4) in nature, or of a church in art, each presuppose the concept of an end, and so are examples of dependent beauty. For Schiller, the problem with the beauty of a woman, as we will shortly see, is not the conceptual, but rather the sensuous interest, we may take in her. In contrast to Kant, Schiller emphasizes sense, rather than concepts, as posing a problem for the 'purity' of aesthetic judgements. As a dramatist, no doubt Schiller was not keen on the idea that concepts (and thus words), may render an art form inferior (as

'dependent') in character.

16. Ibid., Part 1, section 16, p. 74 (lines 18-21).

17. The need to 'dispense with the element of life', shows how far Schiller's earlier definition of beauty as 'living form' (in L.15:2) has been revised, to now become the pure form of 'sheer semblance' (in L.26:11).

18. Cf. Schiller, On the Sublime (1801), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 260): '. . . as the whole enchantment of the . . . beautiful consists only in the show and not in the contents, art has every advantage over nature, without sharing her fetters.' For Kant, in contrast, the purposively contrived character of art makesit more likely to be dependent beauty. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 158 (line 30), talks of '. . . the superiority which natural beauty has over that of art . . .', and how '. . . in estimating beauty in art the perfection of the thing must be also taken into account . . .', ibid., Part 1, p. 173 (lines 10-11). The contrast between Kant and Schiller here, again reflects Schiller's greater concern with the sensuous, rather than the conceptual, as threatening the 'purity' of aesthetic experience.

19. Ibid., Part 1, section 16, pp. 72-73.

20. Here, Schiller does follow Kant, in ibid., Part 1, p. 74 (last para.).

21. See L26:10, for this second way in which semblance may be dependent.

22. In Schiller's view, art should not have a direct moral aim. It achieves its moral influence indirectly through re-creating psychological harmony and wholeness. Cf. Schiller, On the Cause of the Pleasure We Derive from Tragic Objects (1791), (in Böhn, op. cit., p. 362): 'If it is the aim that is moral, art loses all that by which it is powerful, - I mean its freedom . . .' 'The play which recreates is changed into serious occupation, and yet it is precisely in recreating us that art can the better complete the great affair - the moral work. It cannot have a salutary influence upon the morals but in exercising its highest aesthetic action, and it can only produce the aesthetic effect in its highest degree in fully exercising its liberty.' Cf. also Schiller's letter to Goethe, 7/8/1797, criticizing Diderot's aesthetics : 'In his aesthetic works, I think, he still looks too much to foreign and moral aims . . .' 'To him the beautiful work of art must always serve some other purpose.' '. . . he seeks this effect of art in its substance, and in some definite result for the understanding . . .'

(In Schmitz, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 365, letter 355.)

23. Similarities between Schiller's ideas and Nietzsche's early aesthetic views, are discussed by Adrian Del Caro, 'Ethical Aesthetic : Schiller and Nietzsche as Critics of the Eighteenth Century' (Germanic Review, vol. 55, 1980). Both men looked back to a Greek ideal, and were concerned with the function of art in society. Del Caro also points to the later divergence of Nietzsche's views from those of Schiller (with Nietzsche explicitly criticizing Schiller).

24. Cf. L26:5.

25. Cf. F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. C. Fadiman (New York, 1927): 'Art approaches as a . . . healing enchantress; she alone may transform these horrible reflections on . . . the absurdity of existence into representations with which man may live' (p. 210). 'Art is not merely an imitation of the reality of nature, but in fact a metaphysical supplement to the reality of nature . . .' (ibid., p. 334). Cf. also F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. O. Levy (London, 1910), vol. 2: 'Art is with us in order that we may not perish through truth' (p. 264). 'We are in need of lies in order to rise superior to this reality, to this truth - that is to say in order to live . . .' (p. 289). 'All art works as a tonic;' (p. 252). 'Art is essentially the affirmation, the blessing, and deification of existence' (p. 263).

LETTER 27

1. See e.g., Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 30 (lines 17 ff.); p. 58 (lines 8 ff.).

2. Ibid., p. 73: '. . . it is a clog on the purity of the judgement of taste to have the agreeable (of sensation) joined with beauty to which properly only the form is relevant . . .' (lines 8-11).

3. Note the clear identification here of 'autonomous' aesthetic semblance with 'the realm of art'. (Mere artifacts, and natural beauty, are forms of 'dependent' semblance.)

4. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 2, pp. 42-44; section 5, pp. 48-50; and esp. section 11, pp. 62-63.

5. In L26:2 & 6.

6. Cf. Schiller's use of the terms 'sheer appearance' and 'sheer semblance' in L26:11 (last 2 sentences). Although the artist does not create a 'pure form' as such, what is aesthetic about the form dominated object he creates (cf. L22:5), is its formal aspect. Autonomous aesthetic semblance may be embodied in a sensuous medium, but in aesthetic

contemplation, we must totally abstract from this if our judgement of it is to be purely aesthetic (cf. L26:11, p. 199, first sentence).

7. Cf. Kant's discussion of the psychological effect of apprehending an 'aesthetic idea', in the Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 177 (lines 7-17); p. 179 (lines 5-13).

8. Where it was stated that in the aesthetic condition, the psyche is '. . . in no wise free from laws', but that '. . . the laws according to which the psyche then behaves do not become apparent as such . . .' In other words, concepts are involved in aesthetic experience, but only implicitly so.

9. There seems no reason to interpret the 'faculty for ideas' here, as being anything other than the understanding. Wilkinson & Willoughby (Schiller's Aesthetic Letters, op. cit., pp. 292-293, note on L27:4 fn.), quote extensively from Schiller's letter to Körner 1/12/1788, in which he argues for the need for a loose co-operation between 'the understanding' and the imagination, in the interests of genuine artistic creativity. Cf. Schiller, On the Necessary Limits of the Beautiful, Especially in the Presentation of Philosophical Truths (1795), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 190): '[The true artist] subjects luxuriant fancy to the discipline of taste, and suffers the sober intellect to survey the banks, between which the stream of inspiration is to leap and sparkle.' In On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. cit., p. 201), Schiller warns against too much control of the imagination by the understanding's thought, in his criticism of Rousseau's poetry: 'His serious character never permits him . . . to rise to poetic play.' '. . . it is his excess of thought that lays shackles upon his imagination.'

10. This distinction between the reproductive/and productive imagination, and the association of creativity with the latter, is also found in Schiller, On the Necessary Limits of the Beautiful, Especially in the Presentation of Philosophical Truths (1795), (in Weiss, op. cit., p. 177): 'Then the imagination will be brought into play much more by the popular exposition, but still only reproductively (renewing communicated representations), and not productively (demonstrating its self-creating power).' The distinction is also found in Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 86: 'If now, imagination must in the judgement of taste be regarded in its freedom . . . it is not taken as reproductive, as in its subjection to the laws of association, but as productive and exerting an activity of its own . . .'

11. Despite the clear similarities between Schiller and Kant here,

Savile (op. cit., p. 201 fn.), creates a false contrast between them : asserting that whereas Kant explains beauty in terms of the harmony of imagination and understanding, Schiller does so in terms of matter and form. In fact, however, Schiller does both : explaining the psychological process involved in creating and contemplating beauty in terms of the former harmony, and the phenomenological structure of the beautiful object in terms of the latter.

12. Schaper, 'Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Schiller' (op. cit., p. 162), denies that in the Aesthetic Letters Schiller ever uses a Cartesian mind/body dichotomy, but instead followed Kant's distinction between man's cognitive faculties of sense/and reason. However, in my view, in the earlier Letters Schiller operates the wider Cartesian duality between the rational and sensuous natures of man, and then in later Letters gradually moves to the lesser Kantian distinction of opposed cognitive faculties, in order to resolve the earlier duality. Even Schaper, when talking of the primary drives, relates one to 'man's animal nature', and the other to his 'spirit' (p. 163). Wilkinson & Willoughby, 'The Whole Man in Schiller's Theory of Culture and Society' (op. cit.), recognize that in the earlier Letters, it is not merely the faculty of sense, but man's physical being as such, that is involved. Thus they talk of '. . . his concept of an aesthetic mode . . . involving . . . the whole man, his physical being included' (p. 197).

13. Schiller sees this development as also due to man's increasing sociability, as he seeks to not merely please himself, but also others: 'Soon he is no longer content that things should please him; he himself wants to please. At first, indeed, only through that which is his; finally through that which he is ' (L27:5). We find the same idea of man's early activity of embellishment being related to his sociability and desire to please others, in Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, p. 155 (lines 17 ff.): At '. . . the beginning of civilization . . .' man is '. . . not quite satisfied with an object unless his feeling of delight in it can be shared in communion with others.' '. . . at first only charms, e.g. colours for painting oneself . . . or flowers, sea shells, beautifully coloured feathers, then in the course of time, also beautiful forms (as in canoes, wearing-apparel, etc.) . . .'

14. Cf. L4:6 (savage/barbarian distinction); L5:3-5 (two classes); L8:6 (intelligentsia of State and church).

15. Cf. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Introduction: '. . . between the realm of the natural concept, as the sensible, and the realm

of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed . . .' (p. 14). However, 'the play of the cognitive faculties whose harmonious accord contains the ground of [aesthetic] pleasure, makes the concept [of a finality of nature], in its consequences, a suitable mediating link connecting the realm of the concept of nature with that of the concept of freedom, as this accord at the same time promotes the sensibility of the mind for moral feeling' (p. 39). For Kant too, then, the aesthetic is able to relate the 'realms' of nature and freedom.

16. In which sensuous inclination/and rational moral duty are in harmony.

17. Cf. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (op. cit., para. 157): 'Civil society - an association of members as self-subsistent individuals . . .' 'Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system - the means to security of person and property - and by an external organization [the State] for attaining their particular and common interests.' Both Hegel and Schiller drew ideas concerning civil society from the Scottish political economist Adam Ferguson's An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), translated into German by C. Garve, 1768. See S. Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972), p. 141, fn. 28, on Hegel's study of Ferguson's essay. R. Plant, Hegel (op. cit.), talks of Schiller reading Ferguson's Essay (p. 21), and how in Germany there was a '. . . growing awareness, after about 1770, of the great works of the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment on the development of commercial society, particularly the writings of Adam Ferguson and John Millar, [which] provided them with a diagnosis of the contemporary malaise . . .' (p. 17). 'Ferguson was interested primarily in tracing the history of mankind from primitive simplicity to complicated refinement, but at the same time, did not forget the effects which this complicated refinement had on the character of the individual . . .' (p. 21). There is an '. . . humanistic critique of industrial society implicit in the work of Ferguson . . .' (p. 22), who unfavourably contrasted Greek wholeness with the effects of the modern division of labour.

18. Whether or not Schiller read Smith (The Wealth of Nations was published in 1776), Ferguson's views implicitly contain the 'invisible hand' idea, that the sum of individuals' activities mediately promote the common well-being. In his Essay (ed. D. Forbes, Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1966), we find Ferguson saying: '. . . the happiness of

individuals is the great end of civil society . . .' 'The interests of society, however, and of its members, are easily reconciled' (p. 58). 'The object in commerce is to make the individual rich; but the more he gains for himself, the more he augments the wealth of his country' (p. 144).

19. J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762), trans. G. D. H. Cole (Dent, 1973), pp. 184-186, 247-250. See my note 23 below.

20. As developed in L23.

21. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit., p. 239 (B266), 'The Postulates of Empirical Thought in General'. See also Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (George Allen & Unwin, 1969), pp. 542-550.

22. What is going on here, is that Schiller is criticizing the contemporary Natural State and its civil or commercial society, as the latter is governed by blind economic forces, whilst the former externally governs society by coercion and laws which lack moral status. The Moral State is basically Rousseau's political ideal (in The Social Contract), which, via the 'general will', is governed by positive laws which conform to the individual's moral will. But, the French Revolution demonstrated the failure of the Moral State to be realizable prior to men becoming predisposed to moral willing. Hence the need for an Aesthetic 'State' or society, of morally ennobled individuals to 'support' the Moral State. The principles of social life in each 'State', which Schiller presents here, can be seen as those described by Ferguson, Rousseau, and Schiller, respectively, (with Schiller attempting to render Rousseau's a realizable proposition).

23. Cf. Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, op. cit., p. 128: In civil society, 'the public interest is often secure, not because individuals are disposed to regard it as the end of their conduct, but because each, in his place, is determined to preserve his own. Liberty is maintained by the continued differences and oppositions of numbers, not by their concurring zeal on behalf of equitable government.' Such a 'concurring zeal' could be construed as Rousseau's 'general will', which establishes an 'equitable' authority, each individual is morally obliged to obey. (See Rousseau, The Social Contract, op. cit., p. 188.)

24. Although Rousseau wished to distinguish the general will from the will of all, and to make the former like a collective Kantian universal or rational willing, the way in which this will is established, viz. by a mass vote, turns it into a quantitative universality of 'allness'.

Thus, in The Social Contract, op. cit., Rousseau tells us: 'There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private interest into account, and is no more than the sum of particular wills . . .' (p. 185). But later, he admits '. . . the general will is found by counting votes' and that '. . . this presupposes, indeed, that all the qualities of the general will . . . reside in the majority . . .' (p. 250).

25. See e.g., Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, section 6, pp. 50-51 (universality based on disinterestedness); sections 20-22, pp. 82-85 (universality based on the common sense). Kant uses the expression 'subjectively universal' to mean that (delight) which is inter-subjectively universal (as distinct from a feeling which is purely subjective and private; or that which is logically, and thus objectively universal, by way of a concept).

26. Given that most of L27:10 is concerned with arguing for the inter-subjective universality of aesthetic pleasure, it is surprising to find Savile (op. cit., p. 201), saying that whereas Kant emphasizes the inter-subjectivity of aesthetic pleasure, Schiller considers only its intra-subjective aspect. Like Kant, Schiller is interested in both.

27. Kant, Critique of Judgement, op. cit., Part 1, sections 6-8, pp. 50-57, also compares the relative universality of sensuous, rational, and aesthetic experience (in terms, explicitly, of the universal validity of judgements concerning the 'agreeable', the 'good', and the 'beautiful', respectively).

28. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, op. cit., p. 129. 'Hence there is not the slightest ground in the moral law for a necessary connection between the morality and proportionate happiness of a being which belongs to the world as one of its parts and as thus dependent on it.' 'Nevertheless . . . such a connection is postulated as necessary . . .' (This leads Kant to postulate the existence of God, as '. . . a cause of the whole of nature, itself distinct from nature, which contains the ground of the exact coincidence of happiness and morality'.)

29. Cf. Schiller, On Naive and Sentimental Poetry (1795), (in Nisbet, op. cit.), where he does take empirical considerations into account, which might limit men's ability to universally respond to the aesthetic. 'The state of mind of most people is on the one hand intensive and exhausting labour, on the other, enervating indulgence.' '. . . nothing is more disadvantageous for sensitivity to the truly beautiful than both

these all-too-common frames of mind among men' (p. 221). A distinction between 'realist' and 'idealist' personality types (ibid., pp.224 ff.), can be seen as continuing, in a modified way, that between the 'savage' and 'barbarian', respectively, in the Aesthetic Letters. In the former division, Schiller recognizes a factor limiting the inter-subjective universality of taste: '. . . a very remarkable psychological antagonism among men . . . [that] is radical and based on inner mental dispositions . . . deprives the artist of all hope of pleasing and affecting universally . . .' (p. 224).

30. The ability of aesthetic experience to create consensus and social harmony, and to provide an escape from reality, are also found in Schiller, On The Stage As A Moral Institution (1784), (in Böhm, op. cit.): 'Opinions about government and classes might be reformed by the stage.' '. . . helping the nation to agree in opinions and inclinations.' '[The stage] unites all classes . . .' (p. 338). 'Men of all ranks, zones, and conditions . . . fraternize here in a universal sympathy, forget about the world . . .' (p. 339).

31. Cf. L21:4, L23:3.

32. Although it cannot determine the content of knowing or willing, the aesthetic can effect the psychological form in which they are carried out (or executed), by harmonizing reason and sense.

33. Continuing an analogy in L4:4, with its talk of the 'political artist' and the 'material on which he works'.

34. Regin (op. cit., p. 145), interprets these 'circles' in a narrow way, contrary to the egalitarian and democratic ideals Schiller has just expressed, as '. . . the courts of such enlightened rulers as Friedrich Christian and Karl August . . .'

35. Here, Schiller appears to be employing the formula Winckelmann used to characterize the finest Greek statues, especially the Laocoon group: 'noble simplicity and tranquil grandeur.' See Winckelmann, Thoughts on the Imitation of the Painting and Sculpture of the Greeks (1755), in Nisbet (ed. & trans.), op. cit., p. 42. As Nisbet points out in his introduction (p. 4), the formula 'encompasses moral and spiritual qualities' besides aesthetic attributes. Classical figures for Winckelmann (and Greek society for Schiller), represented '. . . an ideal of humanity, of human completeness . . .'

36. The general meanings of the terms 'dignity' and 'grace', are ascertained from Schiller's essay On Grace and Dignity (1793), in Böhn, op. cit., passim).

37. Regin (op. cit., p. 140), makes the Aesthetic State into a political State. Finding little evidence for this in the text, he criticizes Schiller for not providing a blue print for the State: without 'a viable constitution [the] Aesthetic State remained a beautiful but unfulfilled idea . . .' (p. 144). Willoughby (op. cit.), also sees the Aesthetic State as a political State, and admitting that there is not much support for this in the Aesthetic Letters, resorts (pp. 172-173) to Schiller's play Wilhelm Tell (1804) for evidence: '. . . it represents the corporate realization of an Aesthetic State . . .' (p. 172). However, his discussion of the play centres on the wholeness and balance in the character of Tell himself, and says little about his society or State. Reiss (op. cit.), takes the view that 'It is not helpful to argue that Schiller when speaking of the Aesthetic State does not envisage a political organization in all its details, but something much less specific, such as an ideal community of men . . .' (p. 39). '. . . the Aesthetic State is an ideal . . . of a peculiar kind . . . which must not be conceived in intellectual terms.' 'The Aesthetic State defies clear definitions, but can be intimated by poetic means' (pp. 39-40). Again, it is unconvincingly argued that 'Wilhelm Tell . . . supplies the missing conclusion and exemplification of the Aesthetic Letters . . .'(p. 40). The aim of establishing a Moral State is denied by Reiss. Apparently, in L4, Schiller 'dismissed [it] as a false aim of political endevour' (p. 41). The overall obscurity and confusion Reiss creates is finally blamed onto Schiller, who '. . . leaves us as far as the State is concerned with a poetic ambiguity . . .' (p. 42).

38. Kain (op. cit.), interprets the Aesthetic State as a political State beyond the Moral State, and asks 'what will move us on from the Rational to the Aesthetic State?' (p. 29).

39. Kain (op. cit., pp. 30-31), asserts that the Aesthetic State is a 'synthesis' of the Natural and Moral States.

40. Schaper, 'Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Schiller', (op. cit., p. 166), tells us that the Natural and Moral States '. . . are presented as having to be kept in balance, interacting and holding each other in check. If this can be achieved . . . a third State will emerge . . .' 'This is a parallel requirement of equilibrium' to that which 'dominates the middle Letters' (p. 166). Thus for Schaper, Schiller has an ideal political model involving the equilibrium of the Natural and Moral States in the Aesthetic State, that corresponds to

his ideal psychological model of an equilibrium of primary drives in the play-drive. Unfortunately, Schaper neither explains how the Natural State, based on blind forces, could co-exist and interact with the Moral State, governed by rational laws and moral principles, nor how the Aesthetic State could fit into this. Perhaps Schaper's view could work if the Aesthetic State is seen as a society of small groups which, in their specifically moral ethos, mediate between the selfish individualism fostered at the economic level of civil society, and the universal orientation demanded by the laws of the Moral State (thus functioning to fulfil the mediating and ethically educative role of corporations, between civil society and the ethical State, in Hegel's Philosophy of Right). However, to make Schaper's view plausible in this way, involves incorrectly identifying civil society (economic life), with the Natural State (its externally related political organization; cf. L5:4, L6:9), as being one and the same. It also involves the retrospective imposition of an Hegelian politico-ethical model onto Schiller. Most critically, we must remember that the Natural State is not to be mediated or held in 'equilibrium', but 'abolished' in Schiller's scheme, as a prelude to establishing the Moral State (cf. L3:4). Civil society itself, is to be retained, as necessary to man's physical existence (cf. L3:3 & 4), though it will be transformed by the indirect effect of the aesthetic on knowing and willing, as man determines himself from a wholistic and harmonious basis.

41. Willoughby (op. cit., p. 171), mistakenly criticizes Schiller for confusing the political Aesthetic State and the psychological aesthetic state. But, in the course of this criticism, Willoughby rightly recognizes the impossibility of a State based on the latter writ - large, as 'unthinkable' in its indeterminacy.

42. Cf. L20:3 (p. 141), L21:2 & 3.

43. Cf. L21:4, L23:3.

44. M. C. Beardsley (op. cit., p. 229), sees '. . . a deep ambivalence in Schiller's aesthetic theory, which he never resolved : whether the aesthetic condition . . . is merely transitional or truly final'. Kerry (Schiller's Writings on Aesthetics, op. cit., pp. 113, 120), thinks that Schiller makes the aesthetic eventually become 'an end in itself'. Kain (op. cit., p. 32), believes Schiller uses two inconsistent models of development : a) Natural-Aesthetic-Rational States (e.g., L3); b) Natural-Rational-Aesthetic States (e.g., L27). Grossman (op. cit., p. 47), asserts that there is a '. . . contradiction in Schiller's idea

of evolution', and sees a change from an earlier model of physical-aesthetic-moral stages of development, to a later one involving physical-moral-aesthetic stages (in L27).

CONCLUSION

1. Particularly in L5 & 6.
2. See L25:1 fn.
3. See L21:5 fn.
4. See L20:4 fn.: 'Everything which is capable of phenomenal manifestation . . .' may be contemplated and judged aesthetically.
5. See L22:1.
6. See L27:7.
7. See L21:5, for both the preparative and restorative roles of the aesthetic.
8. Schaper, 'Towards the Aesthetic : A Journey with Friedrich Schiller', (op. cit., p. 156), recognizes that '. . . the Letters . . . may support . . . a wider conception of the aesthetic than that which emerges from the mainstream of the tradition'. '. . . Schiller took it for granted that the role of the aesthetic has the utmost importance in our lives . . .' Schiller may be arguing the aesthetic is that '. . . through which ordinary living can be enhanced . . .' Wilkinson & Willoughby, 'The Whole Man in Schiller's Theory of Culture and Society', (op. cit., p. 197), also notice Schiller's wide and life-enhancing notion of the aesthetic: '. . . the aesthetic . . . manifests itself, not [merely] in the conscious contemplation of art or beauty, but subliminally or unconsciously, as a mode of mental activity indispensible to the efficient functioning of each and all our determinate activities . . .'
9. H. Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension (Macmillan, 1979).
10. W. Benjamin, 'The Author as Producer', (in Understanding Brecht, trans. Bostock, New Left Books, 1973).
11. The logic of efficiency governing the general productive process, would render aesthetic semblance 'dependent', as serving an extraneous end.
12. Schiller had a lifelong interest in social and political reform, which is traced by W. Witte (op. cit.), who provides concise accounts of the political dimension in each of Schiller's plays.
13. The sublime here, is used to refer to those aesthetic experiences which induce both aesthetic pleasure and intellectual pain, accompanied

by an intensified self-awareness. In the aesthetically sensitive and socially aware individual, most aesthetic experiences (of sufficient quality and duration), may have such a sublime effect.

14. Aesthetic experience will not itself directly disclose the specific causes of our dissatisfaction with existence, only induce an immediate post-aesthetic 'unhappy consciousness', that may motivate us to commence the search for such causes.

15. Many of the socio-economic policies that have been pursued by western governments, have had their ultimate ideological justification in the economic theories of J. M. Keynes or Milton Friedman.

16. W. Witte (op. cit., pp. 288-297), thinks it would be going too far to describe Schiller as a revolutionary in method or aim. However, I would suggest, that whilst Schiller may have rejected revolutionary direct action as a method (following his disillusionment with the course of the French Revolution), he nevertheless hoped that the powerful indirect effect of the aesthetic would achieve reform of a fundamental and wide ranging nature. One could say that Schiller saw the aesthetic as providing a mode of revolutionary indirect action, to achieve a revolutionary aim : the abolition of the contemporary (Natural) State. Wilkinson & Willoughby, 'The Whole Man in Schiller's Theory of Culture and Society', (op. cit., pp. 196-197), recognize that in the Aesthetic Letters, '. . . the revolutionary of his youth was by no means dead within him', and that '. . . he saw art as profoundly subversive of established order . . .'

17. We can distinguish Schiller's theory of aesthetic experience in itself (which is largely Kantian in character), from his own wide view of how it relates to other domains of experience.

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